 |
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[Footnote 1: Brahmajala-sutta, Digha, 1. p. 12 ff.]
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views or to modify and even suppress such of the traditionary views with which they did not agree or which they found it difficult to maintain. Brilliant oppositions from the opposing schools often made it necessary for them to offer solutions to new problems unthought of before, but put forward by some illustrious adherent of a rival school. In order to reconcile these new solutions with the other parts of the system, the commentators never hesitated to offer such slight modifications of the doctrines as could harmonize them into a complete whole. These elaborations or modifications generally developed the traditionary system, but did not effect any serious change in the system as expounded by the older teachers, for the new exponents always bound themselves to the explanations of the older teachers and never contradicted them. They would only interpret them to suit their own ideas, or say new things only in those cases where the older teachers had remained silent. It is not therefore possible to describe the growth of any system by treating the contributions of the individual commentators separately. This would only mean unnecessary repetition. Except when there is a specially new development, the system is to be interpreted on the basis of the joint work of the commentators treating their contributions as forming one whole.
The fact that each system had to contend with other rival systems in order to hold its own has left its permanent mark upon all the philosophic literatures of India which are always written in the form of disputes, where the writer is supposed to be always faced with objections from rival schools to whatever he has got to say. At each step he supposes certain objections put forth against him which he answers, and points out the defects of the objector or shows that the objection itself is ill founded. It is thus through interminable byways of objections, counter-objections and their answers that the writer can wend his way to his destination. Most often the objections of the rival schools are referred to in so brief a manner that those only who know the views can catch them. To add to these difficulties the Sanskrit style of most of the commentaries is so condensed and different from literary Sanskrit, and aims so much at precision and brevity, leading to the use of technical words current in the diverse systems, that a study of these becomes often impossible without the aid of an expert preceptor; it is difficult therefore for all who are not widely read in all the different systems to follow any advanced
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work of any particular system, as the deliberations of that particular system are expressed in such close interconnection with the views of other systems that these can hardly be understood without them. Each system of India has grown (at least in particular epochs) in relation to and in opposition to the growth of other systems of thought, and to be a thorough student of Indian philosophy one should study all the systems in their mutual opposition and relation from the earliest times to a period at which they ceased to grow and came to a stop—a purpose for which a work like the present one may only be regarded as forming a preliminary introduction.
Besides the sutras and their commentaries there are also independent treatises on the systems in verse called karikas, which try to summarize the important topics of any system in a succinct manner; the Sa@mkhya karika may be mentioned as a work of this kind. In addition to these there were also long dissertations, commentaries, or general observations on any system written in verses called the varttikas; the S'lokavarttika, of Kumarila or the Varttika of Sures'vara may be mentioned as examples. All these of course had their commentaries to explain them. In addition to these there were also advanced treatises on the systems in prose in which the writers either nominally followed some selected sutras or proceeded independently of them. Of the former class the Nyayamanjari of Jayanta may be mentioned as an example and of the latter the Pras'astapada bha@sya, the Advaitasiddhi of Madhusudana Sarasvati or the Vedanta-paribha@sa of Dharmarajadhvarindra. The more remarkable of these treatises were of a masterly nature in which the writers represented the systems they adhered to in a highly forcible and logical manner by dint of their own great mental powers and genius. These also had their commentaries to explain and elaborate them. The period of the growth of the philosophic literatures of India begins from about 500 B.C. (about the time of the Buddha) and practically ends in the later half of the seventeenth century, though even now some minor publications are seen to come out.
The Indian Systems of Philosophy.
The Hindus classify the systems of philosophy into two classes, namely, the nastika and the astika. The nastika (na asti "it is not") views are those which neither regard the Vedas as infallible
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nor try to establish their own validity on their authority. These are principally three in number, the Buddhist, Jaina and the Carvaka. The astika-mata or orthodox schools are six in number, Sa@mkhya, Yoga, Vedanta, Mima@msa, Nyaya and Vais'e@sika, generally known as the six systems (@sa@ddars'ana [Footnote ref 1]).
The Sa@mkhya is ascribed to a mythical Kapila, but the earliest works on the subject are probably now lost. The Yoga system is attributed to Patanjali and the original sutras are called the Patanjala Yoga sutras. The general metaphysical position of these two systems with regard to soul, nature, cosmology and the final goal is almost the same, and the difference lies in this that the Yoga system acknowledges a god (Is'vara) as distinct from Atman and lays much importance on certain mystical practices (commonly known as Yoga practices) for the achievement of liberation, whereas the Sa@mkhya denies the existence of Is'vara and thinks that sincere philosophic thought and culture are sufficient to produce the true conviction of the truth and thereby bring about liberation. It is probable that the system of Sa@mkhya associated with Kapila and the Yoga system associated with Patanjali are but two divergent modifications of an original Sa@mkhya school, of which we now get only references here and there. These systems therefore though generally counted as two should more properly be looked upon as two different schools of the same Sa@mkhya system—one may be called the Kapila Sa@mkhya and the other Patanjala Sa@mkhya.
The Purva Mima@msa (from the root man to think—rational conclusions) cannot properly be spoken of as a system of philosophy. It is a systematized code of principles in accordance with which the Vedic texts are to be interpreted for purposes of sacrifices.
[Footnote 1: The word "dars'ana" in the sense of true philosophic knowledge has its earliest use in the Vais'e@sika sutras of Ka@nada (IX. ii. 13) which I consider as pre-Buddhistic. The Buddhist pi@takas (400 B.C.) called the heretical opinions "ditthi" (Sanskrit—dr@sti from the same root d@rs' from which dars'ana is formed). Haribhadra (fifth century A.D.) uses the word Dars'ana in the sense of systems of philosophy (sarvadars'anavacyo' rtha@h—@Sa@ddars'anasamuccaya I.). Ratnakirtti (end of the tenth century A.D.) uses the word also in the same sense ("Yadi nama dars'ane dars'ane nanaprakaram sattvatak-@sanam uktamasti." K@sa@nabha@ngasiddhi in Six Buddhist Nyaya tracts, p.20). Madhava (1331 A.D.) calls his Compendium of all systems of philosophy, Sarvadars'anasa@mgra@na. The word "mata" (opinion or view) was also freely used in quoting the views of other systems. But there is no word to denote 'philosophers' in the technical sense. The Buddhists used to call those who held heretical views "tairthika." The words "siddha," "jnanin," etc. do not denote philosophers, in the modern sense, they are used rather in the sense of "seers" or "perfects."]
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The Vedic texts were used as mantras (incantations) for sacrifices, and people often disputed as to the relation of words in a sentence or their mutual relative importance with reference to the general drift of the sentence. There were also differences of view with regard to the meaning of a sentence, the use to which it may be applied as a mantra, its relative importance or the exact nature of its connection with other similar sentences in a complex Vedic context. The Mima@msa formulated some principles according to which one could arrive at rational and uniform solutions for all these difficulties. Preliminary to these its main objects, it indulges in speculations with regard to the external world, soul, perception, inference, the validity of the Vedas, or the like, for in order that a man might perform sacrifices with mantras, a definite order of the universe and its relation to man or the position and nature of the mantras of the Veda must be demonstrated and established. Though its interest in such abstract speculations is but secondary yet it briefly discusses these in order to prepare a rational ground for its doctrine of the mantras and their practical utility for man. It is only so far as there are these preliminary discussions in the Mima@msa that it may be called a system of philosophy. Its principles and maxims for the interpretation of the import of words and sentences have a legal value even to this day. The sutras of Mima@msa are attributed to Jaimini, and S'abara wrote a bha@sya upon it. The two great names in the history of Mima@msa literature after Jaimini and S'abara are Kumarila Bha@t@ta and his pupil Prabhakara, who criticized the opinions of his master so much, that the master used to call him guru (master) in sarcasm, and to this day his opinions pass as guru-mata, whereas the views of Kumarila Bha@t@ta pass as bha@t@ta-mata [Footnote ref 1]. It may not be out of place to mention here that Hindu Law (sm@rti) accepts without any reservation the maxims and principles settled and formulated by the Mima@msa.
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[Footnote 1: There is a story that Kumarila could not understand the meaning of a Sanskrit sentence "Atra tunoktam tatrapinoktam iti paunaraktam" (hence spoken twice). Tunoktam phonetically admits of two combinations, tu noktam (but not said) and tunauktam (said by the particle tu) and tatrapi noktam as tatra api na uktam (not said also there) and tatra apina uktam (said there by the particle api). Under the first interpretation the sentence would mean, "Not spoken here, not spoken there, it is thus spoken twice." This puzzled Kumarila, when Prabhakara taking the second meaning pointed out to him that the meaning was "here it is indicated by tu and there by api, and so it is indicated twice." Kumarila was so pleased that he called his pupil "Guru" (master) at this.]
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The Vedanta sutras, also called Uttara Mima@msa, written by Badaraya@na, otherwise known as the Brahma-sutras, form the original authoritative work of Vedanta. The word Vedanta means "end of the Veda," i.e. the Upani@sads, and the Vedanta sutras are so called as they are but a summarized statement of the general views of the Upani@sads. This work is divided into four books or adhyayas and each adhyaya is divided into four padas or chapters. The first four sutras of the work commonly known as Catu@hsutri are (1) How to ask about Brahman, (2) From whom proceed birth and decay, (3) This is because from him the Vedas have come forth, (4) This is shown by the harmonious testimony of the Upani@sads. The whole of the first chapter of the second book is devoted to justifying the position of the Vedanta against the attacks of the rival schools. The second chapter of the second book is busy in dealing blows at rival systems. All the other parts of the book are devoted to settling the disputed interpretations of a number of individual Upani@sad texts. The really philosophical portion of the work is thus limited to the first four sutras and the first and second chapters of the second book. The other portions are like commentaries to the Upani@sads, which however contain many theological views of the system. The first commentary of the Brahma-sutra was probably written by Baudhayana, which however is not available now. The earliest commentary that is now found is that of the great S'a@nkara. His interpretations of the Brahma-sutras together with all the commentaries and other works that follow his views are popularly known as Vedanta philosophy, though this philosophy ought more properly to be called Vis'uddhadvaitavada school of Vedanta philosophy (i.e. the Vedanta philosophy of the school of absolute monism). Variant forms of dualistic philosophy as represented by the Vai@s@navas, S'aivas, Ramayatas, etc., also claim to express the original purport of the Brahma sutras. We thus find that apostles of dualistic creeds such as Ramanuja, Vallabha, Madhva, S'rika@n@tha, Baladeva, etc., have written independent commentaries on the Brahma-sutra to show that the philosophy as elaborated by themselves is the view of the Upani@sads and as summarized in the Brahma-sutras. These differed largely and often vehemently attacked S'a@nkara's interpretations of the same sutras. These systems as expounded by them also pass by the name of Vedanta as these are also claimed to be the real interpretations intended by the Vedanta (Upani@sads)
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and the Vedanta sutras. Of these the system of Ramanuja has great philosophical importance.
The Nyaya sutras attributed to Gautama, called also Ak@sapada, and the Vais'e@sika sutras attributed to Ka@nada, called also Uluka, represent the same system for all practical purposes. They are in later times considered to differ only in a few points of minor importance. So far as the sutras are concerned the Nyaya sutras lay particular stress on the cultivation of logic as an art, while the Vais'e@sika sutras deal mostly with metaphysics and physics. In addition to these six systems, the Tantras had also philosophies of their own, which however may generally be looked upon largely as modifications of the Sa@mkhya and Vedanta systems, though their own contributions are also noteworthy.
Some fundamental Points of Agreement.
I. The Karma Theory.
It is, however, remarkable that with the exception of the Carvaka materialists all the other systems agree on some fundamental points of importance. The systems of philosophy in India were not stirred up merely by the speculative demands of the human mind which has a natural inclination for indulging in abstract thought, but by a deep craving after the realization of the religious purpose of life. It is surprising to note that the postulates, aims and conditions for such a realization were found to be identical in all the conflicting systems. Whatever may be their differences of opinion in other matters, so far as the general postulates for the realization of the transcendent state, the summum bonum of life, were concerned, all the systems were practically in thorough agreement. It may be worth while to note some of them at this stage.
First, the theory of Karma and rebirth. All the Indian systems agree in believing that whatever action is done by an individual leaves behind it some sort of potency which has the power to ordain for him joy or sorrow in the future according as it is good or bad. When the fruits of the actions are such that they cannot be enjoyed in the present life or in a human life, the individual has to take another birth as a man or any other being in order to suffer them.
The Vedic belief that the mantras uttered in the correct accent at the sacrifices with the proper observance of all ritualistic
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details, exactly according to the directions without the slightest error even in the smallest trifle, had something like a magical virtue automatically to produce the desired object immediately or after a lapse of time, was probably the earliest form of the Karma doctrine. It postulates a semi-conscious belief that certain mystical actions can produce at a distant time certain effects without the ordinary process of the instrumentality of visible agents of ordinary cause and effect. When the sacrifice is performed, the action leaves such an unseen magical virtue, called the ad@r@s@ta (the unseen) or the apurva (new), that by it the desired object will be achieved in a mysterious manner, for the modus operandi of the apurva is unknown. There is also the notion prevalent in the Sa@mhitas, as we have already noticed, that he who commits wicked deeds suffers in another world, whereas he who performs good deeds enjoys the highest material pleasures. These were probably associated with the conception of @rta, the inviolable order of things. Thus these are probably the elements which built up the Karma theory which we find pretty well established but not emphasized in the Upani@sads, where it is said that according to good or bad actions men will have good or bad births.
To notice other relevant points in connection with the Karma doctrine as established in the astika systems we find that it was believed that the unseen (ad@r@s@ta) potency of the action generally required some time before it could be fit for giving the doer the merited punishment or enjoyment. These would often accumulate and prepare the items of suffering and enjoyment for the doer in his next life. Only the fruits of those actions which are extremely wicked or particularly good could be reaped in this life. The nature of the next birth of a man is determined by the nature of pleasurable or painful experiences that have been made ready for him by his maturing actions of this life. If the experiences determined for him by his action are such that they are possible to be realized in the life of a goat, the man will die and be born as a goat. As there is no ultimate beginning in time of this world process, so there is no time at which any person first began his actions or experiences. Man has had an infinite number of past lives of the most varied nature, and the instincts of each kind of life exist dormant in the life of every individual, and thus whenever he has any particular birth as this or that animal or man,
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the special instincts of that life (technically called vasana) come forth. In accordance with these vasanas the person passes through the painful or pleasurable experiences as determined for him by his action. The length of life is also determined by the number and duration of experiences as preordained by the fructifying actions of his past life. When once certain actions become fit for giving certain experiences, these cannot be avoided, but those actions which have not matured are uprooted once for all if the person attains true knowledge as advocated by philosophy. But even such an emancipated (mukta) person has to pass through the pleasurable or painful experiences ordained for him by the actions just ripened for giving their fruits. There are four kinds of actions, white or virtuous (s'ukla), black or wicked (k@r@s@na), white-black or partly virtuous and partly vicious (s'ukla-k@r@s@na) as most of our actions are, neither black nor white (as'uklak@r@s@na), i.e. those acts of self-renunciation or meditation which are not associated with any desires for the fruit. It is only when a person can so restrain himself as to perform only the last kind of action that he ceases to accumulate any new karma for giving fresh fruits. He has thus only to enjoy the fruits of his previous karmas which have ripened for giving fruits. If in the meantime he attains true knowledge, all his past accumulated actions become destroyed, and as his acts are only of the as'uklak@r@s@na type no fresh karma for ripening is accumulated, and thus he becomes divested of all karma after enjoying the fruits of the ripened karmas alone.
The Jains think that through the actions of body, speech and mind a kind of subtle matter technically called karma is produced. The passions of a man act like a viscous substance that attracts this karma matter, which thus pours into the soul and sticks to it. The karma matter thus accumulated round the soul during the infinite number of past lives is technically called karmas'arira, which encircles the soul as it passes on from birth to birth. This karma matter sticking to the soul gradually ripens and exhausts itself in ordaining the sufferance of pains or the enjoyment of pleasures for the individual. While some karma matter is being expended in this way, other karma matters are accumulating by his activities, and thus keep him in a continuous process of suffering and enjoyment. The karma matter thus accumulated in the soul produces a kind of coloration called les'ya, such as white, black, etc., which marks the character of the soul. The
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idea of the s'ukla and k@r@s@na karmas of the Yoga system was probably suggested by the Jaina view. But when a man is free from passions, and acts in strict compliance with the rules of conduct, his actions produce karma which lasts but for a moment and is then annihilated. Every karma that the sage has previously earned has its predestined limits within which it must take effect and be purged away. But when by contemplation and the strict adherence to the five great vows, no new karma is generated, and when all the karmas are exhausted the worldly existence of the person rapidly draws towards its end. Thus in the last stage of contemplation, all karma being annihilated, and all activities having ceased, the soul leaves the body and goes up to the top of the universe, where the liberated souls stay for ever.
Buddhism also contributes some new traits to the karma theory which however being intimately connected with their metaphysics will be treated later on.
2. The Doctrine of Mukti.
Not only do the Indian systems agree as to the cause of the inequalities in the share of sufferings and enjoyments in the case of different persons, and the manner in which the cycle of births and rebirths has been kept going from beginningless time, on the basis of the mysterious connection of one's actions with the happenings of the world, but they also agree in believing that this beginningless chain of karma and its fruits, of births and rebirths, this running on from beginningless time has somewhere its end. This end was not to be attained at some distant time or in some distant kingdom, but was to be sought within us. Karma leads us to this endless cycle, and if we could divest ourselves of all such emotions, ideas or desires as lead us to action we should find within us the actionless self which neither suffers nor enjoys, neither works nor undergoes rebirth. When the Indians, wearied by the endless bustle and turmoil of worldly events, sought for and believed that somewhere a peaceful goal could be found, they generally hit upon the self of man. The belief that the soul could be realized in some stage as being permanently divested of all action, feelings or ideas, led logically to the conclusion that the connection of the soul with these worldly elements was extraneous, artificial or even illusory. In its true nature the soul is untouched by the impurities of our ordinary life, and it is through ignorance
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and passion as inherited from the cycle of karma from beginningless time that we connect it with these. The realization of this transcendent state is the goal and final achievement of this endless cycle of births and rebirths through karma. The Buddhists did not admit the existence of soul, but recognized that the final realization of the process of karma is to be found in the ultimate dissolution called Nirva@na, the nature of which we shall discuss later on.
3. The Doctrine of Soul.
All the Indian systems except Buddhism admit the existence of a permanent entity variously called atman, puru@sa or jiva. As to the exact nature of this soul there are indeed divergences of view. Thus while the Nyaya calls it absolutely qualityless and characterless, indeterminate unconscious entity, Sa@mkhya describes it as being of the nature of pure consciousness, the Vedanta says that it is that fundamental point of unity implied in pure consciousness (cit), pure bliss (ananda), and pure being (sat). But all agree in holding that it is pure and unsullied in its nature and that all impurities of action or passion do not form a real part of it. The summum bonum of life is attained when all impurities are removed and the pure nature of the self is thoroughly and permanently apprehended and all other extraneous connections with it are absolutely dissociated.
The Pessimistic Attitude towards the World and the Optimistic Faith in the end.
Though the belief that the world is full of sorrow has not been equally prominently emphasized in all systems, yet it may be considered as being shared by all of them. It finds its strongest utterance in Sa@mkhya, Yoga, and Buddhism. This interminable chain of pleasurable and painful experiences was looked upon as nearing no peaceful end but embroiling and entangling us in the meshes of karma, rebirth, and sorrow. What appear as pleasures are but a mere appearance for the attempt to keep them steady is painful, there is pain when we lose the pleasures or when we are anxious to have them. When the pleasures are so much associated with pains they are but pains themselves. We are but duped when we seek pleasures, for they are sure to lead us to pain. All our experiences are essentially sorrowful and ultimately sorrow-begetting. Sorrow is the ultimate truth of this process of the
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world. That which to an ordinary person seems pleasurable appears to a wise person or to a yogin who has a clearer vision as painful. The greater the knowledge the higher is the sensitiveness to sorrow and dissatisfaction with world experiences. The yogin is like the pupil of the eye to which even the smallest grain of disturbance is unbearable. This sorrow of worldly experiences cannot be removed by bringing in remedies for each sorrow as it comes, for the moment it is remedied another sorrow comes in. It cannot also be avoided by mere inaction or suicide, for we are continually being forced to action by our nature, and suicide will but lead to another life of sorrow and rebirth. The only way to get rid of it is by the culmination of moral greatness and true knowledge which uproot sorrow once for all. It is our ignorance that the self is intimately connected with the experiences of life or its pleasures, that leads us to action and arouses passion in us for the enjoyment of pleasures and other emotions and activities. Through the highest moral elevation a man may attain absolute dispassion towards world-experiences and retire in body, mind, and speech from all worldly concerns. When the mind is so purified, the self shines in its true light, and its true nature is rightly conceived. When this is once done the self can never again be associated with passion or ignorance. It becomes at this stage ultimately dissociated from citta which contains within it the root of all emotions, ideas, and actions. Thus emancipated the self for ever conquers all sorrow. It is important, however, to note in this connection that emancipation is not based on a general aversion to intercourse with the world or on such feelings as a disappointed person may have, but on the appreciation of the state of mukti as the supremely blessed one. The details of the pessimistic creed of each system have developed from the logical necessity peculiar to each system. There was never the slightest tendency to shirk the duties of this life, but to rise above them through right performance and right understanding. It is only when a man rises to the highest pinnacle of moral glory that he is fit for aspiring to that realization of selfhood in comparison with which all worldly things or even the joys of Heaven would not only shrink into insignificance, but appear in their true character as sorrowful and loathsome. It is when his mind has thus turned from all ordinary joys that he can strive towards his ideal of salvation. In fact it seems to me that a sincere religious craving after some
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ideal blessedness and quiet of self-realization is indeed the fundamental fact from which not only her philosophy but many of the complex phenomena of the civilization of India can be logically deduced. The sorrow around us has no fear for us if we remember that we are naturally sorrowless and blessed in ourselves. The pessimistic view loses all terror as it closes in absolute optimistic confidence in one's own self and the ultimate destiny and goal of emancipation.
Unity in Indian Sadhana (philosophical, religious and ethical endeavours).
As might be expected the Indian systems are all agreed upon the general principles of ethical conduct which must be followed for the attainment of salvation. That all passions are to be controlled, no injury to life in any form should be done, and that all desire for pleasures should be checked, are principles which are almost universally acknowledged. When a man attains a very high degree of moral greatness he has to strengthen and prepare his mind for further purifying and steadying it for the attainment of his ideal; and most of the Indian systems are unanimous with regard to the means to be employed for the purpose. There are indeed divergences in certain details or technical names, but the means to be adopted for purification are almost everywhere essentially the same as those advocated by the Yoga system. It is only in later times that devotion (bhakti) is seen to occupy a more prominent place specially in Vai@s@nava schools of thought. Thus it was that though there were many differences among the various systems, yet their goal of life, their attitude towards the world and the means fur the attainment of the goal (sadhana) being fundamentally the same, there was a unique unity in the practical sadhana of almost all the Indian systems. The religious craving has been universal in India and this uniformity of sadhana has therefore secured for India a unity in all her aspirations and strivings.
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CHAPTER V
BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY
Many scholars are of opinion that the Sa@mkhya and the Yoga represent the earliest systematic speculations of India. It is also suggested that Buddhism drew much of its inspiration from them. It may be that there is some truth in such a view, but the systematic Sa@mkhya and Yoga treatises as we have them had decidedly been written after Buddhism. Moreover it is well-known to every student of Hindu philosophy that a conflict with the Buddhists has largely stimulated philosophic enquiry in most of the systems of Hindu thought. A knowledge of Buddhism is therefore indispensable for a right understanding of the different systems in their mutual relation and opposition to Buddhism. It seems desirable therefore that I should begin with Buddhism first.
The State of Philosophy in India before the Buddha.
It is indeed difficult to give a short sketch of the different philosophical speculations that were prevalent in India before Buddhism. The doctrines of the Upani@sads are well known, and these have already been briefly described. But these were not the only ones. Even in the Upani@sads we find references to diverse atheistical creeds [Footnote ref 1]. We find there that the origin of the world and its processes were sometimes discussed, and some thought that "time" was the ultimate cause of all, others that all these had sprung forth by their own nature (svabhava), others that everything had come forth in accordance with an inexorable destiny or a fortuitous concourse of accidental happenings, or through matter combinations in general. References to diverse kinds of heresies are found in Buddhist literature also, but no detailed accounts of these views are known. Of the Upani@sad type of materialists the two schools of Carvakas (Dhurtta and Sus'ik@sita) are referred to in later literature, though the time in which these flourished cannot rightly be discovered [Footnote ref 2]. But it seems
[Footnote 1: S'vetas'vatara, I. 2, kala@h svabhabo niyatiryad@rccha bhutani yoni@h puru@sa iti cintyam.]
[Footnote 2: Lokayata (literally, that which is found among people in general) seems to have been the name by which all carvaka doctrines were generally known. See Gu@naratna on the Lokayatas.]
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probable however that the allusion to the materialists contained in the Upani@sads refers to these or to similar schools. The Carvakas did not believe in the authority of the Vedas or any other holy scripture. According to them there was no soul. Life and consciousness were the products of the combination of matter, just as red colour was the result of mixing up white with yellow or as the power of intoxication was generated in molasses (madas'akti). There is no after-life, and no reward of actions, as there is neither virtue nor vice. Life is only for enjoyment. So long as it lasts it is needless to think of anything else, as everything will end with death, for when at death the body is burnt to ashes there cannot be any rebirth. They do not believe in the validity of inference. Nothing is trustworthy but what can be directly perceived, for it is impossible to determine that the distribution of the middle term (hetu) has not depended upon some extraneous condition, the absence of which might destroy the validity of any particular piece of inference. If in any case any inference comes to be true, it is only an accidental fact and there is no certitude about it. They were called Carvaka because they would only eat but would not accept any other religious or moral responsibility. The word comes from carv to eat. The Dhurtta Carvakas held that there was nothing but the four elements of earth, water, air and fire, and that the body was but the result of atomic combination. There was no self or soul, no virtue or vice. The Sus'ik@sita Carvakas held that there was a soul apart from the body but that it also was destroyed with the destruction of the body. The original work of the Carvakas was written in sutras probably by B@rhaspati. Jayanta and Gu@naratna quote two sutras from it. Short accounts of this school may be found in Jayanta's Nyayamanjari, Madhava's Sarvadars'anasa@mgraha and Gu@naratna's Tarkarahasyadipika. Mahabharata gives an account of a man called Carvaka meeting Yudhi@s@thira.
Side by side with the doctrine of the Carvaka materialists we are reminded of the Ajivakas of which Makkhali Gosala, probably a renegade disciple of the Jain saint Mahavira and a contemporary of Buddha and Mahavira, was the leader. This was a thorough-going determinism denying the free will of man and his moral responsibility for any so-called good or evil. The essence of Makkhali's system is this, that "there is no cause, either proximate or remote, for the depravity of beings or for their purity. They
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become so without any cause. Nothing depends either on one's own efforts or on the efforts of others, in short nothing depends on any human effort, for there is no such thing as power or energy, or human exertion. The varying conditions at any time are due to fate, to their environment and their own nature [Footnote ref 1]."
Another sophistical school led by Ajita Kesakambali taught that there was no fruit or result of good or evil deeds; there is no other world, nor was this one real; nor had parents nor any former lives any efficacy with respect to this life. Nothing that we can do prevents any of us alike from being wholly brought to an end at death [Footnote ref 2].
There were thus at least three currents of thought: firstly the sacrificial Karma by the force of the magical rites of which any person could attain anything he desired; secondly the Upani@sad teaching that the Brahman, the self, is the ultimate reality and being, and all else but name and form which pass away but do not abide. That which permanently abides without change is the real and true, and this is self. Thirdly the nihilistic conceptions that there is no law, no abiding reality, that everything comes into being by a fortuitous concourse of circumstances or by some unknown fate. In each of these schools, philosophy had probably come to a deadlock. There were the Yoga practices prevalent in the country and these were accepted partly on the strength of traditional custom among certain sections, and partly by virtue of the great spiritual, intellectual and physical power which they gave to those who performed them. But these had no rational basis behind them on which they could lean for support. These were probably then just tending towards being affiliated to the nebulous Sa@mkhya doctrines which had grown up among certain sections. It was at this juncture that we find Buddha erecting a new superstructure of thought on altogether original lines which thenceforth opened up a new avenue of philosophy for all posterity to come. If the Being of the Upani@sads, the superlatively motionless, was the only real, how could it offer scope for further new speculations, as it had already discarded all other matters of interest? If everything was due to a reasonless fortuitous concourse of circumstances, reason could not proceed further in the direction to create any philosophy of the unreason. The magical
[Footnote 1: Samannaphala-sutta, Digha, II. 20. Hoernle's article on the Ajivakas, E.R.E.]
[Footnote 2: Samannaphala-sutta, II. 23.]
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force of the hocus-pocus of sorcery or sacrifice had but little that was inviting for philosophy to proceed on. If we thus take into account the state of Indian philosophic culture before Buddha, we shall be better able to understand the value of the Buddhistic contribution to philosophy.
Buddha: his Life.
Gautama the Buddha was born in or about the year 560 B.C. in the Lumbini Grove near the ancient town of Kapilavastu in the now dense terai region of Nepal. His father was Suddhodana, a prince of the Sakya clan, and his mother Queen Mahamaya. According to the legends it was foretold of him that he would enter upon the ascetic life when he should see "A decrepit old man, a diseased man, a dead man, and a monk." His father tried his best to keep him away from these by marrying him and surrounding him with luxuries. But on successive occasions, issuing from the palace, he was confronted by those four things, which filled him with amazement and distress, and realizing the impermanence of all earthly things determined to forsake his home and try if he could to discover some means to immortality to remove the sufferings of men. He made his "Great Renunciation" when he was twenty-nine years old. He travelled on foot to Rajag@rha (Rajgir) and thence to Uruvela, where in company with other five ascetics he entered upon a course of extreme self-discipline, carrying his austerities to such a length that his body became utterly emaciated and he fell down senseless and was believed to be dead. After six years of this great struggle he was convinced that the truth was not to be won by the way of extreme asceticism, and resuming an ordinary course of life at last attained absolute and supreme enlightenment. Thereafter the Buddha spent a life prolonged over forty-five years in travelling from place to place and preaching the doctrine to all who would listen. At the age of over eighty years Buddha realized that the time drew near for him to die. He then entered into Dhyana and passing through its successive stages attained nirvana [Footnote ref 1]. The vast developments which the system of this great teacher underwent in the succeeding centuries in India and in other countries have not been thoroughly studied, and it will probably take yet many years more before even the materials for
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[Footnote 1: Mahaparinibbanasuttanta, Digha, XVI. 6, 8, 9.]
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such a study can be collected. But from what we now possess it is proved incontestably that it is one of the most wonderful and subtle productions of human wisdom. It is impossible to overestimate the debt that the philosophy, culture and civilization of India owe to it in all her developments for many succeeding centuries.
Early Buddhist Literature.
The Buddhist Pali Scriptures contain three different collections: the Sutta (relating to the doctrines), the Vinaya (relating to the discipline of the monks) and the Abhidhamma (relating generally to the same subjects as the suttas but dealing with them in a scholastic and technical manner). Scholars of Buddhistic religious history of modern times have failed as yet to fix any definite dates for the collection or composition of the different parts of the aforesaid canonical literature of the Buddhists. The suttas were however composed before the Abhidhamma and it is very probable that almost the whole of the canonical works were completed before 241 B.C., the date of the third council during the reign of King Asoka. The suttas mainly deal with the doctrine (Dhamma) of the Buddhistic faith whereas the Vinaya deals only with the regulations concerning the discipline of the monks. The subject of the Abhidhamma is mostly the same as that of the suttas, namely, the interpretation of the Dhamma. Buddhaghos@a in his introduction to Atthasalini, the commentary on the Dhammasa@nga@ni, says that the Abhidhamma is so called (abhi and dhamma) because it describes the same Dhammas as are related in the suttas in a more intensified (dhammatireka) and specialized (dhammavisesatthena) manner. The Abhidhammas do not give any new doctrines that are not in the suttas, but they deal somewhat elaborately with those that are already found in the suttas. Buddhagho@sa in distinguishing the special features of the suttas from the Abhidhammas says that the acquirement of the former leads one to attain meditation (samadhi) whereas the latter leads one to attain wisdom (pannasampadam). The force of this statement probably lies in this, that the dialogues of the suttas leave a chastening effect on the mind, the like of which is not to be found in the Abhidhammas, which busy themselves in enumerating the Buddhistic doctrines and defining them in a technical manner, which is more fitted to produce a reasoned
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insight into the doctrines than directly to generate a craving for following the path of meditation for the extinction of sorrow. The Abhidhamma known as the Kathavatthu differs from the other Abhidhammas in this, that it attempts to reduce the views of the heterodox schools to absurdity. The discussions proceed in the form of questions and answers, and the answers of the opponents are often shown to be based on contradictory assumptions.
The suttas contain five groups of collections called the Nikayas. These are (1) Digha Nikaya, called so on account of the length of the suttas contained in it; (2) Majjhima Nikaya (middling Nikaya), called so on account of the middling extent of the suttas contained in it; (3) Sa@myutta Nikaya (Nikayas relating to special meetings), called sa@myutta on account of their being delivered owing to the meetings (sa@myoga) of special persons which were the occasions for them; (4) A@nguttara Nikaya, so called because in each succeeding book of this work the topics of discussion increase by one [Footnote ref 1]; (5) Khuddaka Nikaya containing Khuddaka pa@tha, Dhammapada, Udana, Itivuttaka, Sutta Nipata, Vimana-vatthu, Petavatthu, Theragatha, Therigatha, Jataka, Niddesa, Pa@tisambhidamagga, Apadana, Buddhava@msa, Caryapi@taka.
The Abhidhammas are Pa@t@thana, Dhammasa@nga@ni, Dhatukatha, Puggalapannatti, Vibha@nga, Yamaka and Kathavatthu. There exists also a large commentary literature on diverse parts of the above works known as atthakatha. The work known as Milinda Panha (questions of King Milinda), of uncertain date, is of considerable philosophical value.
The doctrines and views incorporated in the above literature is generally now known as Sthaviravada or Theravada. On the origin of the name Theravada (the doctrine of the elders) Dipava@msa says that since the Theras (elders) met (at the first council) and collected the doctrines it was known as the Thera Vada [Footnote ref 2]. It does not appear that Buddhism as it appears in this Pali literature developed much since the time of Buddhagho@sa (4OO A.D.), the writer of Visuddhimagga (a compendium of theravada doctrines) and the commentator of Dighanikaya, Dhammasa@nga@ni, etc.
Hindu philosophy in later times seems to have been influenced by the later offshoots of the different schools of Buddhism, but it does not appear that Pali Buddhism had any share in it. I
[Footnote 1: See Buddhagho@sa's Atthasalini, p. 25.]
[Footnote 2: Oldenberg's Dipava@msa, p. 31.]
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have not been able to discover any old Hindu writer who could be considered as being acquainted with Pali.
The Doctrine of Causal Connection of early Buddhism [Footnote ref 1].
The word Dhamma in the Buddhist scriptures is used generally in four senses: (1) Scriptural texts, (2) quality (gu@na), (3) cause (hetu) and (4) unsubstantial and soulless (nissatta nijjiva [Footnote ref 2]). Of these it is the last meaning which is particularly important, from the point of view of Buddhist philosophy. The early Buddhist philosophy did not accept any fixed entity as determining all reality; the only things with it were the unsubstantial phenomena and these were called dhammas. The question arises that if there is no substance or reality how are we to account for the phenomena? But the phenomena are happening and passing away and the main point of interest with the Buddha was to find out "What being what else is," "What happening what else happens" and "What not being what else is not." The phenomena are happening in a series and we see that there being certain phenomena there become some others; by the happening of some events others also are produced. This is called (pa@ticca-samuppada) dependent origination. But it is difficult to understand what is the exact nature of this dependence. The question as Sa@myutta Nikaya (II. 5) has it with which the Buddha started before attaining Buddhahood was this: in what miserable condition are the people! they are born, they decay, they die, pass away and are born again; and they do not know the path of escape from this decay, death and misery.
How to know the Way to escape from this misery of decay and death. Then it occurred to him what being there, are decay and death, depending on what do they come? As he thought deeply into the root of the matter, it occurred to him that decay and death can only occur when there is birth (jati), so they depend
[Footnote 1: There are some differences of opinion as to whether one could take the doctrine of the twelve links of causes as we find it in the Sa@myutta Nikaya as the earliest Buddhist view, as Sa@myutta does not represent the oldest part of the suttas. But as this doctrine of the twelve causes became regarded as a fundamental Buddhist doctrine and as it gives us a start in philosophy I have not thought it fit to enter into conjectural discussions as to the earliest form. Dr E.J. Thomas drew my attention to this fact.]
[Footnote 2: Atthasatini, p. 38. There are also other senses in which the word is used, as dhamma-desana where it means religious teaching. The La@nkavatara described Dharmma as gu@nadravyapurvaka dharmma, i.e. Dharmmas are those which are associated as attributes and substances.]
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on birth. What being there, is there birth, on what does birth depend? Then it occurred to him that birth could only be if there were previous existence (bhava) [Footnote ref 1]. But on what does this existence depend, or what being there is there bhava. Then it occurred to him that there could not be existence unless there were holding fast (upadana) [Footnote ref 2]. But on what did upadana depend? It occurred to him that it was desire (ta@nha) on which upadana depended. There can be upadana if there is desire (tanha) [Footnote ref 3]. But what being there, can there be desire? To this question it occurred to him that there must be feeling (vedana) in order that there may be desire. But on what does vedana depend, or rather what must be there, that there may be feeling (vedana)? To this it occurred to him that there must be a sense-contact (phassa) in order that there may be feeling [Footnote ref 4]. If there should be no sense-contact there would be no feeling. But on what does sense-contact depend? It occurred to him that as there are six sense-contacts, there are the six fields of contact (ayatana) [Footnote ref 5]. But on what do the six ayatanas depend? It occurred to him that there must be the mind and body (namarupa) in order that there may be the six fields of contact [Footnote ref 6]; but on what does namarupa depend? It occurred to him that without consciousness (vinnana) there could be no namarupa [Footnote ref 8]. But what being there would there
[Footnote 1: This word bhava is interpreted by Candrakirtti in his Madhyamika v@rtti, p. 565 (La Vallee Poussin's edition) as the deed which brought about rebirth (punarbhavajanaka@m karma samutthapayali kayena vaca manasa ca).]
[Footnote 2: Atthasalini, p. 385, upadanantida@lhagaha@na@m. Candrakirtti in explaining upadana says that whatever thing a man desires he holds fast to the materials necessary for attaining it (yatra vastuni sat@r@s@nastasya vastuno 'rjanaya vi@dhapanaya upadanamupadatte tatra tatra prarthayate). Madhyamika v@rtti, p. 565.]
[Footnote 3: Candrakirtti describes t@r@s@na as asvadanabhinandanadhyavasanasthanadatmapriyarupairviyogo ma bhut, nityamaparityago bhavediti, yeyam prarthana—the desire that there may not ever be any separation from those pleasures, etc., which are dear to us. Ibid. 565.]
[Footnote 4: We read also of phassayatana and phassakaya. M. N. II. 261, III. 280, etc. Candrakirtti says that @sa@dbhirayatanadvarai@h k@rtyaprak@riya@h pravarttante prajnayante. tannamarupapratyaya@m @sa@dayatanamucyate. sa@dbhyas'cayatanebhya@h @sa@tspars'akaya@h pravarttante. M.V. 565.]
[Footnote 5: Ayatana means the six senses together with their objects. Ayatana literally is "Field of operation." Sa@layatana means six senses as six fields of operation. Candrakirtti has ayatanadvarai@h.]
[Footnote 6: I have followed the translation of Aung in rendering namarupa as mind and body, Compendium, p. 271. This seems to me to be fairly correct. The four skandhas are called nama in each birth. These together with rupa (matter) give us namarupa (mind and body) which being developed render the activities through the six sense-gates possible so that there may be knowledge. Cf. M. V. 564. Govindananda, the commentator on S'a@nkara's bhasya on the Brahma sutras (II. ii. 19), gives a different interpretation of Namarupa which may probably refer to the Vijnanavada view though we have no means at hand to verify it. He says—To think the momentary as the permanent is Avidya; from there come the samskaras of attachment, antipathy or anger, and infatuation; from there the first vijnana or thought of the foetus is produced, from that alayavijnana, and the four elements (which are objects of name and are hence called nama) are produced, and from those are produced the white and black, semen and blood called rupa. Both Vacaspati and Amalananda agree with Govindananda in holding that nama signifies the semen and the ovum while rupa means the visible physical body built out of them. Vijnana entered the womb and on account of it namarupa were produced through the association of previous karma. See Vedantakalpataru, pp 274, 275. On the doctrine of the entrance of vijnana into the womb compare D N II. 63.]
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be vinnana. Here it occurred to him that in order that there might be vinnana there must be the conformations (sa@nkhara) [Footnote ref 1]. But what being there are there the sa@nkharas? Here it occurred to him that the sa@nkharas can only be if there is ignorance (avijja). If avijja could be stopped then the sa@nkharas will be stopped, and if the sa@nkharas could be stopped vinnana could be stopped and so on [Footnote ref 2].
It is indeed difficult to be definite as to what the Buddha actually wished to mean by this cycle of dependence of existence sometimes called Bhavacakra (wheel of existence). Decay and death (jaramarana) could not have happened if there was no birth [Footnote ref 3]. This seems to be clear. But at this point the difficulty begins. We must remember that the theory of rebirth was
[Footnote 1: It is difficult to say what is the exact sense of the word here. The Buddha was one of the first few earliest thinkers to introduce proper philosophical terms and phraseology with a distinct philosophical method and he had often to use the same word in more or less different senses. Some of the philosophical terms at least are therefore rather elastic when compared with the terms of precise and definite meaning which we find in later Sanskrit thought. Thus in S N III. p. 87, "Sankhata@m abdisa@nkharonta," sa@nkhara means that which synthesises the complexes. In the Compendium it is translated as will, action. Mr. Aung thinks that it means the same as karma; it is here used in a different sense from what we find in the word sa@nkhata khandha (viz mental states). We get a list of 51 mental states forming sa@nkhata khandha in Dhamma Sangam, p 18, and another different set of 40 mental states in Dharmasamgraha, p. 6. In addition to these forty cittasamprayuktasa@mskara, it also counts thirteen cittaviprayuktasa@mskara. Candrakirtti interprets it as meaning attachment, antipathy and infatuation, p 563. Govindananda, the commentator on S'a@nkara's Brahma sutra (II. ii. 19), also interprets the word in connection with the doctrine of Pratityasamutpada as attachment, antipathy and infatuation.]
[Footnote 2: Samyutta Nikaya, II. 7-8.]
[Footnote 3: Jara and marana bring in s'oka (grief), paridevana (lamentation), duhkha (suffering), daurmanasya (feeling of wretchedness and miserableness) and upayasa (feeling of extreme destitution) at the prospect of one's death or the death of other dear ones. All these make up suffering and are the results of jati (birth). M. V. (B.T.S.p. 208). S'a@nkara in his bhasya counted all the terms from jara, separately. The whole series is to be taken as representing the entirety of duhkhaskandha.]
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enunciated in the Upani@sads. The B@rhadara@nyaka says that just as an insect going to the end of a leaf of grass by a new effort collects itself in another so does the soul coming to the end of this life collect itself in another. This life thus presupposes another existence. So far as I remember there has seldom been before or after Buddha any serious attempt to prove or disprove the doctrine of rebirth [Footnote ref 1]. All schools of philosophy except the Carvakas believed in it and so little is known to us of the Carvaka sutras that it is difficult to say what they did to refute this doctrine. The Buddha also accepts it as a fact and does not criticize it. This life therefore comes only as one which had an infinite number of lives before, and which except in the case of a few emancipated ones would have an infinite number of them in the future. It was strongly believed by all people, and the Buddha also, when he came to think to what our present birth might be due, had to fall back upon another existence (bhava). If bhava means karma which brings rebirth as Candrakirtti takes it to mean, then it would mean that the present birth could only take place on account of the works of a previous existence which determined it. Here also we are reminded of the Upani@sad note "as a man does so will he be born" (Yat karma kurute tadabhisampadyate, Brh IV. iv. 5). Candrakirtti's interpretation of "bhava" as Karma (punarbhavajanakam karma) seems to me to suit better than "existence." The word was probably used rather loosely for kammabhava. The word bhava is not found in the earlier Upani@sads and was used in the Pali scriptures for the first time as a philosophical term. But on what does this bhava depend? There could not have been a previous existence if people had not betaken themselves to things or works they desired. This betaking oneself to actions or things in accordance with desire is called upadana. In the Upani@sads we read, "whatever one betakes himself to, so does he work" (Yatkraturbhavati tatkarmma kurute, B@rh. IV. iv. 5). As this betaking to the thing depends upon desire {t@r@s@na}, it is said that in order that there may be upadana there must be tanha. In the Upani@sads also we read "Whatever one desires so does he betake himself to" (sa yathakamo bhavati tatkraturbhavati). Neither the word upadana nor t@rs@na (the Sanskrit word corresponding
[Footnote 1: The attempts to prove the doctrine of rebirth in the Hindu philosophical works such as the Nyaya, etc., are slight and inadequate.]
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to ta@nha) is found in the earlier Upani@sads, but the ideas contained in them are similar to the words "kratu" and "kama." Desire (ta@nha) is then said to depend on feeling or sense-contact. Sense-contact presupposes the six senses as fields of operation [Footnote ref 1]. These six senses or operating fields would again presuppose the whole psychosis of the man (the body and the mind together) called namarupa. We are familiar with this word in the Upani@sads but there it is used in the sense of determinate forms and names as distinguished from the indeterminate indefinable reality [Footnote ref 2]. Buddhagho@sa in the Visuddhimagga says that by "Name" are meant the three groups beginning with sensation (i.e. sensation, perception and the predisposition); by "Form" the four elements and form derivative from the four elements [Footnote ref 3]. He further says that name by itself can produce physical changes, such as eating, drinking, making movements or the like. So form also cannot produce any of those changes by itself. But like the cripple and the blind they mutually help one another and effectuate the changes [Footnote ref 4]. But there exists no heap or collection of material for the production of Name and Form; "but just as when a lute is played upon, there is no previous store of sound; and when the sound comes into existence it does not come from any such store; and when it ceases, it does not go to any of the cardinal or intermediate points of the compass;...in exactly the same way all the elements of being both those with form and those without, come into existence after having previously been non-existent and having come into existence pass away [Footnote ref 5]." Namarupa taken in this sense will not mean the whole of mind and body, but only the sense functions and the body which are found to operate in the six doors of sense (sa@layatana). If we take namarupa in this sense, we can see that it may be said to depend upon the vinnana (consciousness). Consciousness has been compared in the Milinda Panha with a watchman at the middle of
[Footnote 1: The word ayatana is found in many places in the earlier Upani@sads in the sense of "field or place," Cha. I. 5, B@rh. III. 9. 10, but @sa@dayatana does not occur.]
[Footnote 2: Candrakirtti interprets nama as Vedanadayo' rupi@nas'catvara@h skandhastatra tatra bhave namayantili nama. saha rupaskandhena ca nama rupam ceti namarupamucyate. The four skandhas in each specific birth act as name. These together with rupa make namarupa. M. V. 564.]
[Footnote 3: Warren's Buddhism in Translations, p. 184.]
[Footnote 4: Ibid. p. 185, Visuddhimagga, Ch. XVII.]
[Footnote 5: Ibid. pp. 185-186, Visuddhimagga, Ch. XVII.]
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the cross-roads beholding all that come from any direction [Footnote ref 1]. Buddhagho@sa in the Atthasalini also says that consciousness means that which thinks its object. If we are to define its characteristics we must say that it knows (vijanana), goes in advance (pubba@ngama), connects (sandhana), and stands on namarupa (namarupapada@t@thanam). When the consciousness gets a door, at a place the objects of sense are discerned (arammana-vibhavana@t@thane) and it goes first as the precursor. When a visual object is seen by the eye it is known only by the consciousness, and when the dhammas are made the objects of (mind) mano, it is known only by the consciousness [Footnote ref 2]. Buddhagho@sa also refers here to the passage in the Milinda Panha we have just referred to. He further goes on to say that when states of consciousness rise one after another, they leave no gap between the previous state and the later and consciousness therefore appears as connected. When there are the aggregates of the five khandhas it is lost; but there are the four aggregates as namarupa, it stands on nama and therefore it is said that it stands on namarupa. He further asks, Is this consciousness the same as the previous consciousness or different from it? He answers that it is the same. Just so, the sun shows itself with all its colours, etc., but he is not different from those in truth; and it is said that just when the sun rises, its collected heat and yellow colour also rise then, but it does not mean that the sun is different from these. So the citta or consciousness takes the phenomena of contact, etc., and cognizes them. So though it is the same as they are yet in a sense it is different from them [Footnote ref 3].
To go back to the chain of twelve causes, we find that jati (birth) is the cause of decay and death, jaramara@na, etc. Jati is the appearance of the body or the totality of the five skandhas [Footnote ref 4]. Coming to bhava which determines jati, I cannot think of any better rational explanation of bhava, than that I have already
[Footnote 1: Warren's Buddhism in Translations, p. 182, Milinda Panha (628).]
[Footnote 2: Atthasalini, p. 112...]
[Footnote 3: Ibid. p. 113, Yatha hi rupadini upadaya pannatta suriyadayo na atthato rupadihi anne honti ten' eva yasmin samaye suriyo udeti tasmin samaye tassa teja-sa@nkhatam rupa@m piti eva@m vuccamane pi na rupadihi anno suriyo nama atthi. Tatha cittam phassadayo dhamme upadaya pannapiyati. Atthato pan' ettha tehi annam eva. Tena yasmin samaye cittam uppanna@m hoti eka@msen eva tasmin samaye phassadihi atthato annad eva hoti ti.]
[Footnote 4: "Jatirdehajanma pancaskandhasamudaya@h," Govindananda's Ratnaprabha on S'a@nkara's bha@sya, II. ii. 19.]
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suggested, namely, the works (karma) which produce the birth [Footnote ref 1]. Upadana is an advanced t@r@s@na leading to positive clinging [Footnote ref 2]. It is produced by t@r@s@na (desire) which again is the result of vedana (pleasure and pain). But this vedana is of course vedana with ignorance (avidya), for an Arhat may have also vedana but as he has no avidya, the vedana cannot produce t@r@s@na in turn. On its development it immediately passes into upadana. Vedana means pleasurable, painful or indifferent feeling. On the one side it leads to t@r@s@na (desire) and on the other it is produced by sense-contact (spars'a). Prof. De la Vallee Poussin says that S'rilabha distinguishes three processes in the production of vedana. Thus first there is the contact between the sense and the object; then there is the knowledge of the object, and then there is the vedana. Depending on Majjhima Nikaya, iii. 242, Poussin gives the other opinion that just as in the case of two sticks heat takes place simultaneously with rubbing, so here also vedana takes place simultaneously with spars'a for they are "produits par un meme complexe de causes (samagri) [Footnote ref 3]."
Spars'a is produced by @sa@dayatana, @sa@dayatana by namarupa, and namarupa by vijnana, and is said to descend in the womb of the mother and produce the five skandhas as namarupa, out of which the six senses are specialized.
Vijnana in this connection probably means the principle or germ of consciousness in the womb of the mother upholding the five elements of the new body there. It is the product of the past karmas (sa@nkhara) of the dying man and of his past consciousness too.
We sometimes find that the Buddhists believed that the last thoughts of the dying man determined the nature of his next
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[Footnote 1: Govindananda in his Ratnaprabha on S'a@nkara's bha@sya, II. ii. 19, explains "bhava" as that from which anything becomes, as merit and demerit (dharmadi). See also Vibhanga, p. 137 and Warren's Buddhism in Translations, p. 201. Mr Aung says in Abhidhammatthasa@ngaha, p. 189, that bhavo includes kammabhavo (the active side of an existence) and upapattibhavo (the passive side). And the commentators say that bhava is a contraction of "kammabhava" or Karma-becoming i.e. karmic activity.]
[Footnote 2: Prof. De la Vallee Poussin in his Theoric des Douze Causes, p. 26, says that S'alistambhasutra explains the word "upadana" as "t@r@s@navaipulya" or hyper-t@r@s@na and Candrakirtti also gives the same meaning, M. V. (B.T.S.p. 210). Govmdananda explains "upadana" as prav@rtti (movement) generated by t@r@s@na (desire), i.e. the active tendency in pursuance of desire. But if upadana means "support" it would denote all the five skandhas. Thus Madhyamaka v@rtti says upadanam pancaskandhalak@sa@nam...pancopadanaskandhakhyam upadanam. M.V. XXVII. 6.]
[Footnote 3: Poussin's Theorie des Douze Causes, p. 23.
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birth [Footnote ref 1]. The manner in which the vijnana produced in the womb is determined by the past vijnana of the previous existence is according to some authorities of the nature of a reflected image, like the transmission of learning from the teacher to the disciple, like the lighting of a lamp from another lamp or like the impress of a stamp on wax. As all the skandhas are changing in life, so death also is but a similar change; there is no great break, but the same uniform sort of destruction and coming into being. New skandhas are produced as simultaneously as the two scale pans of a balance rise up and fall, in the same manner as a lamp is lighted or an image is reflected. At the death of the man the vijnana resulting from his previous karmas and vijnanas enters into the womb of that mother (animal, man or the gods) in which the next skandhas are to be matured. This vijnana thus forms the principle of the new life. It is in this vijnana that name (nama) and form (rupa) become associated.
The vijnana is indeed a direct product of the sa@mskaras and the sort of birth in which vijnana should bring down (namayati) the new existence (upapatti) is determined by the sa@mskaras [Footnote ref 2], for in reality the happening of death (mara@nabhava) and the instillation of the vijnana as the beginning of the new life (upapattibhava) cannot be simultaneous, but the latter succeeds just at the next moment, and it is to signify this close succession that they are said to be simultaneous. If the vijnana had not entered the womb then no namarupa could have appeared [Footnote ref 3].
This chain of twelve causes extends over three lives. Thus avidya and sa@mskara of the past life produce the vijnana, namarupa,
[Footnote 1: The deities of the gardens, the woods, the trees and the plants, finding the master of the house, Citta, ill said "make your resolution, 'May I be a cakravartti king in a next existence,'" Sa@myutta, IV. 303.]
[Footnote 2: "sa cedanandavijnana@m matu@hkuk@sim navakrameta, na tat kalalam kalalatvaya sannivartteta," M. V. 552. Compare Caraka, S'arira, III. 5-8, where he speaks of a "upapiduka sattva" which connects the soul with body and by the absence of which the character is changed, the senses become affected and life ceases, when it is in a pure condition one can remember even the previous births; character, purity, antipathy, memory, fear, energy, all mental qualities are produced out of it. Just as a chariot is made by the combination of many elements, so is the foetus.]
[Footnote 3: Madhyamaka v@riti (B.T.S. 202-203). Poussin quotes from Digha, II. 63, "si le vijnana ne descendait pas dans le sein maternel la namarupa s'y constituerait-il?" Govindananda on S'a@nkara's commentary on the Brahma-sutras (II. ii. 19) says that the first consciousness (vijnana) of the foetus is produced by the sa@mskaras of the previous birth, and from that the four elements (which he calls nama) and from that the white and red, semen and ovum, and the first stage of the foetus (kalala-budbudavastha} is produced.]
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@sa@dayatana, spars'a, vedana, t@r@s@na, upadana and the bhava (leading to another life) of the present actual life. This bhava produces the jati and jaramara@na of the next life [Footnote ref l].
It is interesting to note that these twelve links in the chain extending in three sections over three lives are all but the manifestations of sorrow to the bringing in of which they naturally determine one another. Thus Abhidhammatthasa@ngaha says "each of these twelve terms is a factor. For the composite term 'sorrow,' etc. is only meant to show incidental consequences of birth. Again when 'ignorance' and 'the actions of the mind' have been taken into account, craving (t@r@s@na), grasping (upadana) and (karma) becoming (bhava) are implicitly accounted for also. In the same manner when craving, grasping and (karma) becoming have been taken into account, ignorance and the actions of the mind are (implicitly) accounted for, also; and when birth, decay, and death are taken into account, even the fivefold fruit, to wit (rebirth), consciousness, and the rest are accounted for. And thus:
Five causes in the Past and Now a fivefold 'fruit.'
Five causes Now and yet to come a fivefold 'fruit' make up the Twenty Modes, the Three Connections (1. sa@nkhara and vinnana, 2. vedana and tanha, 3. bhava and jati) and the four groups (one causal group in the Past, one resultant group in the Present, one causal group in the Present and one resultant group in the Future, each group consisting of five modes) [Footnote ref 2]."
These twelve interdependent links (dvadas'a@nga) represent the pa@ticcasamuppada (pratatyasamutpada) doctrines (dependent origination) [Footnote ref 3] which are themselves but sorrow and lead to cycles of sorrow. The term pa@ticcasamuppada or pratityasamutpada has been differently interpreted in later Buddhist literature [Footnote ref 4].
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[Footnote 1: This explanation probably cannot be found in the early Pali texts; but Buddhagho@sa mentions it in Suma@ngalavilasini on Mahanidana suttanta. We find it also in Abhidhammatthasa@ngaha, VIII. 3. Ignorance and the actions of the mind belong to the past; "birth," "decay and death" to the future; the intermediate eight to the present. It is styled as tri@ka@n@daka (having three branches) in Abhidkarmakos'a, III. 20-24. Two in the past branch, two in the future and eight in the middle "sa pratityasamutpado dvadas'a@ngastrika@n@daka@h purvaparantayordve dve madhye@s@tau."]
[Footnote 2: Aung and Mrs Rhys Davids' translation of Abhidhammatthasa@ngaha, pp. 189-190.]
[Footnote 3: The twelve links are not always constant. Thus in the list given in the Dialogues of the Buddha, II. 23 f., avijja and sa@nkhara have been omitted and the start has been made with consciousness, and it has been said that "Cognition turns back from name and form; it goes not beyond."]
[Footnote 4: M. V. p. 5 f.]
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Samutpada means appearance or arising (pradurbhdava) and pratitya means after getting (prati+i+ya); combining the two we find, arising after getting (something). The elements, depending on which there is some kind of arising, are called hetu (cause) and paccaya (ground). These two words however are often used in the same sense and are interchangeable. But paccaya is also used in a specific sense. Thus when it is said that avijja is the paccaya of sa@nkhara it is meant that avijja is the ground (@thiti) of the origin of the sa@nkharas, is the ground of their movement, of the instrument through which they stand (nimitta@t@thiti), of their ayuhana (conglomeration), of their interconnection, of their intelligibility, of their conjoint arising, of their function as cause and of their function as the ground with reference to those which are determined by them. Avijja in all these nine ways is the ground of sa@nkhara both in the past and also in the future, though avijja itself is determined in its turn by other grounds [Footnote ref 1]. When we take the betu aspect of the causal chain, we cannot think of anything else but succession, but when we take the paccaya aspect we can have a better vision into the nature of the cause as ground. Thus when avijja is said to be the ground of the sa@nkharas in the nine ways mentioned above, it seems reasonable to think that the sa@nkharas were in some sense regarded as special manifestations of avijja [Footnote ref 2]. But as this point was not further developed in the early Buddhist texts it would be unwise to proceed further with it.
The Khandhas.
The word khandha (Skr. skandha) means the trunk of a tree and is generally used to mean group or aggregate [Footnote ref 3]. We have seen that Buddha said that there was no atman (soul). He said that when people held that they found the much spoken of soul, they really only found the five khandhas together or any one of them. The khandhas are aggregates of bodily and psychical states which are immediate with us and are divided into five
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[Footnote 1: See Pa@tisambhidamagga, vol. I.p. 50; see also Majjhima Nikaya, I. 67, sa@nkhara...avijjanidana avijjasamudaya avijjajatika avijjapabhava.]
[Footnote 2: In the Yoga derivation of asmita (egoism), raga (attachment), dve@sa (antipathy) and abhinives'a (self love) from avidya we find also that all the five are regarded as the five special stages of the growth of avidya (pancaparvi avidya).]
[Footnote 3: The word skandha is used in Chandogya, II. 23 (trayo dharmaskandha@h yajna@h adhyayanam danam) in the sense of branches and in almost the same sense in Maitri, VII. II.]
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classes: (1) rupa (four elements, the body, the senses), sense data, etc., (2) vedana (feeling—pleasurable, painful and indifferent), (3) sanna (conceptual knowledge), (4) sa@nkhara (synthetic mental states and the synthetic functioning of compound sense-affections, compound feelings and compound concepts), (5) vinnana (consciousness) [Footnote ref 1].
All these states rise depending one upon the other (pa@ticcasamuppanna) and when a man says that he perceives the self he only deludes himself, for he only perceives one or more of these. The word rupa in rupakhandha stands for matter and material qualities, the senses, and the sense data [Footnote ref 2]. But "rupa" is also used in the sense of pure organic affections or states of mind as we find in the Khandha Yamaka, I.p. 16, and also in Sa@myutta Nikaya, III. 86. Rupaskandha according to Dharmasa@mgraha means the aggregate of five senses, the five sensations, and the implicatory communications associated in sense perceptions vijnapti).
The elaborate discussion of Dhammasa@nga@ni begins by defining rupa as "cattaro ca mahabhuta catunnanca mahabhntanam upadaya rupam" (the four mahabhutas or elements and that proceeding from the grasping of that is called rupa) [Footnote ref 3]. Buddhagho@sa explains it by saying that rupa means the four mahabhutas and those which arise depending (nissaya) on them as a modification of them. In the rupa the six senses including their affections are also included. In explaining why the four elements are called mahabhutas, Buddhagho@sa says: "Just as a magician (mayakara) makes the water which is not hard appear as hard, makes the stone which is not gold appear as gold; just as he himself though not a ghost nor a bird makes himself appear as a ghost or a bird, so these elements though not themselves blue make themselves appear as blue (nilam upada rupam), not yellow, red, or white make themselves appear as yellow, red or white (odatam upadarupam), so on account of their similarity to the appearances created by the magician they are called mahabhuta [Footnote ref 4]."
In the Sa@myutta Nikaya we find that the Buddha says, "O Bhikkhus it is called rupam because it manifests (rupyati); how
[Footnote 1: Sa@myutta Nikaya, III. 86, etc.]
[Footnote 2: Abhidhammatthasangaha, J.P.T.S. 1884, p. 27 ff.]
[Footnote 3: Dhammasa@nga@ni, pp. 124-179.]
[Footnote 4: Atthasalini, p. 299.]
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does it manifest? It manifests as cold, and as heat, as hunger and as thirst, it manifests as the touch of gnats, mosquitos, wind, the sun and the snake; it manifests, therefore it is called rupa [Footnote ref 1]."
If we take the somewhat conflicting passages referred to above for our consideration and try to combine them so as to understand what is meant by rupa, I think we find that that which manifested itself to the senses and organs was called rupa. No distinction seems to have been made between the sense-data as colours, smells, etc., as existing in the physical world and their appearance as sensations. They were only numerically different and the appearance of the sensations was dependent upon the sense-data and the senses but the sense-data and the sensations were "rupa." Under certain conditions the sense-data were followed by the sensations. Buddhism did not probably start with the same kind of division of matter and mind as we now do. And it may not be out of place to mention that such an opposition and duality were found neither in the Upani@sads nor in the Sa@mkhya system which is regarded by some as pre-Buddhistic. The four elements manifested themselves in certain forms and were therefore called rupa; the forms of affection that appeared were also called rupa; many other mental states or features which appeared with them were also called rupa [Footnote ref 2]. The ayatanas or the senses were also called rupa [Footnote ref 3]. The mahabhutas or four elements were themselves but changing manifestations, and they together with all that appeared in association with them were called rupa and formed the rupa khandha (the classes of sense-materials, sense-data, senses and sensations).
In Sa@myutta Nikaya (III. 101) it is said that "the four mahabhutas were the hetu and the paccaya for the communication of the rupakkhandha (rupakkhandhassa pannapanaya). Contact (sense-contact, phassa) is the cause of the communication of feelings (vedana); sense-contact was also the hetu and paccaya for the communication of the sannakkhandha; sense-contact is also the hetu and paccaya for the communication of the sa@nkharakkhandha. But namarupa is the hetu and the paccaya for the communication of the vinnanakkhandha." Thus not only feelings arise on account of the sense-contact but sanna and sa@nkhara also arise therefrom. Sanna is that where specific knowing or
[Footnote 1: Sa@myutta Nikaya, III. 86.]
[Footnote 2: Khandhayamaka.]
[Footnote 3: Dhammasanga@ni, p. 124 ff.]
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conceiving takes place. This is the stage where the specific distinctive knowledge as the yellow or the red takes place.
Mrs. Rhys Davids writing on sanna says: "In editing the second book of the Abhidhamma pi@taka I found a classification distinguishing between sanna as cognitive assimilation on occasion of sense, and sanna as cognitive assimilation of ideas by way of naming. The former is called perception of resistance, or opposition (patigha-sanna). This, writes Buddhagho@sa, is perception on occasion of sight, hearing, etc., when consciousness is aware of the impact of impressions; of external things as different, we might say. The latter is called perception of the equivalent word or name (adhivachana-sanna) and is exercised by the sensus communis (mano), when e.g. 'one is seated...and asks another who is thoughtful: "What are you thinking of?" one perceives through his speech.' Thus there are two stages of sanna-consciousness, 1. contemplating sense-impressions, 2. ability to know what they are by naming [Footnote ref 1]."
About sa@nkhara we read in Sa@myutta Nikaya (III. 87) that it is called sa@nkhara because it synthesises (abhisa@nkharonti), it is that which conglomerated rupa as rupa, conglomerated sanna as sanna, sa@nkhara as sa@nkhara and consciousness (vinnana) as consciousness. It is called sa@nkhara because it synthesises the conglomerated (sa@nkhatam abhisa@nkharonti). It is thus a synthetic function which synthesises the passive rupa, sanna, sa@nkhara and vinnana elements. The fact that we hear of 52 sa@nkhara states and also that the sa@nkhara exercises its synthetic activity on the conglomerated elements in it, goes to show that probably the word sa@nkhara is used in two senses, as mental states and as synthetic activity.
Vinnana or consciousness meant according to Buddhagho@sa, as we have already seen in the previous section, both the stage at which the intellectual process started and also the final resulting consciousness.
Buddhagho@sa in explaining the process of Buddhist psychology says that "consciousness(citta)first comes into touch (phassa) with its object (aramma@na) and thereafter feeling, conception (sanna) and volition (cetana) come in. This contact is like the pillars of a palace, and the rest are but the superstructure built upon it (dabbasambharasadisa). But it should not be thought that contact
[Footnote 1: Buddhist Psychology, pp. 49, 50.]
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is the beginning of the psychological processes, for in one whole consciousness (ekacittasmi@m) it cannot be said that this comes first and that comes after, so we can take contact in association with feeling (vedana), conceiving (sanna) or volition (cetana); it is itself an immaterial state but yet since it comprehends objects it is called contact." "There is no impinging on one side of the object (as in physical contact), nevertheless contact causes consciousness and object to be in collision, as visible object and visual organs, sound and hearing; thus impact is its function; or it has impact as its essential property in the sense of attainment, owing to the impact of the physical basis with the mental object. For it is said in the Commentary:—"contact in the four planes of existence is never without the characteristic of touch with the object; but the function of impact takes place in the five doors. For to sense, or five-door contact, is given the name 'having the characteristic of touch' as well as 'having the function of impact.' But to contact in the mind-door there is only the characteristic of touch, but not the function of impact. And then this Sutta is quoted 'As if, sire, two rams were to fight, one ram to represent the eye, the second the visible object, and their collision contact. And as if, sire, two cymbals were to strike against each other, or two hands were to clap against each other; one hand would represent the eye, the second the visible object and their collision contact. Thus contact has the characteristic of touch and the function of impact [Footnote ref 1]'. Contact is the manifestation of the union of the three (the object, the consciousness and the sense) and its effect is feeling (vedana); though it is generated by the objects it is felt in the consciousness and its chief feature is experiencing (anubhava) the taste of the object. As regards enjoying the taste of an object, the remaining associated states enjoy it only partially. Of contact there is (the function of) the mere touching, of perception the mere noting or perceiving, of volition the mere coordinating, of consciousness the mere cognizing. But feeling alone, through governance, proficiency, mastery, enjoys the taste of an object. For feeling is like the king, the remaining states are like the cook. As the cook, when he has prepared food of diverse tastes, puts it in a basket, seals it, takes it to the king, breaks the seal, opens the basket, takes the best of all the soup and curries, puts them in a dish, swallows (a portion) to find out
[Footnote 1: Atthasalini, p. 108; translation, pp. 143-144.]
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whether they are faulty or not and afterwards offers the food of various excellent tastes to the king, and the king, being lord, expert, and master, eats whatever he likes, even so the mere tasting of the food by the cook is like the partial enjoyment of the object by the remaining states, and as the cook tastes a portion of the food, so the remaining states enjoy a portion of the object, and as the king, being lord, expert and master, eats the meal according to his pleasure so feeling being lord expert, and master, enjoys the taste of the object and therefore it is said that enjoyment or experience is its function [Footnote ref 1]."
The special feature of sanna is said to be the recognizing (paccabhinna) by means of a sign (abhinnanena). According to another explanation, a recognition takes place by the inclusion of the totality (of aspects)—sabbasa@ngahikavasena. The work of volition (cetana) is said to be coordination or binding together (abhisandahana). "Volition is exceedingly energetic and makes a double effort, a double exertion. Hence the Ancients said 'Volition is like the nature of a landowner, a cultivator who taking fifty-five strong men, went down to the fields to reap. He was exceedingly energetic and exceedingly strenuous; he doubled his strength and said "Take your sickles" and so forth, pointed out the portion to be reaped, offered them drink, food, scent, flowers, etc., and took an equal share of the work.' The simile should be thus applied: volition is like the cultivator, the fifty-five moral states which arise as factors of consciousness are like the fifty-five strong men; like the time of doubling strength, doubling effort by the cultivator is the doubled strength, doubled effort of volition as regards activity in moral and immoral acts [Footnote ref 2]." It seems that probably the active side operating in sa@nkhara was separately designated as cetana (volition).
"When one says 'I,' what he does is that he refers either to all the khandhas combined or any one of them and deludes himself that that was 'I.' Just as one could not say that the fragrance of the lotus belonged to the petals, the colour or the pollen, so one could not say that the rupa was 'I' or that the vedana was 'I' or any of the other khandhas was 'I.' There is nowhere to be found in the khandhas 'I am [Footnote ref 3]'."
[Footnote 1: Atthasalini, pp. 109-110; translation, pp. 145-146.]
[Footnote 2: Ibid. p. 111; translation, pp. 147-148.]
[Footnote 3: Samyutta Nikaya, III. 130.]
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Avijja and Asava.
As to the question how the avijja (ignorance) first started there can be no answer, for we could never say that either ignorance or desire for existence ever has any beginning [Footnote ref 1]. Its fruition is seen in the cycle of existence and the sorrow that comes in its train, and it comes and goes with them all. Thus as we can never say that it has any beginning, it determines the elements which bring about cycles of existence and is itself determined by certain others. This mutual determination can only take place in and through the changing series of dependent phenomena, for there is nothing which can be said to have any absolute priority in time or stability. It is said that it is through the coming into being of the asavas or depravities that the avijja came into being, and that through the destruction of the depravities (asava) the avijja was destroyed [Footnote ref 2]. These asavas are classified in the Dhammasa@nga@ni as kamasava, bhavasava, di@t@thasava and avijjasava. Kamasava means desire, attachment, pleasure, and thirst after the qualities associated with the senses; bhavasava means desire, attachment and will for existence or birth; di@t@thasava means the holding of heretical views, such as, the world is eternal or non-eternal, or that the world will come to an end or will not come to an end, or that the body and the soul are one or are different; avijjasava means the ignorance of sorrow, its cause, its extinction and its means of extinction. Dhammasa@nga@ni adds four more supplementary ones, viz. ignorance about the nature of anterior mental khandhas, posterior mental khandhas, anterior and posterior together, and their mutual dependence [Footnote ref 3]. Kamasava and bhavasava can as Buddhagho@sa says be counted as one, for they are both but depravities due to attachment [Footnote ref 4].
[Footnote 1: Warren's Buddhism in Translations (Visuddhimagga, chap. XVII.), p. 175.]
[Footnote 2: M. N. I.p. 54. Childers translates "asava" as "depravities" and Mrs Rhys Davids as "intoxicants." The word "asava" in Skr. means "old wine." It is derived from "su" to produce by Buddhagho@sa and the meaning that he gives to it is "cira parivasika@t@thena" (on account of its being stored up for a long time like wine). They work through the eye and the mind and continue to produce all beings up to Indra. As those wines which are kept long are called "asavas" so these are also called asavas for remaining a long time. The other alternative that Buddhagho@sa gives is that they are called asava on account of their producing sa@msaradukkha (sorrows of the world), Atthasalini, p. 48. Contrast it with Jaina asrava (flowing in of karma matter). Finding it difficult to translate it in one word after Buddhagho@sa, I have translated it as "depravities," after Childers.]
[Footnote 3: See Dhammasa@nga@ni, p. 195.]
[Footnote 4: Buddhagho@sa's Atthasalini, p. 371.]
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The di@t@thasavas by clouding the mind with false metaphysical views stand in the way of one's adopting the true Buddhistic doctrines. The kamasavas stand in the way of one's entering into the way of Nirva@na (anagamimagga) and the bhavasavas and avijjasavas stand in the way of one's attaining arha or final emancipation. When the Majjhima Nikaya says that from the rise of the asavas avijja rises, it evidently counts avijja there as in some sense separate from the other asavas, such as those of attachment and desire of existence which veil the true knowledge about sorrow.
The afflictions (kilesas) do not differ much from the asavas for they are but the specific passions in forms ordinarily familiar to us, such as covetousness (lobha), anger or hatred (dosa), infatuation (moha), arrogance, pride or vanity (mana), heresy (di@t@thi), doubt or uncertainty (vicikiccha), idleness (thina), boastfulness (udhacca), shamelessness (ahirika) and hardness of heart anottapa); these kilesas proceed directly as a result of the asavas. In spite of these varieties they are often counted as three (lobha, dosa, moha) and these together are called kilesa. They are associated with the vedanakkhandha, sannakkhandha, sa@nkharakkhandha and vinnanakkhandha. From these arise the three kinds of actions, of speech, of body, and of mind [Footnote ref 1].
Sila and Samadhi.
We are intertwined all through outside and inside by the tangles of desire (ta@nha ja@ta), and the only way by which these may be loosened is by the practice of right discipline (sila), concentration (samadhi) and wisdom (panna). Sila briefly means the desisting from committing all sinful deeds (sabbapapassa akara@nam). With sila therefore the first start has to be made, for by it one ceases to do all actions prompted by bad desires and thereby removes the inrush of dangers and disturbances. This serves to remove the kilesas, and therefore the proper performance of the sila would lead one to the first two successive stages of sainthood, viz. the sotapannabhava (the stage in which one is put in the right current) and the sakadagamibhava (the stage when one has only one more birth to undergo). Samadhi is a more advanced effort, for by it all the old roots of the old kilesas are destroyed and the ta@nha or desire is removed and
[Footnote 1: Dhammasa@nga@ni, p. 180.]
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by it one is led to the more advanced states of a saint. It directly brings in panna (true wisdom) and by panna the saint achieves final emancipation and becomes what is called an arhat [Footnote ref 1]. Wisdom (panna) is right knowledge about the four ariya saccas, viz. sorrow, its cause, its destruction and its cause of destruction.
Sila means those particular volitions and mental states, etc. by which a man who desists from committing sinful actions maintains himself on the right path. Sila thus means 1. right volition (cetana), 2. the associated mental states (cetasika), 3. mental control (sa@mvara) and 4. the actual non-transgression (in body and speech) of the course of conduct already in the mind by the preceding three silas called avitikkama. Sa@mvara is spoken of as being of five kinds, 1. Pa@timokkhasa@mvara (the control which saves him who abides by it), 2. Satisa@mvara (the control of mindfulness), 3. Nanasa@mvara (the control of knowledge), 4. Khantisa@mvara (the control of patience), 5. Viriyasa@mvara (the control of active self-restraint). Pa@timokkhasa@mvara means all self-control in general. Satisa@mvara means the mindfulness by which one can bring in the right and good associations when using one's cognitive senses. Even when looking at any tempting object he will by virtue of his mindfulness (sati) control himself from being tempted by avoiding to think of its tempting side and by thinking on such aspects of it as may lead in the right direction. Khantisa@mvara is that by which one can remain unperturbed in heat and cold. By the proper adherence to sila all our bodily, mental and vocal activities (kamma) are duly systematized, organized, stabilized (samadhanam, upadhara@na@m, pati@t@tha) [Footnote ref 2].
The sage who adopts the full course should also follow a number of healthy monastic rules with reference to dress, sitting, dining, etc., which are called the dhuta@ngas or pure disciplinary parts [Footnote ref 3]. The practice of sila and the dhutangas help the sage to adopt the course of samadhi. Samadhi as we have seen means the concentration of the mind bent on right endeavours (kusalacittekaggata samadhi@h) together with its states upon one particular object (ekaramma@na) so that they may completely cease to shift and change (samma ca avikkhipamana) [Footnote ref 4]. |
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