It is interesting to notice that between the Vatsyayana bha@sya and the Udyotakara's Varttika no Hindu work on logic of importance seems to have been written: it appears that the science of logic in this period was in the hands of the Jains and the Buddhists; and it was Di@nnaga's criticism of Hindu Nyaya that roused Udyotakara to write the Varttika. The Buddhist and the Jain method of treating logic separately from metaphysics as an independent study was not accepted by the Hindus till we come to Ga@nges'a, and there is probably only one Hindu work of importance on Nyaya in the Buddhist style namely Nyayasara of Bhasarvajna. Other older Hindu works generally treated of



[Footnote 1: See Indian Logic Medieval School, by Dr S.C. Vidyabhu@sa@na, for a bibliography of Jain and Buddhist Logic.]

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inference only along with metaphysical and other points of Nyaya interest [Footnote ref 1].

The main doctrine of the Nyaya-Vais'e@sika Philosophy [Footnote ref 2].

The Nyaya-Vais'e@sika having dismissed the doctrine of momentariness took a common-sense view of things, and held that things remain permanent until suitable collocations so arrange themselves that the thing can be destroyed. Thus the jug continues to remain a jug unless or until it is broken to pieces by the stroke of a stick. Things exist not because they can produce an impression on us, or serve my purposes either directly or through knowledge, as the Buddhists suppose, but because existence is one of their characteristics. If I or you or any other perceiver did not exist, the things would continue to exist all the same. Whether they produce any effect on us or on their surrounding environments is immaterial. Existence is the most general characteristic of things, and it is on account of this that things are testified by experience to be existing.

As the Nyaya-Vais'e@sikas depended solely on experience and on valid reasons, they dismissed the Sa@mkhya cosmology, but accepted the atomic doctrine of the four elements (bhutas), earth (k@siti), water (ap), fire (tejas), and air (marut). These atoms are eternal; the fifth substance (akas'a) is all pervasive and eternal. It is regarded as the cause of propagating sound; though all-pervading and thus in touch with the ears of all persons, it manifests sound only in the ear-drum, as it is only there that it shows itself as a sense-organ and manifests such sounds as the man deserves to hear by reason of his merit and demerit. Thus a deaf man though he has the akas'a as his sense of hearing, cannot hear on account of his demerit which impedes the faculty of that sense organ [Footnote ref 3]. In addition to these they admitted the existence of time (kala) as extending from the past through the present to the

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[Footnote 1: Almost all the books on Nyaya and Vais'e@sika referred to have been consulted in the writing of this chapter. Those who want to be acquainted with a fuller bibliography of the new school of logic should refer to the paper called "The History of Navya Nyaya in Bengal," by Mr. Cakravartti in J.A.S.B. 1915.]

[Footnote 2: I have treated Nyaya and Vais'e@sika as the same system. Whatever may have been their original differences, they are regarded since about 600 A.D. as being in complete agreement except in some minor points. The views of one system are often supplemented by those of the other. The original character of the two systems has already been treated.]

[Footnote 3: See Nyayakandali, pp. 59-64.]

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endless futurity before us. Had there been no time we could have no knowledge of it and there would be nothing to account for our time-notions associated with all changes. The Sa@mkhya did not admit the existence of any real time; to them the unit of kala is regarded as the time taken by an atom to traverse its own unit of space. It has no existence separate from the atoms and their movements. The appearance of kala as a separate entity is a creation of our buddhi _(buddhinirma@na) as it represents the order or mode in which the buddhi records its perceptions. But kala in Nyaya-Vais'e@sika is regarded as a substance existing by itself. In accordance with the changes of things it reveals itself as past, present, and future. Sa@mkhya regarded it as past, present, and future, as being the modes of the constitution of the things in its different manifesting stages of evolution _(adhvan)_. The astronomers regarded it as being clue to the motion of the planets. These must all be contrasted with the Nyaya-Vais'e@sika conception of kala which is regarded as an all-pervading, partless substance which appears as many in association with the changes related to it [Footnote ref l].

The seventh substance is relative space (dik). It is that substance by virtue of which things are perceived as being on the right, left, east, west, upwards and downwards; kala like dik is also one. But yet tradition has given us varieties of it in the eight directions and in the upper and lower [Footnote ref 2]. The eighth substance is the soul (atman) which is all-pervading. There are separate atmans for each person; the qualities of knowledge, feelings of pleasure and pain, desire, etc. belong to atman. Manas (mind) is the ninth substance. It is atomic in size and the vehicle of memory; all affections of the soul such as knowing, feeling, and willing, are generated by the connection of manas with soul, the senses and the objects. It is the intermediate link which connects the soul with the senses, and thereby produces the affections of knowledge, feeling, or willing. With each single connection of soul with manas we have a separate affection of the soul, and thus our intellectual experience is conducted in a series, one coming after another and not simultaneously. Over and above all these we have Isvara. The definition



[Footnote 1: See Nyayakandali, pp. 64-66, and Nyayamanjari, pp. 136-139. The Vais'e@sika sutras regarded time as the cause of things which suffer change but denied it of things which are eternal.]

[Footnote 2: See Nyayakandali, pp. 66-69, and Nyayamanjari, p. 140.]

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of substance consists in this, that it is independent by itself, whereas the other things such as quality (gu@na), action (karma), sameness or generality (samanya), speciality or specific individuality (vis'e@sa) and the relation of inherence (samavaya) cannot show themselves without the help of substance (dravya). Dravya is thus the place of rest (as'raya) on which all the others depend (as'@rta). Dravya, gu@na, karma, samanya, vis'e@sa, and samavaya are the six original entities of which all things in the world are made up [Footnote ref 1]. When a man through some special merit, by the cultivation of reason and a thorough knowledge of the fallacies and pitfalls in the way of right thinking, comes to know the respective characteristics and differences of the above entities, he ceases to have any passions and to work in accordance with their promptings and attains a conviction of the nature of self, and is liberated [Footnote ref 2]. The Nyaya-Vais'e@sika is a pluralistic system which neither tries to reduce the diversity of experience to any universal principle, nor dismisses patent facts of experience on the strength of the demands of the logical coherence of mere abstract thought. The entities it admits are taken directly from experience. The underlying principle is that at the root of each kind of perception there must be something to which the perception is due. It classified the percepts and concepts of experience into several ultimate types or categories (padartha), and held that the notion of each type was due to the presence of that entity. These types are six in number—dravya, gu@na, etc. If we take a percept "I see a red book," the book appears to be an independent entity on which rests the concept of "redness" and "oneness," and we thus call the book a substance (dravya); dravya is thus defined as that which has the characteristic of a dravya (dravyatva). So also gu@na and karma. In the subdivision of different kinds of dravya also the same principle of classification is followed. In contrasting it with Sa@mkhya or Buddhism we see that for each unit of sensation (say

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[Footnote 1: Abhava (negation) as dependent on bhava (position) is mentioned in the Vais'e@sika sutras. Later Nyaya writers such as Udayana include abhava as a separate category, but S'ridhara a contemporary of Udayana rightly remarks that abhava was not counted by Pras'astapada as it was dependent on bhava—"abhavasya prthaganupades'a@h bhavaparatantryat na tvabhavat." Nyayakandali, p. 6, and Lak@sa@navali, p. 2.]

[Footnote 2: "Tattvato jnate@su bahyadhyatmike@su vi@saye@su do@sadars'anat viraktasya samihaniv@rttau atmajnasya tadarthani karmanyakurvatah tatparityagasadhanani s'rutism@rtyuditani asa@nkalpitaphalani upadadanasya atmajnanamabhyasyata@h prak@r@s@tanivarttakadharmopacaye sati paripakvatmajnanasyatyantikas'ariraviyogasya bhavat." Ibid. p. 7.]

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whiteness) the latter would admit a corresponding real, but Nyaya-Vais'e@sika would collect "all whiteness" under the name of "the quality of white colour" which the atom possessed [Footnote ref l]. They only regarded as a separate entity what represented an ultimate mode of thought. They did not enquire whether such notions could be regarded as the modification of some other notion or not; but whenever they found that there were some experiences which were similar and universal, they classed them as separate entities or categories.

The six Padarthas: Dravya, Gu@na, Karma, Samanya, Vis'e@sa, Samavaya.

Of the six classes of entities or categories (padartha) we have already given some account of dravya [Footnote ref 2]. Let us now turn to the others. Of the qualities (gu@na) the first one called rupa (colour) is that which can be apprehended by the eye alone and not by any other sense. The colours are white, blue, yellow, red, green, brown and variegated (citra). Colours are found only in k@siti, ap and tejas. The colours of ap and tejas are permanent (nitya}, but the colour of k@siti changes when heat is applied, and this, S'ridhara holds, is due to the fact that heat changes the atomic structure of k@siti (earth) and thus the old constitution of the substance being destroyed, its old colour is also destroyed, and a new one is generated. Rupa is the general name for the specific individual colours. There is the genus rupatva (colourness), and the rupa gu@na (quality) is that on which rests this genus; rupa is not itself a genus and can be apprehended by the eye.

The second is rasa (taste), that quality of things which can be apprehended only by the tongue; these are sweet, sour, pungent (ka@tu), astringent (ka@saya) and bitter (tikta). Only k@siti and ap have taste. The natural taste of ap is sweetness. Rasa like rupa also denotes the genus rasatva, and rasa as quality must be distinguished from rasa as genus, though both of them are apprehended by the tongue.

The third is gandha (odour), that quality which can be apprehended by the nose alone. It belongs to k@siti alone. Water



[Footnote 1: The reference is to Sautrantika Buddhism, "yo yo vruddhadhyasavan nasaveka@h." See Pa@n@ditas'oka's Avayavinirakarana, Six Buddhist Nyaya tracts.

[Footnote 2: The word "padartha" literally means denotations of words.]

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or air is apprehended as having odour on account of the presence of earth materials.

The fourth is spars'a (touch), that quality which can be apprehended only by the skin. There are three kinds of touch, cold, hot, neither hot nor cold. Spars'a belongs to k@siti; ap, tejas, and vayu. The fifth s'abda (sound) is an attribute of akas'a. Had there been no akas'a there would have been no sound.

The sixth is sa@mkhya (number), that entity of quality belonging to things by virtue of which we can count them as one, two, three, etc. The conception of numbers two, three, etc. is due to a relative oscillatory state of the mind (apek@sabuddhi); thus when there are two jugs before my eyes, I have the notion—This is one jug and that is another jug. This is called apek@sabuddhi; then in the two jugs there arises the quality of twoness (dvitva) and then an indeterminate perception (nirvikalpa-dvitva-gu@na) of dvitva in us and then the determinate perceptions that there are the two jugs. The conceptions of other numbers as well as of many arise in a similar manner [Footnote ref 1].

The seventh is parimiti (measure), that entity of quality in things by virtue of which we perceive them as great or small and speak of them as such. The measure of the partless atoms is called parima@n@dala parima@na; it is eternal, and it cannot generate the measure of any other thing. Its measure is its own absolutely; when two atoms generate a dyad (dvya@nuka) it is not the measure of the atom that generates the a@nu (atomic) and the hrasva (small) measure of the dyad molecule (dvya@nuka), for then the size (parima@na) of it would have been still smaller than the measure of the atom (parima@n@dala), whereas the measure of the dya@nuka is of a different kind, namely the small (hrasva) [Footnote ref 2]. Of course two atoms generate a dyad, but then the number (sa@mkhya) of the atom should be regarded as bringing forth a new kind of measure, namely the small (hrasva) measure in the dyads. So again when three dyads (dya@nuka) compose a trya@nuka the number and not the measure "small"



[Footnote 1: This is distinctively a Vais'e@sika view introduced by Pras'astapada. Nyaya seems to be silent on this matter. See S'a@nkara Mis'ra's Upaskara, VII. ii. 8.]

[Footnote 2 It should be noted that the atomic measure appears in two forms as eternal as in "parama@nus" and non-eternal as in the dvya@nuka. The parima@n@dala parima@na is thus a variety of a@nuparima@na. The a@nuparima@na and the hrasvaparima@na represent the two dimensions of the measure of dvya@nukas as mahat and dirgha are with reference to trya@nukas. See Nyayakandali, p. 133.]

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(hrasva) of the dyad is the cause of the measure "great" (mahat) of the trya@nuka. But when we come to the region of these gross trya@nukas we find that the "great" measure of the trya@nukas is the cause of the measure of other grosser bodies composed by them. For as many trya@nukas constitute a gross body, so much bigger does the thing become. Thus the cumulation of the trya@nukas of mahat parima@na makes things of still more mahat parima@na. The measure of trya@nukas is not only regarded as mahat but also as dirgha (long) and this dirgha parima@na has to be admitted as coexisting with mahat parima@na but not identical, for things not only appear as great but also as long (dirgha). Here we find that the accumulation of trya@nukas means the accumulation of "great" (mahat) and "long" (dirgha) parima@na, and hence the thing generated happens to possess a measure which is greater and longer than the individual atoms which composed them. Now the hrasva parima@na of the dyads is not regarded as having a lower degree of greatness or length but as a separate and distinct type of measure which is called small (hrasva). As accumulation of grossness, greatness or length, generates still more greatness, grossness and length in its effect, so an accumulation of the hrasva (small) parima@na ought to generate still more hrasva parima@na, and we should expect that if the hrasva measure of the dyads was the cause of the measure of the trya@nukas, the trya@nukas should be even smaller than the dya@nukas. So also if the atomic and circular (parima@n@dala) size of the atoms is regarded as generating by their measure the measure of the dya@nukas, then the measure of the dya@nukas ought to be more atomic than the atoms. The atomic, small, and great measures should not be regarded as representing successively bigger measures produced by the mere cumulation of measures, but each should be regarded as a measure absolutely distinct, different from or foreign to the other measure. It is therefore held that if grossness in the cause generates still more greatness in the effect, the smallness and the parima@n@dala measure of the dyads and atoms ought to generate still more smallness and subtleness in their effect. But since the dyads and the trya@nuka molecules are seen to be constituted of atoms and dyads respectively, and yet are not found to share the measure of their causes, it is to be argued that the measures of the atoms and dyads do not generate the measure of their effects, but it is their number which is the cause

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of the measure of the latter. This explains a@nuparima@na, hrasva parima@na, mahat parima@na, and dirgha parima@na. The parima@na of akas'a, kala, dik and atman which are regarded as all-pervasive, is said to be paramamahat (absolutely large). The parima@nas of the atoms, akas'a, kala, dik, manas, and atman are regarded as eternal (nitya). All other kinds of parima@nas as belonging to non-eternal things are regarded as non-eternal.

The eighth is p@rthaktva (mutual difference or separateness of things), that entity or quality in things by virtue of which things appear as different (e.g. this is different from that). Difference is perceived by us as a positive notion and not as a mere negation such as this jug is not this pot.

The ninth is sa@myoga (connection), that entity of gu@na by virtue of which things appear to us as connected.

The tenth is vibhaga (separation), that entity of gu@na which destroys the connection or contact of things.

The eleventh and twelfth gu@nas, paratva and aparatva, give rise in us to the perceptions of long time and short time, remote and near.

The other gu@nas such as buddhi(knowledge),sukha (happiness), du@hkha (sorrow), iccha (will), dve@sa (antipathy or hatred) and yatna (effort) can occur only with reference to soul.

The characteristic of gurutva (heaviness) is that by virtue of which things fall to the ground. The gu@na of sneha (oiliness) belongs to water. The gu@na of sa@mskara is of three kinds, (i) vega (velocity) which keeps a thing moving in different directions, (2) sthiti-sthapaka (elasticity) on account of which a gross thing tries to get back its old state even though disturbed, (3) bhavana is that quality of atman by which things are constantly practised or by which things experienced are remembered and recognized [Footnote ref l]. Dharma is the quality the presence of which enables the soul to enjoy happiness or to attain salvation [Footnote ref 2]. Adharma is



[Footnote 1: Pras'astapada says that bhavana is a special characteristic of the soul, contrary to intoxication, sorrow and knowledge, by which things seen, heard and felt are remembered and recognized. Through unexpectedness (as the sight of a camel for a man of South India), repetition (as in studies, art etc.) and intensity of interest, the sa@mskara becomes particularly strong. See Nyayakandali, p. 167. Ka@nada however is silent on these points. He only says that by a special kind of contact of the mind with soul and also by the sa@mskara, memory (sm@rti) is produced (ix. 2. 6).]

[Footnote 2: Pras'astapada speaks of dharma (merit) as being a quality of the soul. Thereupon S'ridhara points out that this view does not admit that dharma is a power of karma (nakarmasamarthyam). Sacrifice etc. cannot be dharma for these actions being momentary they cannot generate the effects which are only to be reaped at a future time. If the action is destroyed its power (samarthya) cannot last. So dharma is to be admitted as a quality generated in the self by certain courses of conduct which produce happiness for him when helped by certain other conditions of time, place, etc. Faith (s'raddha), non-injury, doing good to all beings, truthfulness, non-stealing, sex-control, sincerity, control of anger, ablutions, taking of pure food, devotion to particular gods, fasting, strict adherence to scriptural duties, and the performance of duties assigned to each caste and stage of life, are enumerated by Pras'astapada as producing dharma. The person who strictly adheres to these duties and the yamas and niyamas (cf. Patanjali's Yoga) and attains Yoga by a meditation on the six padarthas attains a dharma which brings liberation (mok@sa). S'ridhara refers to the Sa@mkhya-Yoga account of the method of attaining salvation (Nyayakandali, pp. 272-280). See also Vallabha's Nyayalilavati, pp. 74-75. (Bombay, 1915.)]

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the opposite quality, the presence of which in the soul leads a man to suffer. Ad@r@s@ta or destiny is that unknown quality of things and of the soul which brings about the cosmic order, and arranges it for the experience of the souls in accordance with their merits or demerits.

Karma means movement; it is the third thing which must be held to be as irreducible a reality as dravya or gu@na. There are five kinds of movement, (1) upward, (2) downward, (3) contraction, (4) expansion, (5) movement in general. All kinds of karmas rest on substances just, as the gu@nas do, and cause the things to which they belong to move.

Samanya is the fourth category. It means the genus, or aspect of generality or sameness that we notice in things. Thus in spite of the difference of colour between one cow and another, both of them are found to have such a sameness that we call them cows. In spite of all diversity in all objects around us, they are all perceived as sat or existing. This sat or existence is thus a sameness, which is found to exist in all the three things, dravya, gu@na, and karma. This sameness is called samanya or jati, and it is regarded as a separate thing which rests on dravya, gu@na, or karma. This highest genus satta (being) is called parajati (highest universal), the other intermediate jatis are called aparajati (lower universals), such as the genus of dravya, of karma, or of gu@na, or still more intermediate jatis such as gotvajati (the genus cow), nilatvajati (the genus blue). The intermediate jatis or genera sometimes appear to have a special aspect as a species, such as pas'utva (animal jati) and gotva (the cow jati); here however gotva appears as a species, yet it is in reality nothing but a jati. The aspect as species has no separate existence. It is jati which from one aspect appears as genus and from another as species.

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This jati or samanya thus must be regarded as having a separate independent reality though it is existent in dravya, gu@na and karma. The Buddhists denied the existence of any independent reality of samanya, but said that the sameness as cow was really but the negation of all non-cows (apoha). The perception of cow realizes the negation of all non-cows and this is represented in consciousness as the sameness as cow. He who should regard this sameness to be a separate and independent reality perceived in experience might also discover two horns on his own head [Footnote ref 1]. The Nyaya-Vais'e@sika said that negation of non-cows is a negative perception, whereas the sameness perceived as cow is a positive perception, which cannot be explained by the aforesaid negation theory of the Buddhists. Samanya has thus to be admitted to have a separate reality. All perception as sameness of a thing is due to the presence of this thing in that object [Footnote ref l]. This jati is eternal or non-destructible, for even with the destruction of individuals comprehended within the jati, the latter is not destroyed [Footnote ref 2].

Through vis'e@sa things are perceived as diverse. No single sensation that we receive from the external world probably agrees with any other sensation, and this difference must be due to the existence of some specific differences amongst the atoms themselves. The, specific difference existing in the atoms, emancipated souls and minds must be regarded as eternally existing, and it



[Footnote 1: The Buddhist Panditas'oka says that there is no single thing running through different individuals (e.g. cooks) by virtue of which the samanya could be established, for if it did exist then we could have known it simply by seeing any cook without any reference to his action of cooking by virtue of which the notion of generality is formed. If there is a similarity between the action of cooks that cannot establish jati in the cooks, for the similarity applies to other things, viz. the action of the cooks. If the specific individualities of a cow should require one common factor to hold them together, then these should require another and that another, and we have a regressus ad infinitum. Whatever being perceptible is not perceived is non-existent (_yadyadupalabdhilaksanapraptam sannopalabhyate tattadasat_). Samanya is such, therefore samanya is non existent. No samanya can be admitted to exist as an entity. But it is only as a result of the impressions of past experiences of existence and non existence that this notion is formed and transferred erroneously to external objects. Apart from this no samanya can be pointed out as being externally perceptible —_Samanyadusanadikprasarita_—in _Six Buddhist Nyaya Tracts_. The Vedanta also does not think that either by perception or by inference we can know jati as a separate substance. So it discards jati. See _Vedantaparibhasa_, _Sikhamani_ and _Mamprabha_, pp. 69-71. See also Sriharsa's _Khan@danakhandakhadya, pp 1079-1086.]

[Footnote 2: Similarity (sadrs'ya_) is not regarded as a separate category, for it is defined as identity in difference (_tadbhinnatve sati tadgatabhuyodharmavattvam_).]

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is on account of its presence that atoms appear as different to the yogins who can perceive them.

Samavaya, the inseparable relation of inherence, is a relation by virtue of which two different things such as substance and attribute, substance and karma, substance and samanya, karana (cause) and karya (effect), atoms and vis'e@sa, appear so unified that they represent one whole, or one identical inseparable reality. This peculiar relation of inseparable inherence is the cause why substance, action, and attribute, cause and effect, and jati in substance and attribute appear as indissolubly connected as if they are one and the same thing Samyoga or contact may take place between two things of the same nature which exist as disconnected and may later on be connected (yutasiddha), such as when I put my pen on the table. The pen and the table are both substances and were disconnected, the samynga relation is the gu@na by virtue of which they appear to be connected for a while. Samavaya however makes absolutely difficient things such as dravya and gu@na and karma or karana and karya (clay and jug) appear as one inseparable whole (ayutasiddha). This relation is thus a separate and independent category. This is not regarded as many like sa@myogas (contact) but as one and eternal because it has no cause. This or that object (eg. jug) may be destroyed but the samavaya relation which was never brought into being by anybody always remains [Footnote ref 1].

These six things are called the six padarthas or independent realities experienced in perception and expressed in language.

The Theory of Causation.

The Nyaya-Vais'e@sika in most of its speculations took that view of things which finds expression in our language, and which we tacitly assume as true in all our ordinary experience. Thus



[Footnote 1: The Vedanta does not admit the existence of the relation of samavaya as subsisting between two different entities (e.g. substance and qualities). Thus S'a@nkara says (Brahma-sutrabha@sya II. ii. 13) that if a samavaya relation is to be admitted to connect two different things, then another samavaya would be necessary to connect it with either of the two entities that it intended to connect, and that another, and so there will be a vicious infinite (anavastha). Nyaya, however, would not regard it as vicious at all. It is well to remember that the Indian systems acknowledge two kinds of anavastha—prama@niki (valid infinite, as in case of the question of the seed and the tree, or of the avidya and the passions), and another aprama@niki anavastha (vicious infinite) as when the admission of anything invokes an infinite chain before it can be completed.]

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they admitted dravya, gu@na, karma and samanya, Vis'e@sa they had to admit as the ultimate peculiarities of atoms, for they did not admit that things were continually changing their qualities, and that everything could be produced out of everything by a change of the collocation or arrangement of the constituting atoms. In the production of the effect too they did not admit that the effect was potentially pre-existent in the cause. They held that the material cause (e.g. clay) had some power within it, and the accessory and other instrumental causes (such as the stick, the wheel etc.) had other powers; the collocation of these two destroyed the cause, and produced the effect which was not existent before but was newly produced. This is what is called the doctrine of asatkaryavada. This is just the opposite of the Sa@mkhya axiom, that what is existent cannot be destroyed nabhavo vidyate sata@h) and that the non-existent could never be produced (nasato vidyate bhavah). The objection to this view is that if what is non-existent is produced, then even such impossible things as the hare's horn could also be produced. The Nyaya-Vais'e@sika answer is that the view is not that anything that is non-existent can be produced, but that which is produced was non-existent [Footnote ref 1].

It is held by Mima@msa that an unseen power resides in the cause which produces the effect. To this Nyaya objects that this is neither a matter of observation nor of legitimate hypothesis, for there is no reason to suppose that there is any transcendental operation in causal movement as this can be satisfactorily explained by molecular movement (parispanda). There is nothing except the invariable time relation (antecedence and sequence) between the cause and the effect, but the mere invariableness of an antecedent does not suffice to make it the cause of what succeeds; it must be an unconditional antecedent as well (anyathasiddhis'unyasya niyatapurvavarttita). Unconditionality and invariability are indispensable for karyakara@na-bhava or cause and effect relation. For example, the non-essential or adventitious accompaniments of an invariable antecedent may also be invariable antecedents; but they are not unconditional, only collateral or indirect. In other words their antecedence is conditional upon something else (na svatantrye@na). The potter's stick is an unconditional invariable antecedent of the jar; but the colour



[Footnote 1: Nyayamunjari, p. 494.]

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of a stick or its texture or size, or any other accompaniment or accident which does not contribute to the work done, is not an unconditional antecedent, and must not therefore be regarded as a cause. Similarly the co-effects of the invariable antecedents or what enters into the production of their co-effects may themselves be invariable antecedents; but they are not unconditional, being themselves conditioned by those of the antecedents of which they are effects. For example, the sound produced by the stick or by the potter's wheel invariably precedes the jar but it is a co-effect; and akas'a (ether) as the substrate and vayu (air) as the vehicle of the sound enter into the production of this co-effect, but these are no unconditional antecedents, and must therefore be rejected in an enumeration of conditions or causes of the jar. The conditions of the conditions should also be rejected; the invariable antecedent of the potter (who is an invariable antecedent of the jar), the potter's father, does not stand in a causal relation to the potter's handiwork. In fact the antecedence must not only be unconditionally invariable, but must also be immediate. Finally all seemingly invariable antecedents which may be dispensed with or left out are not unconditional and cannot therefore be regarded as causal conditions. Thus Dr. Seal in describing it rightly remarks, "In the end, the discrimination of what is necessary to complete the sum of causes from what is dependent, collateral, secondary, superfluous, or inert (i.e. of the relevant from the irrelevant factors), must depend on the test of expenditure of energy. This test the Nyaya would accept only in the sense of an operation analysable into molar or molecular motion (parispanda eva bhautiko vyapara@h karotyartha@h atindriyastu vyaparo nasti. Jayanta's Manjari Ahnika I), but would emphatically reject, if it is advanced in support of the notion of a mysterious causal power or efficiency (s'akti) [Footnote ref 1]." With Nyaya all energy is necessarily kinetic. This is a peculiarity of Nyaya—its insisting that the effect is only the sum or resultant of the operations of the different causal conditions—that these operations are of the nature of motion or kinetic, in other words it firmly holds to the view that causation is a case of expenditure of energy, i.e. a redistribution of motion, but at the same time absolutely repudiates the Sa@mkhya conception of power or productive



[Footnote 1: Dr P.C. Ray's Hindu Chemistry, 1909, pp. 249-250.]

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efficiency as metaphysical or transcendental (atindriya) and finds nothing in the cause other than unconditional invariable complements of operative conditions (kara@na-samagri), and nothing in the effect other than the consequent phenomenon which results from the joint operations of the antecedent conditions [Footnote ref 1]. Certain general conditions such as relative space (dik), time (kala), the will of Is'vara, destiny (ad@r@s@ta) are regarded as the common cause of all effects (karyatva-prayojaka). Those are called sadhara@na-kara@na (common cause) as distinguished from the specific causes which determine the specific effects which are called sadhara@na kara@na. It may not be out of place here to notice that Nyaya while repudiating transcendental power (s'akti) in the mechanism of nature and natural causation, does not deny the existence of metaphysical conditions like merit (dharma), which constitutes a system of moral ends that fulfil themselves through the mechanical systems and order of nature.

The causal relation then like the relation of genus to species, is a natural relation of concomitance, which can be ascertained only by the uniform and uninterrupted experience of agreement in presence and agreement in absence, and not by a deduction from a certain a priori principle like that of causality or identity of essence [Footnote ref 2].

The material cause such as the clay is technically called the samavayi-kara@na of the jug. Samavaya means as we have seen an intimate, inseparable relation of inherence. A kara@na is called samavayi when its materials are found inseparably connected with the materials of the effect. Asamavayi-kara@na is that which produces its characteristics in the effect through the medium of the samavayi or material cause, e.g. the clay is not the cause of the colour of the jug but the colour of the clay is the cause of the colour of the jug. The colour of the clay which exists in the clay in inseparable relation is the cause of the colour of the jug. This colour of the clay is thus called the asamavayi cause of the jug. Any quality (gu@na) or movement which existing in the samavaya cause in the samavaya relation determines the characteristics of the effect is called the asamavayi-kara@na. The instrumental



[Footnote 1: Dr P.C. Ray's Hindu Chemistry, 1909, pp. 249-250.]

[Footnote 2: See for this portion Dr B.N. Seal's Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus, pp. 263-266. Sarvadars'anasa@mgraha on Buddhism. Nyayamanjari Bha@sa-pariccheda, with Muktavali and Dinakari, and Tarkas@mgraha. The doctrine of Anyathasiddhi was systematically developed from the time of Ga@nges'a.]

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nimitta and accessory (sahakari) causes are those which help the material cause to produce the effect. Thus the potter, the wheel and the stick may be regarded as the nimitta and the sahakari causes of the effect.

We know that the Nyaya-Vais'e@sika regards the effect as nonexistent, before the operation of the cause in producing it, but it holds that the gu@nas in the cause are the causes of the gu@nas in the effect, e.g. the black colour of the clay is the cause of the black colour of the effect, except in cases where heat comes as an extraneous cause to generate other qualities; thus when a clay jug is burnt, on account of the heat we get red colour, though the colour of the original clay and the jug was black. Another important exception is to be found in the case of the production of the parima@nas of dvya@nukas and trasare@nus which are not produced by the parima@nas of an a@nu or a dya@nuka, but by their number as we have already seen.

Dissolution (Pralaya) and Creation (S@r@s@ti).

The doctrine of pralaya is accepted by all the Hindu systems except the Mima@msa [Footnote ref 1]. According to the Nyaya-Vais'e@sika view Is'vara wishing to give some respite or rest to all living beings desires to bring about dissolution (sa@mhareccho bhavati). Simultaneously with it the ad@r@s@ta force residing in all the souls and forming bodies, senses, and the gross elements, ceases to act (s'akti-pratibandha). As a result of this no further bodies, senses, or other products come into being. Then for the bringing about of the dissolution of all produced things (by the desire of Is'vara) the separation of the atoms commences and thus all combinations as bodies or senses are disintegrated; so all earth is reduced to the disintegrated atomic state, then all ap, then all tejas and then all vayu. These disintegrated atoms and the souls associated with dharma, adharma and past impressions (sa@mskara) remain suspended in their own inanimate condition. For we know that souls in their natural condition are lifeless and knowledgeless, non-intelligent entities. It is only when these are connected with bodies that they possess knowledge through the activity of manas. In the state of pralaya owing to the ad@r@s@ta of souls the



[Footnote 1: The doctrine of pralaya and s@r@s@ti is found only in later Nyaya-Vais'e@sika works, but the sutras of both the systems seem to be silent on the matter.]

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atoms do not conglomerate. It is not an act of cruelty on the part of Is'vara that he brings about dissolution, for he does it to give some rest to the sufferings of the living beings.

At the time of creation, Is'vara wishes to create and this desire of Is'vara works in all the souls as ad@r@s@ta. This one eternal desire of Is'vara under certain conditions of time (e.g. of pralaya) as accessory causes (sahakari) helps the disintegration of atoms and at other times (e.g. that of creation) the constructive process of integration and unification of atoms for the world-creation. When it acts in a specific capacity in the diverse souls it is called ad@r@s@ta. At the time of dissolution the creative function of this ad@r@s@ta is suspended and at the time of creation it finds full play. At the time of creation action first begins in the vayu atoms by the kinetic function of this ad@r@s@ta, by the contact of the souls with the atoms. By such action the air atoms come in contact with one another and the dvya@nukas are formed and then in a similar way the trya@nukas are formed, and thus vayu originates. After vayu, the ap is formed by the conglomeration of water atoms, and then the tejas atoms conglomerate and then the earth atoms. When the four elements are thus conglomerated in the gross form, the god Brahma and all the worlds are created by Is'vara and Brahma is directed by Is'vara to do the rest of the work. Brahma thus arranges for the enjoyment and suffering of the fruits of diverse kinds of karma, good or bad. Is'vara brings about this creation not for any selfish purpose but for the good of all beings. Even here sorrows have their place that they may lead men to turn from worldly attachment and try for the attainment of the highest good, mukti. Moreover Is'vara arranges for the enjoyment of pleasures and the suffering of pains according to the merits and demerits of men, just as in our ordinary experience we find that a master awards prizes or punishments according to good or bad deeds [Footnote ref 1]. Many Nyaya books do not speak of the appointment of a Brahma as deputy for supervision of the due disposal of the fruits of karma according to merit or demerit. It is also held that pralaya and creation were brought about in accordance with the karma of men, or that it may be due to a mere play (lila) of Is'vara. Is'vara is one, for if there were many Is'varas they might quarrel. The will of Is'vara not only brings about dissolution and creation,

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[Footnote 1: See Nyayakandali, pp. 48-54.]

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but also acts always among us in a general way, for without it our karmas could not ripen, and the consequent disposal of pleasures and sorrows to us and a corresponding change in the exterior world in the form of order or harmony could not happen. The exterior world is in perfect harmony with men's actions. Their merits and demerits and all its changes and modifications take place in accordance with merits and demerits. This desire (iccha) of Is'vara may thus be compared with the iccha of Is'vara as we find it in the Yoga system.

Proof of the Existence of Is'vara.

Sa@mkhya asserts that the teleology of the prak@rti is sufficient to explain all order and arrangement of the cosmos. The Mima@msakas, the Carvakas, the Buddhists and the Jains all deny the existence of Is'vara (God). Nyaya believes that Is'vara has fashioned this universe by his will out of the ever-existing atoms. For every effect (e.g. a jug) must have its cause. If this be so, then this world with all its order and arrangement must also be due to the agency of some cause, and this cause is Is'vara. This world is not momentary as the Buddhists suppose, but is permanent as atoms, is also an effect so far as it is a collocation of atoms and is made up of parts like all other individual objects (e.g. jug, etc.), which we call effects. The world being an effect like any other effect must have a cause like any other effect. The objection made against this view is that such effects as we ordinarily perceive may be said to have agents as their causes but this manifest world with mountains, rivers, oceans etc. is so utterly different in form from ordinary effects that we notice every day, that the law that every effect must have a cause cannot be said to hold good in the present case. The answer that Nyaya gives is that the concomitance between two things must be taken in its general aspect neglecting the specific peculiarities of each case of observed concomitance. Thus I had seen many cases of the concomitance of smoke with fire, and had thence formed the notion that "wherever there is smoke there is fire"; but if I had only observed small puffs of smoke and small fires, could I say that only small quantities of smoke could lead us to the inference of fire, and could I hold that therefore large volumes of smoke from the burning of a forest should not be sufficient reason for us to infer the existence of fire in the forest?

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Thus our conclusion should not be that only smaller effects are preceded by their causes, but that all effects are invariably and unconditionally preceded by causes. This world therefore being an effect must be preceded by a cause, and this cause is Is'vara. This cause we cannot see, because Is'vara has no visible body, not because he does not exist. It is sometimes said that we see every day that shoots come out of seeds and they are not produced by any agent. To such an objection the Nyaya answer is that even they are created by God, for they are also effects. That we do not see any one to fashion them is not because there is no maker of them, but because the creator cannot be seen. If the objector could distinctly prove that there was no invisible maker shaping these shoots, then only could he point to it as a case of contradiction. But so long as this is not done it is still only a doubtful case of enquiry and it is therefore legitimate for us to infer that since all effects have a cause, the shoots as well as the manifest world being effects must have a cause. This cause is Is'vara. He has infinite knowledge and is all merciful. At the beginning of creation He created the Vedas. He is like our father who is always engaged in doing us good [Footnote ref 1].

Tht Nyaya-Vais'e@sika Physics.

The four kinds of atoms are earth, water, fire, and air atoms. These have mass, number, weight, fluidity (or hardness), viscosity (or its opposite), velocity, characteristic potential colour, taste, smell, or touch, not produced by the chemical operation of heat. Akas'a (space) is absolutely inert and structure-less being only as the substratum of sound, which is supposed to travel wave-like in the manifesting medium of air. Atomic combination is only possible with the four elements. Atoms cannot exist in an uncombined condition in the creation stage; atmospheric air however consists of atoms in an uncombined state.

Two atoms combine to form a binary molecule (dvya@nuka). Two, three, four, or five dvya@nukas form themselves into grosser molecules of trya@nuka, catura@nuka, etc. [Footnote ref 2]. Though this was the generally current view, there was also another view as has been pointed out by Dr B.N. Seal in his Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus, that the "atoms have also an inherent tendency to unite," and that



[Footnote 1: See Jayanta's Nyayamanjari, pp. 190-204, and Udayana's Kusumanjali with Prakas'a and Is'varanumana of Raghunatha.]

[Footnote 2: Kadacit tribhirarabhyate iti trya@nukamityucyate, kadacit caturbhirarabhyate kadacit pancabhiriti yathe@s@ta@m kalpana. Nyayakandali, p. 32.]

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they do so in twos, threes, or fours, "either by the atoms falling into groups of threes, fours, etc., directly, or by the successive addition of one atom to each preceding aggregate [Footnote ref l]." Of course the atoms are regarded as possessed of an incessant vibratory motion. It must however be noted in this connection that behind this physical explanation of the union of atoms there is the ad@r@s@ta, the will of Is'vara, which gives the direction of all such unions in harmony with the principle of a "moral government of the universe," so that only such things are produced as can be arranged for the due disposal of the effects of karma. "An elementary substance thus produced by primary atomic combination may however suffer qualitative changes under the influence of heat (pakajotpatti)" The impact of heat corpuscles decomposes a dvya@nuka into the atoms and transforms the characters of the atoms determining them all in the same way. The heat particles continuing to impinge reunite the atoms so transformed to form binary or other molecules in different orders or arrangements, which account for the specific characters or qualities finally produced. The Vais'e@sika holds that there is first a disintegration into simple atoms, then change of atomic qualities, and then the final re-combination, under the influence of heat. This doctrine is called the doctrine of pilupaka (heating of atoms). Nyaya on the other hand thinks that no disintegration into atoms is necessary for change of qualities, but it is the molecules which assume new characters under the influence of heat. Heat thus according to Nyaya directly affects the characters of the molecules and changes their qualities without effecting a change in the atoms. Nyaya holds that the heat-corpuscles penetrate into the porous body of the object and thereby produce the change of colour. The object as a whole is not disintegrated into atoms and then reconstituted again, for such a procedure is never experienced by observation. This is called the doctrine of pi@tharapaka (heating of molecules). This is one of the few points of difference between the later Nyaya and Vais'e@sika systems [Footnote ref 2].

Chemical compounds of atoms may take place between the



[Footnote 1: Utpala's commentary on Brhatsamh@ita I. 7.]

[Footnote 2: See Dr B.N. Seal in P.C. Ray's Hindu Chemistry, pp. 190-191, Nyayamanjari, p 438, and Udyotakara's Varttika. There is very little indication in the Nyaya and Vais'e@sika sutras that they had any of those differences indicated here. Though there are slight indications of these matters in the Vais'e@sika sutras (VII. 1), the Nyaya sutras are almost silent upon the matter. A systematic development of the theory of creation and atomic combinations appear to have taken place after Vatsyayana.]

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atoms of the same bhuta or of many bhutas. According to the Nyaya view there are no differences in the atoms of the same bhuta, and all differences of quality and characteristics of the compound of the same bhuta are due only to diverse collocations of those atoms. Thus Udyotakara says (III. i. 4) that there is no difference between the atom of a barley seed and paddy seed, since these are all but atoms of earth. Under the continued impact of heat particles the atoms take new characters. It is heat and heat alone that can cause the transformations of colours, tastes etc. in the original bhuta atoms. The change of these physical characters depends on the colours etc. of the constituent substances in contact, on the intensity or degree of heat and also on the species of tejas corpuscles that impinge on the atoms. Heat breaks bodies in contact into atoms, transforms their qualities, and forms separate bodies with them.

Pras'astapada (the commentator of Vais'e@sika) holds that in the higher compounds of the same bhuta the transformation takes place (under internal heat) in the constituent atoms of the compound molecules, atoms specially determined as the compound and not in the original atoms of the bhuta entering into the composition of the compound. Thus when milk is turned into curd, the transformation as curd takes place in the atoms determined as milk in the milk molecule, and it is not necessary that the milk molecule should be disintegrated into the atoms of the original bhuta of which the milk is a modification. The change as curd thus takes place in the milk atom, and the milk molecule has not to be disintegrated into k@siti or ap atoms. So again in the fertilized ovum, the germ and the ovum substances, which in the Vais'e@sika view are both isomeric modes of earth (with accompaniments of other bhutas) are broken up into homogeneous earth atoms, and it is these that chemically combine under the animal heat and biomotor force vayu to form the germ (kalala). But when the germ plasm develops, deriving its nutrition from the blood of the mother, the animal heat breaks up the molecules of the germ plasm into its constituent atoms, i.e. atoms specifically determined which by their grouping formed the germ plasm. These germ-plasm atoms chemically combine with the atoms of the food constituents and thus produce cells and tissues [Footnote ref 1]. This atomic contact is called arambhaka-sa@myoga.



[Footnote 1: See Dr B.N. Seal's Positive Sciences, pp. 104-108, and Nyayakandali, pp. 33-34, "S'arirarambhe paramanava eva kara@nam na s'ukra-s'onitasannipata@h kriyavibhagadinyayena tayorvinas'e sati utpannapakajai@h parama@nubhirarambhat, na ca s'ukras'onitaparama@nuna@m kas'cidvis'e@sa@h parthivatvavis'e@sat....Pitu@h s'ukra@m matuh s'onita@m tayos sannipatanantara@m ja@tharanalasambandhat s'ukra-s'onitarambhake@su parama@nu@su purvarupadivinas'e sama@nagu@nantarotpattau dvya@nukadikrame@na kalalas'arirotpatti@h tatrantahkara@napraves'o...tatra maturahararaso matraya sa@mkramate, ad@r@s@tavas'attatra punarja@tharanalasambandhat kalalarambhakaparama@nu@su kriyavibhagadinyayena kalalas'arire na@s@te samutpannapakajai@h kalalarambhakaparama@nubhirad@r@s@tavas'ad upajatakriyairaharaparama@nitbhi@h saha sambhuya s'arirantaramarakkyate.".]

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In the case of poly-bhautik or bi-bhautik compounds there is another kind of contact called upa@s@tambha. Thus in the case of such compounds as oils, fats, and fruit juices, the earth atoms cannot combine with one another unless they are surrounded by the water atoms which congregate round the former, and by the infra-atomic forces thus set up the earth atoms take peculiar qualities under the impact of heat corpuscles. Other compounds are also possible where the ap, tejas, or the vayu atoms form the inner radicle and earth atoms dynamically surround them (e.g. gold, which is the tejas atom with the earth atoms as the surrounding upa@s@tambhaka). Solutions (of earth substances in ap) are regarded as physical mixtures.

Udayana points out that the solar heat is the source of all the stores of heat required for chemical change. But there are differences in the modes of the action of heat; and the kind of contact with heat-corpuscles, or the kind of heat with chemical action which transforms colours, is supposed to differ from what transforms flavour or taste.

Heat and light rays are supposed to consist of indefinitely small particles which dart forth or radiate in all directions rectilineally with inconceivable velocity. Heat may penetrate through the interatomic space as in the case of the conduction of heat, as when water boils in a pot put on the fire; in cases of transparency light rays penetrate through the inter-atomic spaces with parispanda of the nature of deflection or refraction (tiryag-gamana). In other cases heat rays may impinge on the atoms and rebound back—which explains reflection. Lastly heat may strike the atoms in a peculiar way, so as to break up their grouping, transform the physico-chemical characters of the atoms, and again recombine them, all by means of continual impact with inconceivable velocity, an operation which explains all cases of chemical combination [Footnote ref l]. Govardhana a later Nyaya writer says that paka means the combination of different kinds of heat. The heat that



[Footnote 1: See Dr Seal's Positive Sciences of the Hindus.]

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changes the colour of a fruit is different from that which generates or changes the taste. Even when the colour and taste remain the same a particular kind of heat may change the smell. When grass eaten by cows is broken up into atoms special kinds of heat-light rays change its old taste, colour, touch and smell into such forms as those that belong to milk [Footnote ref 1].

In the Nyaya-Vais'e@sika system all action of matter on matter is thus resolved into motion. Conscious activity (prayatna) is distinguished from all forms of motion as against the Sa@mkhya doctrine which considered everything other than puru@sa (intelligence) to arise in the course of cosmic evolution and therefore to be subject to vibratory motion.

The Origin of Knowledge (Prama@na).

The manner in which knowledge originates is one of the most favourite topics of discussion in Indian philosophy. We have already seen that Sa@mkhya-Yoga explained it by supposing that the buddhi (place of consciousness) assumed the form of the object of perception, and that the buddhi so transformed was then intelligized by the reflection of the pure intelligence or puru@sa. The Jains regarded the origin of any knowledge as being due to a withdrawal of a veil of karma which was covering the all-intelligence of the self.

Nyaya-Vais'e@sika regarded all effects as being due to the assemblage of certain collocations which unconditionally, invariably, and immediately preceded these effects. That collocation (samagri) which produced knowledge involved certain non-intelligent as well as intelligent elements and through their conjoint action uncontradicted and determinate knowledge was produced, and this collocation is thus called prama@na or the determining cause of the origin of knowledge [Footnote ref 2]. None of the separate elements composing

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[Footnote 1: Govardhana's Nyayabodhini on Tarkasa@mgraha, pp. 9, 10.]

[Footnote 2: "Avyabhicarinimasandigdharthopalabdhi@m vidadhati bodhabodhasvabhava samagri prama@nam." Nyayamanjari, p. 12. Udyotakara however defined "prama@na" as upalabdhihetu (cause of knowledge). This view does not go against Jayanta's view which I have followed, but it emphasizes the side of vyapara or movement of the senses, etc. by virtue of which the objects come in contact with them and knowledge is produced. Thus Vacaspati says: "siddhamindriyadi, asiddhanca tatsannikar@sadi vyaparayannutpadayan kara@na eva caritartha@h kar@na@m tvindriyadi tatsannikar@sadi va nanyatra caritarthamiti sak@sadupalabdhaveva phale vyapriyate." Tatparya@tika, p. 15. Thus it is the action of the senses as prama@na which is the direct cause of the production of knowledge, but as this production could not have taken place without the subject and the object, they also are to be regarded as causes in some sense. "Pramat@rprameyayo@h. pramane caritarthatvamacaritarthatvam pramanasya tasmat tadeva phalahetu@h. Pramat@rprameye tu phaloddes'ena prav@rtte iti taddhetu kathancit." Ibid. p. 16.]

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the causal collocation can be called the primary cause; it is only their joint collocation that can be said to determine the effect, for sometimes the absence of a single element composing the causal collocation is sufficient to stop the production of the effect. Of course the collocation or combination is not an entity separated from the collocated or combined things. But in any case it is the preceding collocations that combine to produce the effect jointly. These involve not only intellectual elements (e.g. indeterminate cognition as qualification (vis'e@sa@na) in determinate perceptions, the knowledge of li@nga in inference, the seeing of similar things in upamana, the hearing of sound in s'abda) but also the assemblage of such physical things (e.g. proximity of the object of perception, capacity of the sense, light, etc.), which are all indispensable for the origin of knowledge. The cognitive and physical elements all co-operate in the same plane, combine together and produce further determinate knowledge. It is this capacity of the collocations that is called prama@na.

Nyaya argues that in the Sa@mkhya view knowledge originates by the transcendent influence of puru@sa on a particular state of buddhi; this is quite unintelligible, for knowledge does not belong to buddhi as it is non-intelligent, though it contains within it the content and the form of the concept or the percept (knowledge). The puru@sa to whom the knowledge belongs, however, neither knows, nor feels, neither conceives nor perceives, as it always remains in its own transcendental purity. If the transcendental contact of the puru@sa with buddhi is but a mere semblance or appearance or illusion, then the Sa@mkhya has to admit that there is no real knowledge according to them. All knowledge is false. And since all knowledge is false, the Sa@mkhyists have precious little wherewith to explain the origin of right knowledge.

There are again some Buddhists who advocate the doctrine that simultaneously with the generation of an object there is the knowledge corresponding to it, and that corresponding to the rise of any knowledge there is the rise of the object of it. Neither is the knowledge generated by the object nor the object by the knowledge; but there is a sort of simultaneous parallelism. It is evident that this view does not explain why knowledge should

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express or manifest its object. If knowledge and the object are both but corresponding points in a parallel series, whence comes this correspondence? Why should knowledge illuminate the object. The doctrine of the Vijnana vadins, that it is knowledge alone that shows itself both as knowledge and as its object, is also irrational, for how can knowledge divide itself as subject and object in such a manner that knowledge as object should require the knowledge as subject to illuminate it? If this be the case we might again expect that knowledge as knowledge should also require another knowledge to manifest it and this another, and so on ad infinitum. Again if prama@na be defined as prapa@na (capacity of being realized) then also it would not hold, for all things being momentary according to the Buddhists, the thing known cannot be realized, so there would be nothing which could be called prama@na. These views moreover do not explain the origin of knowledge. Knowledge is thus to be regarded as an effect like any other effect, and its origin or production occurs in the same way as any other effect, namely by the joint collocation of causes intellectual and physical [Footnote ref 1]. There is no transcendent element involved in the production of knowledge, but it is a production on the same plane as that in which many physical phenomena are produced [Footnote ref 2].

The four Prama@nas of Nyaya.

We know that the Carvakas admitted perception (pratyak@sa) alone as the valid source of knowledge. The Buddhists and the Vais'e@sika admitted two sources, pratyak@sa and inference (anumana); Sa@mkhya added s'abda (testimony) as the third source;



[Footnote 1: See Nyayamanjari, pp. 12-26.]

[Footnote 2: Discussing the question of the validity of knowledge Ganges'a, a later naiyayika of great fame, says that it is derived as a result of our inference from the correspondence of the perception of a thing with the activity which prompted us to realize it. That which leads us to successful activity is valid and the opposite invalid. When I am sure that if I work in accordance with the perception of an object I shall be successful, I call it valid knowledge. Tattvacintama@ni, K. Tarkavagis'a's edition, Prama@nyavada.

"The Vais'e@sika sutras tacitly admit the Vedas as a prama@na. The view that Vais'e@sika only admitted two prama@nas, perception and inference, is traditionally accepted, "pratyak@sameka@mcarvaka@h ka@nadasugatau puna@h anumananca taccapi, etc." Pras'astapada divides all cognition (buddhi) as vidya (right knowledge) and avidya (ignorance). Under avidya he counts sa@ms'aya (doubt or uncertainty), viparyaya (illusion or error), anadhyavasaya (want of definite knowledge, thus when a man who had never seen a mango, sees it for the first time, he wonders what it may be) and svapna (dream). Right knowledge (vidya) is of four kinds, perception, inference, memory and the supernatural knowledge of the sages (ar@sa). Interpreting the Vais'e@sika sutras I.i. 3, VI. i. 1, and VI. i. 3, to mean that the validity of the Vedas depends upon the trustworthy character of their author, he does not consider scriptures as valid in themselves. Their validity is only derived by inference from the trustworthy character of their author. Arthapatti (implication) and anupalabdhi (non-perception) are also classed as inference and upamana (analogy) and aitihya (tradition) are regarded as being the same as faith in trustworthy persons and hence cases of inference.]

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Nyaya adds a fourth, upamana (analogy). The principle on which the four-fold division of prama@nas depends is that the causal collocation which generates the knowledge as well as the nature or characteristic kind of knowledge in each of the four cases is different. The same thing which appears to us as the object of our perception, may become the object of inference or s'abda (testimony), but the manner or mode of manifestation of knowledge being different in each case, and the manner or conditions producing knowledge being different in each case, it is to be admitted that inference and s'abda are different prama@nas, though they point to the same object indicated by the perception. Nyaya thus objects to the incorporation of s'abda (testimony) or upamana within inference, on the ground that since the mode of production of knowledge is different, these are to be held as different prama@nas [Footnote ref 1].

Perception (Pratyak@sa).

The naiyayikas admitted only the five cognitive senses which they believed to be composed of one or other of the five elements. These senses could each come in contact with the special characteristic of that element of which they were composed. Thus the ear could perceive sound, because sound was the attribute of akas'a, of which the auditory sense, the ear, was made up. The eye could send forth rays to receive the colour, etc., of things. Thus the cognitive senses can only manifest their specific objects by going over to them and thereby coming in contact with them. The cognitive senses (vak, pani, pada, payu, and upastha) recognized in Sa@mkhya as separate senses are not recognized here as such for the functions of these so-called senses are discharged by the general motor functions of the body.

Perception is defined as that right knowledge generated by the contact of the senses with the object, devoid of doubt and error not associated with any other simultaneous sound cognition (such



[Footnote 1:

Samagribhedai phalabhedacca prama@nabheda@h Anye eva hi samagriphale pratyak@sali@ngayo@h Anye eva ca samagriphale s'abdopamanayo@h. Nyayamanjari, p. 33.]

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as the name of the object as heard from a person uttering it, just at the time when the object is seen) or name association, and determinate [Footnote ref 1]. If when we see a cow, a man says here is a cow, the knowledge of the sound as associated with the percept cannot be counted as perception but as sound-knowledge (s'abda-prama@na). That right knowledge which is generated directly by the contact of the senses with the object is said to be the product of the perceptual process. Perception may be divided as indeterminate (nirvikalpa) and (savikalpa) determinate. Indeterminate perception is that in which the thing is taken at the very first moment of perception in which it appears without any association with name. Determinate perception takes place after the indeterminate stage is just passed; it reveals things as being endowed with all characteristics and qualities and names just as we find in all our concrete experience. Indeterminate perception reveals the things with their characteristics and universals, but at this stage there being no association of name it is more or less indistinct. When once the names are connected with the percept it forms the determinate perception of a thing called savikalpa-pratyak@sa. If at the time of having the perception of a thing of which the name is not known to me anybody utters its name then the hearing of that should be regarded as a separate auditory name perception. Only that product is said to constitute nirvikalpa perception which results from the perceiving process of the contact of the senses with the object. Of this nirvikalpa (indeterminate) perception it is held by the later naiyayikas that we are not conscious of it directly, but yet it has to be admitted as a necessary first stage without which the determinate consciousness could not arise. The indeterminate perception is regarded as the first stage in the process of perception. At the second stage it joins the other conditions of perception in producing the determinate perception. The contact of the sense with the object is regarded as being of six kinds: (1) contact with the dravya (thing) called sa@myoga, (2) contact with the gu@nas (qualities) through the thing (sa@myukta-samavaya) in which they inhere in samavaya (inseparable) relation, (3) contact with the gu@nas (such as colour etc.) in the generic character as universals of those qualities, e.g. colourness (rupatva), which inhere in the gu@nas in the samavaya relation.



[Footnote 1: Ganges'a, a later naiyayika of great reputation, describes perception as immediate awareness (pratyak@sasya sak@satkaritvam lak@sa@nam).]

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This species of contact is called sa@myukta-samaveta-samavaya, for the eye is in contact with the thing, in the thing the colour is in samavaya relation, and in the specific colour there is the colour universal or the generic character of colour in samavaya relation. (4) There is another kind of contact called samavaya by which sounds are said to be perceived by the ear. The auditory sense is akas'a and the sound exists in akas'a in the samavaya relation, and thus the auditory sense can perceive sound in a peculiar kind of contact called samaveta-samavaya. (5) The generic character of sound as the universal of sound (s'abdatva) is perceived by the kind of contact known as samaveta-samavaya. (6) There is another kind of contact by which negation (abhava) is perceived, namely sa@myukta vis'e@sa@na (as qualifying contact). This is so called because the eye perceives only the empty space which is qualified by the absence of an object and through it the negation. Thus I see that there is no jug here on the ground. My eye in this case is in touch with the ground and the absence of the jug is only a kind of quality of the ground which is perceived along with the perception of the empty ground. It will thus be seen that Nyaya admits not only the substances and qualities but all kinds of relations as real and existing and as being directly apprehended by perception (so far as they are directly presented).

The most important thing about the Nyaya-Vais'e@sika theory of perception is this that the whole process beginning from the contact of the sense with the object to the distinct and clear perception of the thing, sometimes involving the appreciation of its usefulness or harmfulness, is regarded as the process of perception and its result perception. The self, the mind, the senses and the objects are the main factors by the particular kinds of contact between which perceptual knowledge is produced. All knowledge is indeed arthaprakas'a, revelation of objects, and it is called perception when the sense factors are the instruments of its production and the knowledge produced is of the objects with which the senses are in contact. The contact of the senses with the objects is not in any sense metaphorical but actual. Not only in the case of touch and taste are the senses in contact with the objects, but in the cases of sight, hearing and smell as well. The senses according to Nyaya-Vais'e@sika are material and we have seen that the system does not admit of any other kind of transcendental (atindriya) power (s'akti) than that of actual vibratory

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movement which is within the purview of sense-cognition [Footnote ref 1]. The production of knowledge is thus no transcendental occurrence, but is one which is similar to the effects produced by the conglomeration and movements of physical causes. When I perceive an orange, my visual or the tactual sense is in touch not only with its specific colour, or hardness, but also with the universals associated with them in a relation of inherence and also with the object itself of which the colour etc. are predicated. The result of this sense-contact at the first stage is called alocanajnana (sense-cognition) and as a result of that there is roused the memory of its previous taste and a sense of pleasurable character (sukhasadhanatvasm@rti) and as a result of that I perceive the orange before me to have a certain pleasure-giving character [Footnote ref 2]. It is urged that this appreciation of the orange as a pleasurable object should also be regarded as a direct result of perception through the action of the memory operating as a concomitant cause (sahakari). I perceive the orange with the eye and understand the pleasure it will give, by the mind, and thereupon understand by the mind that it is a pleasurable object. So though this perception results immediately by the operation of the mind, yet since it could only happen in association with sense-contact, it must be considered as a subsidiary effect of sense-contact and hence regarded as visual perception. Whatever may be the successive intermediary processes, if the knowledge is a result of sense-contact and if it appertains to the object with which the sense is in contact, we should regard it as a result of the perceptual process. Sense-contact with the object is thus the primary and indispensable condition of all perceptions and not only can the senses be in contact with the objects, their qualities, and the universals associated with them but also with negation. A perception is erroneous when it presents an object in a character which it does not possess (atasmi@mstaditi) and right knowledge (prama) is that which presents an object with a character which it really has



[Footnote 1:

_Na khalvatindriya s'aktirasmabhirupagamyate yaya saha na karyyasya sambandhajnanasambhava@h.

Nyayamanjari_, p. 69.]

[Footnote 2:

_Sukhadi manasa buddhva kapitthadi ca cak@su@sa tasya karanata tatra manasaivavagamyate... ...Sambandhagraha@nakale yattatkapitthadivi@sayamak@sajam jnanam tadupadeyadijnanaphalamiti bha@syak@rtas'cetasi sthitam sukhasadhanatvajnanamupadeyajnanam.

Nyayamanjari, pp. 69-70; see also pp. 66-71.]

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(tadvati tatprakarakanubhava) [Footnote ref 1]. In all cases of perceptual illusion the sense is in real contact with the right object, but it is only on account of the presence of certain other conditions that it is associated with wrong characteristics or misapprehended as a different object. Thus when the sun's rays are perceived in a desert and misapprehended as a stream, at the first indeterminate stage the visual sense is in real contact with the rays and thus far there is no illusion so far as the contact with a real object is concerned, but at the second determinate stage it is owing to the similarity of certain of its characteristics with those of a stream that it is misapprehended as a stream [Footnote ref 2]. Jayanta observes that on account of the presence of the defect of the organs or the rousing of the memory of similar objects, the object with which the sense is in contact hides its own characteristics and appears with the characteristics of other objects and this is what is meant by illusion [Footnote ref 3]. In the case of mental delusions however there is no sense-contact with any object and the rousing of irrelevant memories is sufficient to produce illusory notions [Footnote ref 4]. This doctrine of illusion is known as viparitakhyati or anyathakhyati. What existed in the mind appeared as the object before us (h@rdaye parisphurato'rthasya bahiravabhasanam) [Footnote ref 5]. Later Vais'e@sika as interpreted by Pras'astapada and S'ridhara is in full agreement with Nyaya in this doctrine of illusion (bhrama or as Vais'e@sika calls it viparyaya) that the object of illusion is always the right thing with which the sense is in contact and that the illusion consists in the imposition of wrong characteristics [Footnote ref 6].

I have pointed out above that Nyaya divided perception into two classes as nirvikalpa (indeterminate) and savikalpa (determinate) according as it is an earlier or a later stage. Vacaspati says, that at the first stage perception reveals an object as a particular; the perception of an orange at this avikalpika or nirvikalpika stage gives us indeed all its colour, form, and also the universal of orangeness associated with it, but it does not reveal



[Footnote 1: See Udyotakara's Nyayavarttika, p. 37, and Ga@nges'a's Tattvacintama@ni, p. 401, Bibliotheca Indica.]

[Footnote 2: "Indriye@nalocya maricin uccavacamuccalato nirvikalpena g@rhitva pas'cattatropaghatado@sat viparyyeti, savikalpako'sya pratyayo bhranto jayate tasmadvijnanasya uvabhicaro narthasya, Vacaspati's Tatparyatika," p. 87.]

[Footnote 3: Nyayamanjari, p. 88.]

[Footnote 4: Ibid. pp. 89 and 184.]

[Footnote 5: Ibid. p. 184.]

[Footnote 6: Nyayakandali, pp. 177-181, "S'uktisa@myuktenendriye@na do@sasahakarina rajatasa@mskarasacivena sad@rs'yamanurundhata s'uktikavi@sayo rajatadhyavasaya@h k@rta@h."]

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it in a subject-predicate relation as when I say "this is an orange." The avikalpika stage thus reveals the universal associated with the particular, but as there is no association of name at this stage, the universal and the particular are taken in one sweep and not as terms of relation as subject and predicate or substance and attribute (jatyadisvarupavagahi na tu jatyadina@m mitho vis'e@sa@navis'e@syabhavavagahiti yavat) [Footnote ref 1]. He thinks that such a stage, when the object is only seen but not associated with name or a subject-predicate relation, can be distinguished in perception not only in the case of infants or dumb persons that do not know the names of things, but also in the case of all ordinary persons, for the association of the names and relations could be distinguished as occurring at a succeeding stage [Footnote ref 2]. S'ridhara, in explaining the Vais'e@sika view, seems to be largely in agreement with the above view of Vacaspati. Thus S'ridhara says that in the nirvikalpa stage not only the universals were perceived but the differences as well. But as at this stage there is no memory of other things, there is no manifest differentiation and unification such as can only result by comparison. But the differences and the universals as they are in the thing are perceived, only they are not consciously ordered as "different from this" or "similar to this," which can only take place at the savikalpa stage [Footnote ref 3]. Vacaspati did not bring in the question of comparison with others, but had only spoken of the determinate notion of the thing in definite subject-predicate relation in association with names. The later Nyaya writers however, following Ga@nges'a, hold an altogether different opinion on the subject. With them nirvikalpa knowledge means the knowledge of mere predication without any association with the subject or the thing to which the predicate refers. But such a knowledge is never testified by experience. The nirvikalpa stage is thus a logical stage in the development of perceptual cognition and not a psychological stage. They would

___________

[Footnote 1: Tatparya@tika, p. 81, also ibid. p. 91, "prathamamalocito'rtha@h samanyavis'e@savan."]

[Footnote 2: Ibid. p.84, "tasmadvyutpannasyapi namadheyasmara@naya purvame@sitavyo vinaiva namadheyamarthapratyaya@h."]

[Footnote 3: Nyayakandali,p. 189 ff., "ata@h savikalpakamicchata nirvikalpakamapye@sitavyam, tacca na samanyamatram g@rh@nati bhedasyapi pratibhasanat napi svalak@sa@namatram samanyakarasyapi sa@mvedanat vyaktyantaradars'ane pratisandhanacca, kintu samanya@m vis'e@sancobhayamapi g@rh@nati yadi paramida@m samanyamayam vis'e@sa@h ityeva@m vivicya na pratyeti vastvantaranusandhanavirahat, pi@ndantaranuv@rttigraha@naddhi samanya@m vivicyate, vyav@rttigraha@nadvis'e@soyamiti viveka@h."]

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not like to dispense with it for they think that it is impossible to have the knowledge of a thing as qualified by a predicate or a quality, without previously knowing the quality or the predicate (vis'i@s@tavais'i@styajnanam prati hi vis'e@sa@natavacchedakaprakara@m jnana@m kara@na@m) [Footnote ref 1]. So, before any determinate knowledge such as "I see a cow," "this is a cow" or "a cow" can arise it must be preceded by an indeterminate stage presenting only the indeterminate, unrelated, predicative quality as nirvikalpa, unconnected with universality or any other relations (jatyadiyojanarahita@m vais'i@s@tyanavagahi ni@sprakarakam nirvikalpaka@m) [Footnote ref 2]. But this stage is never psychologically experienced (atindriya) and it is only a logical necessity arising out of their synthetic conception of a proposition as being the relationing of a predicate with a subject. Thus Vis'vanatha says in his Siddhantamuktavali, "the cognition which does not involve relationing cannot be perceptual for the perception is of the form 'I know the jug'; here the knowledge is related to the self, the knower, the jug again is related to knowledge and the definite content of jugness is related to the jug. It is this content which forms the predicative quality (vis'e@sa@natavacchedaka) of the predicate 'jug' which is related to knowledge. We cannot therefore have the knowledge of the jug without having the knowledge of the predicative quality, the content [Footnote ref 3]." But in order that the knowledge of the jug could be rendered possible, there must be a stage at which the universal or the pure predication should be known and this is the nirvikalpa stage, the admission of which though not testified by experience is after all logically indispensably necessary. In the proposition "It is a cow," the cow is an universal, and this must be intuited directly before it could be related to the particular with which it is associated.

But both the old and the new schools of Nyaya and Vais'e@sika admitted the validity of the savikalpa perception which the Buddhists denied. Things are not of the nature of momentary particulars, but they are endowed with class-characters or universals and thus our knowledge of universals as revealed by the perception of objects is not erroneous and is directly produced by objects. The Buddhists hold that the error of savikalpa perception consists in the attribution of jati (universal), gu@na (quality),



[Footnote 1: Tattvacintama@ni p. 812.]

[Footnote 2: Ibid. p. 809.]

[Footnote 3: Siddhantamuktavali on Bha@sapariccheda karika, 58.]

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kriya (action), nama (name), and dravya (substance) to things [Footnote ref 1]. The universal and that of which the universal is predicated are not different but are the same identical entity. Thus the predication of an universal in the savikalpa perception involves the false creation of a difference where there was none. So also the quality is not different from the substance and to speak of a thing as qualified is thus an error similar to the former. The same remark applies to action, for motion is not something different from that which moves. But name is completely different from the thing and yet the name and the thing are identified, and again the percept "man with a stick" is regarded as if it was a single thing or substance, though "man" and "stick" are altogether different and there is no unity between them. Now as regards the first three objections it is a question of the difference of the Nyaya ontological position with that of the Buddhists, for we know that Nyaya and Vais'e@sika believe jati, gu@na and kriya to be different from substance and therefore the predicating of them of substance as different categories related to it at the determinate stage of perception cannot be regarded as erroneous. As to the fourth objection Vacaspati replies that the memory of the name of the thing roused by its sight cannot make the perception erroneous. The fact that memory operates cannot in any way vitiate perception. The fact that name is not associated until the second stage through the joint action of memory is easily explained, for the operation of memory was necessary in order to bring about the association. But so long as it is borne in mind that the name is not identical with the thing but is only associated with it as being the same as was previously acquired, there cannot be any objection to the association of the name. But the Buddhists further object that there is no reason why one should identify a thing seen at the present moment as being that which was seen before, for this identity is never the object of visual perception. To this Vacaspati says that through the help of memory or past impressions (sa@mskara) this can be considered as being directly the object of perception, for whatever may be the concomitant causes when the main cause of sense-contact is



[Footnote 1: Nyayamanjari, pp. 93-100, "Panca caite kalpana bhavanti jatikalpana, gu@nakalpana, kriyakalpana, namakalpana dravyakalpana ceti, tas'ca kvacidabhede'pi bhedakalpanat kvacicca bhede'pyabhedakalpanat kalpana ucyante." See Dharmakirtti's theory of Perception, pp. 151-4. See also pp. 409-410 of this book.]

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present, this perception of identity should be regarded as an effect of it. But the Buddhists still emphasize the point that an object of past experience refers to a past time and place and is not experienced now and cannot therefore be identified with an object which is experienced at the present moment. It has to be admitted that Vacaspati's answer is not very satisfactory for it leads ultimately to the testimony of direct perception which was challenged by the Buddhists [Footnote ref 1]. It is easy to see that early Nyaya-Vais'e@sika could not dismiss the savikalpa perception as invalid for it was the same as the nirvikalpa and differed from it only in this, that a name was associated with the thing of perception at this stage. As it admits a gradual development of perception as the progressive effects of causal operations continued through the contacts of the mind with the self and the object under the influence of various intellectual (e.g. memory) and physical (e.g. light rays) concomitant causes, it does not, like Vedanta, require that right perception should only give knowledge which was not previously acquired. The variation as well as production of knowledge in the soul depends upon the variety of causal collocations.

Mind according to Nyaya is regarded as a separate sense and can come in contact with pleasure, pain, desire, antipathy and will. The later Nyaya writers speak of three other kinds of contact of a transcendental nature called samanyalak@sa@na, jnanalak@sa@na and yogaja (miraculous). The contact samanyalak@sa@na is that by virtue of which by coming in contact with a particular we are transcendentally (alaukika) in contact with all the particulars (in a general way) of which the corresponding universal may be predicated. Thus when I see smoke and through it my sense is in contact with the universal associated with smoke my visual sense is in transcendental contact with all smoke in general. Jnanalak@sa@na contact is that by virtue of which we can associate the perceptions of other senses when perceiving by any one sense. Thus when we are looking at a piece of sandal wood our visual sense is in touch with its colour only, but still we perceive it to be fragrant without any direct contact of the object with the organ of smell. The sort of transcendental contact (alaukika sannikar@sa) by virtue of which this is rendered



[Footnote 1: Tatparya@tika, pp. 88-95.]

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possible is called jnanalak@sa@na. But the knowledge acquired by these two contacts is not counted as perception [Footnote ref l].

Pleasures and pains (sukha and du@hkha) are held by Nyaya to be different from knowledge (jnana). For knowledge interprets, conceives or illumines things, but sukha etc. are never found to appear as behaving in that character. On the other hand we feel that we grasp them after having some knowledge. They cannot be self-revealing, for even knowledge is not so; if it were so, then that experience which generates sukha in one should have generated the same kind of feeling in others, or in other words it should have manifested its nature as sukha to all; and this does not happen, for the same thing which generates sukha in one might not do so in others. Moreover even admitting for argument's sake that it is knowledge itself that appears as pleasure and pain, it is evident that there must be some differences between the pleasurable and painful experiences that make them so different, and this difference is due to the fact that knowledge in one case was associated with sukha and in another case with du@hkha, This shows that sukha and du@hkha are not themselves knowledge. Such is the course of things that sukha and du@hkha are generated by the collocation of certain conditions, and are manifested through or in association with other objects either in direct perception or in memory. They are thus the qualities which are generated in the self as a result of causal operation. It should however be remembered that merit and demerit act as concomitant causes in their production.

The yogins are believed to have the pratyak@sa of the most distant things beyond our senses; they can acquire this power by gradually increasing their powers of concentration and perceive the subtlest and most distant objects directly by their mind. Even we ourselves may at some time have the notions of future events which come to be true, e.g. sometimes I may have the intuition that "To-morrow my brother will come,"



[Footnote 1:Siddhantamuktavali on Karika 63 and 64. We must remember that Ga@nges'a discarded the definition of perception as given in the Nyaya sutra which we have discussed above, and held that perception should be defined as that cognition which has the special class-character of direct apprehension. He thinks that the old definition of perception as the cognition generated by sense-contact involves a vicious circle (Tattvacintama@ni, pp. 538-546). Sense-contact is still regarded by him as the cause of perception, but it should not be included in the definition. He agrees to the six kinds of contact described first by Udyotakara as mentioned above.]

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and this may happen to be true. This is called pratibhanajnana, which is also to be regarded as a pratyak@sa directly by the mind. This is of course different from the other form of perception called manasa-pratyak@sa, by which memories of past perceptions by other senses are associated with a percept visualized at the present moment; thus we see a rose and perceive that it is fragrant; the fragrance is not perceived by the eye, but the manas perceives it directly and associates the visual percept with it. According to Vedanta this acquired perception is only a case of inference. The pratibha-pratyak@sa however is that which is with reference to the happening of a future event. When a cognition is produced, it is produced only as an objective cognition, e.g. This is a pot, but after this it is again related to the self by the mind as "I know this pot." This is effected by the mind again coming in contact for reperception of the cognition which had already been generated in the soul. This second reperception is called anuvyavasaya, and all practical work can proceed as a result of this anuvyavasaya [Footnote ref. l].

Inference.

Inference (anumana) is the second means of proof (prama@na) and the most valuable contribution that Nyaya has made has been on this subject. It consists in making an assertion about a thing on the strength of the mark or linga which is associated with it, as when finding smoke rising from a hill we remember that since smoke cannot be without fire, there must also be fire in yonder hill. In an example like this smoke is technically called linga, or hetu. That about which the assertion has been made (the hill in this example) is called pak@sa, and the term "fire" is called sadhya. To make a correct inference it is necessary that the hetu or linga must be present in the pak@sa,



[Footnote 1: This later Nyaya doctrine that the cognition of self in association with cognition is produced at a later moment must be contrasted with the _triputipratyak@sa_ doctrine of Prabhakara, which holds that the object, knower and knowledge are all given simultaneously in knowledge. Vyavasaya (determinate cognition), according to Ga@nges'a, gives us only the cognition of the object, but the cognition that I am aware of this object or cognition is a different functioning succeeding the former one and is called anu (after) vyavasaya (cognition), "_idamaha@m janamiti vyavasaye na bhasate taddhakendriyasannikar@sabhavat kintvida@mvi@sayakajnanatvavis'i@s@tasya jnanasya vais'i@styamatmani bhasate; na ca svaprakas'e vyavasaya tad@rs'a@m svasya vais'i@s@tya@m bhasitumarhati, purva@m vis'e@sa@nasya tasyajnanat, tasmadidamaha@m janamiti na vyavasaya@h kintu anuvyavasayah." _Tattvacintama@ni_, p. 795.]

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and in all other known objects similar to the pak@sa in having the sadhya in it (sapak@sa-satta), i.e., which are known to possess the sadhya (possessing fire in the present example). The linga must not be present in any such object as does not possess the sadhya (vipak@sa-vyav@rtti absent from vipak@sa or that which does not possess the sadhya). The inferred assertion should not be such that it is invalidated by direct perception {pratyak@sa) or the testimony of the s'astra (abadhita-vi@sayatva). The linga should not be such that by it an inference in the opposite way could also be possible (asat-pratipak@sa). The violation of any one of these conditions would spoil the certitude of the hetu as determining the inference, and thus would only make the hetu fallacious, or what is technically called hetvabhasa or seeming hetu by which no correct inference could be made. Thus the inference that sound is eternal because it is visible is fallacious, for visibility is a quality which sound (here the pak@sa) does not possess [Footnote ref l]. This hetvabhasa is technically called asiddha-hetu. Again, hetvabhasa of the second type, technically called viruddha-hetu, may be exemplified in the case that sound is eternal, since it is created; the hetu "being created" is present in the opposite of sadhya {vipak@sa), namely non-eternality, for we know that non-eternality is a quality which belongs to all created things. A fallacy of the third type, technically called anaikantika-hetu, is found in the case that sound is eternal, since it is an object of knowledge. Now "being an object of knowledge" (prameyatva) is here the hetu, but it is present in things eternal (i.e. things possessing sadhya), as well as in things that are not eternal (i.e. which do not possess the sadhya), and therefore the concomitance of the hetu with the sadhya is not absolute (anaikantika). A fallacy of the fourth type, technically called kalatyayapadi@s@ta, may be found in the example—fire is not hot, since it is created like a jug, etc. Here pratyak@sa shows that fire is hot, and hence the hetu is fallacious. The fifth fallacy, called prakara@nasama, is to be found in cases where opposite hetus are available at the same time for opposite conclusions, e.g. sound like a jug is non-eternal,



[Footnote 1: It should be borne in mind that Nyaya did not believe in the doctrine of the eternality of sound, which the Mima@msa did. Eternality of sound meant with Mima@msa the theory that sounds existed as eternal indestructible entities, and they were only manifested in our ears under certain conditions, e.g. the stroke of a drum or a particular kind of movement of the vocal muscles.]

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since no eternal qualities are found in it, and sound like akas'a is eternal, since no non-eternal qualities are found in it.

The Buddhists held in answer to the objections raised against inference by the Carvakas, that inferential arguments are valid, because they are arguments on the principle of the uniformity of nature in two relations, viz. tadatmya (essential identity) and tadutpatti (succession in a relation of cause and effect). Tadatmya is a relation of genus and species and not of causation; thus we know that all pines are trees, and infer that this is a tree since it is a pine; tree and pine are related to each other as genus and species, and the co-inherence of the generic qualities of a tree with the specific characters of a pine tree may be viewed as a relation of essential identity (tadatmya). The relation of tadutpatti is that of uniformity of succession of cause and effect, e.g. of smoke to fire.

Nyaya holds that inference is made because of the invariable association (niyama) of the li@nga or hetu (the concomitance of which with the sadhya has been safeguarded by the five conditions noted above) with the sadhya, and not because of such specific relations as tadatmya or tadutpatti. If it is held that the inference that it is a tree because it is a pine is due to the essential identity of tree and pine, then the opposite argument that it is a pine because it is a tree ought to be valid as well; for if it were a case of identity it ought to be the same both ways. If in answer to this it is said that the characteristics of a pine are associated with those of a tree and not those of a tree with those of a pine, then certainly the argument is not due to essential identity, but to the invariable association of the li@nga (mark) with the li@ngin (the possessor of li@nga), otherwise called niyama. The argument from tadutpatti (association as cause and effect) is also really due to invariable association, for it explains the case of the inference of the type of cause and effect as well as of other types of inference, where the association as cause and effect is not available (e.g. from sunset the rise of stars is inferred). Thus it is that the invariable concomitance of the li@nga with the li@ngin, as safeguarded by the conditions noted above, is what leads us to make a valid inference [Footnote ref l].