s. 419. Collectiveness as opposed to plurality.—In sentences like the meeting was large, the multitude pursue pleasure, meeting and multitude are each collective nouns; that is, although they present the idea of a single object, that object consists of a plurality of individuals. Hence, pursue is put in the plural number. To say, however, the meeting were large would sound improper. The number of the verb that shall accompany a collective noun depends upon whether the idea of the multiplicity of individuals, or that of the unity of the aggregate, shall predominate.

Sand and salt and a mass of iron is easier to bear than a man without understanding.—Let sand and salt and a mass of iron be dealt with as a series of things the aggregate of which forms a mixture, and the expression is allowable.

The king and the lords and commons forms an excellent frame of government.—Here the expression is doubtful. Substitute with for the first and, and there is no doubt as to the propriety of the singular form is.

s. 420. The reduction of complex forms to simple ones.—Take, for instance, the current illustration, viz., the-king-of-Saxony's army.—Here the assertion is, not that the army belongs to Saxony, but that it belongs to the king of Saxony; which words must, for the sake of taking a true view of the construction, be dealt with as a single word in the possessive case. Here two cases are dealt with as one; and a complex term is treated as a single word.

The same reason applies to phrases like the two king Williams. If we say the two kings William, we must account for the phrase by apposition.

s. 421. True notion of the part of speech in use.—In he is gone, the word gone must be considered as equivalent to absent; that is, as an adjective. Otherwise the expression is as incorrect as the expression she is eloped. Strong participles are adjectival oftener than weak ones: their form being common to many adjectives.

True notion of the original form.—In the phrase I must speak, the word speak is an infinitive. In the phrase I am forced to speak, the word speak is (in the present English) an infinitive also. In one case, however, it is preceded by to; whilst in the other, the particle to is absent. The reason for this lies in the original difference of form. Speak - to = the Anglo-Saxon sprécan, a simple infinitive; to speak, or speak + to = the Anglo-Saxon to sprécanne, an infinitive in the dative case.

s. 422. Convertibility.—In the English language, the greater part of the words may, as far as their form is concerned, be one part of speech as well as another. Thus the combinations s-a-n-th, or f-r-e-n-k, if they existed at all, might exist as either nouns or verbs, as either substantives or adjectives, as conjunctions, adverbs, or prepositions. This is not the case in the Greek languages. There, if a word be a substantive, it will probably end in -s; if an infinitive verb, in -ein, &c. The bearings of this difference between languages like the English and languages like the Greek will soon appear.

At present, it is sufficient to say that a word, originally one part of speech (e.g., a noun), may become another (e.g., a verb). This may be called the convertibility of words.

There is an etymological convertibility, and a syntactic convertibility; and although, in some cases, the line of demarcation is not easily drawn between them, the distinction is intelligible and convenient.

s. 423. Etymological convertibility.—The words then and than, now adverbs or conjunctions, were once cases: in other words, they have been converted from one part of speech to another. Or, they may even be said to be cases, at the present moment; although only in an historical point of view. For the practice of language, they are not only adverbs or conjunctions, but they are adverbs or conjunctions exclusively.

s. 424. Syntactic convertibility.—The combination to err, is at this moment an infinitive verb. Nevertheless it can be used as the equivalent to the substantive error.

To err is human = error is human. Now this is an instance of syntactic conversion. Of the two meanings, there is no doubt as to which is the primary one; which primary meaning is part and parcel of the language at this moment.

The infinitive, when used as a substantive, can be used in a singular form only.

To err = error; but we have no such form as to errs = errors. Nor is it wanted. The infinitive, in a substantival sense, always conveys a general statement, so that even when singular, it has a plural power; just as man is mortal = men are mortal.

s. 425. The adjective used as a substantive.—Of these, we have examples in expressions like the blacks of Africa—the bitters and sweets of life—all fours were put to the ground. These are true instances of conversion, and are proved to be so by the fact of their taking a plural form.

Let the blind lead the blind is not an instance of conversion. The word blind in both instances remains an adjective, and is shown to remain so by its being uninflected.

s. 426. Uninflected parts of speech, used as substantive.—When King Richard III. says, none of your ifs, he uses the word if as a substantive = expressions of doubt.

So in the expression one long now, the word now = present time.

s. 427. The convertibility of words in English is very great; and it is so because the structure of the language favours it. As few words have any peculiar signs expressive of their being particular parts of speech, interchange is easy, and conversion follows the logical association of ideas unimpeded.

The convertibility of words is in the inverse ratio to the amount of their inflection.

* * * * *

CHAPTER II.

SYNTAX OF SUBSTANTIVES.

s. 428. The phenomena of convertibility have been already explained.

The remaining points connected with the syntax of substantives, are chiefly points of ellipsis.

Ellipsis of substantives.—The historical view of phrases, like Rundell and Bridge's, St. Paul's, &c., shows that this ellipsis is common to the English and the other Gothic languages. Furthermore, it shows that it is met with in languages not of the Gothic stock; and, finally, that the class of words to which it applies, is, there or thereabouts, the same generally.

s. 429. The following phrases are referable to a different class of relations—

1. Right and left—supply hand. This is, probably, a real ellipsis. The words right and left, have not yet become true substantives; inasmuch as they have no plural forms. In this respect they stand in contrast with bitter and sweet; inasmuch as we can say he has tasted both the bitters and sweets of life. Nevertheless, the expression can be refined on.

2. All fours. To go on all fours. No ellipsis. The word fours is a true substantive, as proved by its existence as a plural.

* * * * *

CHAPTER III.

SYNTAX OF ADJECTIVES.

s. 430. Pleonasm.—Pleonasm can take place with adjectives only in the expression of the degrees of comparison. Over and above the etymological signs of the comparative and superlative degrees, there may be used the superlative words more and most.

And this pleonasm really occurs—

The more serener spirit. The most straitest sect.

These are instances of pleonasm in the strictest sense of the term.

s. 431. Collocation.—As a general rule, the adjective precedes the substantive—a good man, not a man good.

When, however, the adjective is qualified by either the expression of its degree, or accompanied by another adjective, it may follow the substantive—

A man just and good. A woman wise and fair. A hero devoted to his country. A patriot disinterested to a great degree.

Single simple adjectives thus placed after their substantive, belong to the poetry of England, and especially to the ballad poetry—sighs profound—the leaves green.

s. 432. Government.—The only adjective that governs a case, is the word like. In the expression, this is like him, &c., the original power of the dative remains. This we infer—

1. From the fact that in most languages which have inflections to a sufficient extent, the word meaning like governs a dative case.

2. That if ever we use in English any preposition at all to express similitude, it is the preposition to—like to me, like to death, &c.

Expressions like full of meat, good for John, are by no means instances of the government of adjectives; the really governing words being the prepositions to and for respectively.

s. 433. The positive degree preceded by the adjective more, is equivalent to the comparative form—e.g., more wise = wiser.

The reasons for employing one expression in preference to the other, depend upon the nature of the particular word used.

When the word is at one and the same time of Anglo-Saxon origin and monosyllabic, there is no doubt about the preference to be given to the form in -er. Thus, wis-er is preferable to more wise.

When, however, the word is compound, or trisyllabic, the combination with the word more, is preferable.

more fruitful fruitfuller. more villainous villainouser.

Between these two extremes there are several intermediate forms, wherein the use of one rather than another will depend upon the taste of the writer. The question, however, is a question of euphony, rather than of aught else. It is also illustrated by the principle of not multiplying secondary elements. In such a word as fruit-full-er, there are two additions to the root. The same is the case with the superlative, fruit-full-est.

s. 434. In the Chapter on the Comparative Degree is indicated a refinement upon the current notions as to the power of the comparative degree, and reasons are given for believing that the fundamental notion expressed by the comparative inflexion is the idea of comparison or contrast between two objects.

In this case, it is better in speaking of only two objects to use the comparative degree rather than the superlative—even when we use the definite article the. Thus—

This is the better of the two

is preferable to

This is the best of the two.

This principle is capable of an application more extensive than our habits of speaking and writing will verify. Thus to go to other parts of speech, we should logically say—

Whether of the two,

rather than

Which of the two.

Either the father or the son,

but not

Either the father, the son, or the daughter.

This statement may be refined on. It is chiefly made for the sake of giving fresh prominence to the idea of duality, expressed by the terminations -er and -ter.

s. 435. The absence of inflection simplifies the syntax of adjectives. Violations of concord are impossible. We could not make an adjective disagree with its substantive if we wished.

* * * * *

CHAPTER IV.

SYNTAX OF PRONOUNS.

s. 436. Pleonasm in the syntax of pronouns.—In the following sentences the words in italics are pleonastic:

1. The king he is just. 2. I saw her, the queen. 3. The men, they were there. 4. The king, his crown.

Of these forms, the first is more common than the second and third, and the fourth more common than the first.

s. 437. The fourth has another element of importance. It has given rise to the absurd notion that the genitive case in -'s (father-'s) is a contraction from his (father his).

To say nothing about the inapplicability of this rule to feminine genders, and plural numbers, the whole history of the Indo-Germanic languages is against it.

1. We cannot reduce the queen's majesty to the queen his majesty.

2. We cannot reduce the children's bread to the children his bread.

3. The Anglo-Saxon forms are in -es, not in his.

4. The word his itself must be accounted for; and that cannot be done by assuming it to be he + his.

5. The -s in father's is the -is in patris, and the [Greek: -os] in [Greek: pateros].

s. 438. The preceding examples illustrate an apparent paradox, viz., the fact of pleonasm and ellipsis being closely allied. The king he is just, dealt with as a single sentence, is undoubtedly pleonastic. But it is not necessary to be considered as a mere simple sentence. The king—may represent a first sentence incomplete, whilst he is just represents a second sentence in full. What is pleonasm in a single sentence is ellipsis in a double one.

* * * * *

CHAPTER V.

THE TRUE PERSONAL PRONOUNS.

s. 439. Personal pronouns.—The use of the second person plural instead of the second singular has been noticed already. This use of one number for another is current throughout the Gothic languages. A pronoun so used is conveniently called the pronomen reverentiae.

s. 440. Dativus ethicus.—In the phrase

Rob me the exchequer,—Henry IV.,

the me is expletive, and is equivalent to for me. This expletive use of the dative is conveniently called the dativus ethicus.

s. 441. The reflected personal pronoun.—In the English language there is no equivalent to the Latin se, the German sich, and the Scandinavian sik, and sig.

It follows from this that the word self is used to a greater extent than would otherwise be the case.

I strike me is awkward, but not ambiguous.

Thou strikest thee is awkward, but not ambiguous.

He strikes him is ambiguous; inasmuch as him may mean either the person who strikes or some one else. In order to be clear we add the word self when the idea is reflective. He strikes himself is, at once idiomatic and unequivocal.

So it is with the plural persons.

We strike us is awkward, but not ambiguous.

Ye strike you is the same.

They strike them is ambiguous.

This shows the value of a reflective pronoun for the third person.

As a general rule, therefore, whenever we use a verb reflectively we use the word self in combination with the personal pronoun.

Yet this was not always the case. The use of the simple personal pronoun was current in Anglo-Saxon, and that, not only for the first two persons, but for the third as well.

The exceptions to this rule are either poetical expressions, or imperative moods.

He sat him down at a pillar's base.—BYRON.

Sit thee down.

s. 442. Reflective neuters.—In the phrase I strike me, the verb strike is transitive; in other words, the word me expresses the object of an action, and the meaning is different from the meaning of the simple expression I strike.

In the phrase I fear me (used by Lord Campbell in his lives of the Chancellors), the verb fear is intransitive or neuter; in other words, the word me (unless, indeed, fear mean terrify), expresses no object of any action at all; whilst the meaning is the same as in the simple expression I fear.

Here the reflective pronoun appears out of place, i.e., after a neuter or intransitive verb.

Such a use, however, is but the fragment of an extensive system of reflective verbs thus formed, developed in different degrees in the different Gothic languages; but in all more than in the English.

s. 443. Equivocal reflectives.—The proper place of the reflective is after the verb.

The proper place of the governing pronoun is, in the indicative and subjunctive moods, before the verb.

Hence in expressions like the preceding there is no doubt as to the power of the pronoun.

The imperative mood, however, sometimes presents a complication. Here the governing person may follow the verb.

Mount ye = either be mounted, or mount yourselves. In phrases like this, and in phrases

Busk ye, busk ye, my bonny, bonny bride, Busk ye, busk ye, my winsome marrow,

the construction is ambiguous. Ye may either be a nominative case governing the verb busk, or an accusative case governed by it.

This is an instance of what may be called the equivocal reflective.

* * * * *

CHAPTER VI.

ON THE SYNTAX OF THE DEMONSTRATIVE PRONOUNS, AND THE PRONOUNS OF THE THIRD PERSON.

s. 444. As his and her are genitive cases (and not adjectives), there is no need of explaining such combinations as his mother, her father, inasmuch as no concord of gender is expected. The expressions are respectively equivalent to

mater ejus, not mater sua; pater ejus, — pater suus.

s. 445. It has been stated that its is a secondary genitive, and it may be added, that it is of late origin in the language. The Anglo-Saxon form was his, the genitive of he for the neuter and masculine equally. Hence, when, in the old writers, we meet his, where we expect its, we must not suppose that any personification takes place, but simply that the old genitive common to the two genders is used in preference to the modern one limited to the neuter, and irregularly formed.

The following instances are the latest specimens of its use:

"The apoplexy is, as I take it, a kind of lethargy. I have read the cause of his effects in Galen; it is a kind of deafness."—2 Henry IV. i. 2.

"If the salt have lost his savour, wherewith shall it be seasoned? It is neither fit for the land, nor yet for the dunghill; but men cast it out."—Luke xiv. 35.

"Some affirm that every plant has his particular fly or caterpillar, which it breeds and feeds."—WALTON'S Angler.

"This rule is not so general, but that it admitteth of his exceptions."—CAREW.

* * * * *

CHAPTER VII.

ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE WORD SELF.

s. 446. The undoubted constructions of the word self, in the present state of the cultivated English, are threefold.

1. Government.—In my-self, thy-self, our-selves, and your-selves, the construction is that of a common substantive with an adjective or genitive case. My-self = my individuality, and is similarly construed—mea individualitas (or persona), or mei individualitas (or persona).

2. Apposition.—In him-self and them-selves, when accusative, the construction is that of a substantive in apposition with a pronoun. Himself = him, the individual.

3. Composition.—It is only, however, when himself and themselves, are in the accusative case, that the construction is appositional. When they are used as nominatives, it must be explained on another principle. In phrases like

He himself was present They themselves were present,

there is neither apposition nor government; him and them, being neither related to my and thy, so as to be governed, nor yet to he and they, so as to form an apposition. In order to come under one of these conditions, the phrases should be either he his self (they their selves), or else he he self (they they selves). In this difficulty, the only logical view that can be taken of the matter, is to consider the words himself and themselves, not as two words, but as a single word compounded; and even then, the compound will be of an irregular kind; inasmuch as the inflectional element -m is dealt with as part and parcel of the root.

s. 447. Her-self.—The construction here is ambiguous. It is one of the preceding constructions. Which, however it is, is uncertain; since her may be either a so-called genitive, like my, or an accusative like him.

Itself—is also ambiguous. The s may represent the -s in its, as well as the s- in self.

This inconsistency is as old as the Anglo-Saxon stage of the English language.

* * * * *

CHAPTER VIII.

ON THE POSSESSIVE PRONOUNS.

s. 448. The possessive pronouns fall into two classes. The first contains the forms like my and thy, &c.; the second, those like mine and thine, &c.

My, thy, his (as in his book), her, its (as in its book), our, your, their, are conveniently considered as the equivalents to the Latin forms mei, tui, ejus, nostrum, vestrum, eorum.

Mine, thine, his (as in the book is his), hers, ours, yours, theirs are conveniently considered as the equivalents to the Latin forms meus, mea, meum; tuus, tua, tuum; suus, sua, suum; noster, nostra, nostrum; vester, vestra, vestrum.

s. 449. There is a difference between the construction of my and mine. We cannot say this is mine hat, and we cannot say this hat is my. Nevertheless, this difference is not explained by any change of construction from that of adjectives to that of cases. As far as the syntax is concerned the construction of my and mine is equally that of an adjective agreeing with a substantive, and of a genitive (or possessive) case governed by a substantive.

Now a common genitive case can be used in two ways; either as part of a term, or as a whole term (i.e., absolutely).—1. As part of a term—this is John's hat. 2. As a whole term—this hat is John's.

And a common adjective can be used in two ways; either as part of a term, or as a whole term (i.e. absolutely).—1. As part of a term—these are good hats. 2. As a whole term—these hats are good.

Now whether we consider my, and the words like it, as adjectives or cases, they possess only one of the properties just illustrated, i.e., they can only be used as part of a term—this is my hat; not this hat is my.

And whether we consider mine, and the words like it, as adjectives or cases, they possess only one of the properties just illustrated, i.e., they can only be used as whole terms, or absolutely—this hat is mine; not this is mine hat.

For a full and perfect construction whether of an adjective or a genitive case, the possessive pronouns present the phenomenon of being, singly, incomplete, but, nevertheless, complementary to each other when taken in their two forms.

s. 450. In the absolute construction of a genitive case, the term is formed by the single word, only so far as the expression is concerned. A substantive is always understood from what has preceded.—This discovery is Newton's = this discovery is Newton's discovery.

The same with adjectives.—This weather is fine = this weather is fine weather.

And the same with absolute pronouns.—This hat is mine = this hat is my hat; and this is a hat of mine = this is a hat of my hats.

s. 451. In respect to all matters of syntax considered exclusively, it is so thoroughly a matter of indifference whether a word be an adjective or a genitive case that Wallis considers the forms in -'s, like father's, not as genitive cases but as adjectives. Looking to the logic of the question alone he is right, and looking to the practical syntax of the question he is right also. He is only wrong on the etymological side of the question.

"Nomina substantiva apud nos nullum vel generum vel casuum discrimen sortiuntur."—p. 76.

"Duo sunt adjectivorum genera, a substantivis immediate descendentia, quae semper substantivis suis praeponuntur. Primum quidem adjectivum possessivum libet appellare. Fit autem a quovis substantivo, sive singulari sive plurali, addito -s.—Ut man's nature, the nature of man, natura humana vel hominis; men's nature, natura humana vel hominum; Virgil's poems, the poems of Virgil, poemata Virgilii vel Virgiliana."—p. 89.

* * * * *

CHAPTER IX.

THE RELATIVE PRONOUNS.

s. 452. It is necessary that the relative be in the same gender as the antecedent—the man who—the woman who—the thing which.

s. 453. It is necessary that the relative be in the same number with the antecedent.

s. 454. It is not necessary for the relative to be in the same case with its antecedent.

1. John, who trusts me, comes here. 2. John, whom I trust, comes here. 3. John, whose confidence I possess, comes here. 4. I trust John who trusts me.

s. 455. The reason why the relative must agree with its antecedent in both number and gender, whilst it need not agree with it in case, is found in the following observations.

1. All sentences containing a relative contain two verbs—John who (1) trusts me (2) comes here.

2. Two verbs express two actions—(1) trust (2) come.

3. Whilst, however, the actions are two in number, the person or thing which does or suffers them is single—John.

4. He (she or it) is single ex vi termini. The relative expresses the identity between the subjects (or objects) of the two actions. Thus who = John, or is another name for John.

5. Things and persons that are one and the same, are of one and the same gender. The John who trusts is necessarily of the same gender with the John who comes.

6. Things and persons that are one and the same, are of one and the same number. The number of Johns who trust, is the same as the number of Johns who come. Both these elements of concord are immutable.

7. But a third element of concord is not immutable. The person or thing that is an agent in the one part of the sentence, may be the object of an action in the other. The John whom I trust may trust me also. Hence

a. I trust John—John the object. b. John trusts me—John the agent.

s. 456. As the relative is only the antecedent in another form, it may change its case according to the construction.

1. I trust John—(2) John trusts me. 2. I trust John—(2) He trusts me. 3. I trust John—(2) Who trusts me. 4. John trusts me—(2) I trust John. 5. John trusts me—(2) I trust him. 6. John trusts me—(2) I trust whom. 7. John trusts me—(2) Whom I trust. 8. John—(2) Whom I trust trusts me.

s. 457. The books I want are here.—This is a specimen of a true ellipsis. In all such phrases in full, there are three essential elements.

1. The first proposition; as the books are here.

2. The second proposition; as I want.

3. The word which connects the two propositions, and without which, they naturally make separate, independent, unconnected statements.

Now, although true and unequivocal ellipses are scarce, the preceding is one of the most unequivocal kind—the word which connects the two propositions being wanting.

s. 458. When there are two words in a clause, each capable of being an antecedent, the relative refers to the latter.

1. Solomon the son of David that slew Goliah.—This is unexceptionable.

2. Solomon the son of David who built the temple.—This is exceptionable.

Nevertheless, it is defensible, on the supposition that Solomon-the-son-of-David is a single many-worded name.

* * * * *

CHAPTER X.

ON THE INTERROGATIVE PRONOUN.

s. 459. Questions are of two sorts, direct and oblique.

Direct.—Who is he?

Oblique.—Who do you say that he is?

All difficulties about the cases of the interrogative pronoun may be determined by framing an answer, and observing the case of the word with which the interrogative coincides. Whatever be the case of this word will also be the case of the interrogative.

DIRECT.

Qu. Who is this?—Ans. I. Qu. Whose is this?—Ans. His. Qu. Whom do you seek?—Ans. Him.

OBLIQUE.

Qu. Who do you say that it is?—Ans. He. Qu. Whose do you say that it is?—Ans. His. Qu. Whom do you say that they seek?—Ans. Him.

Note.—The answer should always be made by means of a pronoun, as by so doing we distinguish the accusative case from the nominative.

Note.—And, if necessary, it should be made in full. Thus the full answer to whom do you say that they seek? is, I say that they seek him.

s. 460. Nevertheless, such expressions as whom do they say that it is? are common, especially in oblique questions.

"And he axed him and seide, whom seien the people that I am?—Thei answereden and seiden, Jon Baptist—and he seide to hem, But whom seien ye that I am?"—WICLIF, Luke ix.

"Tell me in sadness whom she is you love."—Romeo and Juliet, i, 1.

"And as John fulfilled his course, he said, whom think ye that I am?"—Acts xiii. 25.

This confusion, however, is exceptionable.

* * * * *

CHAPTER XI.

THE RECIPROCAL CONSTRUCTION.

s. 461. In all sentences containing the statement of a reciprocal or mutual action there are in reality two assertions, viz., the assertion that A. strikes (or loves) B., and the assertion that B. strikes (or loves) A.; the action forming one, the reaction another. Hence, if the expressions exactly coincided with the fact signified, there would always be two propositions. This, however, is not the habit of language. Hence arises a more compendious form of expression, giving origin to an ellipsis of a peculiar kind. Phrases like Eteocles and Polynices killed each other are elliptical, for Eteocles and Polynices killed—each the other. Here the second proposition expands and explains the first, whilst the first supplies the verb to the second. Each, however, is elliptic.

s. 462. This is the syntax. As to the power of the words each and one in the expression (each other and one another), I am not prepared to say that in the common practice of the English language there is any distinction between them. A distinction, however, if it existed, would give strength to our language. Where two persons performed a reciprocal action on another, the expression might be one another; as Eteocles and Polynices killed one another. Where more than two persons were engaged on each side of a reciprocal action, the expression might be each other; as, the ten champions praised each other.

This amount of perspicuity is attained, by different processes, in the French, Spanish, and Scandinavian languages.

1. French.—Ils (i.e., A. and B.) se battaient—l'un l'autre. Ils (A. B. C.) se battaient—les uns les autres. In Spanish, uno otro = l'un l'autre, and unos otros = les uns les autres.

2. Danish.—Hinander = the French l'un l'autre; whilst hverandre = les uns les autres.

* * * * *

CHAPTER XII.

THE INDETERMINATE PRONOUNS.

s. 463. Different nations have different methods of expressing indeterminate propositions.

Sometimes it is by the use of the passive voice. This is the common method in Latin and Greek, and is also current in English—dicitur, [Greek: legetai], it is said.

Sometimes the verb is reflective—si dice = it says itself, Italian.

Sometimes the plural pronoun of the third person is used. This also is an English locution—they say = the world at large says.

Finally, the use of some word = man is a common indeterminate expression.

The word man has an indeterminate sense in the Modern German; as man sagt = they say.

The word man was also used indeterminately in the Old English, although it is not so used in the Modern.

In the Old English, the form man often lost the -n, and became me.—"Deutsche Grammatik." This form is also extinct.

s. 464. The present indeterminate pronoun is one; as one says = they say = it is said = man sagt, German = on dit, French = si dice, Italian.

It has been stated, that the indeterminate pronoun one has no etymological connection with the numeral one; but that it is derived from the French on = homme = homo = man; and that it has replaced the Old English man or me.

s. 465. Two other pronouns, or, to speak more in accordance with the present habit of the English language, one pronoun, and one adverb of pronominal origin, are also used indeterminately, viz., it and there.

s. 466. It can be either the subject or the predicate of a sentence,—it is this, this is it, I am it, it is I. When it is the subject of a proposition, the verb necessarily agrees with it, and can be of the singular number only; no matter what be the number of the predicate—it is this, it is these.

When it is the predicate of a proposition, the number of the verb depends upon the number of the subject. These points of universal syntax are mentioned here for the sake of illustrating some anomalous forms.

s. 467. There can only be the predicate of a subject. It differs from it in this respect. It follows also that it must differ from it in never affecting the number of the verb. This is determined by the nature of the subject—there is this, there are these.

When we say there is these, the analogy between the words these and it misleads us; the expression being illogical.

Furthermore, although a predicate, there always stands in the beginning of propositions, i.e., in the place of the subject. This also misleads.

s. 468. Although it, when the subject, being itself singular, absolutely requires that its verb should be singular also, there is a tendency to use it incorrectly, and to treat it as a plural. Thus, in German, when the predicate is plural, the verb joined to the singular form es ( = it) is plural—es sind menschen, literally translated = it are men; which, though bad English, is good German.

* * * * *

CHAPTER XIII.

THE ARTICLES.

s. 469. The rule of most practical importance about the articles is the rule that determines when the article shall be repeated as often as there is a fresh substantive, and when it shall not.

When two or more substantives following each other denote the same object, the article precedes the first only. We say, the secretary and treasurer (or, a secretary and treasurer), when the two offices are held by one person.

When two or more substantives following each other denote different objects, the article is repeated, and precedes each. We say, the (or a) secretary and the (or a) treasurer, when the two offices are held by different persons.

This rule is much neglected.

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CHAPTER XIV.

THE NUMERALS.

s. 470. The numeral one is naturally single. All the rest are naturally plural.

Nevertheless such expressions—one two ( = one collection of two), two threes ( = two collections of three) are legitimate. These are so, because the sense of the word is changed. We may talk of several ones just as we may talk of several aces; and of one two just as of one pair.

Expressions like the thousand-and-first are incorrect. They mean neither one thing nor another: 1001st being expressed by the thousand-and-first, and 1000th + 1st being expressed by the thousandth and the first.

Here it may be noticed that, although I never found it to do so, the word odd is capable of taking an ordinal form. The thousand-and-odd-th is as good an expression as the thousand-and-eight-th.

The construction of phrases like the thousand-and-first is the same construction as we find in the king of Saxony's army.

s. 471. It is by no means a matter of indifference whether we say the two first or the first two.

The captains of two different classes at school should be called the two first boys. The first and second boys of the same class should be called the first two boys. I believe that when this rule is attended to, more is due to the printer than to the author: such, at least, is the case with myself.

* * * * *

CHAPTER XV.

ON VERBS IN GENERAL.

s. 472. For the purposes of syntax it is necessary to divide verbs into the five following divisions: transitive, intransitive, auxiliary, substantive, and impersonal.

Transitive verbs.—In transitive verbs the action is never a simple action. It always affects some object or other,—I move my limbs; I strike my enemy. The presence of a transitive verb implies also the presence of a noun; which noun is the name of the object affected. A transitive verb, unaccompanied by a noun, either expressed or understood, is a contradiction in terms. The absence of the nouns, in and of itself, makes it intransitive. I move means, simply, I am in a state of moving. I strike means, simply, I am in the act of striking. Verbs like move and strike are naturally transitive.

Intransitive verbs.—An act may take place, and yet no object be affected by it. To hunger, to thirst, to sleep, to wake, are verbs that indicate states of being, rather than actions affecting objects. Verbs like hunger and sleep are naturally intransitive.

Many verbs, naturally transitive, may be used as intransitive,—e.g., I move, I strike, &c.

Many verbs, naturally intransitive, may be used as transitives,—e.g., I walked the horse = I made the horse walk.

This variation in the use of one and the same verb is of much importance in the question of the government of verbs.

A. Transitive verbs are naturally followed by some noun or other; and that noun is always the name of something affected by them as an object.

B. Intransitive verbs are not naturally followed by any noun at all; and when they are so followed, the noun is never the name of anything affected by them as an object.

Nevertheless, intransitive verbs may be followed by nouns denoting the manner, degree, or instrumentality of their action,—I walk with my feet = incedo pedibus.

s. 473. The auxiliary verbs will be noticed fully in Chapter XXIII.

s. 474. The verb substantive has this peculiarity, viz., that for all purposes of syntax it is no verb at all. I speak may, logically, be reduced to I am speaking; in which case it is only the part of a verb. Etymologically, indeed, the verb substantive is a verb; inasmuch as it is inflected as such: but for the purposes of construction, it is a copula only, i.e., it merely denotes the agreement or disagreement between the subject and the predicate.

For the impersonal verbs see Chapter XXI.

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CHAPTER XVI.

THE CONCORD OF VERBS.

s. 475. The verb must agree with its subject in person, I walk, not I walks: he walks, not he walk.

It must also agree with it in number,—we walk, not we walks: he walks, not he walk.

Clear as these rules are, they require some expansion before they become sufficient to solve all the doubtful points of English syntax connected with the concord of the verb.

A. It is I, your master, who command you. Query? would it is I, your master, who commands you, be correct? This is an example of a disputed point of concord in respect to the person of the verb.

B. The wages of sin is death. Query? would the wages of sin are death be correct? This is an example of a disputed point of concord in respect to the number of the verb.

s. 476. In respect to the concord of person the following rules will carry us through a portion of the difficulties.

Rule.—In sentences where there is but one proposition, when a noun and a pronoun of different persons are in apposition, the verb agrees with the first of them,—I, your master, command you (not commands): your master, I, commands you (not command).

To understand the nature of the difficulty, it is necessary to remember that subjects may be extremely complex as well as perfectly simple; and that a complex subject may contain, at one and the same time, a noun substantive and a pronoun,—I, the keeper; he, the merchant, &c.

Now all noun-substantives are naturally of the third person—John speaks, the men run, the commander gives orders. Consequently the verb is of the third person also.

But the pronoun with which such a noun-substantive may be placed in apposition, may be a pronoun of either person, the first or second: I or thou—I the commander—thou the commander.—In this case the construction requires consideration. With which does the verb agree? with the substantive which requires a third person? or with the pronoun which requires a first or second?

Undoubtedly the idea which comes first is the leading idea; and, undoubtedly, the idea which explains, qualifies, or defines it, is the subordinate idea: and, undoubtedly, it is the leading idea which determines the construction of the verb. We may illustrate this from the analogy of a similar construction in respect to number—a man with a horse and a gig meets me on the road. Here the ideas are three; nevertheless the verb is singular. No addition of subordinate elements interferes with the construction that is determined by the leading idea. In the expression I, your master, the ideas are two; viz., the idea expressed by I, and the idea expressed by master. Nevertheless, as the one only explains or defines the other, the construction is the same as if the idea were single. Your master, I, is in the same condition. The general statement is made concerning the master, and it is intended to say what he does. The word I merely defines the expression by stating who the master is. Of the two expressions the latter is the awkwardest. The construction, however, is the same for both.

From the analysis of the structure of complex subjects of the kind in question, combined with a rule concerning the position of the subject, which will soon be laid down, I believe that, for all single propositions, the foregoing rule is absolute.

Rule.—In all single propositions the verb agrees in person with the noun (whether substantive or pronoun) which comes first.

s. 477. But the expression it is I your master, who command (or commands) you, is not a single proposition. It is a sentence containing two propositions.

1. It is I. 2. Who commands you.

Here the word master is, so to say, undistributed. It may belong to either clause of the sentence, i.e., the whole sentence may be divided into

Either—it is I your master— Or—your master who commands you.

This is the first point to observe. The next is that the verb in the second clause (command or commands) is governed, not by either the personal pronoun or the substantive, but by the relative, i.e., in the particular case before us, not by either I or master, but by who.

And this brings us to the following question—with which of the two antecedents does the relative agree? with I or with master?

This may be answered by the two following rules;—

Rule 1.—When the two antecedents are in the same proposition, the relative agrees with the first. Thus—

1. It is I your master— 2. Who command you.

Rule 2.—When the two antecedents are in different propositions, the relative agrees with the second. Thus—

1. It is I— 2. Your master who commands you.

This, however, is not all. What determines whether the two antecedents shall be in the same or in different propositions? I believe that the following rules for what may be called the distribution of the substantive antecedent will bear criticism.

Rule 1. That when there is any natural connection between the substantive antecedent and the verb governed by the relative, the antecedent belongs to the second clause. Thus, in the expression just quoted, the word master is logically connected with the word command; and this fact makes the expression, It is I your master who commands you the better of the two.

Rule 2. That when there is no natural connection between the substantive antecedent and the verb governed by the relative, the antecedent belongs to the first clause. It is I, John, who command (not commands) you.

To recapitulate, the train of reasoning has been as follows:—

1. The person of the second verb is the person of the relative.

2. The person of the relative is that of one of two antecedents.

3. Of such two antecedents the relative agrees with the one which stands in the same proposition with itself.

4. Which position is determined by the connection or want of connection between the substantive antecedent and the verb governed by the relative.

Respecting the person of the verb in the first proposition of a complex sentence there is no doubt. I, your master, who commands you to make haste, am (not is) in a hurry. Here, I am in a hurry is the first proposition; who commands you to make haste, the second.

It is not difficult to see why the construction of sentences consisting of two propositions is open to an amount of latitude which is not admissible in the construction of single propositions. As long as the different parts of a complex idea are contained within the limits of a single proposition, their subordinate character is easily discerned. When, however, they amount to whole propositions, they take the appearance of being independent members of the sentence.

s. 478. The concord of number.—It is believed that the following three rules will carry us through all difficulties of the kind just exhibited.

Rule 1. That the verb agrees with the subject, and with nothing but the subject. The only way to justify such an expression as the wages of sin is death, is to consider death not as the subject, but as the predicate; in other words, to consider the construction to be, death is the wages of sin.

Rule 2. That, except in the case of the word there, the word which comes first is generally the subject.

Rule 3. That no number of connected singular nouns can govern a plural verb, unless they be connected by a copulative conjunction. The sun and moon shine,—the sun in conjunction with the moon shines.

s. 479. Plural subjects with singular predicates.—- The wages of sin are death.—Honest men are the salt of the earth.

Singular subjects with plural predicates.—These constructions are rarer than the preceding: inasmuch as two or more persons (or things) are oftener spoken of as being equivalent to one, than one person (or thing) is spoken of as being equivalent to two or more.

Sixpence is twelve halfpennies. He is all head and shoulders. Vulnera totus erat. Tu es deliciae meae. [Greek: Hektor, atar su moi essi pater kai potnia meter,] [Greek: Ede kasignetos, su de moi thaleros parakoites.]

* * * * *

CHAPTER XVII.

ON THE GOVERNMENT OF VERBS.

s. 480. The government of verbs is of two sorts, (1.) objective, and (2.) modal.

It is objective where the noun which follows the verb is the name of some object affected by the action of the verb,—as he strikes me; he wounds the enemy.

It is modal when the noun which follows the verb is not the name of any object affected by the verb, but the name of some object explaining the manner in which the action of the verb takes place, the instrument with which it is done, the end for which it is done, &c.

The government of all transitive verbs is necessarily objective. It may also be modal,—I strike the enemy with the sword = ferio hostem gladio.

The government of all intransitive verbs can only be modal,—I walk with the stick. When we say, I walk the horse, the word walk has changed its meaning, and signifies make to walk, and is, by the very fact of its being followed by the name of an object, converted from an intransitive into a transitive verb.

The modal construction may also be called the adverbial construction; because the effect of the noun is akin to that of an adverb,—I fight with bravery = I fight bravely: he walks a king = he walks regally. The modal (or adverbial) construction, sometimes takes the appearance of the objective: inasmuch as intransitive verbs are frequently followed by a substantive, e.g., to sleep the sleep of the righteous. Here, nevertheless, this is no proof of government. For a verb to be capable of governing an objective case, it must be a verb signifying an action affecting an object; which is not the case here. The sentence means, to sleep as the righteous sleep, or according to the sleep of the righteous.

* * * * *

CHAPTER XVIII.

ON THE PARTICIPLES.

s. 481. The present participle, or the participle in -ing, must be considered in respect to its relations with the substantive in -ing. Dying-day is, probably, no more a participle than morning-walk. In respect to the syntax of such expressions as the forthcoming, I consider that they are either participles or substantives.

1. When substantives, they are in regimen, and govern a genitive case—What is the meaning of the lady's holding up her train? Here the word holding = the act of holding.—Quid est significatio elevationis pallae de parte foeminae.

2. When participles, they are in apposition or concord, and would, if inflected, appear in the same case with the substantive, or pronoun, preceding them—What is the meaning of the lady holding up her train? Here the word holding = in the act of holding, and answers to the Latin foeminae elevantis.—Quid est significatio foeminae elevantis pallam?

s. 482. The past participle corresponds not with the Greek form [Greek: tuptomenos], but with the form [Greek: tetummenos]. I am beaten is essentially a combination, expressive not of present but of past time, just like the Latin sum verberatus. Its Greek equivalent is not [Greek: eimi tuptomenos] = I am a man in the act of being beaten, but [Greek: eimi tetummenos] = I am a man who has been beaten. It is past in respect to the action, though present in respect to the state brought about by the action. This essentially past element in the so-called present expression, I am beaten, will be again referred to.

* * * * *

CHAPTER XIX.

ON THE MOODS.

s. 483. The infinitive mood is a noun. The current rule that when two verbs come together the latter is placed in the infinitive mood, means that one verb can govern another only by converting it into a noun—I begin to move = I begin the act of moving. Verbs, as verbs, can only come together in the way of apposition—I irritate, I beat, I talk at him, I call him names, &c.

s. 484. The construction, however, of English infinitives is two fold. (1.) Objective. (2.) Gerundial.

When one verb is followed by another without the preposition to, the construction must be considered to have grown out of the objective case, or from the form in -an.

Such is the case with the following words, and, probably, with others:

I may go, not I may to go. I might go, — I might to go. I can move, — I can to move. I could move, — I could to move. I will speak, — I will to speak. I would speak, — I would to speak. I shall wait, — I shall to wait. I should wait, — I should to wait. Let me go, — Let me to go. He let me go, — He let me to go. I do speak, — I do to speak. I did speak, — I did to speak. I dare go, — I dare to go. I durst go, — I durst to go.

This, in the present English, is the rarer of the two constructions.

When a verb is followed by another, preceded by the preposition to, the construction must be considered to have grown out of the so-called gerund, i.e., the form in -nne, i.e., the dative case—I begin to move. This is the case with the great majority of English verbs.

s. 485. Imperatives have three peculiarities. (1.) They can only, in English, be used in the second person—go thou on, get you gone, &c.: (2.) They take pronouns after, instead of before them: (3.) They often omit the pronoun altogether.

* * * * *

CHAPTER XX.

ON THE TENSES.

s. 486. Notwithstanding its name, the present tense in English does not express a strictly present action. It rather expresses an habitual one. He speaks well = he is a good speaker. If a man means to say that he is in the act of speaking, he says I am speaking.

It has also, especially when combined with a subjunctive mood, a future power—I beat you ( = I will beat you) if you don't leave off.

s. 487. The English praeterite is the equivalent, not to the Greek perfect but the Greek aorist. I beat = [Greek: etupsa] not [Greek: tetupha]. The true perfect is expressed, in English, by the auxiliary have + the past participle.

* * * * *

CHAPTER XXI.

SYNTAX OF THE PERSONS OF VERBS.

s. 488. The concord of persons.—A difficulty that occurs frequently in the Latin language is rare in English. In expressions like ego et ille followed by a verb, there arises a question as to the person in which that verb should be used. Is it to be in the first person in order to agree with ego, or in the third in order to agree with ille? For the sake of laying down a rule upon these and similar points, the classical grammarians arrange the persons (as they do the genders) according to their dignity, making the verb (or adjective if it be a question of gender) agree with the most worthy. In respect to persons, the first is more worthy than the second, and the second more worthy than the third. Hence, the Latins said—

Ego et Balbus sustulimus manus. Tu et Balbus sustulistis manus.

Now, in English, the plural form is the same for all three persons. Hence we say I and you are friends, you and I are friends, I and he are friends, &c., so that for the practice of language, the question as to the relative dignity of the three persons is a matter of indifference.

Nevertheless, it may occur even in English. Whenever two or more pronouns of different persons, and of the singular number, follow each other disjunctively, the question of concord arises. I or you,—you or he,—he or I. I believe that, in these cases, the rule is as follows:—

1. Whenever the words either or neither precede the pronouns, the verb is in the third person. Either you or I is in the wrong; neither you nor I is in the wrong.

2. Whenever the disjunctive is simple (i.e. unaccompanied with the word either or neither) the verb agrees with the first of the two pronouns.

I (or he) am in the wrong. He (or I) is in the wrong. Thou (or he) art in the wrong. He (or thou) is in the wrong.

Now, provided that they are correct, it is clear that the English language knows nothing about the relative degrees of dignity between these three pronouns; since its habit is to make the verb agree with the one which is placed first—whatever may be the person. I am strongly inclined to believe that the same is the case in Latin; in which case (in the sentence ego et Balbus sustulimus manus) sustulimus agrees, in person, with ego, not because the first person is the worthiest, but because it comes first in the proposition,

s. 489. In the Chapter on the Impersonal Verbs, it is stated that the construction of me-thinks is peculiar.

This is because in Anglo-Saxon the word thincan = seem. Hence me-thinks is [Greek: phainetai moi], or mihi videtur, and me is a dative case, not an accusative.

The thencan = think, was, in Anglo-Saxon, a different word.

* * * * *

CHAPTER XXII.

ON THE VOICES OF VERBS.

s. 490. In English there is neither a passive nor a middle voice.

The following couplet from Dryden's "Mac Flecnoe" exhibits a construction which requires explanation:—

An ancient fabric, raised to inform the sight, There stood of yore, and Barbican it hight.

Here the word hight = was called, and seems to present an instance of the participle being used in a passive sense without the so-called verb substantive. Yet it does no such thing. The word is no participle at all; but a simple preterite. Certain verbs are naturally either passive or active, as one of two allied meanings may predominate. To be called is passive; so is, to be beaten. But, to bear as a name is active; so is, to take a beating. The word, hight, is of the same class of verbs with the Latin vapulo; and it is the same as the Latin word, cluo.—Barbican cluit = Barbican audivit = Barbican it hight.

* * * * *

CHAPTER XXIII.

ON THE AUXILIARY VERBS.

s. 491. The auxiliary verbs, in English, play a most important part in the syntax of the language. They may be classified upon a variety of principles. The following, however, are all that need here be applied.

A. Classification of auxiliaries according to their inflection or non-inflectional powers.—Inflectional auxiliaries are those that may either replace or be replaced by an inflection. Thus—I am struck = the Latin ferior, and the Greek [Greek: tuptomai]. These auxiliaries are in the same relation to verbs that prepositions are to nouns. The inflectional auxiliaries are,—

1. Have; equivalent to an inflection in the way of tense—I have bitten = mo-mordi.

2. Shall; ditto. I shall call = voc-abo.

3. Will; ditto. I will call = voc-abo.

4. May; equivalent to an inflection in the way of mood. I am come that I may see = venio ut vid-eam.

5. Be; equivalent to an inflection in the way of voice. To be beaten = verberari, [Greek: tuptesthai].

6. Am, art, is, are; ditto. Also equivalent to an inflection in the way of tense. I am moving = move-o.

7. Was, were; ditto, ditto. I was beaten = [Greek: e-tuphthen]. I was moving = move-bam.

Do, can, must, and let, are non-inflectional auxiliaries.

B. Classification of auxiliaries according to their non-auxiliary significations.—The power of the word have in the combination of I have a horse is clear enough. It means possession. The power of the same word in the combination I have been is not so clear; nevertheless it is a power which has grown out of the idea of possession. This shows that the power of a verb as an auxiliary may be a modification of its original power; i.e., of the power it has in non-auxiliary constructions. Sometimes the difference is very little: the word let, in let us go, has its natural sense of permission unimpaired. Sometimes it is lost altogether. Can and may exist only as auxiliaries.

1. Auxiliary derived from the idea of possession—have.

2. Auxiliaries derived from the idea of existence—be, is, was.

3. Auxiliary derived from the idea of future destination, dependent upon circumstances external to the agent—shall. There are etymological reasons for believing that shall is no present tense, but a perfect.

4. Auxiliary derived from the idea of future destination, dependent upon the volition of the agent—will. Shall is simply predictive; will is predictive and promissive as well.

5. Auxiliary derived from the idea of power, dependent upon circumstances external to the agent—may.

6. Auxiliary derived from the idea of power, dependent upon circumstances internal to the agent—can. May is simply permissive; can is potential. In respect to the idea of power residing in the agent being the cause which determines a contingent action, can is in the same relation to may as will is to shall.

"May et can, cum eorum praeteritis imperfectis, might et could, potentiam innuunt: cum hoc tamen discrimine: may et might vel de jure vel saltem de rei possibilitate, dicuntur, at can et could de viribus agentis."—WALLIS, p. 107.

7. Auxiliary derived from the idea of sufferance—let.

8. Auxiliary derived from the idea of necessity—must.

"Must necessitatem innuit. Debeo, oportet, necesse est urere, I must burn. Aliquando sed rarius in praeterito dicitur must (quasi ex must'd seu must't contractum). Sic, si de praeterito dicatur, he must (seu must't) be burnt, oportebat uri seu necesse habuit ut ureretur."—WALLIS, 107.

9. Auxiliary derived from the idea of action—do.

C. Classification of auxiliary verbs in respect to their mode of construction.—Auxiliary verbs combine with others in three ways.

1. With participles.—a) With the present, or active, participle—I am speaking: b) With the past, or passive, participle—I am beaten, I have beaten.

2. With infinitives.—a) With the objective infinitive—I can speak: b) With the gerundial infinitive—I have to speak.

3. With both infinitives and participles.—I shall have done, I mean to have done.

D. Auxiliary verbs may be classified according to their effect.—Thus—have makes the combination in which it appears equivalent to a tense; be to a passive form; may to a sign of mood, &c.

This sketch of the different lights under which auxiliary verbs may be viewed, has been written for the sake of illustrating, rather than exhausting, the subject.

s. 492. The combination of the auxiliary, have, with the past participle requires notice. It is, here, advisable to make the following classifications.

1. The combination with the participle of a transitive verb.—I have ridden the horse; thou hast broken the sword; he has smitten the enemy.

2. The combination with the participle of an intransitive verb,—I have waited; thou hast hungered; he has slept.

3. The combination with the participle of the verb substantive, I have been; thou hast been; he has been.

It is by examples of the first of these three divisions that the true construction is to be shown.

For an object of any sort to be in the possession of a person, it must previously have existed. If I possess a horse, that horse must have had a previous existence.

Hence, in all expressions like I have ridden a horse, there are two ideas, a past idea in the participle, and a present idea in the word denoting possession.

For an object of any sort, affected in a particular manner, to be in the possession of a person, it must previously have been affected in the manner required. If I possess a horse that has been ridden, the riding must have taken place before I mention the fact of the ridden horse being in my possession; inasmuch as I speak of it as a thing already done,—the participle, ridden, being in the past tense.

I have ridden a horse = I have a horse ridden = I have a horse as a ridden horse, or (changing the gender and dealing with the word horse as a thing) I have a horse as a ridden thing.

In this case the syntax is of the usual sort. (1) Have = own = habeo = teneo; (2) horse is the accusative case equum; (3) ridden is a past participle agreeing either with horse, or with a word in apposition with it understood.

Mark the words in italics. The word ridden does not agree with horse, since it is of the neuter gender. Neither if we said I have ridden the horses, would it agree with horses; since it is of the singular number.

The true construction is arrived at by supplying the word thing. I have a horse as a ridden thing = habeo equum equitatum (neuter). Here the construction is the same as triste lupus stabulis.

I have horses as a ridden thing = habeo equos equitatum (singular, neuter). Here the construction is—

"Triste ... maturis frugibus imbres, Arboribus venti, nobis Amaryllidos irae."

or in Greek—

[Greek: Deinon gunaixin hai di' odinon gonai].

The classical writers supply instances of this use of have. Compertum habeo, milites, verba viris virtutem non addere = I have discovered = I am in possession of the discovery. Quae cum ita sint, satis de Caesare hoc dictum habeo.

The combination of have with an intransitive verb is irreducible to the idea of possession: indeed, it is illogical. In I have waited, we cannot make the idea expressed by the word waited the object of the verb have or possess. The expression has become a part of language by means of the extension of a false analogy. It is an instance of an illegitimate imitation.

The combination of have with been is more illogical still, and is a stronger instance of the influence of an illegitimate imitation. In German and Italian, where even intransitive verbs are combined with the equivalents to the English have (haben, and avere), the verb substantive is not so combined; on the contrary, the combinations are

Italian; io sono stato = I am been. German; ich bin gewesen = ditto.

which is logical.

s. 493. I am to speak.—Three facts explain this idiom.

1. The idea of direction towards an object conveyed by the dative case, and by combinations equivalent to it.

2. The extent to which the ideas of necessity, obligation, or intention are connected with the idea of something that has to be done, or something towards which some action has a tendency.

3. The fact that expressions like the one in question historically represent an original dative case, or its equivalent; since to speak grows out of the Anglo-Saxon form to sprecanne, which, although called a gerund, is really a dative case of the infinitive mood.

When Johnson thought that, in the phrase he is to blame, the word blame was a noun, if he meant a noun in the way that culpa is a noun, his view was wrong. But if he meant a noun in the way that culpare, ad culpandum, are nouns, it was right.

s. 494. I am to blame.—This idiom is one degree more complex than the previous one; since I am to blame = I am to be blamed. As early, however, as the Anglo-Saxon period the gerunds were liable to be used in a passive sense: he is to lufigenne = not he is to love, but he is to be loved.

The principle of this confusion may be discovered by considering that an object to be blamed, is an object for some one to blame, an object to be loved is an object for some one to love.

s. 495. I am beaten.—This is a present combination, and it is present on the strength of the verb am, not on the strength of the participle beaten, which is praeterite.

The following table exhibits the expedients on the part of the different languages of the Gothic stock, since the loss of the proper passive form of the Moeso-Gothic.

Language LATIN datur, LATIN datus est.

Moeso-Gothic gibada, ist, vas, varth gibans. Old High German ist, wirdit kepan, was, warth kepan. Notker wirt keben, ist keben. Middle High German wirt geben, ist geben. New High German wird gegeben, ist gegeben worden. Old Saxon is, wirtheth gebhan, was, warth gebhan. Middle Dutch es blift ghegheven, waert, blêf ghegeven. New Dutch wordt gegeven, es gegeven worden. Old Frisian werth ejeven, is ejeven. Anglo-Saxon weorded gifen, is gifen. English is given, has been given. Old Norse er gefinn, hefr verit gefinn. Swedish gifves, har varit gifven. Danish bliver, vorder given, har varet given. "Deutsche Grammatik, iv. 19."

* * * * *

CHAPTER XXIV.

THE SYNTAX OF ADVERBS.

s. 496. The syntax of the adverb is simpler than that of any other part of speech, excepting, perhaps, that of the adjective.

Adverbs have no concord.

Neither have they any government. They seem, indeed, to have it, when they are in the comparative or superlative degree; but it is merely apparent. In this is better than that, the word that is governed neither by better nor by than. It is not governed at all. It is a nominative case; the subject of a separate proposition. This is better (i.e., more good) than that is good. Even if we admit such an expression as he is stronger than me to be good English, there is no adverbial government. Than, if it govern me at all, governs it as a preposition.

The position of an adverb is, in respect to matters of syntax, pre-eminently parenthetic; i.e., it may be omitted without injuring the construction. He is fighting—now; he was fighting—then; he fights—bravely; I am almost—tired, &c.

s. 497. By referring to the Chapter on the Adverbs, we shall find that the neuter adjective is frequently converted into an adverb by deflection. As any neuter adjective may be so deflected, we may justify such expressions as full (for fully) as conspicuous (for conspicuously), and peculiar (for peculiarly) bad grace, &c. We are not, however, bound to imitate everything that we can justify.

s. 498. The termination -ly was originally adjectival. At present it is a derivational syllable by which we can convert an adjective into an adverb: brave, brave-ly. When, however, the adjective ends in -ly already, the formation is awkward. I eat my daily bread is unexceptionable English; I eat my bread daily is exceptionable. One of two things must here take place: the two syllables ly are packed into one (the full expression being dai-li-ly), or else the construction is that of a neuter adjective deflected.

Adverbs are convertible. The then men = [Greek: hoi nun brotoi], &c. This will be seen more clearly in the Chapter on Conjunctions.

s. 499. It has been remarked that in expressions like he sleeps the sleep of the righteous, the construction is adverbial. So it is in expressions like he walked a mile, it weighs a pound. The ideas expressed by mile and pound are not the names of anything that serves as either object or instrument to the verb. They only denote the manner of the action, and define the meaning of the verb.

s. 500. From whence, from thence.—This is an expression which, if it have not taken root in our language, is likely to do so. It is an instance of excess of expression in the way of syntax; the -ce denoting direction from a place, and the preposition doing the same. It is not so important to determine what this construction is, as to suggest what it is not. It is not an instance of an adverb governed by a preposition. If the two words be dealt with as logically separate, whence (or thence) must be a noun = which place (or that place); just as from then till now = from that time to this. But if (which is the better view) the two words be dealt with as one (i.e., as an improper compound) the preposition from has lost its natural power, and become the element of an adverb.

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CHAPTER XXV.

ON PREPOSITIONS.

s. 501. All prepositions govern an oblique case. If a word ceases to do this, it ceases to be a preposition. In the first of the two following sentences the word up is a preposition, in the second an adverb.

1. I climbed up the tree. 2. I climbed up.

All prepositions in English, precede the noun which they govern. I climbed up the tree, never I climbed the tree up. This is a matter not of government, but of collocation. It is the case in most languages; and, from the frequency of its occurrence, the term pre-position (or pre-fix) has originated. Nevertheless, it is by no means a philological necessity. In many languages the prepositions are post-positive, following their noun.

s. 502. No preposition, in the present English, governs a genitive case. This remark is made, because expressions like the part of the body = pars corporis,—a piece of the bread = portio panis, make it appear as if the preposition of did so. The true expression is, that the preposition of followed by an objective case is equivalent in many instances, to the genitive case of the classical languages.

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CHAPTER XXVI.

ON CONJUNCTIONS.

s. 503. A conjunction is a part of speech which connects propositions,—the day is bright, is one proposition. The sun shines, is another. The day is bright because the sun shines is a pair of propositions connected by the conjunction, because.

From this it follows, that whenever there is a conjunction, there are two subjects, two copulas, and two predicates: i.e., two propositions in all their parts.

But this may be expressed compendiously. The sun shines, and the moon shines may be expressed by the sun and moon shine.

Nevertheless, however compendious may be the expression, there are always two propositions wherever there is one conjunction. A part of speech that merely combines two words is a preposition,—the sun along with the moon shines.

It is highly important to remember that conjunctions connect propositions.

It is also highly important to remember that many double propositions may be expressed so compendiously as to look like one. When this takes place, and any question arises as to the construction, they must be exhibited in their fully expanded form, i.e., the second subject, the second predicate, and the second copula must be supplied. This can always be done from the first proposition,—he likes you better than me = he likes you better than he likes me. The compendious expression of the second proposition is the first point of note in the syntax of conjunctions.

s. 504. The second point in the syntax of conjunctions is the fact of their great convertibility. Most conjunctions have been developed out of some other part of speech.

The conjunction of comparison, than, is derived from the adverb of time, then: which is derived from the accusative singular of the demonstrative pronoun.

The conjunction, that, is derived also from a demonstrative pronoun.

The conjunction, therefore, is a demonstrative pronoun + a preposition.

The conjunction, because, is a substantive governed by a preposition.

One and the same word, in one and the same sentence, may be a conjunction or preposition, as the case may be.

All fled but John.—If this mean all fled except John, the word but is a preposition, the word John is an accusative case, and the proposition is single. If instead of John, we had a personal pronoun, we should say all fled but him.

All fled but John.—If this mean all fled but John did not fly, the word but is a conjunction, the word John is a nominative case, and the propositions are two in number. If, instead of John, we had a personal pronoun, we should say, all fled but he.

From the fact of the great convertibility of conjunctions it is often necessary to determine whether a word be a conjunction or not. If it be a conjunction, it cannot govern a case. If it govern a case it is no conjunction but a preposition. A conjunction cannot govern a case, for the following reasons,—the word that follows it must be the subject of the second proposition, and as such, a nominative case.

s. 505. The third point to determine in the syntax of conjunctions is the certainty or uncertainty in the mind of the speaker as to the facts expressed by the propositions which they serve to connect.

1. Each proposition may contain a certain, definite, absolute fact—the day is clear because the sun shines. Here there is neither doubt nor contingency of either the day being clear, or of the sun shining.

Of two propositions one may be the condition of the other—the day will be clear if the sun shine. Here, although it is certain that if the sun shine the day will be clear, there is no certainty of the sun shining. Of the two propositions one only embodies a certain fact, and that is certain only conditionally.

Now an action, wherein there enters any notion of uncertainty, or indefinitude, and is at the same time connected with another action, is expressed, not by the indicative mood, but by the subjunctive. If the sun shine (not shines) the day will be clear.

Simple uncertainty will not constitute a subjunctive construction,—I am, perhaps, in the wrong.

Neither will simple connection.—I am wrong, because you are right.

But, the two combined constitute the construction in question,—if I be wrong, you are right.

Now, a conjunction that connects two certain propositions may be said to govern an indicative mood.

And a conjunction that connects an uncertain proposition with a certain one, may be said to govern a subjunctive mood.

The government of mood is the only form of government of which conjunctions are capable.

s. 506. Previous to the question of the government of conjunctions in the way of mood, it is necessary to notice certain points of agreement between them and the relative pronouns; inasmuch as, in many cases, the relative pronoun exerts the same government, in the way of determining the mood of the verb, as the conjunction.

Between the relative pronouns and conjunctions in general there is this point of connection,—both join propositions. Wherever there is a relative, there is a second proposition. So there is wherever there is a conjunction.

Between certain relative pronouns and those particular conjunctions that govern a subjunctive mood there is also a point of connection. Both suggest an element of uncertainty or indefinitude. This the relative pronouns do, through the logical elements common to them and to the interrogatives: these latter essentially suggesting the idea of doubt. Wherever the person, or thing, connected with an action, and expressed by a relative is indefinite, there is room for the use of a subjunctive mood. Thus—"he that troubled you shall bear his judgment, whosoever he be."

s. 507. By considering the nature of such words as when, their origin as relatives on the one hand, and their conjunctional character on the other hand, we are prepared for finding a relative element in words like till, until, before, as long as, &c. These can all be expanded into expressions like until the time when, during the time when, &c. Hence, in an expression like seek out his wickedness till thou find (not findest) none, the principle of the construction is nearly the same as in he that troubled you, &c., or vice versâ.[64]

s. 508. In most conditional expressions the subjunctive mood should follow the conjunction. All the following expressions are conditional.

1. Except I be by Silvia in the night, There is no music in the nightingale.—SHAKSPEARE.

2. Let us go and sacrifice to the Lord our God, lest he fall upon us with pestilence.—Old Testament.

3. ——Revenge back on itself recoils. Let it. I reck not, so it light well aimed.—J. MILTON.

4. If this be the case.

5. Although my house be not so with God.—Old Testament.

6. He shall not eat of the holy thing unless he wash his flesh with water.—Old Testament.

Expressions like except and unless are equally conditional with words like if and provided that, since they are equivalent to if—not.

Expressions like though and although are peculiar. They join propositions, of which the one is a primâ facie reason against the existence of the other: and this is the conditional element. In the sentence, if the children be so badly brought-up, they are not to be trusted, the bad bringing-up is the reason for their being unfit to be trusted; and, as far as the expression is concerned, is admitted to be so. The only uncertainty lies in the question as to the degree of the badness of the education. The inference from it is unequivocal.

But if, instead of saying if, we say although, and omit the word not, so that the sentence run although the children be so badly brought-up they are to be trusted, we do two things: we indicate the general relation of cause and effect that exists between bad bringing-up and unfitness for being trusted, but we also, at the same time, take an exception to it in the particular instance before us. These remarks have been made for the sake of showing the extent to which words like though, &c., are conditional.

It must be remembered, however, that conjunctions, like the ones lately quoted, do not govern subjunctive moods because they are conditional, but because, in the particular condition which they accompany, there is an element of uncertainty.

s. 509. This introduces a fresh question. Conditional conjunctions are of two sorts:—

1. Those which express a condition as an actual fact, and one admitted as such by the speaker.

2. Those which express a condition as a possible fact, and one which the speaker either does not admit, or admits only in a qualified manner.

Since the children are so badly brought-up, &c.—This is an instance of the first construction. The speaker admits as an actual fact the bad bringing-up of the children.

If the children be so badly brought-up, &c.—This is an instance of the second construction. The speaker admits as a possible (perhaps, as a probable) fact the bad bringing-up of the children: but he does not adopt it as an indubitable one.

s. 510. Now, if every conjunction had a fixed unvariable meaning, there would be no difficulty in determining whether a condition was absolute, and beyond doubt, or possible, and liable to doubt. But such is not the case.

Although may precede a proposition which is admitted as well as one which is doubted.

a. Although the children are, &c. b. Although the children be, &c.

If, too, may precede propositions wherein there is no doubt whatever implied: in other words it may be used instead of since.

In some languages this interchange goes farther than in others; in the Greek, for instance, such is the case with [Greek: ei], to a very great extent indeed.

Hence we must look to the meaning of the sentence in general, rather than to the particular conjunction used.

It is a philological fact that if may stand instead of since.

It is also a philological fact that when it does so it should be followed by the indicative mood.

This is written in the way of illustration. What applies to if applies to other conjunctions as well.

s. 511. As a point of practice, the following method of determining the amount of doubt expressed in a conditional proposition is useful:—

Insert, immediately after the conjunction, one of the two following phrases,—(1.) as is the case; (2.) as may or may not be the case. By ascertaining which of these two supplements expresses the meaning of the speaker, we ascertain the mood of the verb which follows.

When the first formula is the one required, there is no element of doubt, and the verb should be in the indicative mood. If (as is the case), he is gone, I must follow him.

When the second formula is the one required, there is an element of doubt, and the verb should be in the subjunctive mood. If (as may or may not be the case) he be gone, I must follow him.

s. 512. The use of the word that in expressions like I eat that I may live, &c., is a modification of the subjunctive construction, that is conveniently called potential. It denotes that one act is done for the sake of supplying the power or opportunity for the performance of another.

The most important point connected with the powers of that is the so-called succession of tenses.

s. 513. The succession of tenses.—Whenever the conjunction that expresses intention, and consequently connects two verbs, the second of which takes place after the first, the verbs in question must be in the same tense.

I do this that I may gain by it I did this that I might gain by it.

In the Greek language this is expressed by a difference of mood; the subjunctive being the construction equivalent to may, the optative to might. The Latin idiom coincides with the English.

A little consideration will show that this rule is absolute. For a man to be doing one action (in present time) in order that some other action may follow it (in past time) is to reverse the order of cause and effect. To do anything in A.D. 1851, that something may result from it in 1850 is a contradiction; and so it is to say I do this that I might gain by it.

The reasons against the converse construction are nearly, if not equally cogent. To have done anything at any previous time in order that a present effect may follow, is, ipso facto, to convert a past act into a present one, or, to speak in the language of the grammarian, to convert an aorist into a perfect. To say I did this that I may gain by it, is to make, by the very effect of the expression, either may equivalent to might, or did equivalent to have done.

I did this that I might gain. I have done this that I may gain.

s. 514. Disjunctives.—Disjunctives (or, nor) are of two sorts, real and nominal.

A king or queen always rules in England. Here the disjunction is real; king or queen being different names for different objects. In all real disjunctions the inference is, that if one out of two (or more) individuals (or classes) do not perform a certain action, the other does.

A sovereign or supreme ruler always rules in England. Here the disjunction is nominal; sovereign and supreme governor being different names for the same object. In all nominal disjunctives the inference is, that if an agent (or agents) do not perform a certain action under one name, he does (or they do) it under another.

Nominal disjunctives are called by Harris subdisjunctives.

In the English language there is no separate word to distinguish the nominal from the real disjunctive. In Latin, vel is considered by Harris to be disjunctive, sive subdisjunctive. As a periphrasis, the combination in other words is subdisjunctive.

Both nominal and real disjunctives agree in this,—whatever may be the number of nouns which they connect, the construction of the verb is the same as if there were but one—Henry, or John, or Thomas, walks (not walk); the sun, or solar luminary, shines (not shine). The disjunctive isolates the subject, however much it may be placed in juxtaposition with other nouns.

* * * * *

CHAPTER XXVII.

THE SYNTAX OF THE NEGATIVE.

s. 515. When the verb is in the infinitive mood, the negative precedes it.—Not to advance is to retreat.

When the verb is not in the infinitive mood, the negative follows it.—He advanced not. I cannot.

This rule is absolute. It only seems to precede the verb in such expressions as I do not advance, I cannot advance, I have not advanced, &c. However, the words do, can, and have, are no infinitives; and it consequently follows them. The word advance is an infinitive, and it consequently precedes it. Wallis's rule makes an equivalent statement, although differently. "Adverbium negandi not (non) verbo postponitur (nempe auxiliari primo si adsit; aut si non adsit auxiliare, verbo principali): aliis tamen orationis partibus praefigi solet."—P. 113.

That the negative is rarely used, except with an auxiliary, in other words, that the presence of a negative converts a simple form like it burneth not into the circumlocution it does not burn, is a fact in the practice of the English language. The syntax is the same in either expression.

s. 516. What may be called the distribution of the negative is pretty regular in English. Thus, when the word not comes between an indicative, imperative, or subjunctive mood and an infinitive verb, it almost always is taken with the word which it follows—I can not eat may mean either I can—not eat (i.e., I can abstain), or I can not—eat (i.e., I am unable to eat); but, as stated above, it almost always has the latter signification.

But not always. In Byron's "Deformed Transformed" we find the following lines:—

Clay! not dead but soulless, Though no mortal man would choose thee, An immortal no less Deigns not to refuse thee.

Here not to refuse = to accept; and is probably a Grecism. To not refuse would, perhaps, be better.

The next expression is still more foreign to the English idiom:—

For not to have been dipped in Lethe's lake Could save the son of Thetis from to die.

Here not is to be taken with could.

s. 517. In the present English, two negatives make an affirmative. I have not not seen him = I have seen him. In Greek this was not the case. Duae aut plures negativae apud Graecos vehementius negant is a well known rule. The Anglo-Saxon idiom differed from the English and coincided with the Greek. The French negative is only apparently double; words like point, pas, mean not not, but at all. Je ne parle pas = I not speak at all, not I not speak no.

s. 518. Questions of appeal.—All questions imply want of information; want of information may then imply doubt; doubt, perplexity; and perplexity the absence of an alternative. In this way, what are called, by Mr. Arnold,[65] questions of appeal, are, practically speaking, negatives. What should I do? when asked in extreme perplexity, means that nothing can well be done. In the following passage we have the presence of a question instead of a negative:—

Or hear'st thou (cluis, Lat.) rather pure ethereal stream, Whose fountain who (no one) shall tell?—Paradise Lost.

* * * * *

CHAPTER XXVIII.

ON THE CASE ABSOLUTE.

s. 519. Broadly speaking, all adverbial constructions are absolute. The term, however, is conveniently limited to a particular combination of the noun, verb, and participle. When two actions are connected with each other, either by the fact of their simultaneous occurrence, or as cause and effect, they may be expressed within the limits of a single proposition, by expressing the one by means of a verb, and the other by means of a noun and participle agreeing with each other. The door being open, the horse was stolen.

Considering the nature of the connection between the two actions, we find good grounds for expecting à priori that the participle will be in the instrumental case, when such exists in the language: and when not, in some case allied to it, i.e., the ablative or dative.

In Latin the ablative is the case that is used absolutely. Sole orto, claruit dies.

In Anglo-Saxon the absolute case was the dative. This is logical.

In the present English, however, the nominative is the absolute case. He made the best proverbs, him alone excepted, is an expression of Tillotson's. We should now write he alone excepted. The present mode of expression is only to be justified by considering the nominative form to be a dative one, just as in the expression you are here, the word you, although an accusative, is considered as a nominative. A real nominative absolute is as illogical as a real accusative case governing a verb.

* * * * *

PART VI.

PROSODY.

s. 520. The word Prosody is derived from a Greek word (prosodia) signifying accent. It is used by Latin and English grammarians in a wider sense, and includes not only the doctrines of accent and quantity, but also the laws of metre and versification.

s. 521. Observe the accents in the following lines:—

Then fáre thee wéll, mine ówn dear lóve, The wórld hath nów for ús No greáter griéf, no paín abóve The paín of párting thús.—MOORE.

Here the syllables accented are the 2nd, 4th, 6th, 8th, 10th, 12th, 14th, 16th, 18th, 20th, 22nd, 24th, 26th, 28th; that is, every other syllable.—Again,

At the clóse of the dáy, when the hámlet is stíll, And the mórtals the sweéts of forgétfulness próve, And when nóught but the tórrent is heárd on the híll, And there's nóught but the níghtingale's sóng in the gróve.—BEATTIE.

Here the syllables accented are the 3rd, 6th, 9th, 12th, 15th, 18th, 21st, 24th, 27th, 30th, 33rd, 36th, 39th, 42nd, 45th, 48th; that is, every third syllable.

s. 522. Metre is a general term for the recurrence within certain intervals of syllables similarly affected. The syllables that have just been numbered are similarly affected, being similarly accented. Accent is not the only quality of a syllable, which by returning at regular intervals can constitute metre. It is the one, however, upon which English metre depends. English metre essentially consists in the regular recurrence of syllables similarly accented.

Abbot.—And whý not líve and áct with óther mén?

Manfred.—Becaúse my náture wás avérse from lífe; And yét not crúel, fór I woúld not máke, But fínd a désolátion:—líke the wínd, The réd-hot breáth of thé most lóne simoóm, Which dwélls but ín the désert, ánd sweeps o'ér The bárren sánds which beár no shrúbs to blást, And révels ó'er their wíld and árid wáves, And seéketh nót so thát it ís not soúght, But béing mét is deádly: súch hath beén The páth of mý exístence.—BYRON.

s. 523. Measures.—For every accented syllable in the following line, write the letter a, and for every unaccented one, the letter x, so that a may stand for an accent, x for the absence of one—

The wáy was lóng, the wínd was cóld.—SCOTT.

or expressed symbolically

x a x a x a x a,

where x coincides with the, a with way, &c.

s. 524. Determine the length of the line in question.—It is plain that this may be done in two ways. We may either measure by the syllables, and say that the line consists of eight syllables; or by the accents, and say that it consists of four accents. In this latter case we take the accented syllable with its corresponding unaccented one, and, grouping the two together, deal with the pair at once. Now, a group of syllables thus taken together is called a measure. In the line in question the way (x a) is one measure, was long (x a) another, and so on throughout; the line itself consisting of four measures.

s. 525. Trisyllabic measures.—The number of measures consisting of two syllables, or dissyllabic measures, is necessarily limited to two, expressed a x and x a respectively. But beyond these there are in the English language measures of three syllables, or trisyllabic measures. The number of these is necessarily limited to three.

The first of these is exhibited in the word mérrily (a x x).

Mérrily, mérrily sháll I live nów, Únder the blóssom that hángs on the boúgh.—SHAKSPEARE.

The second is exhibited by the word disáble (x a x).

But vaínly thou wárrest, For thís is alóne in Thy pówer to decláre, That ín the dim fórest Thou heárd'st a low moáning, And sáw'st a bright lády surpássingly faír.—COLERIDGE.

s. 526. The third is exhibited by the word cavaliér (x x a).

There's a beaúty for éver unfádingly bríght, Like the lóng ruddy lápse of a súmmer-day's níght.—MOORE.

When grouped together according to certain rules, measures form lines and verses; and lines and verses, regularly arranged, constitute couplets, triplets, and stanzas, &c.

s. 527. The expression of measures, lines, &c., by such symbols as a x, x a, &c., is metrical notation.

s. 528. Rhyme.—We can have English verse without rhyme. We cannot have English verse without accent. Hence accent is an essential; rhyme an accessory to metre.

s. 529. Analysis of a pair of rhyming syllables.—Let the syllables told and bold be taken to pieces, and let the separate parts of each be compared. Viewed in reference to metre, they consist of three parts or elements: 1. the vowel (o); 2. the part preceding the vowel (t and b respectively); 3. the parts following the vowel (ld). Now the vowel (o) and the parts following the vowel (ld) are alike in both words (old); but the part preceding the vowel is different in the different words (told, bold). This difference between the parts preceding the vowels is essential; since, if it were not for this, the two words would be identical, or rather there would be but one word altogether. This is the case with I and eye. Sound for sound (although different in spelling) the two words are identical, and, consequently, the rhyme is faulty.

Again—compared with the words bold and told, the words teeth and breeze have two of the elements necessary to constitute a rhyme. The vowels are alike (ee), whilst the parts preceding the vowels are different (br and t); and, as far as these two matters are concerned, the rhyme is a good one, tee and bree. Notwithstanding this, there is anything rather than a rhyme; since the parts following the vowel (th and ze) instead of agreeing, differ. Breathe and beneath are in the same predicament, because the th is not sounded alike in the two words.

Again—the words feel and mill constitute only a false and imperfect rhyme. Sound for sound, the letters f and m (the parts preceding the vowel) are different. This is as it should be. Also, sound for sound, l and ll (the parts following the vowel) are identical; and this is as it should be also: but ee and i (the vowels) are different, and this difference spoils the rhyme. None and own are in the same predicament; since one o is sounded as o in note, and the other as the u in but.

From what has gone before we get the notion of true and perfect rhymes as opposed to false and imperfect ones. For two (or more) words to rhyme to each other, it is necessary

a. That the vowel be the same in both. b. That the parts following the vowel be the same. c. That the parts preceding the vowel be different.

Beyond this it is necessary that the syllables, to form a full and perfect rhyme, should be accented syllables. Sky and lie form good rhymes, but sky and merrily bad ones, and merrily and silly worse. Lines like the second and fourth of the following stanza are slightly exceptionable on this score: indeed, many readers sacrifice the accent in the word mérrily to the rhyme, and pronounce it merrilý.