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[Footnote 1: Visuddhimagga Nidanadikatha.]

[Footnote 2: Visuddhimagga-silaniddeso, pp. 7 and 8.]

[Footnote 3: Visuddhimagga, II.]

[Footnote 4: Visuddhimagga, pp. 84-85.]

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The man who has practised sila must train his mind first in particular ways, so that it may be possible for him to acquire the chief concentration of meditation called jhana (fixed and steady meditation). These preliminary endeavours of the mind for the acquirement of jhanasamadhi eventually lead to it and are called upacara samadhi (preliminary samadhi) as distinguished from the jhanasamadhi called the appanasamadhi (achieved samadhi) [Footnote ref 1]. Thus as a preparatory measure, firstly he has to train his mind continually to view with disgust the appetitive desires for eating and drinking (ahare pa@tikkulasanna) by emphasizing in the mind the various troubles that are associated in seeking food and drink and their ultimate loathsome transformations as various nauseating bodily elements. When a man continually habituates himself to emphasize the disgusting associations of food and drink, he ceases to have any attachment to them and simply takes them as an unavoidable evil, only awaiting the day when the final dissolution of all sorrows will come [Footnote ref 2]. Secondly he has to habituate his mind to the idea that all the parts of our body are made up of the four elements, k@siti (earth), ap (water), tejas (fire) and wind (air), like the carcase of a cow at the butcher's shop. This is technically called catudhatuvavatthanabhavana (the meditation of the body as being made up of the four elements) [Footnote ref 3]. Thirdly he has to habituate his mind to think again and again (anussati) about the virtues or greatness of the Buddha, the sa@ngha (the monks following the Buddha), the gods and the law (dhamma) of the Buddha, about the good effects of sila, and the making of gifts (caganussati), about the nature of death (mara@nanussati) and about the deep nature and qualities of the final extinction of all phenomena (upasamanussati) [Footnote ref 4].



[Footnote 1: As it is not possible for me to enter into details, I follow what appears to me to be the main line of division showing the interconnection of jhana (Skr. dhyana) with its accessory stages called parikammas (Visuddhimagga, pp. 85 f.).]

[Footnote 2: Visuddhimagga, pp. 341-347; mark the intense pessimistic attitude, "Iman ca pana ahare pa@tikulasanna@m anuyuttassa bhikkhu@no rasata@nhaya cittam pa@tiliyati, pa@tiku@t@tati, pa@tiva@t@tati; so, kantaranitthara@na@t@thiko viya puttama@msa@m vigatamado ahara@m ahareti yavad eva dukkhassa ni@t@thara@natthaya," p. 347. The mind of him who inspires himself with this supreme disgust to all food, becomes free from all desires for palatable tastes, and turns its back to them and flies off from them. As a means of getting rid of all sorrow he takes his food without any attachment as one would eat the flesh of his own son to sustain himself in crossing a forest.]

[Footnote 3: Visuddhimagga, pp. 347-370.]

[Footnote 4: Visuddhimagga, pp. 197-294.]

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Advancing further from the preliminary meditations or preparations called the upacara samadhi we come to those other sources of concentration and meditation called the appanasamadhi which directly lead to the achievement of the highest samadhi. The processes of purification and strengthening of the mind continue in this stage also, but these represent the last attempts which lead the mind to its final goal Nibbana. In the first part of this stage the sage has to go to the cremation grounds and notice the diverse horrifying changes of the human carcases and think how nauseating, loathsome, unsightly and impure they are, and from this he will turn his mind to the living human bodies and convince himself that they being in essence the same as the dead carcases are as loathsome as they [Footnote ref.1] This is called asubhakamma@t@thana or the endeavour to perceive the impurity of our bodies. He should think of the anatomical parts and constituents of the body as well as their processes, and this will help him to enter into the first jhana by leading his mind away from his body. This is called the kayagatasati or the continual mindfulness about the nature of the body [Footnote ref 2]. As an aid to concentration the sage should sit in a quiet place and fix his mind on the inhaling (passasa) and the exhaling (assasa) of his breath, so that instead of breathing in a more or less unconscious manner he may be aware whether he is breathing quickly or slowly; he ought to mark it definitely by counting numbers, so that by fixing his mind on the numbers counted he may fix his mind on the whole process of inhalation and exhalation in all stages of its course. This is called the anapanasati or the mindfulness of inhalation and exhalation [Footnote ref 3]

Next to this we come to Brahmavihara, the fourfold meditation of metta (universal friendship), karu@na (universal pity), mudita (happiness in the prosperity and happiness of all) and upekkha (indifference to any kind of preferment of oneself, his friend, enemy or a third party). In order to habituate oneself to the meditation on universal friendship, one should start with thinking how he should himself like to root out all misery and become happy, how he should himself like to avoid death and live cheerfully, and then pass over to the idea that other beings would also have the same desires. He should thus habituate himself to think that his friends, his enemies, and all those with whom he is not



[Footnote 1: Visuddhimagga, VI.]

[Footnote 2: Ibid. pp. 239-266.]

[Footnote 3: Ibid. pp. 266-292.]

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connected might all live and become happy. He should fix himself to such an extent in this meditation that he would not find any difference between the happiness or safety of himself and of others. He should never become angry with any person. Should he at any time feel himself offended on account of the injuries inflicted on him by his enemies, he should think of the futility of doubling his sadness by becoming sorry or vexed on that account. He should think that if he should allow himself to be affected by anger, he would spoil all his sila which he was so carefully practising. If anyone has done a vile action by inflicting injury, should he himself also do the same by being angry at it? If he were finding fault with others for being angry, could he himself indulge in anger? Moreover he should think that all the dhammas are momentary (kha@nikatta); that there no longer existed the khandhas which had inflicted the injury, and moreover the infliction of any injury being only a joint product, the man who was injured was himself an indispensable element in the production of the infliction as much as the man who inflicted the injury, and there could not thus be any special reason for making him responsible and of being angry with him. If even after thinking in this way the anger does not subside, he should think that by indulging in anger he could only bring mischief on himself through his bad deeds, and he should further think that the other man by being angry was only producing mischief to himself but not to him. By thinking in these ways the sage would be able to free his mind from anger against his enemies and establish himself in an attitude of universal friendship [Footnote ref 1]. This is called the metta-bhavana. In the meditation of universal pity (karu@na) also one should sympathize with the sorrows of his friends and foes alike. The sage being more keen-sighted will feel pity for those who are apparently leading a happy life, but are neither acquiring merits nor endeavouring to proceed on the way to Nibbana, for they are to suffer innumerable lives of sorrow [Footnote ref 2].

We next come to the jhanas with the help of material things as objects of concentration called the Kasi@nam. These objects of concentration may either be earth, water, fire, wind, blue colour, yellow colour, red colour, white colour, light or limited space (paricchinnakasa). Thus the sage may take a brown ball of earth and concentrate his mind upon it as an earth ball, sometimes



[Footnote 1: Visuddhimagga, pp. 295-314.]

[Footnote 2: Ibid. pp. 314-315.]

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with eyes open and sometimes with eyes shut. When he finds that even in shutting his eyes he can visualize the object in his mind, he may leave off the object and retire to another place to concentrate upon the image of the earth ball in his mind.

In the first stages of the first meditation (pathamam jhanam) the mind is concentrated on the object in the way of understanding it with its form and name and of comprehending it with its diverse relations. This state of concentration is called vitakka (discursive meditation). The next stage of the first meditation is that in which the mind does not move in the object in relational terms but becomes fixed and settled in it and penetrates into it without any quivering. This state is called vicara (steadily moving). The first stage vitakka has been compared in Buddhagho@sa's Visuddhimagga to the flying of a kite with its wings flapping, whereas the second stage is compared to its flying in a sweep without the least quiver of its wings. These two stages are associated with a buoyant exaltation (piti) and a steady inward bliss called sukha [Footnote ref 1] instilling the mind. The formation of this first jhana roots out five ties of avijja, kamacchando (dallying with desires), vyapado (hatred), thinamiddham (sloth and torpor), uddhaccakukkuccam (pride and restlessness), and vicikiccha (doubt). The five elements of which this jhana is constituted are vitakka, vicara, plti, sukham and ekaggata (one pointedness).

When the sage masters the first jhana he finds it defective and wants to enter into the second meditation (dutiyam jhanam), where there is neither any vitakka nor vicara of the first jhana, but the mind is in one unruffled state (ekodibhavam). It is a much steadier state and does not possess the movement which characterized the vitakka and the vicara stages of the first jhana and is therefore a very placid state (vitakka-vicarakkhobha-virahe@na ativiya acalata suppasannata ca). It is however associated with piti, sukha and ekaggata as the first jhana was.

When the second jhana is mastered the sage becomes disinclined towards the enjoyment of the piti of that stage and becomes indifferent to them (upekkhako). A sage in this stage sees the objects but is neither pleased nor displeased. At this stage all the asavas of the sage become loosened (khi@nasava). The enjoyment of sukha however still remains in the stage and the



[Footnote 1: Where there is piti there is sukha, but where there is sukha there may not necessarily be piti. Visuddhimagga, p. 145.]

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mind if not properly and carefully watched would like sometimes to turn back to the enjoyment of piti again. The two characteristics of this jhana are sukha and ekaggata. It should however be noted that though there is the feeling of highest sukha here, the mind is not only not attached to it but is indifferent to it (atimadhhurasukhe sukhaparamippatte pi tatiyajjhane upekkhako, na tattha sukhabhisangena aka@d@dhiyati) [Footnote ref 1]. The earth ball (pa@thavi) is however still the object of the jhana.

In the fourth or the last jhana both the sukha (happiness) and the dukkha (misery) vanish away and all the roots of attachment and antipathies are destroyed. This state is characterized by supreme and absolute indifference (upekkha) which was slowly growing in all the various stages of the jhanas. The characteristics of this jhana are therefore upekkha and ekaggata. With the mastery of this jhana comes final perfection and total extinction of the citta called cetovimutti, and the sage becomes thereby an arhat [Footnote ref 2]. There is no further production of the khandhas, no rebirth, and there is the absolute cessation of all sorrows and sufferings—Nibbana.

Kamma.

In the Katha (II. 6) Yama says that "a fool who is blinded with the infatuation of riches does not believe in a future life; he thinks that only this life exists and not any other, and thus he comes again and again within my grasp." In the Digha Nikaya also we read how Payasi was trying to give his reasons in support of his belief that "Neither is there any other world, nor are there beings, reborn otherwise than from parents, nor is there fruit or result of deeds well done or ill done [Footnote ref 3]." Some of his arguments were that neither the vicious nor the virtuous return to tell us that they suffered or enjoyed happiness in the other world, that if the virtuous had a better life in store, and if they believed in it, they would certainly commit suicide in order to get it at the earliest opportunity, that in spite of taking the best precautions we do not find at the time of the death of any person that his soul goes out, or that his body weighs less on account of the departure of his soul, and so on. Kassapa refutes his arguments with apt illustrations. But in spite of a few agnostics of

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[Footnote 1: Visuddhimagga, p. 163.]

[Footnote 2: Majjhima Nikaya, I.p. 296, and Visuddhimagga, pp. 167-168.]

[Footnote 3: Dialogues of the Buddha, II. p. 349; D. N. II. pp. 317 ff.]

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Payasi's type, we have every reason to believe that the doctrine of rebirth in other worlds and in this was often spoken of in the Upani@sads and taken as an accepted fact by the Buddha. In the Milinda Panha, we find Nagasena saying "it is through a difference in their karma that men are not all alike, but some long lived, some short lived, some healthy and some sickly, some handsome and some ugly, some powerful and some weak, some rich and some poor, some of high degree and some of low degree, some wise and some foolish [Footnote ref 1]." We have seen in the third chapter that the same soil of views was enunciated by the Upani@sad sages.

But karma could produce its effect in this life or any other life only when there were covetousness, antipathy and infatuation. But "when a man's deeds are performed without covetousness, arise without covetousness and are occasioned without covetousness, then inasmuch as covetousness is gone these deeds are abandoned, uprooted, pulled out of the ground like a palmyra tree and become non-existent and not liable to spring up again in the future [Footnote ref 2]." Karma by itself without craving (ta@nha) is incapable of bearing good or bad fruits. Thus we read in the Mahasatipa@t@thana sutta, "even this craving, potent for rebirth, that is accompanied by lust and self-indulgence, seeking satisfaction now here, now there, to wit, the craving for the life of sense, the craving for becoming (renewed life) and the craving for not becoming (for no new rebirth) [Footnote ref 3]." "Craving for things visible, craving for things audible, craving for things that may be smelt, tasted, touched, for things in memory recalled. These are the things in this world that are dear, that are pleasant. There does craving take its rise, there does it dwell [Footnote ref 4]." Pre-occupation and deliberation of sensual gratification giving rise to craving is the reason why sorrow comes. And this is the first arya satya (noble truth).

The cessation of sorrow can only happen with "the utter cessation of and disenchantment about that very craving, giving it up, renouncing it and emancipation from it [Footnote ref 5]."

When the desire or craving (ta@nha) has once ceased the sage becomes an arhat, and the deeds that he may do after that will bear no fruit. An arhat cannot have any good or bad



[Footnote 1: Warren's Buddhism in Translations, p. 215.]

[Footnote 2: Ibid. pp. 216-217.]

[Footnote 3: Dialogues of the Buddha, II. p. 340.]

[Footnote 4: Ibid. p. 341.]

[Footnote 5: Ibid. p. 341.]

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fruits of whatever he does. For it is through desire that karma finds its scope of giving fruit. With the cessation of desire all ignorance, antipathy and grasping cease and consequently there is nothing which can determine rebirth. An arhat may suffer the effects of the deeds done by him in some previous birth just as Moggallana did, but in spite of the remnants of his past karma an arhat was an emancipated man on account of the cessation of his desire [Footnote ref 1].

Kammas are said to be of three kinds, of body, speech and mind (kayika, vacika and manasika). The root of this kamma is however volition (cetana) and the states associated with it [Footnote ref 2]. If a man wishing to kill animals goes out into the forest in search of them, but cannot get any of them there even after a long search, his misconduct is not a bodily one, for he could not actually commit the deed with his body. So if he gives an order for committing a similar misdeed, and if it is not actually carried out with the body, it would be a misdeed by speech (vacika) and not by the body. But the merest bad thought or ill will alone whether carried into effect or not would be a kamma of the mind (manasika) [Footnote ref 3]. But the mental kamma must be present as the root of all bodily and vocal kammas, for if this is absent, as in the case of an arhat, there cannot be any kammas at all for him.

Kammas are divided from the point of view of effects into four classes, viz. (1) those which are bad and produce impurity, (2) those which are good and productive of purity, (3) those which are partly good and partly bad and thus productive of both purity and impurity, (4) those which are neither good nor bad and productive neither of purity nor of impurity, but which contribute to the destruction of kammas [Footnote ref 4].

Final extinction of sorrow (nibbana) takes place as the natural result of the destruction of desires. Scholars of Buddhism have tried to discover the meaning of this ultimate happening, and various interpretations have been offered. Professor De la Vallee Poussin has pointed out that in the Pali texts Nibbana has sometimes been represented as a happy state, as pure annihilation, as an inconceivable existence or as a changeless state [Footnote ref 5].

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[Footnote 1: See Kathavatthu and Warren's Buddhism in Translations, pp, 221 ff.]

[Footnote 2: Atthasalini, p. 88.]

[Footnote 3: See Atthasalini, p. 90.]

[Footnote 4: See Atthasalini, p. 89.]

[Footnote 5: Prof. De la Vallae Poussin's article in the E. R.E. on Nirva@na. See also Cullavagga, IX. i. 4; Mrs Rhys Davids's Psalms of the early Buddhists, I. and II., Introduction, p. xxxvii; Digha, II. 15; Udana, VIII.; Sa@myutta, III. 109.]

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Mr Schrader, in discussing Nibbana in Pali Text Society Journal, 1905, says that the Buddha held that those who sought to become identified after death with the soul of the world as infinite space (akasa) or consciousness (vinnana) attained to a state in which they had a corresponding feeling of infiniteness without having really lost their individuality. This latter interpretation of Nibbana seems to me to be very new and quite against the spirit of the Buddhistic texts. It seems to me to be a hopeless task to explain Nibbana in terms of worldly experience, and there is no way in which we can better indicate it than by saying that it is a cessation of all sorrow; the stage at which all worldly experiences have ceased can hardly be described either as positive or negative. Whether we exist in some form eternally or do not exist is not a proper Buddhistic question, for it is a heresy to think of a Tathagata as existing eternally (s'as'vata) or not-existing (as'as'vata) or whether he is existing as well as not existing or whether he is neither existing nor non-existing. Any one who seeks to discuss whether Nibbana is either a positive and eternal state or a mere state of non-existence or annihilation, takes a view which has been discarded in Buddhism as heretical. It is true that we in modern times are not satisfied with it, for we want to know what it all means. But it is not possible to give any answer since Buddhism regarded all these questions as illegitimate.

Later Buddhistic writers like Nagarjuna and Candrakirtti took advantage of this attitude of early Buddhism and interpreted it as meaning the non-essential character of all existence. Nothing existed, and therefore any question regarding the existence or non-existence of anything would be meaningless. There is no difference between the worldly stage (sa@msara) and Nibbana, for as all appearances are non-essential, they never existed during the sa@msara so that they could not be annihilated in Nibbana.

Upani@sads and Buddhism.

The Upani@sads had discovered that the true self was ananda (bliss) [Footnote ref 1]. We could suppose that early Buddhism tacitly presupposes some such idea. It was probably thought that if there was the self (atta) it must be bliss. The Upani@sads had asserted that the self(atman) was indestructible and eternal [Footnote ref 2]. If we are allowed



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[Footnote 1: Tait, II.5.]

[Footnote 2: B@rh. IV. 5. 14. Ka@tha V. 13.]

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to make explicit what was implicit in early Buddhism we could conceive it as holding that if there was the self it must be bliss, because it was eternal. This causal connection has not indeed been anywhere definitely pronounced in the Upani@sads, but he who carefully reads the Upani@sads cannot but think that the reason why the Upani@sads speak of the self as bliss is that it is eternal. But the converse statement that what was not eternal was sorrow does not appear to be emphasized clearly in the Upani@sads. The important postulate of the Buddha is that that which is changing is sorrow, and whatever is sorrow is not self [Footnote ref 1]. The point at which Buddhism parted from the Upani@sads lies in the experiences of the self. The Upani@sads doubtless considered that there were many experiences which we often identify with self, but which are impermanent. But the belief is found in the Upani@sads that there was associated with these a permanent part as well, and that it was this permanent essence which was the true and unchangeable self, the blissful. They considered that this permanent self as pure bliss could not be defined as this, but could only be indicated as not this, not this (neti neti) [Footnote ref 2]. But the early Pali scriptures hold that we could nowhere find out such a permanent essence, any constant self, in our changing experiences. All were but changing phenomena and therefore sorrow and therefore non-self, and what was non-self was not mine, neither I belonged to it, nor did it belong to me as my self [Footnote ref 3].

The true self was with the Upani@sads a matter of transcendental experience as it were, for they said that it could not be described in terms of anything, but could only be pointed out as "there," behind all the changing mental categories. The Buddha looked into the mind and saw that it did not exist. But how was it that the existence of this self was so widely spoken of as demonstrated in experience? To this the reply of the Buddha was that what people perceived there when they said that they perceived the self was but the mental experiences either individually or together. The ignorant ordinary man did not know the noble truths and was not trained in the way of wise men, and considered himself to be endowed with form (rupa) or found the forms in his self or the self in the forms. He

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[Footnote 1: Sa@myutta Nikuya, III. pp. 44-45 ff.]

[Footnote 2: See B@rh. IV. iv. Chandogya, VIII. 7-12.]

[Footnote 3: Sa@myutta Nikaya, III 45.]

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experienced the thought (of the moment) as it were the self or experienced himself as being endowed with thought, or the thought in the self or the self in the thought. It is these kinds of experiences that he considered as the perception of the self [Footnote ref 1].

The Upani@sads did not try to establish any school of discipline or systematic thought. They revealed throughout the dawn of an experience of an immutable Reality as the self of man, as the only abiding truth behind all changes. But Buddhism holds that this immutable self of man is a delusion and a false knowledge. The first postulate of the system is that impermanence is sorrow. Ignorance about sorrow, ignorance about the way it originates, ignorance about the nature of the extinction of sorrow, and ignorance about the means of bringing about this extinction represent the fourfold ignorance (avijja) [Footnote ref 2]. The avidya, which is equivalent to the Pali word avijja, occurs in the Upani@sads also, but there it means ignorance about the atman doctrine, and it is sometimes contrasted with vidya or true knowledge about the self (atman) [Footnote ref 3]. With the Upani@sads the highest truth was the permanent self, the bliss, but with the Buddha there was nothing permanent; and all was change; and all change and impermanence was sorrow [Footnote ref 4]. This is, then, the cardinal truth of Buddhism, and ignorance concerning it in the above fourfold ways represented the fourfold ignorance which stood in the way of the right comprehension of the fourfold cardinal truths (ariya sacca)—sorrow, cause of the origination of sorrow, extinction of sorrow, and the means thereto.

There is no Brahman or supreme permanent reality and no self, and this ignorance does not belong to any ego or self as we may ordinarily be led to suppose.

Thus it is said in the Visuddhimagga "inasmuch however as ignorance is empty of stability from being subject to a coming into existence and a disappearing from existence...and is empty of a self-determining Ego from being subject to dependence,—...or in other words inasmuch as ignorance is not an Ego, and similarly with reference to Karma and the rest—therefore is it to be understood of the wheel of existence that it is empty with a twelvefold emptiness [Footnote ref 5]."



[Footnote 1: Samyutta Nikaya, II. 46.]

[Footnote 2: Majjhima Nikaya, I.p. 54.]

[Footnote 3: Cha. I.i. 10. B@rh. IV. 3.20. There are some passages where vidya and avidya have been used in a different and rather obscure sense, I's'a 9-11.]

[Footnote 4: A@ng. Nikaya, III. 85.]

[Footnote 5 Warren's Buddhism in Translations (Visuddhimagga, chap. XVII.), p. 175.]

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The Schools of Theravada Buddhism.

There is reason to believe that the oral instructions of the Buddha were not collected until a few centuries after his death. Serious quarrels arose amongst his disciples or rather amongst the successive generations of the disciples of his disciples about his doctrines and other monastic rules which he had enjoined upon his followers. Thus we find that when the council of Vesali decided against the V@rjin monks, called also the Vajjiputtakas, they in their turn held another great meeting (Mahasa@ngha) and came to their own decisions about certain monastic rules and thus came to be called as the Mahasa@nghikas [Footnote ref 1]. According to Vasumitra as translated by Vassilief, the Mahasa@nghikas seceded in 400 B.C. and during the next one hundred years they gave rise first to the three schools Ekavyavaharikas, Lokottaravadins, and Kukkulikas and after that the Bahus'rutiyas. In the course of the next one hundred years, other schools rose out of it namely the Prajnaptivadins, Caittikas, Aparas'ailas and Uttaras'ailas. The Theravada or the Sthaviravada school which had convened the council of Vesali developed during the second and first century B.C. into a number of schools, viz. the Haimavatas, Dharmaguptikas, Mahis'asakas, Kas'yapiyas, Sa@nkrantikas (more well known as Sautrantikas) and the Vatsiputtriyas which latter was again split up into the Dharmottariyas, Bhadrayaniyas, Sammitiyas and Channagarikas. The main branch of the Theravada school was from the second century downwards known as the Hetuvadins or Sarvastivadins [Footnote ref 2]. The Mahabodhiva@msa identifies the Theravada school with the Vibhajjavadins. The commentator of the Kathavatthu who probably lived according to Mrs Rhys Davids sometime in the fifth century A.D. mentions a few other schools of Buddhists. But of all these Buddhist schools we know very little. Vasumitra (100 A.D.) gives us some very meagre accounts of



[Footnote 1: The Mahava@msa differs from Dipava@msa in holding that the Vajjiputtakas did not develop into the Mahasa@nghikas, but it was the Mahasa@nghikas who first seceded while the Vajjiputtakas seceded independently of them. The Mahabodhiva@msa, which according to Professor Geiger was composed 975 A.D.—1000 A.D., follows the Mahava@msa in holding the Mahasa@nghikas to be the first seceders and Vajjiputtakas to have seceded independently.

Vasumitra confuses the council of Vesali with the third council of Pa@taliputra. See introduction to translation of Kathavatthu by Mrs Rhys Davids.]

[Footnote 2: For other accounts of the schism see Mr Aung and Mrs Rhys Davids's translation of Kathavatthu, pp. xxxvi-xlv.]

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certain schools, of the Mahasa@nghikas, Lokottaravadins, Ekavyavaharikas, Kakkulikas, Prajnaptivadins and Sarvastivadins, but these accounts deal more with subsidiary matters of little philosophical importance. Some of the points of interest are (1) that the Mahasa@nghikas were said to believe that the body was filled with mind (citta) which was represented as sitting, (2) that the Prajnaptivadins held that there was no agent in man, that there was no untimely death, for it was caused by the previous deeds of man, (3) that the Sarvastivadins believed that everything existed. From the discussions found in the Kathavatthu also we may know the views of some of the schools on some points which are not always devoid of philosophical interest. But there is nothing to be found by which we can properly know the philosophy of these schools. It is quite possible however that these so-called schools of Buddhism were not so many different systems but only differed from one another on some points of dogma or practice which were considered as being of sufficient interest to them, but which to us now appear to be quite trifling. But as we do not know any of their literatures, it is better not to make any unwarrantable surmises. These schools are however not very important for a history of later Indian Philosophy, for none of them are even referred to in any of the systems of Hindu thought. The only schools of Buddhism with which other schools of philosophical thought came in direct contact, are the Sarvastivadins including the Sautrantikas and the Vaibha@sikas, the Yogacara or the Vijnanavadins and the Madhyamikas or the S'unyavadins. We do not know which of the diverse smaller schools were taken up into these four great schools, the Sautrantika, Vaibha@sika, Yogacara and the Madhyamika schools. But as these schools were most important in relation to the development of the different systems in Hindu thought, it is best that we should set ourselves to gather what we can about these systems of Buddhistic thought.

When the Hindu writers refer to the Buddhist doctrine in general terms such as "the Buddhists say" without calling them the Vijnanavadins or the Yogacaras and the S'unyavadins, they often refer to the Sarvustivudins by which they mean both the Sautruntikas and the Vaibhu@sikas, ignoring the difference that exists between these two schools. It is well to mention that there is hardly any evidence to prove that the Hindu writers were acquainted with the Theravuda doctrines

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as expressed in the Pali works. The Vaibha@sikas and the Sautrantikas have been more or less associated with each other. Thus the Abhidharmakos'as'astra of Vasubandhu who was a Vaibha@sika was commented upon by Yas'omitra who was a Sautrantika. The difference between the Vaibha@sikas and the Sautrantikas that attracted the notice of the Hindu writers was this, that the former believed that external objects were directly perceived, whereas the latter believed that the existence of the external objects could only be inferred from our diversified knowledge [Footnote ref 1]. Gu@naratna (fourteenth century A.D.) in his commentary Tarkarahasyadipika on @Sa@ddars'anasamuccaya says that the Vaibhasika was but another name of the Aryasammitiya school. According to Gu@naratna the Vaibha@sikas held that things existed for four moments, the moment of production, the moment of existence, the moment of decay and the moment of annihilation. It has been pointed out in Vastlbandhu's Abhidharmakos'a that the Vaibha@sikas believed these to be four kinds of forces which by coming in combination with the permanent essence of an entity produced its impermanent manifestations in life (see Prof. Stcherbatsky's translation of Yas'omitra on Abhidharmakos'a karika, V. 25). The self called pudgala also possessed those characteristics. Knowledge was formless and was produced along with its object by the very same conditions (arthasahabhasi ekasamagryadhinah). The Sautrantikas according to Gu@naratna held that there was no soul but only the five skandhas. These skandhas transmigrated. The past, the future, annihilation, dependence on cause, akas'a and pudgala are but names (sa@mjnamatram), mere assertions (pratijnamatram), mere limitations (samv@rtamatram) and mere phenomena (vyavaharamatram). By pudgala they meant that which other people called eternal and all pervasive soul. External objects are never directly perceived but are only inferred as existing for explaining the diversity of knowledge. Definite cognitions are valid; all compounded things are momentary (k@sa@nikah sarvasa@mskarah).



[Footnote 1: Madhavacarya's Sarvadars'anasa@mgraha, chapter II. S'astradipika, the discussions on Pratyak@sa, Amalananda's commentary (on Bhamati) Vedantakalpataru, p 286. "vaibha@sikasya bahyo'rtha@h pratyak@sa@h, sautrantikasya jnanagatakaravaicitrye@n anumeya@h." The nature of the inference of the Sautrantikas is shown thus by Amalananda (1247-1260 A.D.) "ye yasmin satyapi kadacitka@h te tadatiriktapek@sa@h" (those [i.e. cognitions] which in spite of certain unvaried conditions are of unaccounted diversity must depend on other things in addition to these, i.e. the external objects) Vedantakalpataru, p. 289.]

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The atoms of colour, taste, smell and touch, and cognition are being destroyed every moment. The meanings of words always imply the negations of all other things, excepting that which is intended to be signified by that word (anyapoha@h s'abdartha@h). Salvation (mok@sa) comes as the result of the destruction of the process of knowledge through continual meditation that there is no soul [Footnote ref 1].

One of the main differences between the Vibhajjavadins, Sautrantikas and the Vaibha@sikas or the Sarvastivadins appears to refer to the notion of time which is a subject of great interest with Buddhist philosophy. Thus Abhidharmakos'a (v. 24...) describes the Sarvastivadins as those who maintain the universal existence of everything past, present and future. The Vibhajjavadins are those "who maintain that the present elements and those among the past that have not yet produced their fruition, are existent, but they deny the existence of the future ones and of those among the past that have already produced fruition." There were four branches of this school represented by Dharmatrata, Gho@sa, Vasumitra and Buddhadeva. Dharmatrata maintained that when an element enters different times, its existence changes but not its essence, just as when milk is changed into curd or a golden vessel is broken, the form of the existence changes though the essence remains the same. Gho@sa held that "when an element appears at different times, the past one retains its past aspects without being severed from its future and present aspects, the present likewise retains its present aspect without completely losing its past and future aspects," just as a man in passionate love with a woman does not lose his capacity to love other women though he is not actually in love with them. Vasumitra held that an entity is called present, past and future according as it produces its efficiency, ceases to produce after having once produced it or has not yet begun to produce it. Buddhadeva maintained the view that just as the same woman may be called mother, daughter, wife, so the same entity may be called present, past or future in accordance with its relation to the preceding or the succeeding moment.

All these schools are in some sense Sarvastivadins, for they maintain universal existence. But the Vaibha@sika finds them all defective excepting the view of Vasumitra. For Dharmatrata's



[Footnote 1: Gu@naratna's Tarkarahasyadipika, pp. 46-47.]

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view is only a veiled Sa@mkhya doctrine; that of Gho@sa is a confusion of the notion of time, since it presupposes the coexistence of all the aspects of an entity at the same time, and that of Buddhadeva is also an impossible situation, since it would suppose that all the three times were found together and included in one of them. The Vaibha@sika finds himself in agreement with Vasumitra's view and holds that the difference in time depends upon the difference of the function of an entity; at the time when an entity does not actually produce its function it is future; when it produces it, it becomes present; when after having produced it, it stops, it becomes past; there is a real existence of the past and the future as much as of the present. He thinks that if the past did not exist and assert some efficiency it could not have been the object of my knowledge, and deeds done in past times could not have produced its effects in the present time. The Sautrantika however thought that the Vaibha@sika's doctrine would imply the heretical doctrine of eternal existence, for according to them the stuff remained the same and the time-difference appeared in it. The true view according to him was, that there was no difference between the efficiency of an entity, the entity and the time of its appearance. Entities appeared from non-existence, existed for a moment and again ceased to exist. He objected to the Vaibha@sika view that the past is to be regarded as existent because it exerts efficiency in bringing about the present on the ground that in that case there should be no difference between the past and the present, since both exerted efficiency. If a distinction is made between past, present and future efficiency by a second grade of efficiencies, then we should have to continue it and thus have a vicious infinite. We can know non-existent entities as much as we can know existent ones, and hence our knowledge of the past does not imply that the past is exerting any efficiency. If a distinction is made between an efficiency and an entity, then the reason why efficiency started at any particular time and ceased at another would be inexplicable. Once you admit that there is no difference between efficiency and the entity, you at once find that there is no time at all and the efficiency, the entity and the moment are all one and the same. When we remember a thing of the past we do not know it as existing in the past, but in the same way in which we knew it when it was present. We are

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never attracted to past passions as the Vaibha@sika suggests, but past passions leave residues which become the causes of new passions of the present moment [Footnote ref.1].

Again we can have a glimpse of the respective positions of the Vatsiputtriyas and the Sarvastivadins as represented by Vasubandhu if we attend to the discussion on the subject of the existence of soul in Abhidharmakos'a. The argument of Vasubandhu against the existence of soul is this, that though it is true that the sense organs may be regarded as a determining cause of perception, no such cause can be found which may render the inference of the existence of soul necessary. If soul actually exists, it must have an essence of its own and must be something different from the elements or entities of a personal life. Moreover, such an eternal, uncaused and unchanging being would be without any practical efficiency (arthakriyakaritva) which alone determines or proves existence. The soul can thus be said to have a mere nominal existence as a mere object of current usage. There is no soul, but there are only the elements of a personal life. But the Vatsiputtriya school held that just as fire could not be said to be either the same as the burning wood or as different from it, and yet it is separate from it, so the soul is an individual (pudgala) which has a separate existence, though we could not say that it was altogether different from the elements of a personal life or the same as these. It exists as being conditioned by the elements of personal life, but it cannot further be defined. But its existence cannot be denied, for wherever there is an activity, there must be an agent (e.g. Devadatta walks). To be conscious is likewise an action, hence the agent who is conscious must also exist. To this Vasubandhu replies that Devadatta (the name of a person) does not represent an unity. "It is only an unbroken continuity of momentary forces (flashing into existence), which simple people believe to be a unity and to which they give the name Devadatta. Their belief that Devadatta moves is conditioned, and is based on an analogy with their own experience, but their own continuity of life consists in constantly moving from one place to another. This movement, though regarded as



[Footnote 1: I am indebted for the above account to the unpublished translation from Tibetan of a small portion of Abhidharmakoia by my esteemed friend Prof. Th. Stcherbatsky of Petrograd. I am grateful to him that he allowed me to utilize it.]

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belonging to a permanent entity, is but a series of new productions in different places, just as the expressions 'fire moves,' 'sound spreads' have the meaning of continuities (of new productions in new places). They likewise use the words 'Devadatta cognises' in order to express the fact that a cognition (takes place in the present moment) which has a cause (in the former moments, these former moments coming in close succession being called Devadatta)."

The problem of memory also does not bring any difficulty, for the stream of consciousness being one throughout, it produces its recollections when connected with a previous knowledge of the remembered object under certain conditions of attention, etc., and absence of distractive factors, such as bodily pains or violent emotions. No agent is required in the phenomena of memory. The cause of recollection is a suitable state of mind and nothing else. When the Buddha told his birth stories saying that he was such and such in such and such a life, he only meant that his past and his present belonged to one and the same lineage of momentary existences. Just as when we say "this same fire which had been consuming that has reached this object," we know that the fire is not identical at any two moments, but yet we overlook the difference and say that it is the same fire. Again, what we call an individual can only be known by descriptions such as "this venerable man, having this name, of such a caste, of such a family, of such an age, eating such food, finding pleasure or displeasure in such things, of such an age, the man who after a life of such length, will pass away having reached an age." Only so much description can be understood, but we have never a direct acquaintance with the individual; all that is perceived are the momentary elements of sensations, images, feelings, etc., and these happening at the former moments exert a pressure on the later ones. The individual is thus only a fiction, a mere nominal existence, a mere thing of description and not of acquaintance; it cannot be grasped either by the senses or by the action of pure intellect. This becomes evident when we judge it by analogies from other fields. Thus whenever we use any common noun, e.g. milk, we sometimes falsely think that there is such an entity as milk, but what really exists is only certain momentary colours, tastes, etc., fictitiously unified as milk; and "just as milk and water are

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conventional names (for a set of independent elements) for some colour, smell (taste and touch) taken together, so is the designation 'individual' but a common name for the different elements of which it is composed."

The reason why the Buddha declined to decide the question whether the "living being is identical with the body or not" is just because there did not exist any living being as "individual," as is generally supposed. He did not declare that the living being did not exist, because in that case the questioner would have thought that the continuity of the elements of a life was also denied. In truth the "living being" is only a conventional name for a set of constantly changing elements [Footnote ref 1].

The only book of the Sammitiyas known to us and that by name only is the Sammitiyas'astra translated into Chinese between 350 A.D. to 431 A.D.; the original Sanskrit works are however probably lost [Footnote ref 2].

The Vaibha@sikas are identified with the Sarvastivadins who according to Dipava@msa V. 47, as pointed out by Takakusu, branched off from the Mahis'asakas, who in their turn had separated from the Theravada school.

From the Kathavatthu we know (1) that the Sabbatthivadins believed that everything existed, (2) that the dawn of right attainment was not a momentary flash of insight but by a gradual process, (3) that consciousness or even samadhi was nothing but



[Footnote 1: This account is based on the translation of A@s@tamakos'asthananibaddha@h pudgolavinis'caya@h, a special appendix to the eighth chapter of Abhidharmakos'a, by Prof Th. Stcherbatsky, Bulletin de l' Academie des Sciences de Russie, 1919.]

[Footnote 2: Professor De la Vallee Poussin has collected some of the points of this doctrine in an article on the Sammitiyas in the E. R.E. He there says that in the Abhidharmakos'avyakhya the Sammitiyas have been identified with the Vatsiputtriyas and that many of its texts were admitted by the Vaibha@sikas of a later age. Some of their views are as follows: (1) An arhat in possession of nirvana can fall away; (2) there is an intermediate state between death and rebirth called antarabhava; (3) merit accrues not only by gift (tyaganvaya) but also by the fact of the actual use and advantage reaped by the man to whom the thing was given (paribhoganvaya pu@nya); (4) not only abstention from evil deeds but a declaration of intention to that end produces merit by itself alone; (5) they believe in a pudgala (soul) as distinct from the skandhas from which it can be said to be either different or non-different. "The pudgala cannot be said to be transitory (anitye) like the skandhas since it transmigrates laying down the burden (skandhas) shouldering a new burden; it cannot be said to be permanent, since it is made of transitory constituents." This pudgala doctrine of the Sammitiyas as sketched by Professor De la Vallee Poussin is not in full agreement with the pudgala doctrine of the Sammitiyas as sketched by Gu@naratna which we have noticed above.]

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a flux and (4) that an arhat (saint) may fall away [Footnote ref 1]. The Sabbatthivadins or Sarvastivadins have a vast Abhidharma literature still existing in Chinese translations which is different from the Abhidharma of the Theravada school which we have already mentioned [Footnote ref 2]. These are 1. Jnanaprasthana S'astra of Katyayaniputtra which passed by the name of Maha Vibha@sa from which the Sabbatthivadins who followed it are called Vaibha@sikas [Footnote ref 3]. This work is said to have been given a literary form by As'vagho@sa. 2. Dharmaskandha by S'ariputtra. 3. Dhatukaya by Pur@na. 4. Prajnaptis'astra by Maudgalyayana. 5. Vijnanakaya by Devak@sema. 6. Sa@ngitiparyyaya by Sariputtra and Prakara@napada by Vasumitra. Vasubandhu (420 A.D.-500 A.D.) wrote a work on the Vaibha@sika [Footnote ref 4] system in verses (karika) known as the Abhidharmakos'a, to which he appended a commentary of his own which passes by the name Abhidharma Kos'abha@sya in which he pointed out some of the defects of the Vaibha@sika school from the Sautrantika point of view [Footnote ref 5]. This work was commented upon by Vasumitra and Gu@namati and later on by Yas'omitra who was himself a Sautrantika and called his work Abhidharmakos'a vyakhya; Sa@nghabhadra a contemporary of Vasubandhu wrote Samayapradipa and Nyayanusara (Chinese translations of which are available) on strict Vaibha@sika lines. We hear also of other Vaibha@sika writers such as Dharmatrata, Gho@saka, Vasumitra and Bhadanta, the writer of Sa@myuktabhidharmas'astra and Mahavibha@sa. Di@nnaga(480 A.D.), the celebrated logician, a Vaibha@sika or a Sautrantika and reputed to be a pupil of Vasubandhu, wrote his famous work Prama@nasamuccaya in which he established Buddhist logic and refuted many of the views of Vatsyayana the celebrated commentator of the Nyaya sutras; but we regret



[Footnote 1: See Mrs Rhys Davids's translation Kathavatthu, p. xix, and Sections I.6,7; II. 9 and XI. 6.]

[Footnote 2: Mahavyutpatti gives two names for Sarvastivada, viz. Mulasarvastivada and Aryyasarvastivada. Itsing (671-695 A.D.) speaks of Aryyamulasarvastivada and Mulasarvastivada. In his time he found it prevailing in Magadha, Guzrat, Sind, S. India, E. India. Takakusu says (P.T.S. 1904-1905) that Paramartha, in his life of Vasubandhu, says that it was propagated from Kashmere to Middle India by Vasubhadra, who studied it there.]

[Footnote 3: Takakusu says (P.T.S. 1904-1905) that Katyayaniputtra's work was probably a compilation from other Vibha@sas which existed before the Chinese translations and Vibha@sa texts dated 383 A.D.]

[Footnote 4: See Takakusu's article J.R.A.S. 1905.]

[Footnote 5: The Sautrantikas did not regard the Abhidharmas of the Vaibha@sikas as authentic and laid stress on the suttanta doctrines as given in the Suttapi@taka.]

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to say that none of the above works are available in Sanskrit, nor have they been retranslated from Chinese or Tibetan into any of the modern European or Indian languages.

The Japanese scholar Mr Yamakami Sogen, late lecturer at Calcutta University, describes the doctrine of the Sabbatthivadins from the Chinese versions of the Abhidharmakos'a, Mahavibha@sas'astra, etc., rather elaborately [Footnote ref 1]. The following is a short sketch, which is borrowed mainly from the accounts given by Mr Sogen.

The Sabbatthivadins admitted the five skandhas, twelve ayatanas, eighteen dhatus, the three asa@msk@rta dharmas of pratisa@mkhyanirodha apratisa@mkhyanirodha and akas'a, and the sa@msk@rta dharmas (things composite and interdependent) of rupa (matter), citta (mind), caitta (mental) and cittaviprayukta (non-mental) [Footnote ref 2]. All effects are produced by the coming together (sa@msk@rta) of a number of causes. The five skandhas, and the rupa, citta, etc., are thus called sa@msk@rta dharmas (composite things or collocations—sambhuyakari). The rupa dharmas are eleven in number, one citta dharma, 46 caitta dharmas and 14 cittaviprayukta sa@mskara dharmas (non-mental composite things); adding to these the three asa@msk@rta dharmas we have the seventy-five dharmas. Rupa is that which has the capacity to obstruct the sense organs. Matter is regarded as the collective organism or collocation, consisting of the fourfold substratum of colour, smell, taste and contact. The unit possessing this fourfold substratum is known as parama@nu, which is the minutest form of rupa. It cannot be pierced through or picked up or thrown away. It is indivisible, unanalysable, invisible, inaudible, untastable and intangible. But yet it is not permanent, but is like a momentary flash into being. The simple atoms are called dravyaparama@nu and the compound ones sa@mghataparama@nu. In the words of Prof. Stcherbatsky "the universal elements of matter are manifested in their actions or functions. They are consequently more energies than substances." The organs of sense are also regarded as modifications of atomic matter. Seven such parama@nus combine together to form an a@nu, and it is in this combined form only that they become perceptible. The combination takes place in the form of a cluster having one atom at the centre and



[Footnote 1: Systems of Buddhistic Thought, published by the Calcutta University.]

[Footnote 2: S'a@nkara in his meagre sketch of the doctrine of the Sarvastivadins in his bha@sya on the Brahma-sutras II. 2 notices some of the categories mentioned by Sogen.]

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others around it. The point which must be remembered in connection with the conception of matter is this, that the qualities of all the mahabhutas are inherent in the parama@nus. The special characteristics of roughness (which naturally belongs to earth), viscousness (which naturally belongs to water), heat (belonging to fire), movableness (belonging to wind), combine together to form each of the elements; the difference between the different elements consists only in this, that in each of them its own special characteristics were predominant and active, and other characteristics though present remained only in a potential form. The mutual resistance of material things is due to the quality of earth or the solidness inherent in them; the mutual attraction of things is due to moisture or the quality of water, and so forth. The four elements are to be observed from three aspects, namely, (1) as things, (2) from the point of view of their natures (such as activity, moisture, etc.), and (3) function (such as dh@rti or attraction, sa@mgraha or cohesion, pakti or chemical heat, and vyuhana or clustering and collecting). These combine together naturally by other conditions or causes. The main point of distinction between the Vaibha@sika Sarvastivadins and other forms of Buddhism is this, that here the five skandhas and matter are regarded as permanent and eternal; they are said to be momentary only in the sense that they are changing their phases constantly, owing to their constant change of combination. Avidya is not regarded here as a link in the chain of the causal series of pratityasamutpada; nor is it ignorance of any particular individual, but is rather identical with "moha" or delusion and represents the ultimate state of immaterial dharmas. Avidya, which through sa@mskara, etc., produces namarupa in the case of a particular individual, is not his avidya in the present existence but the avidya of his past existence bearing fruit in the present life.

"The cause never perishes but only changes its name, when it becomes an effect, having changed its state." For example, clay becomes jar, having changed its state; and in this case the name clay is lost and the name jar arises [Footnote ref 1]. The Sarvastivadins allowed simultaneousness between cause and effect only in the case of composite things (sa@mprayukta hetu) and in the case of

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[Footnote 1: Sogen's quotation from Kumarajiva's Chinese version of Aryyadeva's commentary on the Madhyamika s'astra (chapter XX. Karika 9).]

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the interaction of mental and material things. The substratum of "vijnana" or "consciousness" is regarded as permanent and the aggregate of the five senses (indriyas) is called the perceiver. It must be remembered that the indriyas being material had a permanent substratum, and their aggregate had therefore also a substratum formed of them.

The sense of sight grasps the four main colours of blue, yellow, red, white, and their combinations, as also the visual forms of appearance (sa@msthana) of long, short, round, square, high, low, straight, and crooked. The sense of touch (kayendriya) has for its object the four elements and the qualities of smoothness, roughness, lightness, heaviness, cold, hunger and thirst. These qualities represent the feelings generated in sentient beings by the objects of touch, hunger, thirst, etc., and are also counted under it, as they are the organic effects produced by a touch which excites the physical frame at a time when the energy of wind becomes active in our body and predominates over other energies; so also the feeling of thirst is caused by a touch which excites the physical frame when the energy of the element of fire becomes active and predominates over the other energies. The indriyas (senses) can after grasping the external objects arouse thought (vijnana); each of the five senses is an agent without which none of the five vijnanas would become capable of perceiving an external object. The essence of the senses is entirely material. Each sense has two subdivisions, namely, the principal sense and the auxiliary sense. The substratum of the principal senses consists of a combination of parama@nus, which are extremely pure and minute, while the substratum of the latter is the flesh, made of grosser materials. The five senses differ from one another with respect to the manner and form of their respective atomic combinations. In all sense-acts, whenever an act is performed and an idea is impressed, a latent energy is impressed on our person which is designated as avijnapti rupa. It is called rupa because it is a result or effect of rupa-contact; it is called avijnapti because it is latent and unconscious; this latent energy is bound sooner or later to express itself in karma effects and is the only bridge which connects the cause and the effect of karma done by body or speech. Karma in this school is considered as twofold, namely, that as thought (cetana karma) and that as activity (caitasika karma). This last, again, is of two kinds, viz.

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that due to body-motion (kayika karma) and speech (vacika karma). Both these may again be latent (avijnapti) and patent (vijnapti), giving us the kayika-vijnnpti karma, kayikavijnapti karma, vacika-vijnapti karma and vacikavijnapti karma. Avijnapti rupa and avijnapti karma are what we should call in modern phraseology sub-conscious ideas, feelings and activity. Corresponding to each conscious sensation, feeling, thought or activity there is another similar sub-conscious state which expresses itself in future thoughts and actions; as these are not directly known but are similar to those which are known, they are called avijnapti.

The mind, says Vasubandhu, is called cittam, because it wills (cetati), manas because it thinks (manvate) and vijnana because it discriminates (nirdis'ati). The discrimination may be of three kinds: (1) svabhava nirdes'a (natural perceptual discrimination), (2) prayoga nirdes'a (actual discrimination as present, past and future), and (3) anusm@rti nirdes'a (reminiscent discrimination referring only to the past). The senses only possess the svabhava nirdes'a, the other two belong exclusively to manovijnana. Each of the vijnanas as associated with its specific sense discriminates its particular object and perceives its general characteristics; the six vijnanas combine to form what is known as the Vijnanaskandha, which is presided over by mind (mano). There are forty-six caitta sa@msk@rta dharmas. Of the three asa@msk@rta dharmas akas'a (ether) is in essence the freedom from obstruction, establishing it as a permanent omnipresent immaterial substance (nirupakhya, non-rupa). The second asa@msk@rta dharma, apratisa@mkhya nirodha, means the non-perception of dharmas caused by the absence of pratyayas or conditions. Thus when I fix my attention on one thing, other things are not seen then, not because they are non-existent but because the conditions which would have made them visible were absent. The third asa@msk@rta dharma, pratisa@mkhya nirodha, is the final deliverance from bondage. Its essential characteristic is everlastingness. These are called asa@msk@rta because being of the nature of negation they are non-collocative and hence have no production or dissolution. The eightfold noble path which leads to this state consists of right views, right aspirations, right speech, right conduct, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, right rapture [Footnote ref 1].



[Footnote 1: Mr Sogen mentions the name of another Buddhist Hinayana thinker (about 250 A.D.), Harivarman, who founded a school known as Satyasiddhi school, which propounded the same sort of doctrines as those preached by Nagarjuna. None of his works are available in Sanskrit and I have never come across any allusion to his name by Sanskrit writers.]

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Mahayanism.

It is difficult to say precisely at what time Mahayanism took its rise. But there is reason to think that as the Mahasa@nghikas separated themselves from the Theravadins probably some time in 400 B.C. and split themselves up into eight different schools, those elements of thoughts and ideas which in later days came to be labelled as Mahayana were gradually on the way to taking their first inception. We hear in about 100 A.D. of a number of works which are regarded as various Mahayana sutras, some of which are probably as old as at least 100 B.C. (if not earlier) and others as late as 300 or 400 A.D.[Footnote ref 1]. These Mahayanasutras, also called the Vaipulyasutras, are generally all in the form of instructions given by the Buddha. Nothing is known about their authors or compilers, but they are all written in some form of Sanskrit and were probably written by those who seceded from the Theravada school.

The word Hinayana refers to the schools of Theravada, and as such it is contrasted with Mahayana. The words are generally translated as small vehicle (hina = small, yana = vehicle) and great vehicle (maha = great, yana = vehicle). But this translation by no means expresses what is meant by Mahayana and Hinayana [Footnote ref 2]. Asa@nga (480 A.D.) in his Mahayanasutrala@mkara gives

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[Footnote 1: Quotations and references to many of these sutras are found in Candrakirtti's commentary on the _Madhyamika karikas_ of Nagarjuna; some of these are the following: _A@s@tasahasrikaprajnaparamita_ (translated into Chinese 164 A.D.-167 A.D.), _S'atasahasrikaprajnaparamita, Gaganaganja, Samadhisutra, Tathagataguhyasutra, D@r@dhadhyas'ayasancodanasutra, Dhyayitamu@s@tisutra, Pitaputrasamagamasutra, Mahayanasutra, Maradamanasutra, Ratnaku@tasutra, Ratnacu@daparip@rcchasutra, Ratnameghasutra, Ratnaras'isutra, Ratnakarasutra, Ra@s@trapalaparip@rcchasutra, La@nkavatarasutra, Lalitavistarasutra, Vajracchedikasutra, Vimalakirttinirdes'asutra, S'alistambhasutra, Samadhirajasutra, Sukhavativyuha, Suvar@naprabhasasutra, Saddharmapu@n@darika (translated into Chinese A.D. 255), Amitayurdhyanasutra, Hastikakhyasutra, etc.]

[Footnote 2: The word Yana is generally translated as vehicle, but a consideration of numerous contexts in which the word occurs seems to suggest that it means career or course or way, rather than vehicle (Lalitavistara, pp. 25, 38; Prajnaparamita, pp. 24, 319; Samadhirajasutra, p. 1; Karu@napu@ndarika, p. 67; La@nkavatarasutra, pp. 68, 108, 132). The word Yana is as old as the Upani@sads where we read of Devayana and Pit@ryana. There is no reason why this word should be taken in a different sense. We hear in La@nkavatara of S'ravakayana (career of the S'ravakas or the Theravadin Buddhists), Pratyekabuddhayana (the career of saints before the coming of the Buddha), Buddha yana (career of the Buddhas), Ekayana (one career), Devayana (career of the gods), Brahmayana (career of becoming a Brahma), Tathagatayana (career of a Tathagata). In one place Lankavatara says that ordinarily distinction is made between the three careers and one career and no career, but these distinctions are only for the ignorant (Lankavatara, p. 68).]

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us the reason why one school was called Hinayana whereas the other, which he professed, was called Mahayana. He says that, considered from the point of view of the ultimate goal of religion, the instructions, attempts, realization, and time, the Hinayana occupies a lower and smaller place than the other called Maha (great) Yana, and hence it is branded as Hina (small, or low). This brings us to one of the fundamental points of distinction between Hinayana and Mahayana. The ultimate good of an adherent of the Hinayana is to attain his own nirva@na or salvation, whereas the ultimate goal of those who professed the Mahayana creed was not to seek their own salvation but to seek the salvation of all beings. So the Hinayana goal was lower, and in consequence of that the instructions that its followers received, the attempts they undertook, and the results they achieved were narrower than that of the Mahayana adherents. A Hinayana man had only a short business in attaining his own salvation, and this could be done in three lives, whereas a Mahayana adherent was prepared to work for infinite time in helping all beings to attain salvation. So the Hinayana adherents required only a short period of work and may from that point of view also be called hina, or lower.

This point, though important from the point of view of the difference in the creed of the two schools, is not so from the point of view of philosophy. But there is another trait of the Mahayanists which distinguishes them from the Hinayanists from the philosophical point of view. The Mahayanists believed that all things were of a non-essential and indefinable character and void at bottom, whereas the Hinayanists only believed in the impermanence of all things, but did not proceed further than that.

It is sometimes erroneously thought that Nagarjuna first preached the doctrine of S'unyavada (essencelessness or voidness of all appearance), but in reality almost all the Mahayana sutras either definitely preach this doctrine or allude to it. Thus if we take some of those sutras which were in all probability earlier than Nagarjuna, we find that the doctrine which Nagarjuna expounded

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with all the rigour of his powerful dialectic was quietly accepted as an indisputable truth. Thus we find Subhuti saying to the Buddha that vedana (feeling), samjna (concepts) and the sa@mskaras (conformations) are all maya (illusion) [Footnote ref 1]. All the skandhas, dhaetus (elements) and ayatanas are void and absolute cessation. The highest knowledge of everything as pure void is not different from the skandhas, dhatus and ayatanas, and this absolute cessation of dharmas is regarded as the highest knowledge (prajnaparamita) [Footnote ref 2]. Everything being void there is in reality no process and no cessation. The truth is neither eternal (s'as'vata) nor non-eternal (as'as'vata) but pure void. It should be the object of a saint's endeavour to put himself in the "thatness" (tathata) and consider all things as void. The saint (bodhisattva) has to establish himself in all the virtues (paramita), benevolence (danaparamita), the virtue of character (s'ilaparamita), the virtue of forbearance (k@santiparamita), the virtue of tenacity and strength (viryyaparamita) and the virtue of meditation (dhyanaparamita). The saint (bodhisattva) is firmly determined that he will help an infinite number of souls to attain nirva@na. In reality, however, there are no beings, there is no bondage, no salvation; and the saint knows it but too well, yet he is not afraid of this high truth, but proceeds on his career of attaining for all illusory beings illusory emancipation from illusory bondage. The saint is actuated with that feeling and proceeds in his work on the strength of his paramitas, though in reality there is no one who is to attain salvation in reality and no one who is to help him to attain it [Footnote ref 3]. The true prajnaparamita is the absolute cessation of all appearance (ya@h anupalambha@h sarvadharma@nam sa prajnaparamita ityucyate) [Footnote ref 4].

The Mahayana doctrine has developed on two lines, viz. that of S'unyavada or the Madhyamika doctrine and Vijnanavada. The difference between S'unyavada and Vijnanavada (the theory that there is only the appearance of phenomena of consciousness) is not fundamental, but is rather one of method. Both of them agree in holding that there is no truth in anything, everything is only passing appearance akin to dream or magic. But while the S'unyavadins were more busy in showing this indefinableness of all phenomena, the Vijnanavadins, tacitly accepting

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[Footnote 1: A@s@tesahasiihaprajnaparamita, p. 16.]

[Footnote 2: Ibid p. 177.]

[Footnote 3: Ibid p. 21.]

[Footnote 4: Ibid p. 177.]

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the truth preached by the S'unyavadins, interested themselves in explaining the phenomena of consciousness by their theory of beginningless illusory root-ideas or instincts of the mind (vasana).

As'vagho@sa (100 A.D.) seems to have been the greatest teacher of a new type of idealism (vijnanavada) known as the Tathata philosophy. Trusting in Suzuki's identification of a quotation in As'vagho@sa's S'raddhotpadas'astra as being made from La@nkavatarasutra, we should think of the La@nkavatarasutra as being one of the early works of the Vijnanavadins [Footnote ref 1]. The greatest later writer of the Vijnanavada school was Asa@nga (400 A.D.), to whom are attributed the Saptadas'abhumi sutra, Mahayana sutra, Upades'a, Mahayanasamparigraha s'astra, Yogacarabhumi s'astra and Mahayanasutrala@mkara. None of these works excepting the last one is available to readers who have no access to the Chinese and Tibetan manuscripts, as the Sanskrit originals are in all probability lost. The Vijnanavada school is known to Hindu writers by another name also, viz. Yogacara, and it does not seem an improbable supposition that Asa@nga's Yogacarabhumi s'astra was responsible for the new name. Vasubandhu, a younger brother of Asa@nga, was, as Paramartha (499-569) tells us, at first a liberal Sarvastivadin, but was converted to Vijnanavada, late in his life, by Asa@nga. Thus Vasubandhu, who wrote in his early life the great standard work of the Sarvastivadins, Abhidharmakos'a, devoted himself in his later life to Vijnanavada [Footnote ref 2]. He is said to have commented upon a number of Mahayana sutras, such as Avata@msaka, Nirva@na, Saddharmapu@n@darika, Prajnaparamita, Vimalakirtti and S'rimalasi@mhanada, and compiled some Mahayana sutras, such as Vijnanamatrasiddhi, Ratnatraya, etc. The school of Vijnanavada continued for at least a century or two after Vasubandhu, but we are not in possession of any work of great fame of this school after him.

We have already noticed that the S'unyavada formed the fundamental principle of all schools of Mahayana. The most powerful exponent of this doctrine was Nagarjuna (1OO A.D.), a brief account of whose system will be given in its proper place. Nagarjuna's karikas (verses) were commented upon by Aryyadeva, a disciple of his, Kumarajiva (383 A.D.). Buddhapalita and Candrakirtti (550 A.D.). Aryyadeva in addition to this commentary wrote at

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[Footnote 1: Dr S.C. Vidyabhushana thinks that Lankavatana belongs to about 300 A.D.]

[Footnote 2: Takakusu's "A study of the Paramartha's life of Vasubandhu," J.R.A.S. 1905.]

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least three other books, viz. Catu@hs'ataka, Hastabalaprakara@nav@rtti and Cittavis'uddhiprakara@na [Footnote ref 1]. In the small work called Hastabalaprakara@nav@rtti Aryyadeva says that whatever depends for its existence on anything else may be proved to be illusory; all our notions of external objects depend on space perceptions and notions of part and whole and should therefore be regarded as mere appearance. Knowing therefore that all that is dependent on others for establishing itself is illusory, no wise man should feel attachment or antipathy towards these mere phenomenal appearances. In his Cittavis'uddhiprakara@na he says that just as a crystal appears to be coloured, catching the reflection of a coloured object, even so the mind though in itself colourless appears to show diverse colours by coloration of imagination (vikalpa). In reality the mind (citta) without a touch of imagination (kalpana) in it is the pure reality.

It does not seem however that the S'unyavadins could produce any great writers after Candrakirtti. References to S'unyavada show that it was a living philosophy amongst the Hindu writers until the time of the great Mima@msa authority Kumarila who flourished in the eighth century; but in later times the S'unyavadins were no longer occupying the position of strong and active disputants.

The Tathataa Philosophy of As'vagho@sa (80 A.D.) [Footnote ref 2].

As'vagho@sa was the son of a Brahmin named Sai@mhaguhya who spent his early days in travelling over the different parts of India and defeating the Buddhists in open debates. He was probably converted to Buddhism by Par@sva who was an important person in the third Buddhist Council promoted, according to some authorities, by the King of Kashmere and according to other authorities by Pu@nyayas'as [Footnote ref 3].



[Footnote 1: Aryyadeva's Hastabalaprakara@nav@rtti has been reclaimed by Dr. F.W. Thomas. Fragmentary portions of his Cittavis'uddhiprakara@na were published by Mahamahopadhyaya Haraprasada s'astri in the Bengal Asiatic Society's journal, 1898.]

[Footnote 2: The above section is based on the Awakening of Faith, an English translation by Suzuki of the Chinese version of S'raddhotpadas'astra by As'vagho@sa, the Sanskrit original of which appears to have been lost. Suzuki has brought forward a mass of evidence to show that As'vagho@sa was a contemporary of Kani@ska.]

[Footnote 3: Taranatha says that he was converted by Aryadeva, a disciple of Nagarjuna, Geschichte des Buddhismus, German translation by Schiefner, pp. 84-85. See Suzuki's Awakening of Faith, pp. 24-32. As'vagho@sa wrote the Buddhacaritakavya, of great poetical excellence, and the Mahala@mkaras'astra. He was also a musician and had invented a musical instrument called Rastavara that he might by that means convert the people of the city. "Its melody was classical, mournful, and melodious, inducing the audience to ponder on the misery, emptiness, and non-atmanness of life." Suzuki, p. 35.]

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He held that in the soul two aspects may be distinguished —the aspect as thatness (bhutatathata) and the aspect as the cycle of birth and death (sa@msara). The soul as bhutatathata means the oneness of the totality of all things (dharmadhatu). Its essential nature is uncreate and external. All things simply on account of the beginningless traces of the incipient and unconscious memory of our past experiences of many previous lives (sm@rti) appear under the forms of individuation [Footnote ref 1]. If we could overcome this sm@rti "the signs of individuation would disappear and there would be no trace of a world of objects." "All things in their fundamental nature are not nameable or explicable. They cannot be adequately expressed in any form of language. They possess absolute sameness (samata). They are subject neither to transformation nor to destruction. They are nothing but one soul" —thatness (bhutatathata). This "thatness" has no attribute and it can only be somehow pointed out in speech as "thatness." As soon as you understand that when the totality of existence is spoken of or thought of, there is neither that which speaks nor that which is spoken of, there is neither that which thinks nor that which is thought of, "this is the stage of thatness." This bhutatathata is neither that which is existence, nor that which is non-existence, nor that which is at once existence and non-existence, nor that which is not at once existence and non-existence; it is neither that which is plurality, nor that which is at once unity and plurality, nor that which is not at once unity and plurality. It is a negative concept in the sense that it is beyond all that is conditional and yet it is a positive concept in the sense that it holds all within it. It cannot be comprehended by any kind of particularization or distinction. It is only by transcending the range of our intellectual categories of the comprehension of the limited range of finite phenomena that we can get a glimpse of it. It cannot be comprehended by the particularizing consciousness of all beings, and we thus may call it negation, "s'unyata," in this sense. The truth is that which



[Footnote 1: I have ventured to translate "sm@rti" in the sense of vasana in preference to Suzuki's "confused subjectivity" because sm@rti in the sense of vasana is not unfamiliar to the readers of such Buddhist works as La@nkavatara. The word "subjectivity" seems to be too European a term to be used as a word to represent the Buddhist sense.]

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subjectively does not exist by itself, that the negation (s'unyata) is also void (s'unya) in its nature, that neither that which is negated nor that which negates is an independent entity. It is the pure soul that manifests itself as eternal, permanent, immutable, and completely holds all things within it. On that account it may be called affirmation. But yet there is no trace of affirmation in it, because it is not the product of the creative instinctive memory (sm@rti) of conceptual thought and the only way of grasping the truth—the thatness, is by transcending all conceptual creations.

"The soul as birth and death (sa@msara) comes forth from the Tathagata womb (tathagatagarbha), the ultimate reality. But the immortal and the mortal coincide with each other. Though they are not identical they are not duality either. Thus when the absolute soul assumes a relative aspect by its self-affirmation it is called the all-conserving mind (alayavijnana). It embraces two principles, (1) enlightenment, (2) non-enlightenment. Enlightenment is the perfection of the mind when it is free from the corruptions of the creative instinctive incipient memory (sm@rti). It penetrates all and is the unity of all (dharmadhatu). That is to say, it is the universal dharmakaya of all Tathagatas constituting the ultimate foundation of existence.

"When it is said that all consciousness starts from this fundamental truth, it should not be thought that consciousness had any real origin, for it was merely phenomenal existence—a mere imaginary creation of the perceivers under the influence of the delusive sm@rti. The multitude of people (bahujana) are said to be lacking in enlightenment, because ignorance (avidya) prevails there from all eternity, because there is a constant succession of sm@rti (past confused memory working as instinct) from which they have never been emancipated. But when they are divested of this sm@rti they can then recognize that no states of mentation, viz. their appearance, presence, change and disappearance, have any reality. They are neither in a temporal nor in a spatial relation with the one soul, for they are not self-existent.

"This high enlightenment shows itself imperfectly in our corrupted phenomenal experience as prajna (wisdom) and karma (incomprehensible activity of life). By pure wisdom we understand that when one, by virtue of the perfuming power of dharma, disciplines himself truthfully (i.e. according to the dharma), and accomplishes meritorious deeds, the mind (i.e. the alayavijnana)

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which implicates itself with birth and death will be broken down and the modes of the evolving consciousness will be annulled, and the pure and the genuine wisdom of the Dharmakaya will manifest itself. Though all modes of consciousness and mentation are mere products of ignorance, ignorance in its ultimate nature is identical and non-identical with enlightenment; and therefore ignorance is in one sense destructible, though in another sense it is indestructible. This may be illustrated by the simile of the water and the waves which are stirred up in the ocean. Here the water can be said to be both identical and non-identical with the waves. The waves are stirred up by the wind, but the water remains the same. When the wind ceases the motion of the waves subsides, but the water remains the same. Likewise when the mind of all creatures, which in its own nature is pure and clean, is stirred up by the wind of ignorance (avidya), the waves of mentality (vijnana) make their appearance. These three (i.e. the mind, ignorance, and mentality) however have no existence, and they are neither unity nor plurality. When the ignorance is annihilated, the awakened mentality is tranquillized, whilst the essence of the wisdom remains unmolested." The truth or the enlightenment "is absolutely unobtainable by any modes of relativity or by any outward signs of enlightenment. All events in the phenomenal world are reflected in enlightenment, so that they neither pass out of it, nor enter into it, and they neither disappear nor are destroyed." It is for ever cut off from the hindrances both affectional (kles'avara@na) and intellectual (jneyavara@na), as well as from the mind (i.e. alayavijnana) which implicates itself with birth and death, since it is in its true nature clean, pure, eternal, calm, and immutable. The truth again is such that it transforms and unfolds itself wherever conditions are favourable in the form of a tathagata or in some other forms, in order that all beings may be induced thereby to bring their virtue to maturity.

"Non-elightenment has no existence of its own aside from its relation with enlightenment a priori." But enlightenment a priori is spoken of only in contrast to non-enlightenment, and as non-enlightenment is a non-entity, true enlightenment in turn loses its significance too. They are distinguished only in mutual relation as enlightenment or non-enlightenment. The manifestations of non-enlightenment are made in three ways: (1) as a disturbance of the mind (alayavijnana), by the avidyakarma (ignorant

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action), producing misery (du@hkha); (2) by the appearance of an ego or of a perceiver; and (3) by the creation of an external world which does not exist in itself, independent of the perceiver. Conditioned by the unreal external world six kinds of phenomena arise in succession. The first phenomenon is intelligence (sensation); being affected by the external world the mind becomes conscious of the difference between the agreeable and the disagreeable. The second phenomenon is succession. Following upon intelligence, memory retains the sensations, agreeable as well as disagreeable, in a continuous succession of subjective states. The third phenomenon is clinging. Through the retention and succession of sensations, agreeable as well as disagreeable, there arises the desire of clinging. The fourth phenomenon is an attachment to names or ideas (sa@mjna), etc. By clinging the mind hypostatizes all names whereby to give definitions to all things. The fifth phenomenon is the performance of deeds (karma). On account of attachment to names, etc., there arise all the variations of deeds, productive of individuality. "The sixth phenomenon is the suffering due to the fetter of deeds. Through deeds suffering arises in which the mind finds itself entangled and curtailed of its freedom." All these phenomena have thus sprung forth through avidya.

The relation between this truth and avidya is in one sense a mere identity and may be illustrated by the simile of all kinds of pottery which though different are all made of the same clay [Footnote ref 1]. Likewise the undefiled (anasrava) and ignorance (avidya) and their various transient forms all come from one and the same entity. Therefore Buddha teaches that all beings are from all eternity abiding in Nirva@na.

It is by the touch of ignorance (avidya) that this truth assumes all the phenomenal forms of existence.

In the all-conserving mind (alayavijnana) ignorance manifests itself; and from non-enlightenment starts that which sees, that which represents, that which apprehends an objective world, and that which constantly particularizes. This is called ego (manas). Five different names are given to the ego (according to its different modes of operation). The first name is activity-consciousness (karmavijnana) in the sense that through the agency of ignorance an unenlightened mind begins to be disturbed (or



[Footnote 1: Compare Chandogya, VI. 1. 4.]

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awakened). The second name is evolving-consciousness (prav@rttiivijnana) in the sense that when the mind is disturbed, there evolves that which sees an external world. The third name is representation-consciousness in the sense that the ego (manas} represents (or reflects) an external world. As a clean mirror reflects the images of all description, it is even so with the representation-consciousness. When it is confronted, for instance, with the objects of the five senses, it represents them instantaneously and without effort. The fourth is particularization-consciousness, in the sense that it discriminates between different things defiled as well as pure. The fifth name is succession-consciousness, in the sense that continuously directed by the awakening consciousness of attention (manaskara) it (manas) retains all experiences and never loses or suffers the destruction of any karma, good as well as evil, which had been sown in the past, and whose retribution, painful or agreeable, it never fails to mature, be it in the present or in the future, and also in the sense that it unconsciously recollects things gone by and in imagination anticipates things to come. Therefore the three domains (kamaloka, domain of feeling—rupaloka, domain of bodily existence—arupaloka, domain of incorporeality) are nothing but the self manifestation of the mind (i.e. alayavijnana which is practically identical with bhutatathata). Since all things, owing the principle of their existence to the mind (alayavijnana), are produced by sm@rti, all the modes of particularization are the self-particularizations of the mind. The mind in itself (or the soul) being however free from all attributes is not differentiated. Therefore we come to the conclusion that all things and conditions in the phenomenal world, hypostatized and established only through ignorance (avidya) and memory (sm@rti), have no more reality than the images in a mirror. They arise simply from the ideality of a particularizing mind. When the mind is disturbed, the multiplicity of things is produced; but when the mind is quieted, the multiplicity of things disappears. By ego-consciousness (manovijnana) we mean the ignorant mind which by its succession-consciousness clings to the conception of I and Not-I and misapprehends the nature of the six objects of sense. The ego-consciousness is also called separation-consciousness, because it is nourished by the perfuming influence of the prejudices (asrava), intellectual as well as affectional. Thus believing in the external world produced by memory, the mind becomes

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oblivious of the principle of sameness (samata) that underlies all things which are one and perfectly calm and tranquil and show no sign of becoming.

Non-enlightenment is the raison d'etre of samsara. When this is annihilated the conditions—the external world—are also annihilated and with them the state of an interrelated mind is also annihilated. But this annihilation does not mean the annihilation of the mind but of its modes only. It becomes calm like an unruffled sea when all winds which were disturbing it and producing the waves have been annihilated.

In describing the relation of the interaction of avidya (ignorance), karmavijnana (activity-consciousness—the subjective mind), vi@saya (external world—represented by the senses) and the tathata (suchness), As'vaghosa says that there is an interperfuming of these elements. Thus As'vaghosa says, "By perfuming we mean that while our worldly clothes (viz. those which we wear) have no odour of their own, neither offensive nor agreeable, they can yet acquire one or the other odour according to the nature of the substance with which they are perfumed. Suchness (tathata) is likewise a pure dharma free from all defilements caused by the perfuming power of ignorance. On the other hand ignorance has nothing to do with purity. Nevertheless we speak of its being able to do the work of purity because it in its turn is perfumed by suchness. Determined by suchness ignorance becomes the raison d'etre of all forms of defilement. And this ignorance perfumes suchness and produces sm@rti. This sm@rti in its turn perfumes ignorance. On account of this (reciprocal) perfuming, the truth is misunderstood. On account of its being misunderstood an external world of subjectivity appears. Further, on account of the perfuming power of memory, various modes of individuation are produced. And by clinging to them various deeds are done, and we suffer as the result miseries mentally as well as bodily." Again "suchness perfumes ignorance, and in consequence of this perfuming the individual in subjectivity is caused to loathe the misery of birth and death and to seek after the blessing of Nirvana. This longing and loathing on the part of the subjective mind in turn perfumes suchness. On account of this perfuming influence we are enabled to believe that we are in possession within ourselves of suchness whose essential nature is pure and immaculate; and we also recognize that all phenomena in the world are nothing

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but the illusory manifestations of the mind (alayavijnana) and have no reality of their own. Since we thus rightly understand the truth, we can practise the means of liberation, can perform those actions which are in accordance with the dharma. We should neither particularize, nor cling to objects of desire. By virtue of this discipline and habituation during the lapse of innumerable asa@nkhyeyakalpas [Footnote ref 1] we get ignorance annihilated. As ignorance is thus annihilated, the mind (alayavijnana) is no longer disturbed, so as to be subject to individuation. As the mind is no longer disturbed, the particularization of the surrounding world is annihilated. When in this wise the principle and the condition of defilement, their products, and the mental disturbances are all annihilated, it is said that we attain Nirva@na and that various spontaneous displays of activity are accomplished." The Nirva@na of the tathata philosophy is not nothingness, but tathata (suchness or thatness) in its purity unassociated with any kind of disturbance which produces all the diversity of experience.

To the question that if all beings are uniformly in possession of suchness and are therefore equally perfumed by it, how is it that there are some who do not believe in it, while others do, As'vagho@sa's reply is that though all beings are uniformly in possession of suchness, the intensity of ignorance and the principle of individuation, that work from all eternity, vary in such manifold grades as to outnumber the sands of the Ganges, and hence the difference. There is an inherent perfuming principle in one's own being which, embraced and protected by the love (maitri) and compassion (karu@na) of all Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, is caused to loathe the misery of birth and death, to believe in nirva@na, to cultivate the root of merit (kus'alamula), to habituate oneself to it and to bring it to maturity. In consequence of this, one is enabled to see all Buddhas and Bodhisattvas and, receiving instructions from them, is benefited, gladdened and induced to practise good deeds, etc., till one can attain to Buddhahood and enter into Nirva@na. This implies that all beings have such perfuming power in them that they may be affected by the good wishes of the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas for leading them to the path of virtue, and thus it is that sometimes hearing the Bodhisattvas and sometimes seeing them, "all beings thereby acquire (spiritual) benefits (hitata)" and "entering into the samadhi of purity, they



[Footnote 1: Technical name for a very vast period of time.]

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destroy hindrances wherever they are met with and obtain all-penetrating insight that enables them to become conscious of the absolute oneness (samata) of the universe (sarvaloka) and to see innumerable Buddhas and Bodhisattvas."

There is a difference between the perfuming which is not in unison with suchness, as in the case of s'ravakas (theravadin monks), pratyekabuddhas and the novice bodhisattvas, who only continue their religious discipline but do not attain to the state of non-particularization in unison with the essence of suchness. But those bodhisattvas whose perfuming is already in unison with suchness attain to the state of non-particularization and allow themselves to be influenced only by the power of the dharma. The incessant perfuming of the defiled dharma (ignorance from all eternity) works on, but when one attains to Buddhahood one at once puts an end to it. The perfuming of the pure dharma (i.e. suchness) however works on to eternity without any interruption. For this suchness or thatness is the effulgence of great wisdom, the universal illumination of the dharmadhatu (universe), the true and adequate knowledge, the mind pure and clean in its own nature, the eternal, the blessed, the self-regulating and the pure, the tranquil, the inimitable and the free, and this is called the tathagatagarbha or the dharmakaya. It may be objected that since thatness or suchness has been described as being without characteristics, it is now a contradiction to speak of it as embracing all merits, but it is held, that in spite of its embracing all merits, it is free in its nature from all forms of distinction, because all objects in the world are of one and the same taste; and being of one reality they have nothing to do with the modes of particularization or of dualistic character. "Though all things in their (metaphysical) origin come from the soul alone and in truth are free from particularization, yet on account of non-enlightenment there originates a subjective mind (alayavijnana) that becomes conscious of an external world." This is called ignorance or avidya. Nevertheless the pure essence of the mind is perfectly pure and there is no awakening of ignorance in it. Hence we assign to suchness this quality, the effulgence of great wisdom. It is called universal illumination, because there is nothing for it to illumine. This perfuming of suchness therefore continues for ever, though the stage of the perfuming of avidya comes to an end with the Buddhas when they attain to nirva@na. All Buddhas while at

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the stage of discipline feel a deep compassion (mahakaru@na) for all beings, practise all virtues (paramitas) and many other meritorious deeds, treat others as their own selves, and wish to work out a universal salvation of mankind in ages to come, through limitless numbers of kalpas, recognize truthfully and adequately the principle of equality (samata)among people; and do not cling to the individual existence of a sentient being. This is what is meant by the activity of tathata. The main idea of this tathata philosophy seems to be this, that this transcendent "thatness" is at once the quintessence of all thought and activity; as avidya veils it or perfumes it, the world-appearance springs forth, but as the pure thatness also perfumes the avidya there is a striving for the good as well. As the stage of avidya is passed its luminous character shines forth, for it is the ultimate truth which only illusorily appeared as the many of the world.

This doctrine seems to be more in agreement with the view of an absolute unchangeable reality as the ultimate truth than that of the nihilistic idealism of La@nkavatara. Considering the fact that As'vagho@sa was a learned Brahmin scholar in his early life, it is easy to guess that there was much Upani@sad influence in this interpretation of Buddhism, which compares so favourably with the Vedanta as interpreted by S'a@nkara. The La@nkavatara admitted a reality only as a make-believe to attract the Tairthikas (heretics) who had a prejudice in favour of an unchangeable self (atman). But As'vagho@sa plainly admitted an unspeakable reality as the ultimate truth. Nagarjuna's Madhyamika doctrines which eclipsed the profound philosophy of As'vagho@sa seem to be more faithful to the traditional Buddhist creed and to the Vijnanavada creed of Buddhism as explained in the La@nkavatara [Footnote ref 1].