The Madhyamika or the S'untavada school.—Nihilism.

Candrakirtti, the commentator of Nagarjuna's verses known as "Madhyamika karika," in explaining the doctrine of dependent origination (pratityasamutpada) as described by Nagarjuna starts with two interpretations of the word. According to one the word pratityasamutpada means the origination (utpada) of the nonexistent (abhava) depending on (pratitya) reasons and causes



[Footnote 1: As I have no access to the Chinese translation of As'vagho@sa's S'raddhotpada S'astra, I had to depend entirely on Suzuki's expressions as they appear in his translation.]

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(hetupratyaya). According to the other interpretation pratitya means each and every destructible individual and pratityasamutpada means the origination of each and every destructible individual. But he disapproves of both these meanings. The second meaning does not suit the context in which the Pali Scriptures generally speak of pratityasamutpada (e.g. cak@su@h pratitya rupani ca utpadyante cak@survijnanam) for it does not mean the origination of each and every destructible individual, but the originating of specific individual phenomena (e.g. perception of form by the operation in connection with the eye) depending upon certain specific conditions.

The first meaning also is equally unsuitable. Thus for example if we take the case of any origination, e.g. that of the visual percept, we see that there cannot be any contact between visual knowledge and physical sense, the eye, and so it would not be intelligible that the former should depend upon the latter. If we interpret the maxim of pratityasamutpada as this happening that happens, that would not explain any specific origination. All origination is false, for a thing can neither originate by itself nor by others, nor by a co-operation of both nor without any reason. For if a thing exists already it cannot originate again by itself. To suppose that it is originated by others would also mean that the origination was of a thing already existing. If again without any further qualification it is said that depending on one the other comes into being, then depending on anything any other thing could come into being—from light we could have darkness! Since a thing could not originate from itself or by others, it could not also be originated by a combination of both of them together. A thing also could not originate without any cause, for then all things could come into being at all times. It is therefore to be acknowledged that wherever the Buddha spoke of this so-called dependent origination (pratityasamutpada) it was referred to as illusory manifestations appearing to intellects and senses stricken with ignorance. This dependent origination is not thus a real law, but only an appearance due to ignorance (avidya). The only thing which is not lost (amo@sadharma) is nirva@na; but all other forms of knowledge and phenomena (sa@mskara) are false and are lost with their appearances (sarvasa@mskaras'ca m@r@samo@sadharma@na@h).

It is sometimes objected to this doctrine that if all appearances

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are false, then they do not exist at all. There are then no good or bad works and no cycle of existence, and if such is the case, then it may be argued that no philosophical discussion should be attempted. But the reply to such an objection is that the nihilistic doctrine is engaged in destroying the misplaced confidence of the people that things are true. Those who are really wise do not find anything either false or true, for to them clearly they do not exist at all and they do not trouble themselves with the question of their truth or falsehood. For him who knows thus there are neither works nor cycles of births (sa@msara) and also he does not trouble himself about the existence or non-existence of any of the appearances. Thus it is said in the Ratnaku@tasutra that howsoever carefully one may search one cannot discover consciousness (citta); what cannot be perceived cannot be said to exist, and what does not exist is neither past, nor future, nor present, and as such it cannot be said to have any nature at all; and that which has no nature is subject neither to origination nor to extinction. He who through his false knowledge (viparyyasa) does not comprehend the falsehood of all appearances, but thinks them to be real, works and suffers the cycles of rebirth (sa@msara). Like all illusions, though false these appearances can produce all the harm of rebirth and sorrow.

It may again be objected that if there is nothing true according to the nihilists (s'unyavadins), then their statement that there is no origination or extinction is also not true. Candrakirtti in replying to this says that with s'unyavadins the truth is absolute silence. When the S'unyavadin sages argue, they only accept for the moment what other people regard as reasons, and deal with them in their own manner to help them to come to a right comprehension of all appearances. It is of no use to say, in spite of all arguments tending to show the falsehood of all appearances, that they are testified by our experience, for the whole thing that we call "our experience" is but false illusion inasmuch as these phenomena have no true essence.

When the doctrine of pratityasamutpada is described as "this being that is," what is really meant is that things can only be indicated as mere appearances one after another, for they have no essence or true nature. Nihilism (s'unyavada) also means just this. The true meaning of pratityasamutpada or s'unyavada is this, that there is no truth, no essence in all phenomena that

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appear [Footnote ref 1]. As the phenomena have no essence they are neither produced nor destroyed; they really neither come nor go. They are merely the appearance of maya or illusion. The void (s'unya) does not mean pure negation, for that is relative to some kind of position. It simply means that none of the appearances have any intrinsic nature of their own (ni@hsvabhavatvam).

The Madhyamaka or S'unya system does not hold that anything has any essence or nature (svabhava) of its own; even heat cannot be said to be the essence of fire; for both the heat and the fire are the result of the combination of many conditions, and what depends on many conditions cannot be said to be the nature or essence of the thing. That alone may be said to be the true essence or nature of anything which does not depend on anything else, and since no such essence or nature can be pointed out which stands independently by itself we cannot say that it exists. If a thing has no essence or existence of its own, we cannot affirm the essence of other things to it (parabhava). If we cannot affirm anything of anything as positive, we cannot consequently assert anything of anything as negative. If anyone first believes in things positive and afterwards discovers that they are not so, he no doubt thus takes his stand on a negation (abhava), but in reality since we cannot speak of anything positive, we cannot speak of anything negative either [Footnote ref 2].

It is again objected that we nevertheless perceive a process going on. To this the Madhyamaka reply is that a process of change could not be affirmed of things that are permanent. But we can hardly speak of a process with reference to momentary things; for those which are momentary are destroyed the next moment after they appear, and so there is nothing which can continue to justify a process. That which appears as being neither comes from anywhere nor goes anywhere, and that which appears as destroyed also does not come from anywhere nor go anywhere, and so a process (sa@msara) cannot be affirmed of them. It cannot be that when the second moment arose, the first moment had suffered a change in the process, for it was not the same as the second, as there is no so-called cause-effect connection. In fact there being no relation between the two, the temporal determination as prior and later is wrong. The supposition that there is a self which suffers changes is also not valid, for howsoever we

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[Footnote 1: See Madhyamikav@rtti (B.T.S.), p. 50.]

[Footnote 2: Ibid. pp. 93-100.]

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may search we find the five skandhas but no self. Moreover if the soul is a unity it cannot undergo any process or progression, for that would presuppose that the soul abandons one character and takes up another at the same identical moment which is inconceivable [Footnote ref 1].

But then again the question arises that if there is no process, and no cycle of worldly existence of thousands of afflictions, what is then the nirva@na which is described as the final extinction of all afflictions (kles'a)? To this the Madhyamaka reply is that it does not agree to such a definition of nirva@na. Nirva@na on the Madhyamaka theory is the absence of the essence of all phenomena, that which cannot be conceived either as anything which has ceased or as anything which is produced (aniruddham anntpannam}. In nirva@na all phenomena are lost; we say that the phenomena cease to exist in nirva@na, but like the illusory snake in the rope they never existed [Footnote ref 2]. Nirva@na cannot be any positive thing or any sort of state of being (bhava), for all positive states or things are joint products of combined causes (sa@msk@rta) and are liable to decay and destruction. Neither can it be a negative existence, for since we cannot speak of any positive existence, we cannot speak of a negative existence either. The appearances or the phenomena are communicated as being in a state of change and process coming one after another, but beyond that no essence, existence, or truth can be affirmed of them. Phenomena sometimes appear to be produced and sometimes to be destroyed, but they cannot be determined as existent or non-existent. Nirva@na is merely the cessation of the seeming phenomenal flow (prapancaprav@rtti). It cannot therefore be designated either as positive or as negative for these conceptions belong to phenomena (na caprav@rttimatram bhavabhaveti parikalpitum paryyate evam na bhavabhavanirva@nam, M.V. 197). In this state there is nothing which is known, and even the knowledge that the phenomena have ceased to appear is not found. Even the Buddha himself is a phenomenon, a mirage or a dream, and so are all his teachings [Footnote ref 3].

It is easy to see that in this system there cannot exist any bondage or emancipation; all phenomena are like shadows, like the mirage, the dream, the maya, and the magic without any real nature (ni@hsvabhava). It is mere false knowledge to suppose that



[Footnote 1: See Madhyamikav@rtti (B.T.S.), pp. 101-102.]

[Footnote 2: Ibid. p. 194.]

[Footnote 3: Ibid. pp.162 and 201.]

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one is trying to win a real nirva@na [Footnote ref 1]. It is this false egoism that is to be considered as avidya. When considered deeply it is found that there is not even the slightest trace of any positive existence. Thus it is seen that if there were no ignorance (avidya), there would have been no conformations (sa@mskaras), and if there were no conformations there would have been no consciousness, and so on; but it cannot be said of the ignorance "I am generating the sa@mskaras," and it can be said of the sa@mskaras "we are being produced by the avidya." But there being avidya, there come the sa@mskaras and so on with other categories too. This character of the pratityasamutpada is known as the coming of the consequent depending on an antecedent reason (hetupanibandha).

It can be viewed from another aspect, namely that of dependence on conglomeration or combination (pratyayopanibandh). It is by the combination (samavaya) of the four elements, space (akas'a) and consciousness (vijnana) that a man is made. It is due to earth (p@rthivi) that the body becomes solid, it is due to water that there is fat in the body, it is due to fire that there is digestion, it is due to wind that there is respiration; it is due to akas'a that there is porosity, and it is due to vijnana that there is mind-consciousness. It is by their mutual combination that we find a man as he is. But none of these elements think that they have done any of the functions that are considered to be allotted to them. None of these are real substances or beings or souls. It is by ignorance that these are thought of as existents and attachment is generated for them. Through ignorance thus come the sa@mskaras, consisting of attachment, antipathy and thoughtlessness (raga, dve@sa, moha); from these proceed the vijnana and the four skandhas. These with the four elements bring about name and form (namarupa), from these proceed the senses (@sa@dayatana), from the coming together of those three comes contact (spars'a); from that feelings, from that comes desire (tr@s@na) and so on. These flow on like the stream of a river, but there is no essence or truth behind them all or as the ground of them all [Footnote ref 2]. The phenomena therefore cannot be said to be either existent or non-existent, and no truth can be affirmed of either eternalism (s'as'vatavada) or nihilism (ucchedavada), and it is for this reason



[Footnote 1: See Madhyamikav@rtti (B.T.S.), pp. 101-108.]

[Footnote: Ibid. pp. 209-211, quoted from Salistambhasutra. Vacaspatimis'ra also quotes this passage in his Bhamati on S'a@nkara's Brahma-sutra.]

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that this doctrine is called the middle doctrine (madhyamaka) [Footnote ref 1]. Existence and non-existence have only a relative truth (samv@rtisatya) in them, as in all phenomena, but there is no true reality (paramarthasatya) in them or anything else. Morality plays as high a part in this nihilistic system as it does in any other Indian system. I quote below some stanzas from Nagarjuna's Suk@rllekha as translated by Wenzel (P.T.S. 1886) from the Tibetan translation.

6. Knowing that riches are unstable and void (asara) give according to the moral precepts, to Bhikshus, Brahmins, the poor and friends for there is no better friend than giving.

7. Exhibit morality (s'ila) faultless and sublime, unmixed and spotless, for morality is the supporting ground of all eminence, as the earth is of the moving and immovable.

8. Exercise the imponderable, transcendental virtues of charity, morality, patience, energy, meditation, and likewise wisdom, in order that, having reached the farther shore of the sea of existence, you may become a Jina prince.

9. View as enemies, avarice (matsaryya), deceit (s'a@thya), duplicity (maya), lust, indolence (kausidya), pride (mana), greed (raga), hatred (dve@sa) and pride (mada) concerning family, figure, glory, youth, or power.

15. Since nothing is so difficult of attainment as patience, open no door for anger; the Buddha has pronounced that he who renounces anger shall attain the degree of an anagamin (a saint who never suffers rebirth).

21. Do not look after another's wife; but if you see her, regard her, according to age, like your mother, daughter or sister.

24. Of him who has conquered the unstable, ever moving objects of the six senses and him who has overcome the mass of his enemies in battle, the wise praise the first as the greater hero.

29. Thou who knowest the world, be equanimous against the eight worldly conditions, gain and loss, happiness and suffering, fame and dishonour, blame and praise, for they are not objects for your thoughts.

37. But one (a woman) that is gentle as a sister, winning as a friend, careful of your well being as a mother, obedient as a servant her (you must) honour as the guardian god(dess) of the family.

40. Always perfectly meditate on (turn your thoughts to) kindness, pity, joy and indifference; then if you do not obtain a higher degree you (certainly) will obtain the happiness of Brahman's world (brahmavihara).

41. By the four dhyanas completely abandoning desire (kama), reflection (vicara), joy (priti), and happiness and pain (sukha, du@hkha) you will obtain as fruit the lot of a Brahman.

49. If you say "I am not the form, you thereby will understand I am not endowed with form, I do not dwell in form, the form does not dwell in me; and in like manner you will understand the voidness of the other four aggregates."

50. The aggregates do not arise from desire, nor from time, nor from



[Footnote 1: See Madhyamikav@rtti (B.T.S.), p. 160.]

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nature (prak@rti), not from themselves (svabhavat), nor from the Lord (is'vara), nor yet are they without cause; know that they arise from ignorance (avidya) and desire (t@r@s@na).

51. Know that attachment to religious ceremonies (s'ilabrataparamars'a), wrong views (mithyad@r@s@ti) and doubt (vicikitsa) are the three fetters.

53. Steadily instruct yourself (more and more) in the highest morality, the highest wisdom and the highest thought, for the hundred and fifty one rules (of the pratimok@sa) are combined perfectly in these three.

58. Because thus (as demonstrated) all this is unstable (anitya) without substance (anatma) without help (as'ara@na) without protector (anatha) and without abode (asthana) thou O Lord of men must become discontented with this worthless (asara) kadali-tree of the orb.

104. If a fire were to seize your head or your dress you would extinguish and subdue it, even then endeavour to annihilate desire, for there is no other higher necessity than this.

105. By morality, knowledge and contemplation, attain the spotless dignity of the quieting and the subduing nirva@na not subject to age, death or decay, devoid of earth, water, fire, wind, sun and moon.

107. Where there is no wisdom (prajna) there is also no contemplation (dhyana), where there is no contemplation there is also no wisdom; but know that for him who possesses these two the sea of existence is like a grove.

Uncompromising Idealism or the School of Vijnanavada Buddhism.

The school of Buddhist philosophy known as the Vijnanavada or Yogacara has often been referred to by such prominent teachers of Hindu thought as Kumarila and S'a@nkara. It agrees to a great extent with the S'unyavadins whom we have already described. All the dharmas (qualities and substances) are but imaginary constructions of ignorant minds. There is no movement in the so-called external world as we suppose, for it does not exist. We construct it ourselves and then are ourselves deluded that it exists by itself (nirmmitapratimohi) [Footnote ref 1]. There are two functions involved in our consciousness, viz. that which holds the perceptions (khyati vijnana), and that which orders them by imaginary constructions (vastuprativikalpavijnana). The two functions however mutually determine each other and cannot be separately distinguished (abhinnalak@sa@ne anyonyahetuke). These functions are set to work on account of the beginningless instinctive tendencies inherent in them in relation to the world of appearance (anadikala-prapanca-vasanahetukanca) [Footnote ref 2].

All sense knowledge can be stopped only when the diverse

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[Footnote 1: Lankavatarasutra, pp. 21-22.]

[Footnote 2 Ibid. p. 44.]

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unmanifested instincts of imagination are stopped (abhuta-parikalpa-vasana-vaicitra-nirodha) [Footnote ref 1]. All our phenomenal knowledge is without any essence or truth (nihsvabhava) and is but a creation of maya, a mirage or a dream. There is nothing which may be called external, but all is the imaginary creation of the mind (svacitta), which has been accustomed to create imaginary appearances from beginningless time. This mind by whose movement these creations take place as subject and object has no appearance in itself and is thus without any origination, existence and extinction (utpadasthitibha@ngavarjjam) and is called the alayavijnana. The reason why this alayavijnana itself is said to be without origination, existence, and extinction is probably this, that it is always a hypothetical state which merely explains all the phenomenal states that appear, and therefore it has no existence in the sense in which the term is used and we could not affirm any special essence of it.

We do not realize that all visible phenomena are of nothing external but of our own mind (svacitta), and there is also the beginningless tendency for believing and creating a phenomenal world of appearance. There is also the nature of knowledge (which takes things as the perceiver and the perceived) and there is also the instinct in the mind to experience diverse forms. On account of these four reasons there are produced in the alayavijnana (mind) the ripples of our sense experiences (prav@rttivijnana) as in a lake, and these are manifested as sense experiences. All the five skandhas called panchavijnanakaya thus appear in a proper synthetic form. None of the phenomenal knowledge that appears is either identical or different from the alayavijnana just as the waves cannot be said to be either identical or different from the ocean. As the ocean dances on in waves so the citta or the alayavijnana is also dancing as it were in its diverse operations (v@rtti). As citta it collects all movements (karma) within it, as manas it synthesizes (vidhiyate) and as vijnana it constructs the fivefold perceptions (vijnanan vijanati d@rs'yam kalpate pancabhi@h) [Footnote ref 2].

It is only due to maya (illusion) that the phenomena appear in their twofold aspect as subject and object. This must always be regarded as an appearance (samv@rtisatyata) whereas in the real aspect we could never say whether they existed (bhava) or did not exist [Footnote ref 3].

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[Footnote 1: Pancavatarasutra, p. 44.]

[Footnote 2: Ibid., pp. 50-55.]

[Footnote 3: Asa@nga's Mahayanasutrala@mkara, pp. 58-59.]

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All phenomena both being and non-being are illusory (sadasanta@h mayopama@h). When we look deeply into them we find that there is an absolute negation of all appearances, including even all negations, for they are also appearances. This would make the ultimate truth positive. But this is not so, for it is that in which the positive and negative are one and the same (bhavabhavasamanata) [Footnote ref 1]. Such a state which is complete in itself and has no name and no substance had been described in the La@nkavatarasutra as thatness (tathata) [Footnote ref 2]. This state is also described in another place in the La@nkavatara as voidness (s'unyata) which is one and has no origination and no essence [Footnote ref 3]. In another place it is also designated as tathagatagarbha [Footnote ref 4].

It may be supposed that this doctrine of an unqualified ultimate truth comes near to the Vedantic atman or Brahman like the tathata doctrine of As'vagho@sa; and we find in La@nkavatara that Rava@na asks the Buddha "How can you say that your doctrine of tathagatagarbha was not the same as the atman doctrine of the other schools of philosophers, for those heretics also consider the atman as eternal, agent, unqualified, all pervading and unchanged?" To this the Buddha is found to reply thus—"Our doctrine is not the same as the doctrine of those heretics; it is in consideration of the fact that the instruction of a philosophy which considered that there was no soul or substance in anything (nairatmya) would frighten the disciples, that I say that all things are in reality the tathagatagarbha. This should not be regarded as atman. Just as a lump of clay is made into various shapes, so it is the non-essential nature of all phenomena and their freedom from all characteristics (sarvavikalpalak@sa@navinivrttam) that is variously described as the garbha or the nairatmya (essencelessness). This explanation of tathagatagarbha as the ultimate truth and reality is given in order to attract to our creed those heretics who are superstitiously inclined to believe in the atman doctrine [Footnote ref 5]."

So far as the appearance of the phenomena was concerned, the idealistic Buddhists (vijnanavadins) agreed to the doctrine of pratityasamutpada with certain modifications. There was with them an external pratityasamutpada just as it appeared in the

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[Footnote 1: Asa@nga's Mahayanasutrala@mkara, p. 65.]

[Footnote 2: Lankavatarasutra, p. 70.]

[Footnote 3: Ibid. p. 78.]

[Footnote 4: Ibid. p. 80.]

[Footnote 5: Ibid. pp. 80-81.]

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objective aspect and an internal pratityasamutpada. The external pratityasamutpada (dependent origination) is represented in the way in which material things (e.g. a jug) came into being by the co-operation of diverse elements—the lump of clay, the potter, the wheel, etc. The internal (adhyatmika) pratityasamutpada was represented by avidya, t@r@s@na, karma, the skandhas, and the ayatanas produced out of them [Footnote ref 1].

Our understanding is composed of two categories called the pravichayabuddhi and the vikalpalak@sa@nagrahabhinives'aprati@s@thapikabuddhi. The pravicayabuddhi is that which always seeks to take things in either of the following four ways, that they are either this or the other (ekatvanyaiva); either both or not both (ubhayanubhaya), either are or are not (astinasti), either eternal or non-eternal (nityanitya). But in reality none of these can be affirmed of the phenomena. The second category consists of that habit of the mind by virtue of which it constructs diversities and arranges them (created in their turn by its own constructive activity—parikalpa) in a logical order of diverse relations of subject and predicate, causal and other relations. He who knows the nature of these two categories of the mind knows that there is no external world of matter and that they are all experienced only in the mind. There is no water, but it is the sense construction of smoothness (sneha) that constructs the water as an external substance; it is the sense construction of activity or energy that constructs the external substance of fire; it is the sense construction of movement that constructs the external substance of air. In this way through the false habit of taking the unreal as the real (mithyasatyabhinives'a) five skandhas appear. If these were to appear all together, we could not speak of any kind of causal relations, and if they appeared in succession there could be no connection between them, as there is nothing to bind them together. In reality there is nothing which is produced or destroyed, it is only our constructive imagination that builds up things as perceived with all their relations, and ourselves as perceivers. It is simply a convention (vyavahara) to speak of things as known [Footnote ref 2]. Whatever we designate by speech is mere speech-construction (vagvikalpa) and unreal. In speech one could not speak of anything without relating things in some kind of causal



[Footnote 1: La@nkavatarasutra, p. 85.]

[Footnote 2: Lankavatarasutra, p. 87, compare the term "vyavaharika" as used of the phenomenal and the conventional world in almost the same sense by S'a@nkara.]

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relation, but none of these characters may be said to be true; the real truth (paramartha) can never be referred to by such speech-construction.

The nothingness (s'unyata) of things may be viewed from seven aspects—(1) that they are always interdependent, and hence have no special characteristics by themselves, and as they cannot be determined in themselves they cannot be determined in terms of others, for, their own nature being undetermined, a reference to an "other" is also undetermined, and hence they are all indefinable (laksanas'unyata); (2) that they have no positive essence (bhavasvabhavas'unyata), since they spring up from a natural non-existence (svabhavabhavotpatti); (3) that they are of an unknown type of non-existence (apracaritas'unyata), since all the skandhas vanish in the nirvana; (4) that they appear phenomenally as connected though non-existent (pracaritas'unyata), for their skandhas have no reality in themselves nor are they related to others, but yet they appear to be somehow causally connected; (5) that none of the things can be described as having any definite nature, they are all undemonstrable by language (nirabhilapyas'unyata); (6) that there cannot be any knowledge about them except that which is brought about by the long-standing defects of desires which pollute all our vision; (7) that things are also non-existent in the sense that we affirm them to be in a particular place and time in which they are not (itaretaras'unyata).

There is thus only non-existence, which again is neither eternal nor destructible, and the world is but a dream and a maya; the two kinds of negation (nirodha) are akas'a (space) and nirvana; things which are neither existent nor non-existent are only imagined to be existent by fools.

This view apparently comes into conflict with the doctrine of this school, that the reality is called the tathagatagarbha (the womb of all that is merged in thatness) and all the phenomenal appearances of the clusters (skandhas), elements (dhatus), and fields of sense operation (ayatanas) only serve to veil it with impurities, and this would bring it nearer to the assumption of a universal soul as the reality. But the La@nkavatara attempts to explain away this conflict by suggesting that the reference to the tathagatagarbha as the reality is only a sort of false bait to attract those who are afraid of listening to the nairatmya (non-soul doctrine) [Footnote ref 1].



[Footnote 1: La@nkavatarasutra, p. 80.

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The Bodhisattvas may attain their highest by the fourfold knowledge of (1) svacittad@rs'hyabhavana, (2) utpadasthitibha@ngavivarjjanata, (3) bahyabhavabhavopalak@sa@nata and (4) svapratyaryyajnanadhigamabhinnalak@sa@nata. The first means that all things are but creations of the imagination of one's mind. The second means that as things have no essence there is no origination, existence or destruction. The third means that one should know the distinctive sense in which all external things are said either to be existent or non-existent, for their existence is merely like the mirage which is produced by the beginningless desire (vasana) of creating and perceiving the manifold. This brings us to the fourth one, which means the right comprehension of the nature of all things.

The four dhyanas spoken of in the Lankavatara seem to be different from those which have been described in connection with the Theravada Buddhism. These dhyanas are called (1) balopacarika, (2) arthapravichaya, (3) tathatalambana and (4) tathagata. The first one is said to be that practised by the s'ravakas and the pratyekabuddhas. It consists in concentrating upon the doctrine that there is no soul (pudgalanairatmya), and that everything is transitory, miserable and impure. When considering all things in this way from beginning to end the sage advances on till all conceptual knowing ceases (asa@mjnanirodhat); we have what is called the valopacarika dhyana (the meditation for beginners).

The second is the advanced state where not only there is full consciousness that there is no self, but there is also the comprehension that neither these nor the doctrines of other heretics may be said to exist, and that there is none of the dharmas that appears. This is called the arthapravicayadhyana, for the sage concentrates here on the subject of thoroughly seeking out (pravichaya) the nature of all things (artha).

The third dhyana, that in which the mind realizes that the thought that there is no self nor that there are the appearances, is itself the result of imagination and thus lapses into the thatness (tathata). This dhyana is called tathatalambana, because it has for its object tathata or thatness.

The last or the fourth dhyana is that in which the lapse of the mind into the state of thatness is such that the nothingness and incomprehensibility of all phenomena is perfectly realized;

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and nirvana is that in which all root desires (vasana) manifesting themselves in knowledge are destroyed and the mind with knowledge and perceptions, making false creations, ceases to work. This cannot be called death, for it will not have any rebirth and it cannot be called destruction, for only compounded things (sa@msk@rta) suffer destruction, so that it is different from either death or destruction. This nirvana is different from that of the s'ravakas and the pratyekabuddhas for they are satisfied to call that state nirva@na, in which by the knowledge of the general characteristics of all things (transitoriness and misery) they are not attached to things and cease to make erroneous judgments [Footnote ref 1].

Thus we see that there is no cause (in the sense of ground) of all these phenomena as other heretics maintain. When it is said that the world is maya or illusion, what is meant to be emphasized is this, that there is no cause, no ground. The phenomena that seem to originate, stay, and be destroyed are mere constructions of tainted imagination, and the tathata or thatness is nothing but the turning away of this constructive activity or nature of the imagination (vikalpa) tainted with the associations of beginningless root desires (vasana) [Footnote ref 2]. The tathata has no separate reality from illusion, but it is illusion itself when the course of the construction of illusion has ceased. It is therefore also spoken of as that which is cut off or detached from the mind (cittavimukta), for here there is no construction of imagination (sarvakalpanavirahitam) [Footnote ref 3].

Sautrantika Theory of Perception.

Dharmottara (847 A.D.), a commentator of Dharmakirtti's [Footnote ref 4] (about 635 A.D.) Nyayabindu, a Sautrantika logical and epistemological work, describes right knowledge (samyagjnana) as an invariable antecedent to the accomplishment of all that a man

___________

[Footnote 1: Lankavatarasutra, p. 100.]

[Footnote 2: Ibid. p. 109.]

[Footnote 3: This account of the Vijnanavada school is collected mainly from Lankavatarasutra, as no other authentic work of the Vijnanavada school is available. Hindu accounts and criticisms of this school may be had in such books as Kumarila's S'loka varttika or S'a@nkara's bhasya, II. ii, etc. Asak@nga's Mahayanasutralamkara deals more with the duties concerning the career of a saint (Bodhisattva) than with the metaphysics of the system.]

[Footnote 4: Dharmakirtti calls himself an adherent of Vijnanavada in his Santanantarasiddhi, a treatise on solipsism, but his Nyayabindu seems rightly to have been considered by the author of Nyayabindu@tika@tippani (p. 19) as being written from the Sautrantika point of view.]

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desires to have (samyagjnanapurvika sarvapuru@sarthasiddhi) [Footnote ref 1]. When on proceeding, in accordance with the presentation of any knowledge, we get a thing as presented by it we call it right knowledge. Right knowledge is thus the knowledge by which one can practically acquire the thing he wants to acquire (arthadhigati). The process of knowledge, therefore, starts with the perceptual presentation and ends with the attainment of the thing represented by it and the fulfilment of the practical need by it (arthadhigamat samapta@h prama@navyaparah). Thus there are three moments in the perceptual acquirement of knowledge: (1) the presentation, (2) our prompting in accordance with it, and (3) the final realization of the object in accordance with our endeavour following the direction of knowledge. Inference is also to be called right knowledge, as it also serves our practical need by representing the presence of objects in certain connections and helping us to realize them. In perception this presentation is direct, while in inference this is brought about indirectly through the li@nga (reason). Knowledge is sought by men for the realization of their ends, and the subject of knowledge is discussed in philosophical works only because knowledge is sought by men. Any knowledge, therefore, which will not lead us to the realization of the object represented by it could not be called right knowledge. All illusory perceptions, therefore, such as the perception of a white conch-shell as yellow or dream perceptions, are not right knowledge, since they do not lead to the realization of such objects as are presented by them. It is true no doubt that since all objects are momentary, the object which was perceived at the moment of perception was not the same as that which was realized at a later moment. But the series of existents which started with the first perception of a blue object finds itself realized by the realization of other existents of the same series (niladau ya eva santana@h paricchinno nilajnanena sa eva tena prapita@h tena nilajnanam prama@nam) [Footnote ref 2].

When it is said that right knowledge is an invariable antecedent of the realization of any desirable thing or the retarding of any undesirable thing, it must be noted that it is not meant



[Footnote 1: Brief extracts from the opinions of two other commentators of Nyayaybindu, Vinitadeva and S'antabhadra (seventh century), are found in Nyayabindu@tikatippani, a commentary of Nyayabindutika of Dharmmottara, but their texts are not available to us.]

[Footnote 2: Nyayabindu@tika@tippani, p. 11.]

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that right knowledge is directly the cause of it; for, with the rise of any right perception, there is a memory of past experiences, desire is aroused, through desire an endeavour in accordance with it is launched, and as a result of that there is realization of the object of desire. Thus, looked at from this point of view, right knowledge is not directly the cause of the realization of the object. Right knowledge of course directly indicates the presentation, the object of desire, but so far as the object is a mere presentation it is not a subject of enquiry. It becomes a subject of enquiry only in connection with our achieving the object presented by perception.

Perception (pratyaks'a) has been defined by Dharmakirtti as a presentation, which is generated by the objects alone, unassociated by any names or relations (kalpana) and which is not erroneous (kalpanapo@dhamabhrantam) [Footnote ref 1]. This definition does not indeed represent the actual nature (svarupa) of perception, but only shows the condition which must be fulfilled in order that anything may be valid perception. What is meant by saying that a perception is not erroneous is simply this, that it will be such that if one engages himself in an endeavour in accordance with it, he will not be baffled in the object which was presented to him by his perception (tasmadgrahye arthe vasturupe yadaviparyastam tadabhrantamiha veditavyam}. It is said that a right perception could not be associated with names (kalpana or abhilapa). This qualification is added only with a view of leaving out all that is not directly generated by the object. A name is given to a thing only when it is associated in the mind, through memory, as being the same as perceived before. This cannot, therefore, be regarded as being produced by the object of perception. The senses present the objects by coming in contact with them, and the objects also must of necessity allow themselves to be presented as they are when they are in contact with the proper senses. But the work of recognition or giving names is not what is directly produced by the objects themselves, for this involves the unification of previous experiences, and this is certainly not what is presented



[Footnote 1: The definition first given in the Pramanasamucaya (not available in Sanskrit) of Di@nnaga (500 A.D.) was "Kalpanapodham." According to Dharmakirtti it is the indeterminate knowledge (nirvikalpa jnana) consisting only of the copy of the object presented to the senses that constitutes the valid element presented to perception. The determinate knowledge (savikalpa jnana), as formed by the conceptual activity of the mind identifying the object with what has been experienced before, cannot be regarded as truly representing what is really presented to the senses.]

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to the sense (purvad@r@s@taparad@r@s@tancarthamekikurvadvijnanamasannihitavi@sayam purvad@r@s@tasyasannihitatvat). In all illusory perceptions it is the sense which is affected either by extraneous or by inherent physiological causes. If the senses are not perverted they are bound to present the object correctly. Perception thus means the correct presentation through the senses of an object in its own uniqueness as containing only those features which are its and its alone (svalak@sa@nam). The validity of knowledge consists in the sameness that it has with the objects presented by it (arthena saha yatsarupyam sad@rs'yamasya jnanasya tatprama@namiha). But the objection here is that if our percept is only similar to the external object then this similarity is a thing which is different from the presentation, and thus perception becomes invalid. But the similarity is not different from the percept which appears as being similar to the object. It is by virtue of their sameness that we refer to the object by the percept (taditi sarupyam tasya vas'at) and our perception of the object becomes possible. It is because we have an awareness of blueness that we speak of having perceived a blue object. The relation, however, between the notion of similarity of the perception with the blue object and the indefinite awareness of blue in perception is not one of causation but of a determinant and a determinate (vyavasthapyavyavasthapakabhavena). Thus it is the same cognition which in one form stands as signifying the similarity with the object of perception and is in another indefinite form the awareness as the percept (tata ekasya vastuna@h kincidrupam prama@nam kincitprama@naphalam na virudhyate). It is on account of this similarity with the object that a cognition can be a determinant of the definite awareness (vyavasthapanaheturhi sarupyam), so that by the determinate we know the determinant and thus by the similarity of the sense-datum with the object {prama@na) we come to think that our awareness has this particular form as "blue" (prama@naphala). If this sameness between the knowledge and its object was not felt we could not have spoken of the object from the awareness (sarupyamanubhutam vyavasthapanahetu@h). The object generates an awareness similar to itself, and it is this correspondence that can lead us to the realization of the object so presented by right knowledge [Footnote ref l].



[Footnote 1: See also pp. 340 and 409. It is unfortunate that, excepting the Nyayabindu, Nyayabindu@tika, Nyayabindu@tika@tippani (St Petersburg, 1909), no other works dealing with this interesting doctrine of perception are available to us. Nyayabindu is probably one of the earliest works in which we hear of the doctrine of arthakriyakaritva (practical fulfilment of our desire as a criterion of right knowledge). Later on it was regarded as a criterion of existence, as Ratnakirtti's works and the profuse references by Hindu writers to the Buddhistic doctrines prove. The word arthakriya is found in Candrakirtti's commentary on Nagarjuna and also in such early works as Lalitavistara (pointed out to me by Dr E.J. Thomas of the Cambridge University Library) but the word has no philosophical significance there.]

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Sautrantika theory of Inference [Footnote ref 1].

According to the Sautrantika doctrine of Buddhism as described by Dharmakirtti and Dharmmottara which is probably the only account of systematic Buddhist logic that is now available to us in Sanskrit, inference (anumana) is divided into two classes, called svarthanumana (inferential knowledge attained by a person arguing in his own mind or judgments), and pararthanumana (inference through the help of articulated propositions for convincing others in a debate). The validity of inference depended, like the validity of perception, on copying the actually existing facts of the external world. Inference copied external realities as much as perception did; just as the validity of the immediate perception of blue depends upon its similarity to the external blue thing perceived, so the validity of the inference of a blue thing also, so far as it is knowledge, depends upon its resemblance to the external fact thus inferred (sarupyavas'addhi tannilapratitirupam sidhyati).

The reason by which an inference is made should be such that it may be present only in those cases where the thing to be inferred exists, and absent in every case where it does not exist. It is only when the reason is tested by both these joint conditions that an unfailing connection (pratibandha) between the reason and the thing to be inferred can be established. It is not enough that the reason should be present in all cases where the thing to be inferred exists and absent where it does not exist, but it is necessary that it should be present only in the above case. This law (niyama) is essential for establishing the unfailing condition necessary for inference [Footnote ref 2]. This unfailing natural connection (svabhavapratibandha) is found in two types



[Footnote 1: As the Prama@nasamuccaya of Dinnaga is not available in Sanskrit, we can hardly know anything of developed Buddhist logic except what can be got from the Nyayabindu@tika of Dharmmottara.]

[Footnote 2: tasmat niyamavatorevanvayavyatirekayo@h prayoga@h karttavya@h yena pratibandho gamyeta sadhanyasa sadhyena. Nyayabindu@tika, p. 24.]

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of cases. The first is that where the nature of the reason is contained in the thing to be inferred as a part of its nature, i.e. where the reason stands for a species of which the thing to be inferred is a genus; thus a stupid person living in a place full of tall pines may come to think that pines are called trees because they are tall and it may be useful to point out to him that even a small pine plant is a tree because it is pine; the quality of pineness forms a part of the essence of treeness, for the former being a species is contained in the latter as a genus; the nature of the species being identical with the nature of the genus, one could infer the latter from the former but not vice versa; this is called the unfailing natural connection of identity of nature (tadatmya). The second is that where the cause is inferred from the effect which stands as the reason of the former. Thus from the smoke the fire which has produced it may be inferred. The ground of these inferences is that reason is naturally indissolubly connected with the thing to be inferred, and unless this is the case, no inference is warrantable.

This natural indissoluble connection (svabhavapratibandha), be it of the nature of identity of essence of the species in the genus or inseparable connection of the effect with the cause, is the ground of all inference [Footnote ref 1]. The svabhavapratibandha determines the inseparability of connection (avinabhavaniyama) and the inference is made not through a series of premisses, but directly by the li@nga (reason) which has the inseparable connection [Footnote ref 2].

The second type of inference known as pararthanumana agrees with svarthanumana in all essential characteristics; the main difference between the two is this, that in the case of pararthanumana, the inferential process has to be put verbally in premisses.

Pandit Ratnakarasanti, probably of the ninth or the tenth century A.D., wrote a paper named Antarvyaptisamarthana in which



[Footnote 1: na hi yo yatra svabhavena na pratibaddha@h sa tam apratibaddhavi@sayamavs'yameva na vyabhicaratiti nasti tayoravyabhicaraniyama. Nyayabindu@tika, p. 29.]

[Footnote 2: The inseparable connection determining inference is only possible when the li@nga satisfies the three following conditions, viz. (1) pak@sasattva (existence of the li@nga in the pak@sa—the thing about which something is inferred); (2) sapak@sasattva (existence of the li@nga in those cases where the sadhya oc probandum existed), and (3) vipak@sasattva (its non-existence in all those places where the sadhya did not exist). The Buddhists admitted three propositions in a syllogism, e.g. The hill has fire, because it has smoke, like a kitchen but unlike a lake.]

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he tried to show that the concomitance is not between those cases which possess the li@nga or reason with the cases which possess the sadhya (probandum) but between that which has the characteristics of the li@nga with that which has the characteristics of the sadhya (probandum); or in other words the concomitance is not between the places containing the smoke such as kitchen, etc., and the places containing fire but between that which has the characteristic of the li@nga, viz. the smoke, and that which has the characteristic of the sadhya, viz. the fire. This view of the nature of concomitance is known as inner concomitance (antarvyapti), whereas the former, viz. the concomitance between the thing possessing li@nga and that possessing sadhya, is known as outer concomitance (bahirvyapti) and generally accepted by the Nyaya school of thought. This antarvyapti doctrine of concomitance is indeed a later Buddhist doctrine.

It may not be out of place here to remark that evidences of some form of Buddhist logic probably go back at least as early as the Kathavatthu (200 B.C.). Thus Aung on the evidence of the Yamaka points out that Buddhist logic at the time of As'oka "was conversant with the distribution of terms" and the process of conversion. He further points out that the logical premisses such as the udahara@na (Yo yo aggima so so dhumava—whatever is fiery is smoky), the upanayana (ayam pabbato dhumava—this hill is smoky) and the niggama (tasmadayam aggima—therefore that is fiery) were also known. (Aung further sums up the method of the arguments which are found in the Kathavatthu as follows:

"Adherent. Is A B? (@thapana). Opponent. Yes.

Adherent. Is C D? (papana). Opponent. No.

Adherent. But if A be B then (you should have said) C is D. That B can be affirmed of A but D of C is false. Hence your first answer is refuted.")

The antecedent of the hypothetical major premiss is termed @thapana, because the opponent's position, A is B, is conditionally established for the purpose of refutation.

The consequent of the hypothetical major premiss is termed papana because it is got from the antecedent. And the conclusion

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is termed ropa@na because the regulation is placed on the opponent. Next:

"If D be derived of C. Then B should have been derived of A. But you affirmed B of A. (therefore) That B can be affirmed of A but not of D or C is wrong."

This is the pa@tiloma, inverse or indirect method, as contrasted with the former or direct method, anuloma. In both methods the consequent is derived. But if we reverse the hypothetical major in the latter method we get

"If A is B C is D. But A is B. Therefore C is D.

By this indirect method the opponent's second answer is reestablished [Footnote ref 1]."

The Doctrine of Momentariness.

Ratnakirtti (950 A.D.) sought to prove the momentariness of all existence (sattva), first, by the concomitance discovered by the method of agreement in presence (anvayavyapti), and then by the method of difference by proving that the production of effects could not be justified on the assumption of things being permanent and hence accepting the doctrine of momentariness as the only alternative. Existence is defined as the capacity of producing anything (arthakriyakaritva). The form of the first type of argument by anvayavyapti may be given thus: "Whatever exists is momentary, by virtue of its existence, as for example the jug; all things about the momentariness of which we are discussing are existents and are therefore momentary." It cannot be said that the jug which has been chosen as an example of an existent is not momentary; for the jug is producing certain effects at the present moment; and it cannot be held that these are all identical in the past and the future or that it is producing no effect at all in the past and future, for the first is impossible, for those which are done now could not be done again in the future; the second is impossible, for if it has any capacity to



[Footnote: 1: See introduction to the translation of Kathavatthu (Points of Controversy) by Mrs Rhys Davids.]

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produce effects it must not cease doing so, as in that case one might as well expect that there should not be any effect even at the present moment. Whatever has the capacity of producing anything at any time must of necessity do it. So if it does produce at one moment and does not produce at another, this contradiction will prove the supposition that the things were different at the different moments. If it is held that the nature of production varies at different moments, then also the thing at those two moments must be different, for a thing could not have in it two contradictory capacities.

Since the jug does not produce at the present moment the work of the past and the future moments, it cannot evidently do so, and hence is not identical with the jug in the past and in the future, for the fact that the jug has the capacity and has not the capacity as well, proves that it is not the same jug at the two moments (s'aktas'aktasvabhavataya pratik@sa@nam bheda@h). The capacity of producing effects (arthakriyas'akti), which is but the other name of existence, is universally concomitant with momentariness (k@sa@nikatvavyapta).

The Nyaya school of philosophy objects to this view and says that the capacity of anything cannot be known until the effect produced is known, and if capacity to produce effects be regarded as existence or being, then the being or existence of the effect cannot be known, until that has produced another effect and that another ad infinitum. Since there can be no being that has not capacity of producing effects, and as this capacity can demonstrate itself only in an infinite chain, it will be impossible to know any being or to affirm the capacity of producing effects as the definition of existence. Moreover if all things were momentary there would be no permanent perceiver to observe the change, and there being nothing fixed there could hardly be any means even of taking to any kind of inference. To this Ratnakirtti replies that capacity (saamarthya) cannot be denied, for it is demonstrated even in making the denial. The observation of any concomitance in agreement in presence, or agreement in absence, does not require any permanent observer, for under certain conditions of agreement there is the knowledge of the concomitance of agreement in presence, and in other conditions there is the knowledge of the concomitance in absence. This knowledge of concomitance at the succeeding moment holds within

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itself the experience of the conditions of the preceding moment, and this alone is what we find and not any permanent observer.

The Buddhist definition of being or existence (sattva) is indeed capacity, and we arrived at this when it was observed that in all proved cases capacity was all that could be defined of being;—seed was but the capacity of producing shoots, and even if this capacity should require further capacity to produce effects, the fact which has been perceived still remains, viz. that the existence of seeds is nothing but the capacity of producing the shoots and thus there is no vicious infinite [Footnote ref l]. Though things are momentary, yet we could have concomitance between things only so long as their apparent forms are not different (atadrupaparav@rttayoreva sadhyasadhanayo@h pratyak@se@na vyaptigraha@nat). The vyapti or concomitance of any two things (e.g. the fire and the smoke) is based on extreme similarity and not on identity.

Another objection raised against the doctrine of momentariness is this, that a cause (e.g. seed) must wait for a number of other collocations of earth, water, etc., before it can produce the effect (e.g. the shoots) and hence the doctrine must fail. To this Ratnakirtti replies that the seed does not exist before and produce the effect when joined by other collocations, but such is the special effectiveness of a particular seed-moment, that it produces both the collocations or conditions as well as the effect, the shoot. How a special seed-moment became endowed with such special effectiveness is to be sought in other causal moments which preceded it, and on which it was dependent. Ratnakirtti wishes to draw attention to the fact that as one perceptual moment reveals a number of objects, so one causal moment may produce a number of effects. Thus he says that the inference that whatever has being is momentary is valid and free from any fallacy.

It is not important to enlarge upon the second part of Ratnakirtti's arguments in which he tries to show that the production of effects could not be explained if we did not suppose



[Footnote 1: The distinction between vicious and harmless infinites was known to the Indians at least as early as the sixth or the seventh century. Jayanta quotes a passage which differentiates the two clearly (Nyayamanjari, p. 22):

"mulak@satikarimahuranavastham hi du@sa@nam. mulasiddhau tvarucyapi nanavastha nivaryate."

The infinite regress that has to be gone through in order to arrive at the root matter awaiting to be solved destroys the root and is hence vicious, whereas if the root is saved there is no harm in a regress though one may not be willing to have it.]

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all things to be momentary, for this is more an attempt to refute the doctrines of Nyaya than an elaboration of the Buddhist principles.

The doctrine of momentariness ought to be a direct corollary of the Buddhist metaphysics. But it is curious that though all dharmas were regarded as changing, the fact that they were all strictly momentary (k@sa@nika—i.e. existing only for one moment) was not emphasized in early Pali literature. As'vagho@sa in his S'raddhotpadas'astra speaks of all skandhas as k@sa@nika (Suzuki's translation, p. 105). Buddhaghosa also speaks of the meditation of the khandhas as kha@nika in his Visuddhimagga. But from the seventh century A.D. till the tenth century this doctrine together with the doctrine of arthakriyakaritva received great attention at the hands of the Sautrantikas and the Vaibha@sikas. All the Nyaya and Vedanta literature of this period is full of refutations and criticisms of these doctrines. The only Buddhist account available of the doctrine of momentariness is from the pen of Ratnakirtti. Some of the general features of his argument in favour of the view have been given above. Elaborate accounts of it may be found in any of the important Nyaya works of this period such as Nynyamanjari, Tatparyya@tika of Vacaspati Mis'ra, etc.

Buddhism did not at any time believe anything to be permanent. With the development of this doctrine they gave great emphasis to this point. Things came to view at one moment and the next moment they were destroyed. Whatever is existent is momentary. It is said that our notion of permanence is derived from the notion of permanence of ourselves, but Buddhism denied the existence of any such permanent selves. What appears as self is but the bundle of ideas, emotions, and active tendencies manifesting at any particular moment. The next moment these dissolve, and new bundles determined by the preceding ones appear and so on. The present thought is thus the only thinker. Apart from the emotions, ideas, and active tendencies, we cannot discover any separate self or soul. It is the combined product of these ideas, emotions, etc., that yield the illusory appearance of self at any moment. The consciousness of self is the resultant product as it were of the combination of ideas, emotions, etc., at any particular moment. As these ideas, emotions, etc., change every moment there is no such thing as a permanent self.

The fact that I remember that I have been existing for

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a long time past does not prove that a permanent self has been existing for such a long period. When I say this is that book, I perceive the book with my eye at the present moment, but that "this book" is the same as "that book" (i.e. the book arising in memory), cannot be perceived by the senses. It is evident that the "that book" of memory refers to a book seen in the past, whereas "this book" refers to the book which is before my eyes. The feeling of identity which is adduced to prove permanence is thus due to a confusion between an object of memory referring to a past and different object with the object as perceived at the present moment by the senses [Footnote ref 1]. This is true not only of all recognition of identity and permanence of external objects but also of the perception of the identity of self, for the perception of self-identity results from the confusion of certain ideas or emotions arising in memory with similar ideas of the present moment. But since memory points to an object of past perception, and the perception to another object of the present moment, identity cannot be proved by a confusion of the two. Every moment all objects of the world are suffering dissolution and destruction, but yet things appear to persist, and destruction cannot often be noticed. Our hair and nails grow and are cut, but yet we think that we have the same hair and nail that we had before, in place of old hairs new ones similar to them have sprung forth, and they leave the impression as if the old ones were persisting. So it is that though things are destroyed every moment, others similar to these often rise into being and are destroyed the next moment and so on, and these similar things succeeding in a series produce the impression that it is one and the same thing which has been persisting through all the passing moments [Footnote ref 2]. Just as the flame of a candle is changing every moment and yet it seems to us as if we have been perceiving the same flame all the while, so all our bodies, our ideas, emotions, etc., all external objects around us are being destroyed every moment, and new ones are being generated at every succeeding moment, but so long as the objects of the succeeding moments are similar to those of the preceding moments, it appears to us that things have remained the same and no destruction has taken place.



[Footnote 1: See pratyabhijnanirasa of the Buddhists, Nyayamanjari, V.S. Series, pp. 449, etc.]

[Footnote 2: See Tarkarahasyadipika of Gu@naratna, p. 30, and also Nyayamanjari, V.S. edition, p. 450.]

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The Doctrine of Momentariness and the Doctrine of Causal Efficiency (Arthakriyakaritva).

It appears that a thing or a phenomenon may be defined from the Buddhist point of view as being the combination of diverse characteristics [Footnote ref 1]. What we call a thing is but a conglomeration of diverse characteristics which are found to affect, determine or influence other conglomerations appearing as sentient or as inanimate bodies. So long as the characteristics forming the elements of any conglomeration remain perfectly the same, the conglomeration may be said to be the same. As soon as any of these characteristics is supplanted by any other new characteristic, the conglomeration is to be called a new one [Footnote ref 2]. Existence or being of things means the work that any conglomeration does or the influence that it exerts on other conglomerations. This in Sanskrit is called arthakriyakaritva which literally translated means—the power of performing actions and purposes of some kind [Footnote ref 3]. The criterion of existence or being is the performance of certain specific actions, or rather existence means that a certain effect has been produced in some way (causal efficiency). That which has produced such an effect is then called existent or sat. Any change in the effect thus produced means a corresponding change of existence. Now, that selfsame definite specific effect



[Footnote 1: Compare Milindapanha, II. I. 1—The Chariot Simile.]

[Footnote 2: Compare Tarkarahasyadipika of Gu@naratna, A.S.'s edition, pp. 24, 28 and Nyayamanjari, V.S. edition, pp. 445, etc., and also the paper on K@sa@nabha@ngasiddhi by Ratnakirtti in Six Buddhist Nyaya tracts.]

[Footnote 3: This meaning of the word "arthakriyakaritva" is different from the meaning of the word as we found in the section "sautrantika theory of perception." But we find the development of this meaning both in Ratnakirtti as well as in Nyaya writers who referred to this doctrine. With Vinitadeva (seventh century A.D.) the word "arthakriyasiddhi" meant the fulfilment of any need such as the cooking of rice by fire (arthas'abdena prayojanamucyate puru@sasya praycjana@m darupakadi tasya siddhi@h ni@spatti@h—the word artha means need; the need of man such as cooking by logs, etc.; siddhi of that, means accomplishment). With Dharmottara who flourished about a century and a half later arthasiddhi means action (anu@s@thiti) with reference to undesirable and desirable objects (heyopadeyarthavi@saya). But with Ratnakirtti (950 A.D.) the word arthakriyakaritva has an entirely different sense. It means with him efficiency of producing any action or event, and as such it is regarded as the characteristic definition of existence sattva). Thus he says in his K@sa@nabha@ngasiddhi, pp. 20, 21, that though in different philosophies there are different definitions of existence or being, he will open his argument with the universally accepted definition of existence as arthakriyakaritva (efficiency of causing any action or event). Whenever Hindu writers after Ratnakirtti refer to the Buddhist doctrine of arthakriyakaritva they usually refer to this doctrine in Ratnakirtti's sense.]

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which is produced now was never produced before, and cannot be repeated in the future, for that identical effect which is once produced cannot be produced again. So the effects produced in us by objects at different moments of time may be similar but cannot be identical. Each moment is associated with a new effect and each new effect thus produced means in each case the coming into being of a correspondingly new existence of things. If things were permanent there would be no reason why they should be performing different effects at different points of time. Any difference in the effect produced, whether due to the thing itself or its combination with other accessories, justifies us in asserting that the thing has changed and a new one has come in its place. The existence of a jug for example is known by the power it has of forcing itself upon our minds; if it had no such power then we could not have said that it existed. We can have no notion of the meaning of existence other than the impression produced on us; this impression is nothing else but the power exerted by things on us, for there is no reason why one should hold that beyond such powers as are associated with the production of impressions or effects there should be some other permanent entity to which the power adhered, and which existed even when the power was not exerted. We perceive the power of producing effects and define each unit of such power as amounting to a unit of existence. And as there would be different units of power at different moments, there should also be as many new existences, i.e. existents must be regarded as momentary, existing at each moment that exerts a new power. This definition of existence naturally brings in the doctrine of momentariness shown by Ratnakirtti.

Some Ontological Problems on which the Different Indian Systems Diverged.

We cannot close our examination of Buddhist philosophy without briefly referring to its views on some ontological problems which were favourite subjects of discussion in almost all philosophical circles of India. These are in brief: (1) the relation of cause and effect, (2) the relation of the whole (avayavi) and the part (avayava), (3) the relation of generality (samanya) to the specific individuals, (4) the relation of attributes or qualities and the substance and the problem of the relation of inherence, (5) the

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relation of power (s'akti) to the power-possessor (s'aktiman). Thus on the relation of cause and effect, S'a@nkara held that cause alone was permanent, real, and all effects as such were but impermanent illusions due to ignorance, Sa@mkhya held that there was no difference between cause and effect, except that the former was only the earlier stage which when transformed through certain changes became the effect. The history of any causal activity is the history of the transformation of the cause into the effects. Buddhism holds everything to be momentary, so neither cause nor effect can abide. One is called the effect because its momentary existence has been determined by the destruction of its momentary antecedent called the cause. There is no permanent reality which undergoes the change, but one change is determined by another and this determination is nothing more than "that happening, this happened." On the relation of parts to whole, Buddhism does not believe in the existence of wholes. According to it, it is the parts which illusorily appear as the whole, the individual atoms rise into being and die the next moment and thus there is no such thing as "whole [Footnote ref 1]. The Buddhists hold again that there are no universals, for it is the individuals alone which come and go. There are my five fingers as individuals but there is no such thing as fingerness (a@ngulitva) as the abstract universal of the fingers. On the relation of attributes and substance we know that the Sautrantika Buddhists did not believe in the existence of any substance apart from its attributes; what we call a substance is but a unit capable of producing a unit of sensation. In the external world there are as many individual simple units (atoms) as there are points of sensations. Corresponding to each unit of sensation there is a separate simple unit in the objective world. Our perception of a thing is thus the perception of the assemblage of these sensations. In the objective world also there are no substances but atoms or reals, each representing a unit of sensation, force or attribute, rising into being and dying the next moment. Buddhism thus denies the existence of any such relation as that of inherence (samavaya) in which relation the attributes are said to exist in the substance, for since there are no separate substances there is no necessity for admitting the relation of inherence. Following the same logic Buddhism also does not

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believe in the existence of a power-possessor separate from the power.

Brief survey of the evolution of Buddhist Thought.

In the earliest period of Buddhism more attention was paid to the four noble truths than to systematic metaphysics. What was sorrow, what was the cause of sorrow, what was the cessation of sorrow and what could lead to it? The doctrine of pa@ticcasamuppada was offered only to explain how sorrow came in and not with a view to the solving of a metaphysical problem. The discussion of ultimate metaphysical problems, such as whether the world was eternal or non-eternal, or whether a Tathagata existed after death or not, were considered as heresies in early Buddhism. Great emphasis was laid on sila, samadhi and panna and the doctrine that there was no soul. The Abhidhammas hardly give us any new philosophy which was not contained in the Suttas. They only elaborated the materials of the suttas with enumerations and definitions. With the evolution of Mahayana scriptures from some time about 200 B.C. the doctrine of the non-essentialness and voidness of all dhammas began to be preached. This doctrine, which was taken up and elaborated by Nagarjuna, Aryyadeva, Kumarajiva and Candrakirtti, is more or less a corollary from the older doctrine of Buddhism. If one could not say whether the world was eternal or non-eternal, or whether a Tathagata existed or did not exist after death, and if there was no permanent soul and all the dhammas were changing, the only legitimate way of thinking about all things appeared to be to think of them as mere void and non-essential appearances. These appearances appear as being mutually related but apart from their appearance they have no other essence, no being or reality. The Tathata doctrine which was preached by As'vagho@sa oscillated between the position of this absolute non-essentialness of all dhammas and the Brahminic idea that something existed as the background of all these non-essential dhammas. This he called tathata, but he could not consistently say that any such permanent entity could exist. The Vijnanavada doctrine which also took its rise at this time appears to me to be a mixture of the S'unyavada doctrine and the Tathata doctrine; but when carefully examined it seems to be nothing but S'unyavada, with an attempt at explaining all the observed phenomena. If everything was

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non-essential how did it originate? Vijnanavada proposes to give an answer, and says that these phenomena are all but ideas of the mind generated by the beginningless vasana (desire) of the mind. The difficulty which is felt with regard to the Tathata doctrine that there must be some reality which is generating all these ideas appearing as phenomena, is the same as that in the Vijnanavada doctrine. The Vijnanavadins could not admit the existence of such a reality, but yet their doctrines led them to it. They could not properly solve the difficulty, and admitted that their doctrine was some sort of a compromise with the Brahminical doctrines of heresy, but they said that this was a compromise to make the doctrine intelligible to the heretics; in truth however the reality assumed in the doctrine was also non-essential. The Vijnanavada literature that is available to us is very scanty and from that we are not in a position to judge what answers Vijnanavada could give on the point. These three doctrines developed almost about the same time and the difficulty of conceiving s'unya (void), tathata, (thatness) and the alayavijnana of Vijnanavada is more or less the same.

The Tathata doctrine of As'vagho@sa practically ceased with him. But the S'unyavada and the Vijnanavada doctrines which originated probably about 200 B.C. continued to develop probably till the eighth century A.D. Vigorous disputes with S'unyavada doctrines are rarely made in any independent work of Hindu philosophy, after Kumarila and S'a@nkara. From the third or the fourth century A.D. some Buddhists took to the study of systematic logic and began to criticize the doctrine of the Hindu logicians. Di@nnaga the Buddhist logician (500 A.D.) probably started these hostile criticisms by trying to refute the doctrines of the great Hindu logician Vatsyayana, in his Prama@nasamuccaya. In association with this logical activity we find the activity of two other schools of Buddhism, viz. the Sarvastivadins (known also as Vaibha@sikas) and the Sautrantikas. Both the Vaibha@sikas and the Sautrantikas accepted the existence of the external world, and they were generally in conflict with the Hindu schools of thought Nyaya-Vais'e@sika and Sa@mkhya which also admitted the existence of the external world. Vasubandhu (420-500 A.D.) was one of the most illustrious names of this school. We have from this time forth a number of great Buddhist thinkers such as Yas'omitra (commentator of Vasubandhu's work),

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Dharmmakirtti (writer of Nyayabindu 635 A.D.), Vinitadeva and S'antabhadra (commentators of Nyayabindu), Dharmmottara (commentator of Nyayabindu 847 A.D.), Ratnakirtti (950 A.D.), Pa@n@dita As'oka, and Ratnakara S'anti, some of whose contributions have been published in the Six Buddhist Nyaya Tracts, published in Calcutta in the Bibliotheca Indica series. These Buddhist writers were mainly interested in discussions regarding the nature of perception, inference, the doctrine of momentariness, and the doctrine of causal efficiency (arthakriyakaritva) as demonstrating the nature of existence. On the negative side they were interested in denying the ontological theories of Nyaya and Sa@mkhya with regard to the nature of class-concepts, negation, relation of whole and part, connotation of terms, etc. These problems hardly attracted any notice in the non-Sautrantika and non-Vaibha@sika schools of Buddhism of earlier times. They of course agreed with the earlier Buddhists in denying the existence of a permanent soul, but this they did with the help of their doctrine of causal efficiency. The points of disagreement between Hindu thought up to S'a@nkara (800 A.D.) and Buddhist thought till the time of S'a@nkara consisted mainly in the denial by the Buddhists of a permanent soul and the permanent external world. For Hindu thought was more or less realistic, and even the Vedanta of S'a@nkara admitted the existence of the permanent external world in some sense. With S'a@nkara the forms of the external world were no doubt illusory, but they all had a permanent background in the Brahman, which was the only reality behind all mental and the physical phenomena. The Sautrantikas admitted the existence of the external world and so their quarrel with Nyaya and Sa@mkhya was with regard to their doctrine of momentariness; their denial of soul and their views on the different ontological problems were in accordance with their doctrine of momentariness. After the twelfth century we do not hear much of any new disputes with the Buddhists. From this time the disputes were mainly between the different systems of Hindu philosophers, viz. Nyaya, the Vedanta of the school of S'a@nkara and the Theistic Vedanta of Ramanuja, Madhva, etc.

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CHAPTER VI

THE JAINA PHILOSOPHY

The Origin of Jainism.

Notwithstanding the radical differences in their philosophical notions Jainism and Buddhism, which were originally both orders of monks outside the pale of Brahmanism, present some resemblance in outward appearance, and some European scholars who became acquainted with Jainism through inadequate samples of Jaina literature easily persuaded themselves that it was an offshoot of Buddhism, and even Indians unacquainted with Jaina literature are often found to commit the same mistake. But it has now been proved beyond doubt that this idea is wrong and Jainism is at least as old as Buddhism. The oldest Buddhist works frequently mention the Jains as a rival sect, under their old name Nigantha and their leader Nataputta Varddhamana Mahavira, the last prophet of the Jains. The canonical books of the Jains mention as contemporaries of Mahavira the same kings as reigned during Buddha's career.

Thus Mahavira was a contemporary of Buddha, but unlike Buddha he was neither the author of the religion nor the founder of the sect, but a monk who having espoused the Jaina creed afterwards became the seer and the last prophet (Tirtha@nkara) of Jainism[Footnote ref 1]. His predecessor Pars'va, the last Tirtha@nkara but one, is said to have died 250 years before Mahavira, while Pars'va's predecessor Ari@s@tanemi is said to have died 84,000 years before Mahavira's Nirva@na. The story in Uttaradhyayanasutra that a disciple of Pars'va met a disciple of Mahavira and brought about the union of the old Jainism and that propounded by Mahavira seems to suggest that this Pars'va was probably a historical person.

According to the belief of the orthodox Jains, the Jaina religion is eternal, and it has been revealed again and again in every one of the endless succeeding periods of the world by innumerable Tirthankaras. In the present period the first Tirtha@nkara was @R@sabha and the last, the 24th, was Vardhamana Mahavira. All

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[Footnote 1: See Jacobi's article on Jainism, E. R.E.]

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Tirtha@nkaras have reached mok@sa at their death, and they neither care for nor have any influence on worldly affairs, but yet they are regarded as "Gods" by the Jains and are worshipped [Footnote ref 1].

Two Sects of Jainism [Footnote ref 2].

There are two main sects of Jains, S'vetambaras (wearers of white cloths) and Digambaras (the naked). They are generally agreed on all the fundamental principles of Jainism. The tenets peculiar to the Digambaras are firstly that perfect saints such as the Tirtha@nkaras live without food, secondly that the embryo of Mahavira was not removed from the womb of Devananda to that of Tris'ala as the S'vetambaras contend, thirdly that a monk who owns any property and wears clothes cannot reach Mok@sa, fourthly that no woman can reach Mok@sa [Footnote ref 3]. The Digambaras deny the canonical works of the S'vetambaras and assert that these had been lost immediately after Mahavira. The origin of the Digambaras is attributed to S'ivabhuti (A.D. 83) by the S'vetambaras as due to a schism in the old S'vetambara church, of which there had already been previous to that seven other schisms. The Digambaras in their turn deny this, and say that they themselves alone have preserved the original practices, and that under Bhadrabahu, the eighth sage after Mahavira, the last Tirtha@nkara, there rose the sect of Ardhaphalakas with laxer principles, from which developed the present sect of S'vetambaras (A.D. 80). The Digambaras having separated in early times from the S'vetambaras developed peculiar religious ceremonies of their own, and have a different ecclesiastical and literary history, though there is practically no difference about the main creed. It may not be out of place here to mention that the Sanskrit works of the Digambaras go back to a greater antiquity than those of the S'vetambaras, if we except the canonical books of the latter. It may be noted in this connection that there developed in later times about 84 different schools of Jainism differing from one another only in minute details of conduct. These were called gacchas, and the most important of these is the Kharatara Gaccha, which had split into many minor gacchas. Both sects of Jains have



[Footnote 1: See "_Digumbara Jain Iconography (1. A, xxxii [1903] p. 459" of J. Burgess, and Buhler's "Specimens of Jina sculptures from Mathura," in _Epigraphica Indica_, II. pp. 311 etc. See also Jacobi's article on Jainism, _E.R.E._]

[Footnote 2: See Jacobi's article on Jainism, E.R.E.]

[Footnote 3: See Gu@naratna's commentary on Jainism in @Sa@ddars'anasamuccaya.]

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preserved a list of the succession of their teachers from Mahavira (sthaviravali, pa@t@tavali, gurvavali) and also many legends about them such as those in the Kalpasutra, the Paris'i@s@ta-parvan of Hemacandra, etc.

The Canonical and other Literature of the Jains.

According to the Jains there were originally two kinds of sacred books, the fourteen Purvas and the eleven A@ngas. The Purvas continued to be transmitted for some time but were gradually lost. The works known as the eleven A@ngas are now the oldest parts of the existing Jain canon. The names of these are Acara, Sutrak@rta, Sthana, Samavaya Bhagavati, Jnatadharmakathas, Upasakadas'as, Antak@rtadas'as Anuttaraupapatikadas'as, Pras'navyakara@na, Vipaka. In addition to these there are the twelve Upa@ngas [Footnote ref 1], the ten Prakir@nas [Footnote ref 2], six Chedasutras [Footnote ref 3], Nandi and Anuyogadvara and four Mulasutras (Uttaradhyayana, Avas'yaka, Das'avaikalika, and Pi@n@daniryukti). The Digambaras however assert that these original works have all been lost, and that the present works which pass by the old names are spurious. The original language of these according to the Jains was Ardhamagadhi, but these suffered attempts at modernization and it is best to call the language of the sacred texts Jaina Prakrit and that of the later works Jaina Mahara@s@tri. A large literature of glosses and commentaries has grown up round the sacred texts. And besides these, the Jains possess separate works, which contain systematic expositions of their faith in Prakrit and Sanskrit. Many commentaries have also been written upon these independent treatises. One of the oldest of these treatises is Umasvati's Tattvarthadhigamasutra(1-85 A.D.). Some of the most important later Jaina works on which this chapter is based are Vis'e@savas'yakabha@sya, Jaina Tarkavarttika, with the commentary of S'antyacaryya, Dravyasa@mgraha of Nemicandra (1150 A.D.), Syadvadamanjari of Malli@sena (1292 A.D.), Nyayavatara of Siddhasena Divakara (533 A.D.), Parik@samukhasutralaghuv@rtti of Anantaviryya (1039 A.D.), Prameyakamalamarta@n@da of Prabhacandra



[Footnote 1: Aupapatika, Rajapras'niya, Jivabhigama, Prajnapana, Jambudvipaprajnapti, Candraprajnapti, Suryaprajnapti, Nirayavali, Kalpavata@msika, Pu@spika, Pu@spaculika, V@r@s@nida@sas.]