[Sidenote: A.D. 1618.]

Ralegh in fact guarded against any collision with the Spaniards on his voyage. He was said not to have taken a single Spanish vessel, and he directed his course without stopping to Guiana, the goal which he had set before himself. But the Spaniards had become powerful there, although not until after his former visit. From Caraccas they had conquered the natives, who were engaged in internal wars, and had firmly established themselves at a short distance from the coast. What was likely to happen if they opposed the forces which Ralegh landed to search for the gold mines which he had formerly seen there? Ralegh remembered full well what a danger he ran if he engaged in a struggle and fought with them: he knew that he was thereby forfeiting his life. But on the other side, was he to return without fulfilling his purpose, and to burden himself with the reproach of not having told the truth? Worst of all, was he to fail in effecting the object which he had entertained all his life long, and not to achieve the discovery on which he staked the future glory of his name? It was perhaps the greatest moment in a life that almost always lifts itself above the ordinary level, when the thirst for discovery gained the victory over considerations of legality and the danger involved in discarding them. And well might he have hoped that not only pardon but praise would have been accorded him, if he had actually obtained possession of the gold mines, by whatever means. He commanded his men when they advanced inland to behave to the Spaniards as the Spaniards behaved to them. A collision was thus unavoidable. It took place at S. Thomas, which was destroyed, but the Spaniards nevertheless had completely the superiority: Ralegh's only son was killed; and the captain who had the charge of the expedition was so disheartened that he committed suicide. These disasters involved the utter failure of the expedition. His crews, who were naturally insubordinate, quarrelled among themselves, and on the voyage home the fleet dispersed. Ralegh came back to England without an ounce of gold, and without having effected any result whatever: he appeared in the light of an adventurer who had wantonly desired to break the peace with Spain. And when the ambassador of this power asked for full and signal satisfaction, in order to restore the good understanding which Ralegh's enterprise had at once interrupted, was it to be expected that the King should take under his protection the man who had not complied with the conditions prescribed to him, and whom for other reasons he did not love? And moreover the pulse of free generosity which befits a sovereign did not beat in the breast of King James. He consented that the old sentence of condemnation, for fifteen years suspended over Ralegh's head, should now be enforced against him. It had been pronounced against him for entering into a secret alliance with Spain; an attack on Spain led to its execution. Ralegh and the King exhibit a contrast between ambition that scorns danger on the one side, and caution that supports itself by the forms of law on the other, such as even in England has hardly ever been so sharply drawn. The King could not possibly get any good by his conduct. The position of England in the world depended upon the resistance that she offered to the preponderance of Spain in both the Indies and in Europe. The King detached himself from one of the chief interests of the nation when he allowed a felon's death to be inflicted on the man of lofty genius, who had undertaken, by an ill-advised attempt it is true, to give effect in America to this feeling of world-wide opposition. James thought that his welfare lay in maintaining the peace with Spain. But we know that at an earlier date he had entered on a course adverse to Spain, and that even now he had not entirely renounced it. What confusion must eventually follow from this divided policy!

NOTES:

[381] Ant. Foscarini, Relatione 1618: 'Il re ritiene questa sorte di vita nella quale fu habituato, e spende tutto il tempo che puo nella caccia e ne studj.'

[382] 'Crums fallen from King James' Table, or his Table Talk.' MS. in the British Museum.

[383] Wilson, James I, 289: 'He had pure notions in conception, but could bring few of them into action, though they tended to his own preservation.' Wilson, Weldon, and the notices in Balfour, are certainly all of them deeply tinged with party feeling. The elder Disraeli is quite right in rejecting them: but his own conception is very unsatisfactory. Gardiner (1863) avoids unauthenticated statements; but the views of James' character which have grown up and established themselves owing to the commonplace repetition of such statements, control his representation of it.

[384] Foscarini: 'A due sorti di persone dona particolarmente, a grandi et a quelli che gli assistono che sono quasi tutti Scocesi, e non vaca cosa alcuna della quale possino cavar utile, che non la demandino e nello stesso momento obtengono.'

[385] Harrington: Nugae Antiquae i.

[386] Niccolo Molino, Relatione 1607: 'A abandonato e messo dietro le spalle tutti gli affari li quali lascia al suo consiglio ed a suoi ministri, onde si puo dire con verita ch'egli sia principe di nome e Piu tosto d'apparenza che d'effetto.'

[387] A. Foscarini 1618: 'In campagna gli viene di giorno in giorno dal consiglio che risiede per ordinario in Londra dato conto di quanto passa et inviatigli spacci e corrieri: tratta e risolve molte cose con il consiglio solo de suoi favoriti.—Risolve per ordinario in momenti et havendo seco segretarii per gli affari d'Inghilterra, per quelli di Scotia e Ibernia comanda ciascuno di essi, quanto occorre e vuol che si faccia in tutti i suoi regni.'

[388] Calderwood, vii. 311, 434, &c.

[389] Girolamo Lando, Relatione 1622: '(S. M. e) inclinata all'ambiguita et alla dimora non gia per naturale complessione impastata di foco, colerico et molto ardente, ma perche vuol darsi a credere di cavare della protrattione del tempo cio, che desidera—conli scemi dell'ira tenendo pure quelli della mansuetudine.'

[390] 'Unmoveable in one hair that might concern me against the whole world.' James to Somerset, in Halliwell ii. 127; certainly one of the most important documents in this collection.

[391] Narrative of Abbot in Rushworth i. 460.

[392] A. Foscarini, 1615 Nov. 13. 'Si mantiene viva la voce e sospetto del principe defonto.' Nov. 20, 'Avanthieri parti il re, che per questo accidente e per le gravi dissensioni ed odii che regna in corte si mostra molto addolorato.'

[393] The personal motive of the estrangement might have lain in Overbury's speech to Somerset, mentioned by Payton during the trial: '"I will leave you free to yourself to stand on your own legs." My lord of Somerset answered his legs were strong enough to bear himself.' (State Trials ii. 978.) He wished to show that he could dispense with Overbury.

[394] According to Wilson, Ralph Winwood was informed by a confession made at Vliessingen. From a letter of Winwood extracted by Gardiner (History of England ii. 216) we only learn that Winwood received the first intimation: he reckons it as a proof of the justice of the King of England that he allowed the investigation to be made.

[395] Somerset intimated that he possessed secrets the disclosure of which would compromise the King: and there is nothing, however conjectural or infamous, which has not seemed to some among posterity to be probable on this ground. James I says, 'God knows it is only a trick of his idle brain, hoping thereby to shift his trial. I cannot hear a private message from him without laying an aspersion upon myself of being an accessory to his crime.' (Halliwell ii. 138.)

[396] Girolamo Lando, Relatione 1622, praises him for 'apparenza di modestia, benignita e cortesia,—bellezza, gratia, leggiadria del corpo, a tutti gli esercitii mirabilmente disposto.'

[397] 'Che le lettere Piu importanti del re sono passate in mano di Spagna.' Ant. Foscarini, Nov. 13, 1615. There is a letter of James I of October 20 which likewise supposes acts of treachery of this kind. What is true in this supposition we now learn from Digby's letter, in Gardiner, App. iii. 2.

[398] 'To the south parts of America or elsewhere within America possessed and inhabited by heathen and savage people.' So run the words of the commission: it is therein said expressly 'Sir Walter Ralegh being under the peril of the law.'

[399] Dispaccio Veneto Feb. 10, 1617: 'Che le cose erano concertate che S. M. cattolica non avrebbe occasione di riceverne disgusto—che era fermamente del re, che il Rale andasse al suo viaggio, nel quale se avesse contravenuto alle suoi instruttioni—haveva la testa con che pagherebbe la disubbidienza.'



CHAPTER II.

COMPLICATIONS ARISING OUT OF THE AFFAIRS OF THE PALATINATE.

During these years there had been persons at the helm of state in most countries, who either from natural disposition or from a calculation of present circumstances had cherished peaceful views. In spite of all the activity of Spanish policy, Philip III and his minister Lerma clung to the principle that the rest needed to restore the strength of the exhausted monarchy must be granted to it. The Emperor Matthias owed the crown he wore to his alliance with the Protestants: his first minister Klesel, although a cardinal, was a lukewarm Catholic, and a man of conciliatory views in general. The Regent of France, Mary de' Medici, had surrendered the warlike designs of her husband when she entered on the exercise of sovereign power. Christian IV of Denmark held similar views. He declined the proposals of the Poles, which were aimed at a renewal of the war against Sweden: he preferred, with the approval of his council of state, to proceed with the building of towns and harbours in which he was engaged.

Hence it was possible on the whole to carry out a policy such as that maintained by James I. It corresponded to the tone prevalent among the other powers.

[Sidenote: A.D. 1617.]

From time to time it seemed probable that the opposing forces which were contending with one another in the depths of European life, would burst forth and shatter the peaceful state of affairs. For the advancing revival of Catholicism roused the hostile feelings of Protestants, while the union of the German and the independent feeling of the Italian princes resisted the extension of the alliances of Spain. In the year 1615, on the Netherland frontier, and in the year 1616 on the boundaries between Austria and Venice, warlike movements began which threatened to prove the commencement of a general struggle: but these were disputes of an essentially local nature, and peaceful dispositions still maintained the upper hand.

But in the year 1617 and 1618 a question arose which no longer allowed this state of things to continue. It concerned the imperial dignity of Germany, but it exercised so powerful a secondary influence upon affairs most thoroughly English that even in a history of England a short discussion must be devoted to it.

The increasing weakness of the Emperor Matthias rendered his speedy end probable; and all preparations were already being made in the house of Austria to secure the succession of the Archduke Ferdinand of Styria to the imperial throne, as well as to his own hereditary kingdoms and provinces. No arrangement could in itself have been more suitable in the nature of things. Ferdinand was the most vigorous scion of his house; and both the German Archdukes laid their own well-founded claims at his feet. A resignation on the part of Philip III of the claims which he inherited from his mother was thought indispensable: but even this created no difficulty. It was merely stipulated that Ferdinand should indemnify him for resigning them; and this he was willing to do. It only remained that the crown of the German Empire should also be assured to him. The Archdukes were eager for an immediate negotiation on the subject, and were already certain of the support of the spiritual electors.

It is clear however that the succession was not merely a change of persons. The place of the peaceable and moderate Matthias would be filled by one of the most devoted pupils of the Jesuits in the person of Ferdinand, who had made himself terrible to the Protestants by an unsparing restoration of Catholicism in his own country. Moreover the alliance between the German and Spanish line, which had been loosened in the last few years, was to be consolidated into a union resting on common interests: so that it seemed likely that Austria would enjoy a supremacy like that which had been established in the time of Charles V. The letters which passed between the members of that house, and which had accidentally been divulged, excited surprise by the note of general hostility which they struck, while the share of the Palatinate and of Brandenburg in the election was treated in them as a formality which could be dispensed with in case of necessity.[400]

It is quite intelligible that the Protestants should be agitated by this discovery, and should entertain the idea of opposing the election of Ferdinand. Not that one of them thought of acquiring the throne for himself; they did not resist the election of a Catholic emperor as such, but they wished to guard against the resumption of the combination between the Austro-Spanish power and the prerogatives of the imperial crown. At first their eyes fell upon Duke Maximilian of Bavaria, whom they would by this means have for ever detached from that power. The Elector Frederick controlled the jealousy which, as Elector Palatine, he felt for a branch of the same house, and went to Munich in order to prevail on his cousin to consent to this arrangement; for, according to the plea advanced on grounds of imperial right, the imperial crown could not be allowed to become hereditary in the house of Austria. He hoped that the Archbishop Ferdinand of Cologne, the brother of the Duke of Bavaria, would support him, and that his influence would win over the other spiritual electors also. The Union and the League would then have combined to oppose the house of Austria.

But meanwhile open resistance to the claims of this family had already broken out in its own provinces. While the Emperor Matthias was still alive, the Archduke Ferdinand, through the combination, as prescribed by Bohemian usage, of an election with the recognition of his hereditary claims, had been acknowledged future King of Bohemia, and had been already crowned, on condition that he would not mix in public affairs before the death of his predecessor. But immediately after the coronation people thought that they could discover his hand in every act of the government. Cardinal Klesel, the man in whom the greatest confidence was reposed, especially by the Protestant portion of the Estates, had been overthrown owing to the influence of the Spanish ambassador. In opposition to the influence thus exercised, 'against the practices and snares of the Jesuits,' as the phrase ran, the zealous Protestants who, when Ferdinand was accepted as King, had been thrust into the background or had retired, now obtained the upper hand in the country, and proceeded to open insurrection while the Emperor Matthias was still alive. This Prince was the first who was overturned by the collision of the two parties, whose enmity was again reviving, and between whom he had thought of mediating. He was bitterly disappointed by his failure. After his death the Bohemians thought themselves justified in refusing any longer to acknowledge Ferdinand as their King, and in seeking on the contrary for a worthier successor to the throne, on the ground that in Ferdinand's election the traditional forms had not been accurately observed, and that he was undermining all religious and political freedom. Their eyes had even fallen on Catholic princes; but as the motive which prompted their resistance was certainly the religious one, their attention was still more drawn to the most eminent Protestant prince in their vicinity, Frederick Elector Palatine, who as head of the Union was himself the principal opponent of the election of Ferdinand as Emperor.

[Sidenote: A.D. 1618.]

On the very first steps taken in this matter, the King of England was affected by these movements. We learn that, on the occasion of the overtures made by Frederick, Maximilian of Bavaria had been moved to write to James I, and to express to him his satisfaction at the family connexion which had sprung up between them. The interest of the Palatinate and of England seemed one and the same, especially as the King was still considered a member and protector of the Union. The presumption that the son-in-law of the King of England would find support from his power, contributed greatly to the importance which the Elector at this moment enjoyed.

But at the same time it was evident in what an embarrassing position James I was now placed, and that not only on account of the danger threatening the continuance of peace, which he thought no price too high to secure: his hands were tied not merely by this general consideration, but by another special reason as well. He was at that moment seriously engaged in a treaty for the marriage of his son with a Spanish infanta, which was to carry out the long-talked-of alliance between his family and the Austro-Spanish line.

The first overtures in regard to the present Prince of Wales had been made by the Duke of Lerma to the English envoy, Digby, to whom he opened a proposal for the marriage of Prince Charles with Mary, daughter of Philip III. The Spanish ambassador, Gondomar, had then taken the management of the affair in hand. We should do him wrong by supposing that he wished to deceive the King. Gondomar rather belonged to the party who looked for the welfare of the Spanish monarchy in the maintenance of peace, especially with England. The scheme of the marriage was part of the system of powerful alliances by which it was sought to prop the greatness of Spain. Even the uncertain rumour of this scheme, which was instantly propagated, sufficed to agitate the Protestant party in Europe and in England itself. The King declared that he moved only with leaden foot towards the proposal which had been made to him; and that, if it were seen that the alliance was dangerous to religion or to existing agreements, it should never take effect. But even the Secretary of State, Ralph Winwood, who repeated this declaration, disapproved of the scheme, as did also the whole school of Robert Cecil. They had wished to marry the Prince to the daughter of a German line, perhaps to a Brandenburg princess; and the States General offered their money and their services in order to win the consent of any such princess, and to convey her to England. Many would have preferred even a domestic alliance after the old fashion. Opposition was also offered on the part of the Church of England. Archbishop Abbot only delayed to urge it until the conditions of the marriage should come under discussion. But the King likewise had the approval of influential voices on his side. It was considered possible to conclude the marriage, and yet to preserve the other alliances of the country. People thought that England would in that case be only the more courted by both parties, and that the peace of the world would rest on the shoulders of the King.

[Sidenote: A.D. 1619.]

But what a contradiction was involved in the ascendancy which these ideas obtained? The hereditary right to the crown of Bohemia, which the estates of that country would no longer acknowledge, belonged to the house of Spain. It was intended that the Elector Palatine should step into its place by election; and this prince was son-in-law to the King. After James had married his daughter to the head of the Protestants in Germany, he conceived the thought of marrying his son to the member of a family which had made the patronage and protection of Catholicism its special calling. It seemed as if he was purposely introducing into his own family the disunion which rent Europe in twain.

The negotiations in Germany after a time resulted in the victory of the house of Austria, which in spite of all opposition carried the day in the election of the Emperor. The Elector Palatine acknowledged Ferdinand II without hesitation. But almost at the same moment he received the news that he had himself been elected king by the Estates of Bohemia. It cannot be proved that he was privy to this beforehand: even the rumour that his wife urged him to accept the crown because she was a king's daughter meets with no confirmation. They were not so blind as not to perceive the enormous danger in which the acceptance of this offer would involve them. In reply to a question of the Elector, his wife answered that she regarded the election as a divine dispensation, that if he determined to accept it, which she left entirely to his consideration, she for her part was resolved to undergo everything that might follow from it. We must not regard as hypocrisy the prominence which the prince and the princess alike gave to religious considerations. Such was the fashion of the times generally, and especially of the party to which they belonged.

The Elector Frederick however did not yet declare his decision. The question of the acceptance of the crown of Bohemia was debated from every point of view by the very councillors who had just been present at the election of the Emperor. Their decision was in favour of the prince inviting first of all the advice of his friends in the empire, of the States-General, but especially of the King of England, and making sure of their support.[401] The Bohemian envoys, who most urgently requested an immediate answer, were put off with the reply that the Elector must first of all be certain of the consent of the father of his consort. Count Christopher Dohna was sent to England to persuade King James to give it. He was commissioned to deliver to him a letter from the Princess-Electress in which she most urgently entreated her father to support her husband and to prove his paternal love to them both.

King James came now face to face with the greatest question of his life, which summed up and brought to light, so to speak, all the cross purposes and conflicting political aims among which he had long moved. A word from him was now of the greater consequence, as the States-General declared that they would act as he did. But what was his decision to be? He was not unmoved by the thought that the prospect of possessing a crown was opened to his son-in-law and grandchildren. On the other hand he was greatly impressed by a representation which the King of Spain forwarded to him, that his right to the crown of Bohemia was indisputable—as in fact the Spanish line had a contingent claim to the succession—and that he would contend for it with all his strength: on which King James said that he also as a great sovereign had an interest in seeing that no one was deprived of his own. The theories of James I about the hereditary rights of princes, the electoral rights of the Estates, and the influence of religious profession in these matters, presented themselves to his mind together with his wishes on the question of the aggrandisement of his dynasty. He remarked that it could not be allowed that subjects should presume to fall away from their sovereign on a question of religion; he even feared that this doctrine might react to his own prejudice on England. In these considerations the balance evidently was in favour of a refusal. James would have deserved well of the world if he had given utterance to that refusal, and had decisively dissuaded his son-in-law from accepting the crown. And from his oft-repeated assertions at a later period, to the effect that the Elector had proceeded on his own responsibility, we might think that he had expressed himself in definite terms in favour of a different course.

In reality however this is not the case. He condemned the revolt of the Bohemians against Matthias: in regard to Ferdinand it was his opinion that they should prove from the old capitulations their right to declare his election and coronation invalid, and to proceed to a new election, in which case he would himself support them.[402] He expressed himself in such a manner, that even members of the Privy Council received the impression that he would approve of and even support the acceptance of the crown when once it had taken place. Christopher Dohna relates that in the negotiations at that time he one day declared that his master, the Elector, was ready to refuse the crown if the King required him to do so; and that James replied, 'I do not say that.'[403]

Monarchs are set in authority in order that they may pronounce definitive decisions according to the best of their own judgment. It is sometimes their duty to take a decided line. James, who hitherto had always stood between different parties, could not nerve himself at this eventful moment for a firm and straightforward resolve. In the monstrous dilemma in which the various questions at issue were becoming involved he could not come to any decision. The kindest thing that can be said of him is that at this moment his nature was not equal to the requirements of the situation.

Count Dohna, following the example of James's councillors, concluded from his expressions that he was not only not opposed to the acceptance of the crown, but that he would allow himself to be enlisted in its favour, and would support it. And there is no doubt that this view exercised a decisive influence upon the final resolution of the Elector Frederick. He certainly was already strongly inclined to accept the crown in opposition to his more clear-sighted and sagacious mother, but in agreement with his ardent wife: but he had not yet uttered the final words when Dohna's report came in.[404] When he learned from this that the King was not decidedly unfavourable, the Elector thought that he recognised a dispensation of God which he would not decline to carry out. In the presence of his councillors at the castle of Heidelberg he declared to the Bohemian ambassadors that he accepted the crown; and soon afterwards he set out for Bohemia. In October 1619 (Oct. 25/Nov. 4) he was crowned at Prague.

What unforeseen consequences however for himself and his friends, for Germany and for England, were destined to spring out of this undertaking!

[Sidenote: A.D. 1620.]

In London, where the popular party had already from the first fixed their eyes on the Princess, this step was welcomed with the most joyous approval. It was represented to the King that the most brilliant prospect was thus opened to his family; that on the next vacancy his son-in-law, who already himself held two votes in the electoral body, could not fail to be chosen Emperor; and that England would by this means acquire the greatest influence on the continent. It was expected that these feelings for his family, and the successful issue of events, would work together to detach him again from Spain.

James on one occasion, on receiving the news of the confinement of his daughter, drank a bowl of wine 'to the health of the King and Queen of Bohemia.' He went so far as this, and people thought it worth while to record the event; but he could not be brought to acknowledge Frederick openly. He was not satisfied with the proof of their right advanced by the Bohemians: in conversation he advocated the right of Austria.

Spain and the League, as was inevitable, joined forces with Austria. In the first instance the Palatinate itself was the object of their joint attack. How could men have helped thinking that King James would resolutely take the inheritance of his grandsons under his protection? The Union invited him to do so, reminding him of the obligation imposed on him by his connexion with them mentioned above: they said it was no favour, but justice which they demanded of him. But James replied that he had pledged himself only to repel open and unjustifiable attacks, but that in the present case the Palatinate was the attacking party, and that Austria stood on the defensive. The Union presently saw itself compelled to conclude a treaty with the League, which left that power free to act against Bohemia. The Palatinate however was not secured thereby against the Spaniards.[405] To effect this, it would have been deemed advisable to make an attack from Holland on the Spanish Netherlands; for if a single fortified place had been occupied there, the Palatinate would have had nothing more to fear from Spain. But to this measure also James refused his consent: he thought that this would be equivalent to beginning war, which he did not wish.

The general sympathy of the nation was strong enough at last to cause a large English regiment of 2500 men, under Horace Vere, to be sent on the continent, in order that the Palatinate, on which the Spaniards now advanced, might not become utterly a prey to them. The Earls of Essex and Oxford, who had contributed most to raise the regiment, themselves took part in the campaign. They were joined by many other young men of leading families, who wished to learn the art of war. But they had received from the King positive commands to commit no act of hostility. The troops of the Union, who showed themselves quite ready to fight the Spaniards, were withheld by the threat that in that case the King would recall these troops instead of sending two more regiments to join them, the hope of which he held out to them in the event of their obedience. It was enough for the King that the English troops occupied the most important places. Vere held Mannheim, Herbert Heidelberg, Burrows Frankenthal; while the greater part of the country fell into the hands of the Spaniards.

Europe had reason to be alarmed at the advantage which accrued to the Spanish monarchy from this affair. The Tyrol and Alsace were already promised them to form links between Lombardy and the Netherlands: the possession of the Lower Palatinate completed their chain of communication.

The action of Spain and England presented a marked contrast. Spain, while it forsook Lerma's policy, held together all its friends—Germany, Austria, the League, the Pope, the Archducal Netherlands—and combined their forces for joint action on a large scale; while King James, in clinging to the policy of peace, let his allies fall asunder and crippled their activity.

But if James so acted in the case of the Palatinate which he wished to save, what might be fully expected in the case of Bohemia, with regard to which he openly declared, after some hesitation, that he could take no further part in its affairs? The new King found no hearty obedience among the Bohemians, partly because they found themselves deceived in their expectation of being assisted with troops by the Union, and with money by England. But worse than all, the ill-disciplined soldiery being without pay, broke out in mutiny: they were almost more ready to help themselves to their arrears by an attack upon the capital than to defend their sovereign or their country. On the other hand the soldiers of Austria and of the League, well paid and well disciplined, were spurred on by zealous priests. On their first attack they scattered the troops of Frederick to the four winds (November 1620). It would not have been impossible for Frederick to wage a defensive war in Bohemia; but regard to the danger into which the Queen would have been thrown in consequence prevented the attempt. That one day cost them both crown and country.

It is impossible to describe the impression which the news of this defeat produced in London. The King was held blameable because not a single soldier commissioned by him had been found beside his daughter to draw the sword in her defence. This was attributed either to culpable negligence of his own affairs, or to the influence of the Spanish ambassador. Not Gondomar himself, who was too shrewd to act thus, but certainly his friends and Catholics generally, let their joy at this event be known. The citizens responded with manifestations that were directed against the King himself. A placard was put up in which he was told that he would be made to feel the anger of the people, if in this affair he any longer followed a policy opposed to its views.

James I could no longer put off the question what steps he was to take. The tidings reached him at Newmarket, where he was spending the cold and gloomy days in hunting. He broke off this amusement and hastened to Westminster, in order to attend council with his ministers.

Towards the end of December a meeting was held, in which the secretary Naunton depicted the whole position of the foreign policy of England, and drew from it the conclusion that the King must above all arm, as in that case he could carry on war, or at least negotiate with firmness and some prospect of success. King James himself brought the affair of Bohemia under discussion. He complained, and seemed to feel it as an injury to his paternal authority, that the Elector Frederick even now continued to make the acknowledgment of his right to the crown of Bohemia a condition of his accepting the mediation offered by the King. Viscount Doncaster, who had just returned from a mission to Germany, fell on his knees before him, in order to remark to him that Frederick deserved no blame for clinging to a right which he supposed to be valid: that his refusal was not addressed to James as a father, but as King of England.[406] James I distinctly stated afresh that he could not and would not espouse the cause of his son-in-law in Bohemia. But by this time not only was Frederick's new crown as good as lost, but his whole existence was endangered; the greater part of his hereditary territory was in the enemy's hands. James declared with unusual decision that he would not allow the Palatinate, which would one day descend to his grandchildren, to be wrested from them; that he was resolved to send to the Continent in the next year an army sufficient to reconquer it. It might be asked if this measure also would not inevitably lead to a breach with Spain. King James did not think so. He thought that he could carry on a merely local quarrel, and yet at the same time avoid a war on the part of the one power against the other. He did not intend to attack the King of Spain's own dominion, so long as that sovereign did not meddle with his.

But however that might be, whether he was to begin war, though only on a limited scale, or whether he wished to prosecute negotiations with success, in any case it was necessary for him to arm. But for this purpose he required other means besides those of which he could dispose at his own discretion.

NOTES:

[400] Memorial of the Archduke Maximilian of Feb. 1, 1616, in Lunig, Europaeische Staatsconsilia i. 918. It is clear from this that the anxiety of the members of the Union with regard to the Venetian war was not so groundless as it might otherwise appear. The Archduke lays before the Emperor the question whether 'in the event of the continuance of the Venetian disturbances he would use the opportunity to bring a numerous force into the field, and maintain it until the laudable work had been everywhere set in train, and had been prosecuted with the wished-for result.'

[401] Reasons for hesitating advanced by the Privy Councillors of the Prince Elector, in Moser, who calls them prophetic, Patriotisches Archiv. vii. 118. The Palatinate 'will not well be able to decide anything certain and final: she has therefore made everything depend on England and the States-General, and has asked them, as well other her friends and potentates in the empire, for trusty counsel and declaration of what they will do in every case by her.'

[402] 'Non approbare che in vita del imperatore li populi si sollevassero, ma che bene consigliava dopo morte dassero in luce le loro ragioni del jus eligendi sopra nullita dell'elettione di Ferdinando, con elegerne un altro, nel qual caso offeriva anche l'ajuto et il soccorso suo.'

[403] 'S. M., se non assenti all accettare della corona, non disse ne anche mai all ora di dissentire: che anzi alla venuta di lui in questa corte offerendole al nome dell'istesso suo signore, che quando ella havesse voluto, l'averebbe anche lasciata, egli rispondesse: io non dico questo.' Girolamo Lando, Feb. 5, 1621.

[404] Dohna mentioned that 'the leading English councillors held that, if the Prince Elector would but soon accept the crown, the King on his part would soon declare himself and give his approval, which accordingly threw almost the greatest weight into the scale.' Secret Report in Moser vii. 51.

[405] From the documents relating to these proceedings, it is proved that Spinola had received instructions in June 1620 to gain possession of the Palatinate; that assurances however were given to King James even in August that nothing was really known of the object of his expedition. Senkenberg iii. 545 n.

[406] Dispaccio Veneto, 8 Gennaio 1621.



CHAPTER III.

PARLIAMENT OF THE YEAR 1621.

We already know the antipathy of James to the Parliament, which had become a power to which, as soon as it was manifested in a newly assembled House, the power of the King was obliged to bend. James had already often felt the ascendancy of Parliament. The schemes of union with Scotland, which filled his soul with ambition, had been shattered by the resistance of that body. The exclusively Protestant disposition which prevailed there had made it impossible for him to give a legal sanction to the favour which he entertained for the Catholics, and which his views of policy naturally disposed him to show. He had been obliged to desist from the attempt to secure financial independence by surrendering the feudal privileges of the crown. The Parliament raised claims which the King regarded as attacks on the prerogative of the crown: even his advances to it had been met by a stubborn resistance. In the ordinary course of things he would never again have summoned Parliament together.

This complication in foreign affairs then arose. All parties, including even the King himself, were convinced that England must step forth armed among the contending powers of the world: and that, not in the fashion of the last expedition, so little in keeping with the situation, when private support and tacit sympathy found the means, but on a large scale, as the position of the kingdom among the great powers demanded. But without Parliamentary grants this was impossible. The summoning of a new Parliament was therefore an incontestable necessity.

[Sidenote: A.D. 1621.]

But on the other hand there was not wanting reasons for hesitation, for it could not be disguised that concessions would be inevitable. King James saw that as plainly as any one, and declared himself beforehand ready to make them. In contradiction to his former assertions he gave out that he would this time allow grievances to be freely alleged, and would give his best assistance in removing them. He said that he wished to meet Parliament half way, and that it should find him an honourable man. From the investigation of abuses the less was feared because the late opposition was ascribed to a factious resistance to Somerset's administration. But that favourite had since fallen: and of the leaders of that opposition several had gone over to the government, and some had died.[407] The declared purpose of arming for the reconquest of the Palatinate was in accordance with the feelings of the nation and of the Protestants: no doubt was felt that it would win universal sympathy.

This was in fact the case. The most favourable impression was produced when the King in his speech from the throne (January 30, 1621), which was principally taken up with this subject, declared his resolution to defend the hereditary claim of his grandchildren to the territories of the Palatine Electorate, and the free profession of Protestantism; to compel peace if it were necessary sword in hand; for which objects he claimed the assistance of the country. Parliament did not hesitate for an instant to express its concurrence with him in these designs. Two subsidies were granted on the spot, and the resolution was carried into effect during the continuance of the debates, a step which was altogether unprecedented. The King thanked the Parliament for this extraordinary readiness, which would, he said, increase his importance both at home and abroad.

But this did not prevent Parliament on the other hand from bringing forward its claims with all possible energy. The power of granting money was the sinew of all its powers. The necessity of asking assistance from Parliament in urgent embarrassments, which the Tudors had avoided as far as possible, now appeared as pressing as ever. Was it not to be expected that demands should call forth counter-demands? And the opposition in the previous Parliament rested on a far wider basis than that of hostility to Somerset: at the present election also the candidates of the government were rejected in most of the counties and towns.[408]

The commission appointed for the investigation of abuses did not deal only with those which were acknowledged to be such. The principal question rather concerned the competence of the crown to confer such privileges as those out of which the abuses originated. Under the lead of Edward Coke, the great lawyer, Parliament adopted a principle which secured for it a firm standing ground.

Coke, who moreover did not think it necessary to ask the King's consent for liberty of speech, because this was, he thought, an independent right of Parliament, vindicated the position that no royal proclamation had validity if it contradicted an act of Parliament or an existing law. He took his stand on the times of the later Plantagenet and of the Lancastrian kings: and he considered that the form which the relation between the government and Parliament then assumed was the only legal form. But the government of James I had granted extraordinarily obnoxious privileges—for instance, the right of setting up taverns with a restriction on the entertainment of guests by private individuals, or by the old inns; and again the right of arresting acknowledged vagrants. But the most obnoxious grants were those of patents for the monopoly of some trade, which were annoying to the whole mercantile class, and brought profit only to a few favoured individuals. Coke argued that the patents were either in themselves illegal, or injurious in their enforcement, or both together. While he proved to Parliament its forgotten or disregarded rights, Coke won the full confidence of both Houses alike: the Upper and the Lower House made common cause. Thus the system of government as it had been developed under the Tudors and continued under the Stuarts was encountered face to face by another system, which rested upon other precedents and principles.

And people were not content with merely declaring the patents invalid; they called those to account who had got possession of them, and even the high officials who had contributed to issue them. A general commotion ensued: every day fresh information came in and fresh complaints were drawn up.[409]

The Lord Chancellor Bacon had been already brought into danger by this affair. He had assisted in introducing monopolies of different manufactures under the pretence that work would be found for the poor by means of them. It was well known that in matters of this sort he had for the most part followed the suggestions of the Prime Minister. While Bacon was defending the ideal mission of the monarchy, he had the weakness to identify himself too closely with the accidental form which authority just at that particular moment took. In return he found on the other hand that the attacks really aimed at the government recoiled in the first instance upon him. In reality they were directed principally against Buckingham. In order to save him from destruction, suggestions had been made to the King that he might prefer to dissolve Parliament, as it seemed plain that he had far more reason to expect harm from the attacks than advantage from the grants made by that body. Buckingham saved himself only by coming forward against the monopolies himself, in accordance with the advice of his ecclesiastical confidant, Dean Williams. Claims had been made against two of his brothers also on account of the monopolies. Far from taking them under his protection, he said on the contrary that his father had still a third son who was determined to root out abuses; and that not until the present proceedings had been taken had he recognised the advantages of parliamentary government. Upon this, the leading men with whom Williams had formed a connexion, desisted from attacking the First Minister. It even came about that a person of high rank, accused at the bar of the House of Lords, who had let fall an expression, comparing Buckingham to old favourites of hateful memory, was obliged to retract it with considerable ceremony. But a victim was required: one was found in the Lord Chancellor Bacon.

Although condemned by law and morality, an evil practice still prevailed of receiving presents of money in official transactions. The sums were known and have been registered, by means of which Gondomar retained the services of a number of statesmen in the interest of Spain. How many similar abuses in the control of the Treasury had been brought to light only a short time before! Even the great philosopher, who in his writings is so zealous against bribes, contracted during his administration the stain of receiving them. That he might stand on an equality with the great lords, he incurred inordinate expenses, which these bribes assisted him to meet. Edward Coke was wholly in the right when he exclaimed that a corrupt judge was 'the grievance of grievances.'[410] Two-and-twenty cases were proved in which the supreme judge, the Lord Chancellor of England, had taken presents from the parties concerned. Lord Bacon made no attempt to justify his conduct; he only affirmed—and this appears in fact to have been the case—that in his decisions he never was influenced by the presents that had been made him. When he was called to account for them, he acquiesced himself in the justice of the proceeding, for he allowed that a reform was necessary, and only deemed himself unfortunate in being the person with whom it began. The Lords pronounced sentence upon him that he should never again fill an official position, nor be capable of sitting in Parliament, and that he should be banished from the precincts of the court.

Apart from its importance as affecting individuals, this event is very important in the history of the constitution, which now returned to its former paths. That the Lower House again as in old times was able to procure the fall of one of the highest officials, is an evidence of its growing power. That the First Minister and favourite allowed his intimate friend to fall is a proof of the weakness of the highest authority, which moreover ought itself to have attacked abuses of this kind. Bacon justly remarked that reform would soon reach higher regions.

But while Parliament, which the government had no inclination to withstand openly, thus obtained the ascendancy in domestic matters, it was also already turning its eyes in the direction of foreign affairs. These were times in which a warm religious sympathy was awakened by the advance which the counter-reformation was making in the hereditary dominions of Austria, as well as in France, and by the persecutions which befell the Protestants in both countries. The Spaniards were again engaging in war for the subjugation of the Netherlands. In Parliament, on the other hand, it was thought necessary to combine with the Republic, and to equip a fleet to assist the Huguenots, and even to attack Spain, in order thus to make a diversion in favour of the Palatinate. At the very time of the opening of Parliament the ban of the empire was pronounced against Frederick Elector Palatine amid the sound of trumpets and drums in the Palace at Vienna. This was regarded in the whole Protestant world as an injustice, for it was thought that Ferdinand II had been injured by Frederick only as King of Bohemia, and not as Emperor: and on the same grounds the English Parliament was of opinion that the execution of the ban ought to be hindered by force of arms; and it showed itself dissatisfied that the King sought to meet the evil only by demonstrations and embassies.

We can easily understand that the attitude of Parliament aroused the anxiety of the King. He caused the debates on the war to be put a stop to, remarking that they infringed his prerogative, for which great affairs of this kind were exclusively reserved. And yet, so extraordinary was the complication of affairs that the declarations made in Parliament were not altogether displeasing to him. In June he adjourned Parliament, without formally proroguing it. What was the reason of this? Because Parliament had brought in a new bill containing the severest enactments against Jesuits and Catholic recusants. The King refused to accept it, as by this means the persecution of Protestants in Catholic countries would receive a new impulse. But he was also unwilling to express his refusal in a final shape, because he knew that the wish to hinder the adoption of harsh measures against the Catholics would exercise an influence upon the Spaniards in their negotiations with him.[411] If he had proceeded to a prorogation, he would have been obliged to reject the laws; and he preferred to keep the prospect of them still open, which he was able to do by resorting to the form of an adjournment. He made it a merit in the eyes of the Spaniards that, far from increasing the severity of the penal laws, he did not even enforce them in their existing form, when moreover, if enforced, they would bring him in a large sum. But he was glad to see that people feared that he might do at some future time what at present he had refrained from doing. When he promised the Parliament on his royal word, that he would call it together again without fail in the autumn, he was also influenced by the consideration that he intended the Spaniards to look forward with fear to the resolution which might then be taken. He was greatly pleased that Parliament before dispersing drew up an energetic remonstrance against the persecutions of the Protestants all over the world, and especially against the oppression of his children. Not that he wished to give effect to it: on the contrary he adhered to the policy of assisting his son-in-law only by means of diplomacy: but he desired that the Spaniards should fear a war with England, and he thought that anxiety on this point would induce them and their friends to show themselves conciliatory and respectful.

Sir John Digby, who was commissioned with the negotiations at the Spanish court, was referred by that power to Brussels and Vienna; and in fact he received favourable answers, not only from the Infanta Isabella in the former, but even from the Emperor himself in the latter city. The Emperor held out to him the hope that the matter would be reconsidered at a future assembly of the Estates of the Empire, which he intended to convene at Ratisbon. But meanwhile warlike operations and the execution of the ban held their course undisturbed. In Bohemia the counter-reformation was carried through with extreme severity. Four-and-twenty Protestant nobles and leaders were executed, and their heads with hoary beards were seen exposed on the Bridge at Prague. Silesia hastened to make its peace with the Emperor: the Princes of the Union laid down their arms, but they did not yet make their peace by this means. Tilly took possession of the Upper Palatinate, and then turned with his victorious army to the Lower Palatinate in order to complete the subjugation of this province, notwithstanding all the protection of England. On the Lower Rhine the forces of the Spaniards and of the States General confronted each other in arms. Under these circumstances the Princes, who were invited, refused to appear at an Assembly of the Empire,[412] for none of them thought that he could leave his home without incurring evident danger. The Infanta Isabella too in Brussels declined to conclude the truce which Sir John Digby proposed.

While affairs were in this position, Parliament resumed its interrupted sittings in November 1621. Dean Williams, who after Bacon's fall had received the Great Seal, opened the session with a request for the immediate grant of new subsidies, which he said would be required even before Christmas. He promised that in the coming February, when they resumed their sittings, the other affairs should be brought under discussion.[413]

On this occasion as on a previous one, the King wished for nothing more than a renewed and stronger demonstration. Even now he lived and moved in a policy of compromise between opposite views. While his son-in-law was being robbed of his country in the interest of Spain, he adhered to the wish of marrying his son to a Spanish Infanta: he thought that he would bring about the restoration of the Palatinate most easily by the influence which this new alliance would confer. But he thought that his friendly advances should also be accompanied by threats, and he wished to be placed by the grants of Parliament in a position to arm more effectually than before. It would have been in accordance with his views, if Parliament had repeated its former declarations, according to which it was ready to put forth all its power in his behalf, in order to place him in a position to compel by force of arms what might be refused to his peaceful negotiations.

It is worth noticing in all this that James not only met the wishes of Parliament because he required support, but that he also encouraged the disposition which it showed in favour of Protestantism, in order to avail himself of it: he thought that he would always be able to control it. But how often has a policy been shipwrecked, which has thought to avail itself of great interests and great passions for some end immediately in view!

How could it be expected that while religious parties on the continent were meeting in a struggle for life and death, the English Parliament would approve of the wavering policy of James I, which aimed at compromise and had hitherto been without results?[414] Quite the contrary: starting with the view that England was the centre of Protestantism and must avert the dangers which assailed it, Parliament declared itself ready, it is true, to pay the King new subsidies, but not until the following year, and on the presumption that he should have accepted and ratified the bills for the welfare of the people which had passed the House.[415] They thought that the common danger to religion arising from the alliance between the Pope and the King of Spain had been brought upon England also by the indulgence hitherto shown to the recusants. Parliament invited the King to draw the sword without further circumlocution for the rescue of the foreign Protestants; in the first instance to break with the power whose army had carried on the war in the Palatinate, but above all to marry the Prince his successor to a lady of the Protestant faith.

The King wished to avoid war because he was anxious lest he should be constantly compelled by Parliament, owing to his repeated want of subsidies, to make fresh concessions, which would affect and diminish the substance of his authority. The Parliament wished for war because it expected that such a proceeding would furnish it with great opportunities for establishing its power.

As soon as the rival powers encountered each other on this ground, all agreement between them was at an end. Parliament interfered still more vigorously than before with the affairs which the King reserved for himself: it wished to induce him to adopt those very measures which he was resolved to avoid. He was expected to break with that power with which it was his principal ambition to become most closely connected. He was expected to take the sword in order to defend the common cause of Protestantism. He was expected to put an end to the indulgence which he had hitherto shown to his Catholic subjects; to do what ran counter to all the expectations which he had raised at Rome and Madrid; and what perhaps, considering the strength of the Catholic element in England, was not without danger to the maintenance of quiet at home. Meanwhile the payment of the subsidies, which he required at once in order to maintain his political position, was indefinitely deferred. Although it was not actually stated, yet it was quite clear that Parliament made the validity of its grants dependent on his compliance with its advice. And on what important matters was that advice offered! The King complained that his prerogative was openly infringed by it; that Parliament wished to decide on his alliances with other sovereigns, and to dictate to him how to conduct the war; that it brought under debate questions of religion and state, and the marriage of his son: what portion of the sovereign power, he asked, was left to him? On the competence which Parliament claimed as its hereditary right, he remarked that it had to thank the favour of his ancestors and himself for this: that he would protect Parliament, but only in proportion to the regard which it showed for the prerogative of his crown.

If we had to specify the moment in which the quarrel between the Parliament and the Crown once more found its full expression, we should choose this.[416] The Parliament, which had dissolution in immediate prospect, employed its last moments in making a protest, in which it again affirmed that its liberties and privileges were a birthright and heirloom of the subjects of the English crown, that it certainly was within its power to bring under debate public matters affecting the King, the State, the Church, and the defence of the country; and that full liberty of speech without any subsequent molestation on that account must be secured to every member in the exercise of these rights.

The King would not forego the satisfaction of punishing by arrest a number of members who were peculiarly hateful to him; he declared the protestation null and void, and struck it out of the clerks' book with his own hand. In a detailed exposition of his view of these transactions, in which he gives the assurance that he will still henceforth continue to summon Parliament, he emphatically repudiates this protestation, which he affirms to be drawn up in such terms that the inalienable rights of the crown are called in question by it, rights in the possession of which the crown had found itself in the times of Queen Elizabeth of glorious memory. He affirms that as King he cannot tolerate any such pretensions.

Parliament demanded the policy of Queen Elizabeth; King James demanded her rights. The privileges accorded to the crown and the opposition to Spain had formerly gone together: the surrender of the latter under King James served to supply Parliament on its part with a motive for making an attack upon the former.

The cause of Parliament was of great importance, even when it stood alone: deeper impulses and fresh life and vigour were first imparted to it by its combination with foreign policy and with religion.

NOTES:

[407] From a letter of Bacon to Buckingham.

[408] Lando, Relatione: 'Se bene procuro S. M. di ristringere e captivare fino l'autorita, che hanno li communi d'eleggere li deputati, benche in qualche citta e provincia gli e riuscito, nell'universale non ha potuto, rifiutati i privati del favorito e dei consiglieri li lei.' Lando describes the Parliament as 'republica altretanto mal pratica, quanto molto pretendente.'

[409] Chamberlain to Carleton, March 24: 'They find it more than Hercules' labour purgare hoc stabulum Augiae of monopolies, patents and the like.' (St. P. O.)

[410] Chamberlain to Carleton: 'All men approve E. Coke, who upon discovery of those matters exclaimed that a corrupt judge is the grievance of grievances.' Chamberlain relates that an officer of the Court of Chancery, when accused on account of various irregularities, exclaimed 'that he would not sink alone, but draw others after him.'

[411] Buckingham on one occasion very aptly characterises his policy and its danger: 'So long as you waver between the Spaniards and your subjects, to make your advantage of both, you are sure to do with neither.' Hardwicke Papers i. 466.

[412] 'The princes denied their appearance.' (Digby, Recital of his Speech, Parl. Hist. v. 483.) So that the notice by Struv, rejected by Senkenberg (Fortsetzung Haeberlins xxv. Sec. 80) is nevertheless correct.

[413] A gap in Williams' speech at this part, occurring in the Journals and in both Parliamentary Histories, is to a certain extent filled up by a letter of Chamberlain to Carleton of Nov. 24; 'intimating that they should forbear needless and impertinent discourses, long and extravagant orations which the king would not indure.'

[414] Lando, Relatione: 'Non potendosi accordare con spiriti discordanti dei proprii impressi di non lasciarsi levare un punto dell'autorita.'

[415] John Locke to Carleton, Nov. 29: 'They have put up a petition, that this may be a session and laws enacted, that the laws made against recusants may be executed, so that the promise of the subsidy seemeth yet to be conditional.'

[416] Chamberlain to Carleton on December 22. The Parliament, on receiving a message enjoining the speedy continuance of their business, answered the King two hours after it had been brought before them: 'but with all for fear of surprise gave order to the speaker and the whole house to meet at four o'clock: where they conceived sat down and entered this proposition enclosed which is nothing pleasing above and for preventing where of there came a commission next morning to adjourn the Parliament.' Cf. the Commons' protestation: Parl. Hist. v. 513.



CHAPTER IV.

NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE MARRIAGE OF THE PRINCE OF WALES WITH A SPANISH INFANTA.

It is a general consequence of the dynastic constitution of the states of Europe that marriages between the reigning families are at the same time political transactions, and as a rule not only affect public interests, but also stir up the rivalry of parties: this effect however has hardly ever come more prominently into notice than when it was proposed to marry the heir to the throne of England with an Infanta of Spain.

We have remarked that the scheme originated in Spain, had already been once rejected, and then had been mooted a second time by the leading minister of Philip III, the Duke of Lerma. It formed part of Lerma's characteristic idea of fortifying the greatness of the Spanish monarchy by a dynastic alliance with the two royal families which were able to threaten it with the greatest danger, those of France and England. This design brought him into contact with a current of policy and personal feeling in England which was favourable to him: but at the same time the great difficulty which the difference of religion presented, came at once into prominence. Not that it would have been difficult for King James to make the concessions requisite for obtaining the Papal dispensation; on the contrary he was personally inclined to do so: but he feared unpleasant embarrassments with his allies and with his subjects. Count Gondomar, the ambassador, assured the King that he should never be pressed to do anything which violated his conscience or his honour, or by which he might run a risk of losing the love of his people.[417]

[Sidenote: A.D. 1622.]

On this, negotiations which had already been opened for the marriage of the Prince with a French princess were broken off. Besides, the intermarriage with the house of Spain appeared to be far more deserving of preference, as being likely to pacify the feelings of English Catholics, who were accustomed to side principally with Spain, and even to promote the calm of the world, as Spain was a more prominent representative of the Catholic principle than France. It was thought advisable to leave the conditions of the dispensation to be arranged in the sense indicated by negotiation between the Papal see and the Spanish crown.

But a new and serious hindrance now arose in consequence of the embarrassments caused by the affairs of the Palatinate, in which the interests of the two dynasties came into immediate collision with one another. It is clear that King James could not marry his son to an Infanta of Spain while a Spanish army was taking possession of his son-in-law's territory. He therefore made the restoration of the Palatinate a condition of the marriage. All his tortuous efforts were directed to combine the latter object with the former, and at the same time to avoid a disadvantageous reaction upon his domestic policy.

While he invoked the Protestant sympathies of Parliament in order to give weight to his demands, he nevertheless checked them again as soon as he was in danger of being forced to make war, or even to resume the measures against the Catholics, which might displease the Spanish court. Whilst he made the Spaniards aware that if he were refused the consideration he required, he would throw himself entirely into the hands of his Parliament and proceed to extremities, he at the same time employed every means of effecting a peaceful accommodation, by which he would then at once be saved the necessity of making concessions to Parliament. The most active negotiations were opened in Brussels with the Infanta Isabella, upon whom the issue seemed most to depend. James I had sent thither Richard Weston, the man whom Gondomar himself declared to be the most appropriate instrument for this affair; and an agreement was concluded with the personal co-operation of the Infanta, which held out expectations of the restoration of the Elector. On the side of the Palatinate and England everything was done to promote the conclusion of this agreement, and to ensure its execution. The expelled Elector was induced to recall Mansfeld and Christian of Brunswick from the Upper Rhine, where they were then moving vigorously forward, lest the treaty should be obstructed by their operations.[418] He himself removed to Sedan, in order not to arouse the suspicions of the House of Austria by his residence in the Netherlands. In the summer of 1622 he had no other troops in the Palatinate but the English garrisons; and King James engaged that, if the treaty were concluded, he would take arms himself against the allies of his son-in-law. But while expectation was directed to the conclusion of the contract by which the Elector should be re-established in his country, the League advanced against those strongholds which the English held in his name. Neither Heidelberg nor Mannheim could hold out. The English troops were obliged to bend to necessity and to march out, although with the honours of war. Only in Frankenthal did they still maintain themselves for a while. When Weston at Brussels complained of this conduct he was actually told that the League must have everything in their hands first, in order to restore everything hereafter. He was astounded at this subterfuge, and asked for his recall.

In England the friends of Spain fell into a sort of despair at the course of events. For what could follow from it but open war between the King of England and the Emperor? But on whose side would Spain then be found? Would that power pledge itself to fight to the end against every one, even against the Emperor, in behalf of the treaty when concluded? To prevent England from coming into closer alliance with France, the government of Spain had planned the marriage and opened direct negotiations: would it now, when its cause appeared to be advancing, withdraw in violation of its word of honour? Even the Privy Council represented to the King that he was bringing dishonour and danger on his country. The Duke of Buckingham, who also had himself been in close agreement with Gondomar, and was considered to be the man who held the threads of politics in his hand, regarded the increasing discontent as dangerous to his own position.[419]

While affairs were in this situation and these impressions afloat, a plan for bringing this uncertainty to an end was embraced by the King, the Prince, and the Duke, in those private discussions in which the general course of affairs was decided. It was determined that the Prince, accompanied by Buckingham, should visit Spain himself, in order to bring about the marriage and arrange the conditions. None of the Privy Councillors, not even Williams, who on other occasions was in their intimate confidence, knew anything about this plan. It pleased the King's sense of the romantic, that as he himself had formerly brought home his newly married wife from the icy North, so now his son should in person win the hand of his bride in the distant South. But however much in earnest the King was in the matter, we learn that he still contemplated the possibility of failure. He once said to the Duke of Soubise, that if the marriage came to pass, he would take up the cause of the Huguenots in alliance with Spain: but that if he did not succeed in his design they might still reckon upon him, for that his son would contract a marriage with a French princess, which would procure him great influence at the French court.[420]

[Sidenote: A.D. 1623.]

On March 7, 1623, the Prince of Wales and the Duke of Buckingham arrived in Madrid, with an escort including Cottington and Endymion Porter, both of whom afterwards enjoyed great influence. Their arrival was not altogether welcome to the ambassador in residence there, Digby, now Lord Bristol, who would rather have retained this important business in his own hands: but the Spanish court and the nation itself found a certain satisfaction for their pride in the personal suit urged by the heir-apparent of one of the most powerful kingdoms for the hand of the younger Infanta.

At first the Prince of Wales could only see the Infanta as she drove past along a sort of Corso in the Prado. He was then presented to her, but the words which she was to use to him were written down for her beforehand; for she was to receive him merely as a foreign prince without any reference whatsoever to his suit. Some surprise was created when the principal lady of the court one day condescended to say to the Prince that the Infanta in conversation gave signs of an inclination for him. In the country no doubt was felt that the marriage would come to pass, and the prospect was welcomed with joy. Often did a 'Viva' resound under the windows of the Prince. Lope de Vega dedicated some happily expressed stanzas to him; and splendid shows were given in his honour.[421] All that was now wanting was an agreement as to the conditions.

This depended however in large part on the resolutions which might be arrived at in England. Conditions affecting religion were laid before King James, which he might certainly have hesitated to approve. It was not only that the Infanta was to be indulged in the free exercise of her religion—for how else could the consent of the Spanish clergy or a dispensation from the Pope have been hoped for?—nor even that the children born from this marriage were to be educated under her eyes for the first ten years of their life, for this seemed the natural privilege of a mother: but the presumption that the children might become Catholics involved wide consequences. It was stipulated that the laws against Catholics should not apply to such children, nor prejudice their succession. Still more displeasing however were some other articles of general import, which were carefully kept back from the knowledge of the public. They amounted to this:—that the laws against the Catholics should no longer be carried into execution, and that the Councillors of the sovereign should be pledged by an oath to abstain from enforcing them.[422] The King met with some opposition to these articles in the Privy Council. But he said that the question was not whether they were advisable, but whether they were not necessary at a time when part of the domain under dispute, and the Prince himself, were in the hands of the Spaniards. And moreover they did not amount to a complete concession to the wishes of the Catholics, for they spoke only of tolerating their worship in private, not in public: the articles were in harmony with the old ideas of the King. James solemnly swore to the first articles, on July 20, in the presence of the Spanish ambassador; and immediately after him the members of the Council took the same oath. The King alone then pledged himself to carry out the second set of articles.

An extensive alteration had already taken place in the treatment of the Catholics. Priests and recusants had been discharged from prison and enjoyed full liberty. An injunction was issued to the preachers and to the Universities to abstain from all invectives against the Papacy. Men had to see individual preachers who transgressed these orders thrown into prisons which had been just emptied. The families which openly expressed their hitherto secret adherence to Catholicism were already counted by hundreds. Then came these transactions. What was learnt of the articles was enough to spread universal dismay among the Protestants, but they expected yet worse things. They thought they saw a pronounced Catholic tendency becoming ascendant in the conduct of affairs. An universal danger seemed to be hanging over the religion which they professed. Every one hastened to church to pray against it; the churches had never been more crowded. The second ecclesiastic in the country, the Archbishop of York, put the King in mind that by his project of toleration he was encouraging doctrines which he had himself proved in his writings to be superstitious and idolatrous. At this time moreover religious profession and political freedom were most closely connected: all these penal laws which the King was removing had been passed in Parliament, and were the work of the legislative power as a whole. The Archbishop reminded the King in conclusion that when he annulled the statutes of parliament by royal proclamation, he created an impression that he thought himself at liberty to trample on the laws of the land.[423]

The wishes of the King did not lean so decidedly in that direction as people assumed. Buckingham and the Prince, who recommended him to take the oath, remarked to him, among other observations, that his promise that Parliament should repeal the penal laws against the Catholics within three years would be fulfilled, if he merely exerted himself to the extent of his strength for that object, even if it should prove impossible to attain it.[424] In general everything was merely preliminary, and depended on further agreement. The Prince entreated his father to transmit to him the ratification of the articles, that he might decline them or not according to circumstances. He even wished that, in order to put an end to the dilatoriness of the Spaniards, his father should make an express declaration that any longer delay would compel him again to enforce the penal laws against the Catholics.[425] All these announcements, which filled the Catholics with joy and hope, but the Protestants with dejection, mistrust, and anxiety, were however only political agencies, and were intended to serve a definite end. The object was in the first instance to put an end by this means to all delay in sending the Infanta to England.

Although some religious scruples were still awake in the minds of the Spaniards yet they presented no further obstacle. The conditions for granting a dispensation which had been prescribed by the Pope to the Spanish Court, had been accepted; the Spanish ambassadors had been satisfied: the only question now was whether the Infanta should be conveyed to England at once with the Prince on his return, or in the following spring. As formerly the Tudors so now the Stuarts appeared to be taking their position as a dynasty in Europe in connexion with the Spanish monarchy.

Only one difficulty remained, that connected with the Palatinate; but at the present moment it was more serious than ever.

In his negotiations King James started with the supposition, that the Spanish court could control the Imperial, and bring it over to its own point of view. The inclusion of the German line in this dynastic combination was contemplated. A proposal was made that the eldest son of the expelled Frederick should contract a marriage with a daughter of the Emperor, which would make the task of reconciliation and restitution far easier.

The Emperor however had to take other interests into consideration; not only those of the Duke of Bavaria, to whom he was so deeply pledged, but those of the whole Catholic party, which thought of seizing this occasion to establish for ever its ascendancy in the Empire. The Emperor, who was also instigated by Rome to this step, solemnly transferred the electoral dignity previously held by the Elector Palatine to Maximilian of Bavaria in February 1623, with the intention of satisfying him, and at the same time of obtaining a majority of Catholic votes in the electoral body. It has indeed been assumed, both then and at a later time, that Spain, only bent on deceiving England, had agreed to all these proceedings. But in fact the Spanish ambassador had opposed them most strenuously at Ratisbon in the name of his king, as well as in that of the Infanta Isabella.[426] He prophesied with accurate foresight new and inextricable embarrassments as the consequence. The Papal Nuncio complained that the resistance of the ambassador weakened the Catholics and emboldened the Protestants. But his remonstrance had no effect on the Emperor. After his previous experiences Ferdinand II had no more fear of his adversaries, least of all of King James, who would certainly not in his old age make his first appearance as a warrior and try the doubtful fortune of war. He thought besides that he always consulted his security best when he had nothing before his eyes but the advantage of the Catholic Church.

The negotiation about these matters took place just at the time when the Prince of Wales was in Spain. There no one despaired of finding an arrangement with which the Prince could still be satisfied. It was thought that, when the Palsgrave Frederick had been reconciled with the Emperor, and admitted into his family, the electoral dignity might be enjoyed in turn by Bavaria and the Palatinate, or that a new electorship might be founded for Bavaria. The Imperial ambassador, Count Khevenhiller, however rejected these proposals, for no other reason than that King James was not the proper person to make arrangements for his grandson. He did not accept the supposition that the youth, whose education it was proposed to complete in Vienna, would join the Catholic faith, for he said that his mother would never allow that. He set aside the expectation that the Imperial court might send to Spain a full authorisation to negotiate for the marriage. He moreover affirmed that, if the Imperial court wished to secure its influence in Germany, it could not allow the opinion to gain ground that it depended on Spain and was guided by her.

And in Spain also, after the fall of Lerma, which was brought on by this affair, the old aspirations after the supremacy of the world had again obtained the upper hand.

It is true that at the moment a feeling prevailed in favour of maintaining peace on the very advantageous footing which had then been obtained. Cardinal Zapata, Don Pedro of Toledo, and above all Count Gondomar, who had at that time been made a member of the Council, declared before that body that Spain ought to have no higher political aim than to secure her union with England. These were men of experience in European affairs, who recollected the evils which had sprung from the policy of Philip II. But there were others who were again seized with the old ambition, so interwoven with Catholicism, and who would not separate themselves from the interests of the Emperor at any price—men like the Marquis de Aytona, Don Augustin Mexia. And Count Olivarez, under the influence of the Imperial ambassador, now espoused the same opinion, a man who, as favourite of the King and chief minister, filled the same position in Spain that Buckingham did in England. At the decisive meeting of the Council, he stated that the King of Spain would not venture to separate from the Emperor, even if he had been mortally affronted by him: if he could stand in friendly relations with the Emperor and the King of England at the same time, well and good; but if not, he must break with the King of England without any regard to the marriage: this step was demanded of him for the preservation of Christendom, of the Catholic religion, and of his family. He added that a marriage between the young Count Palatine and a daughter of the Emperor was only to be thought of, if the former became a Catholic: that the complete restoration of the father was by no means advisable; and that he ought to be dealt with as the Duke of Saxony had been dealt with by Charles V.[427] Olivarez carried the Council with him in favour of this policy. The strictly Catholic point of view, which had been asserted by the German line of the house of Austria, was again adopted as the rule of policy in Spain.

This was a resolution that decided the destinies of Spain. That power again renounced the policy of compromise which it had observed for a quarter of a century. The young King Philip IV and his ambitious favourite revived the designs of Philip II, or, as the former once expressed it, of Charles V: to the restoration of Catholic ascendancy in Germany they sacrificed the friendship of King James, which was of inestimable advantage to the monarchy, inasmuch as it kept the coasts of Spain free from all danger of attack from the English forces.[428] Olivarez was too violent, too young, and too ill-informed to have any clear conception of the influence of these relations.

But as in great transactions every step has consequences, it is clear that the Spanish predilections of King James, and the policy founded on them, were thus brought to an end. For maintaining these it was necessary not only that they should be advantageous to the Catholics in England, but that they should be equally serviceable to the Protestant interests in Germany, which in the present instance were his own: otherwise he would never have found rest again in his own country, or his own family, or perhaps even in his own breast. He had asked for the reinstatement of his son-in-law in the electorship as well as in the possession of his hereditary dominions, or at least for the hearty assistance of Spain in effecting this object.[429] And the Prince of Wales shared these views. He once said to Count Olivarez that, without the restoration of the Elector Palatine, the marriage was impossible, and the friendship of England could not be expected. The Spaniards did not think fit to impart to him the resolution which had been taken in the Council of State; but still this implied a new direction given to the course of affairs which could be followed although it was not talked of. The Spaniards contented themselves with dwelling on the necessity of sending the youthful Count Palatine to Vienna for education: as to his father, who was under the ban, they held out indeed a prospect of the restoration of his dominions but not of his electoral dignity. The Prince declared that it was not to be imagined that his brother-in-law would be content with that and would agree to it.[430] And how was even as much as this to be obtained from the court of Vienna? It was now certain that in the affair of the Palatinate Spain would not interfere with decision. But besides this, the resolutions which had been taken in the Spanish Council of State must lead to much wider consequences.

The miscarriage of the negotiations has been ascribed to the misunderstanding between Olivarez and Buckingham; and it is no wonder that such a misunderstanding arose, for the latter was conceited and irritable, the former imperious and assuming. But these causes are only of a secondary character; the root of the failure lies in the political, or in the combination of the religious with the political relations of the two countries. While in England Protestantism was moving in a direction opposed to the intentions of King James, and could hardly be held down, it was met by the Catholic interest in Spain and Germany, which was fully conscious of its position. Now these were the powerful elements which divided the whole world: the strife between them could not be adjusted by political considerations.

It is hardly necessary to state further how Buckingham, who regarded the somewhat unmeaning delays of the Spaniards as affronts, and who would have had reason to fear for his authority in England in the event of his prolonged absence, now urged the return of the Prince. Charles concurred with him: King James, who moreover was impatient, as he said, to see the two men whom he most loved about him again, commanded it; and the Spanish court could not object.

Yet no estrangement arose in consequence, nor was the proposal for the marriage withdrawn. The Infanta was treated as Princess of Wales; and Philip IV in a letter once styled the Prince of Wales his brother-in-law. The Papal dispensation, for which they had long been kept waiting, at last arrived; and the marriage ceremony might have been performed any day. The other negotiations also still kept advancing. King James then once more demanded an express declaration with regard to the affair of the Palatinate. He wished to know what Spain thought of doing if the Emperor refused to accede to the agreement that was to be made between the two powers. The answer of the Spaniards was evasive: how could it have been otherwise? But the English would not advance further without better security. The Prince sent to request the ambassador not to use the full powers, which he already had in his hands, until he received fresh orders.[431] King James declared that the marriage could not be solemnised till the Spanish court consented to take upon itself obligations with regard to the Palatinate.

NOTES:

[417] Letter to Gondomar, as it appears, from Buckingham himself, Cabala 236. 'You promised that the King should be pressed to nothing that should not be agreeable to his conscience, to his honour, and the love of his people.'

[418] So writes Richard Weston to Buckingham: 'The prince elector hath conformed himself to what was demanded, that the count Mansfelt and Duke of Brunswik, the pretended obstacles of the treatie, are now with all their forces removed.' Sept. 3, 1622. Cabala 201. How difficult this was for him we see from a letter of Nethersole to Carlisle, Oct. 18, 1622. 'The slowness of resolution of this side may move H. Mai. [the King of Bohemia] to precipitate his before the time, which will be then to lose the fruits of two long years patience.'

[419] Valaresso: 'Temendo di se stesso e di riuscir l'oggetto di tutta la colpa e forse della pena.'

[420] Valaresso: Disp. 19 Luglio 1623.

[421] A true relation of the arrival and entertainment given to the Prince Charles: in Somers' Tracts ii. 625.

[422] Arcana quatuor capitula ad religionem pertinentia: in Dumont v. ii. 442. Their contents also appear in the Spanish reports.

[423] 'That you now take unto yourself liberty to throw down the laws of the land at your pleasure.' Cabala 13.

[424] The Duke and the Prince to the King, 6 June. Hardwicke Papers i. 419.

[425] Instructions received from His Highness June 7, 1623: in Clarendon State Papers I. xviii. App.

[426] Protestation of the Conde Onate, in Khevenhiller, Ann. Ferd. viii. 66.

[427] From Khevenhiller's letter, Ann. Ferd. x. 95.

[428] In a Letter of Pope Urban to Olivarez, this passage occurs: 'Diceris in Britannico matrimonio differendo religionis dignitatem privatis omnibus rationibus praetulisse.'

[429] 'We have expected the total restitution of the palatinate, and of the electorship.' James to Bristol, in Halliwell ii. 228.

[430] Prince Charles and the Duke to James, Aug. 30, 1623. Hardwicke Papers i. 449.

[431] Prince Charles to the Earl of Bristol. Halliwell 229.



CHAPTER V.

THE PARLIAMENT OF 1624. ALLIANCE WITH FRANCE.

After the Prince had taken leave of his Spanish escort, and had gone on board an English fleet at Santander, whither it had put in to fetch him away, contrary winds, or, in the words of a contemporary narrative, 'the brothers Boreas and Eurus,' for a while delayed his departure. We are assured that people in England never regarded the weathercocks and the direction of the smoke and of the clouds with more painful anxiety than at that time. Even among the dependents of the royal house many almost gave up the Prince as lost; for who, they said, could trust the word of the Spaniards? The Protestant part of the population thought that he would at least be compelled to abjure his religion. At last the wind subsided. On October 5, after an absence of almost eight months, the Prince arrived in Portsmouth, and the day after in London. The universal joy with which he was received was indescribable: all business was at a standstill; the shops were shut; nothing was seen but waggons driving backwards and forwards, laden with the wood intended for the bonfires which blazed at evening in all the open squares, at all corners of the streets, even in the inner courts, but were most brilliant and costly at the Guildhall.[432] The joyful acclamations of the multitude mingled with the sound of the bells; people congratulated each other that the heir to the throne had returned as he had gone, and that without the Infanta; for this marriage had never been popular; but above all, that he returned rather confirmed than shaken in his religion. They praised God for his deliverance out of the land of Egypt. Even Buckingham, who was not loved at other times, enjoyed a moment of universal popularity.

Nevertheless the effect which would have been most welcome to the majority, that of banishing all thoughts of an alliance with Catholic powers, and of causing a wife to be sought for the Prince among Protestants, was certainly not produced, for the King had long been revolving another plan. The combination with Spain, although it had best corresponded to his wishes and ideas, had nevertheless been only an experiment: when it miscarried, he was predisposed to return to the thought of an alliance with France. The Prince, on his way through France, had already seized the opportunity of seeing the Princess, his possible bride, while she was dancing, without being remarked by her; and the impression which she made upon him had been by no means unfavourable.

Instantly on his return from Spain Buckingham opened communications with Mary de' Medici, Queen of France, and that through means of a Franciscan monk, who could not be suspected, and who presented himself to her while she was at dinner. Buckingham made secret overtures to her, intimating that he wished to resume the old negotiations for an alliance between the royal families of England and France, for that he was a Frenchman at heart.[433] As the Queen expressed herself favourably inclined, Henry Rich, who then bore the title of Lord Kensington, and afterwards that of Lord Holland, was sent before the end of the year 1623 on a secret mission to France in order to set the affair in motion. Rich was one of the most intimate friends of Buckingham, and to a certain extent resembled him in character.

[Sidenote: A.D. 1624.]

In this affair Buckingham had two circumstances in his favour. It was the main ambition of the Queen-mother to see her daughter on the throne of the neighbouring kingdom. The preference accorded by the English court to an Infanta of Spain over a daughter of France had had a painful effect upon her: she was the more gratified when that court now resumed the negotiations which had been broken off. Nevertheless she did not embark on so delicate an affair, the failure of which was still possible, without the necessary reserve. The French court could not but ask for religious concessions in favour of the Princess, as Spain had for the Infanta: but on the very first approach to the subject it hinted that it would not urge the King to such strict pledges as had been demanded on the side of the Spaniards.[434] The second influence in Buckingham's favour was the political. The advance of the alliance, and of the power of the Spaniards, especially their establishment in the Palatinate, aroused the jealousy of the French. The opinion, which Cardinal Richelieu so often emphatically expressed, that France, everywhere enclosed by the power of the Spaniards, might some day be prostrated by it, was generally held. The interests of his country seemed to be deeply interested when England, from whose close connexion with Spain the greatest danger was to be apprehended, separated herself from that power, and showed a disposition to adopt a policy in harmony with that of France. Henry Rich assures us that so universal an agreement had never been known among Frenchmen as was shown at that time in the wish to ally themselves with England. Already agents of Mansfeld and Brunswick were seen at Court: an intended mission to Maximilian of Bavaria was given up on the representation of the English ambassador. Envoys from the expelled King of Bohemia also soon arrived, in order to gain the co-operation of the French in his restoration. The negotiations with England actually began: they were directed to an alliance and a marriage at the same time: in each case it was made a preliminary condition that England should openly and completely break with Spain.