The left flank was on Mors Kop and curved round indefinitely to Kameelzyn Kraal with detached posts in the direction of Tygerpoort. The centre north and south of Pienaar's Poort was the strongest section of the line, and for this reason and for another it was held by comparatively small numbers. Botha was an acute observer and had learnt the moves of the British autumn manoeuvre opening, a holding attack on the centre not intended to be pushed home in order to eke out paucity of numbers operating on a wide front. Lord Roberts, in spite of his superiority of strength, could not hope to inflict a decisive defeat upon Botha's well-posted commandos, but only to remove them out of striking distance of Pretoria, and he was successful.

The earlier movements of the attack on June 11 were in the nature of a reconnaissance in force, as it was uncertain how far to the north and south the Boer front extended. The usual tactics were adopted. French with the 1st and 4th Cavalry Brigades under Porter and Dickson was to work round the enemy's right flank and to endeavour to circle round it to the railway; a demonstrating attack on the centre would be made by Pole-Carew; while Ian Hamilton acted against the left flank.

French approached the Kameelfontein valley and won a footing on Boekenhontskloof ridge, which the Boers were only now moving out to occupy, with his left. His right soon came under heavy fire from Krokodil Spruit Hill on the Kameelfontein ridge, but he succeeded in seizing Louwbaken, which he held tenaciously in spite of Delarey's attempts to work round it and of the shells of a heavy gun posted six miles away near Edendale. Meanwhile his left had been struggling for several hours on the Boekenhoutskloof ridge, which it eventually cleared, and was then able to support the right, which was still clinging desperately to Louwbaken. Throughout the afternoon the Boers continued their attacks on French, but were unable to shift him. At nightfall he found that instead of turning the enemy's right, he had only plastered himself against it. He had already reported the situation to Lord Roberts, who authorized him to withdraw if necessary, at the same time cautioning him "not to risk too many casualties."



Pole-Carew, in the centre, was in action with his heavy guns only, "demonstrating" according to the rules, pending the development of the flank attacks.

The force on the right under Ian Hamilton was strong in mounted troops. He entered the arena through Zwavelpoort, and thrust at the bristling but indeterminate left flank of the enemy. The 2nd Cavalry Brigade under Broadwood evicted a small body of Boers from Tygerpoort, and when the 3rd Brigade under Gordon came up to hold the position until the arrival of an infantry regiment, Broadwood advanced across the valley in the direction of Mors Kop, and soon was not only under shell fire from Diamond Hill, but also under rifle fire from some vague detachments of Boers on his right rear.

Nor was this all, for as he proceeded, the enemy was seen pouncing down from Diamond Hill on to the Kleinfontein ridge upon the line of his advance, and simultaneously he was fired on from the right. Two horse artillery guns, which had been sent out, with an insufficient escort, to deal with the swoop, were almost captured, and were only saved by Lord Airlie at the cost of his own life. The attack on the right was soon checked, but the cavalry instead of outflanking the enemy was itself outflanked and unable to make a further advance.

Gordon had now come away from Tygerpoort, and, in touch with Broadwood, screened the right flank of Ian Hamilton's infantry attack; which after the failure to turn the enemy's left flank, had necessarily to be a frontal movement against the strongest section of his line. Bruce Hamilton, with a brigade of Ian Hamilton's command, crossed Pienaar's River near Boschkop and expelled the Boer advanced front from the Kleinfontein ridge. Ian Hamilton was now face to face with Diamond Hill, but the afternoon was too far spent for further action.

The general idea for the right attack on the following day was a movement by Bruce Hamilton, reinforced by the Brigade of Guards from Pole-Carew's command in the centre. Diamond Hill was taken without much difficulty early in the afternoon, and the Donkerhoek plateau was cleared. A gap was now made in the Boer line, the commandos driven off making for the Donkerpoort ridge on the one side, or the Rhenosterfontein heights on the other. From three positions a double rain of bullets poured upon Bruce Hamilton on the plateau, until the heights were reached by De Lisle's mounted infantry from Broadwood's brigade. Bruce Hamilton's right flank was thus relieved, but between him and the enemy clustering on the ridge intervened the impassable ravine of the Donkerpoort. Night was approaching and nothing more could be done.

On the left, French held his own but no more during the day, and Pole-Carew in the centre had no opportunity of going into action. The capture of the Rhenosterfontein heights occurred at an opportune moment and perhaps averted a disaster. At Delarey's request Botha was on the point of sending reinforcements to the Boer right to enable it to drive away French and fall upon the weak British centre, when De Lisle's success vitally changed the situation.

Next morning, June 13, the British Army found that it had won a victory without knowing it. The Boers had faded away during the night and had abandoned the strongest position which they had ever held in the Free State or the Transvaal. French and Ian Hamilton went in pursuit with no results. Delarey succeeded in circling round towards the Western Transvaal, Botha retired to the east. The casualties on the British side were 176; the Boers professed to have lost but four burghers killed and twenty wounded.

Lord Kitchener was away in the Free State, and the battle was fought under the usual restrictive conditions, that no operation likely to entail serious loss of life was to be undertaken: and the enemy found that the ordeal of combat was not very dreadful.

With the occupation of Pretoria, which was not virtually effected until Botha's retreat from Diamond Hill, the ranging phase of Lord Roberts' campaign was nearly at an end. At the two capitals and at other towns already occupied, he had places of arms, from which without wide divagations of large bodies of troops, he could hope soon to control and eventually to dominate the Republics.

To see to the long and lonely furrow which he had ploughed across the veld from the Orange to the Magaliesberg, and to prevent its being obliterated by the wayward and shifting sand of the desert, was the present task before him.

Notes:

[Footnote 43: Plumer raided across the Limpopo into the Transvaal as far back as December, 1899, and Hunter occupied Christiana on May 15.]



CHAPTER XII

The New Colony

[Sidenote: Map, p. 260.]

The Orange River Colony did not receive its incorporation into the British Empire with a display of gratitude for the honour conferred upon it.

The urgent message sent by Botha to De Wet on May 27 after the British Army had crossed into the Transvaal was hardly necessary to incite that free lance into action after his own heart, and he at once quitted Frankfort for Lindley.

When Lord Roberts entered the Transvaal he left behind him a considerable force to teach the New Colony its duties. Besides the stationary troops at Bloemfontein and on the railway, the VIIIth and Colonial Divisions under Rundle and Brabant were at Senekal and Ficksburg; Colvile with the IXth Division, who had been taken off Ian Hamilton's lead and allowed to run alone, was near Lindley; and Methuen had come into Kroonstad from Bothaville, the line of his march, which was originally towards the Transvaal, having been changed by orders from Lord Roberts.

Such were the forces against which De Wet was ready to fling himself. Early in June he was faced by another opponent. Lord Kitchener had come down from the Transvaal with a strong column.

Lord Roberts, on leaving Bloemfontein for the north, instructed Rundle to "exercise a vigilant control east of the railway." In co-operation with Brabant, he worked up through the fertile district along the Basuto border, slowly but steadily; his immediate object being to prevent the enemy breaking back towards the south. No serious opposition was encountered, and by the middle of the month the Divisions had advanced to Clocolan and Winburg, where Rundle came in touch with the IXth Division.

Colvile received orders to advance to Lindley and Heilbron. He was instructed to reach Heilbron with the Highland Brigade on May 29, and was informed that a force of Yeomanry under Spragge would on May 23 join him at Ventersburg, which he would pass through on his march.

Spragge was unable to be at Ventersburg on the date fixed and was ordered on to Kroonstad, where he received telegraphic instructions to join Colvile at Lindley on May 26 at the latest. It has never been ascertained by whom this fatal message was despatched. No British staff officer has ever acknowledged himself the sender of it, and it has been suggested that it was sent by a Boer sympathizer who was better informed of Colvile's movements than the Intelligence Staff.

Colvile believed that his presence at Heilbron on May 29 was imperatively required in connexion with the advance, and, although very weak in mounted troops, he pushed on from Ventersburg without waiting for Spragge. On May 26 he reached Lindley after some resistance outside the town, and next day resumed his march to Heilbron, which, though checked on the way, he reached on the appointed day.

Meanwhile, Spragge was doing his best to deliver himself to the IXth Division, to which he was waybilled. He moved a few miles out of Kroonstad on May 25, and next evening was in bivouac within eighteen miles of Lindley. Next day he resumed his march on the town, about the same time that Colvile was quitting it for Heilbron. The two commanders were in entire ignorance of each other's movements.

At midday, Spragge reconnoitred the town, and finding it occupied, withdrew to a position outside. Although Colvile had quitted it but a few hours previously, and although the dust of his column could still be seen on the Heilbron road, a commando under Michael Prinsloo, which he had driven out, had promptly returned; and some burghers who had surrendered to Spragge on May 26, and who, having given up their rifles, had been "allowed to return to their farms," went to Lindley instead and gave warning of the approach of the Yeomanry.

Spragge counted on being able to draw rations at Lindley when he joined Colvile, and marched out of Kroonstad with two days' rations only, and these, although eked out by a capture of sheep on the way, were almost exhausted. There were three courses open to him: to retire to Kroonstad, to follow Colvile, or to remain where he was. He chose the last.

He took up, and did his best to make defensible, a plateau and kopje position two miles N.W. of the town. He had 500 men, but no guns, and he reported the situation to Colvile, who was eighteen miles away when he received the message next morning; and to Rundle, who was at Senekal. Colvile answered his appeal for assistance with a refusal, but suggested a retirement on Kroonstad; but the message did not reach Spragge. Rundle was too far away to help Spragge directly, but made a movement towards Bethlehem, which he hoped would draw the enemy away from Lindley.

On May 28 the Boers took up positions which practically surrounded Spragge, but he held his own that day and the next; and although the enemy was reinforced on the 29th, he was not so closely invested that he could not have broken out. Firing was heard in the S.E., and Spragge, believing that it was Rundle in action, endeavoured without success to communicate with him.

So long as the investing force was without guns, Spragge was confident of being able to hold on. But on May 30 a further reinforcement came in. Martin Prinsloo joined his brother with three guns and a strong commando. The Prinsloos, who were acting under the orders of De Wet, had originally been detailed to look after Colvile, but were drawn away by the attraction of an easier prey at Lindley.

On May 30 a kopje on the west, from which the Boers were sniping into the position, was captured by Spragge, but soon fell again into the hands of the burghers. It was recovered next morning, but pressure elsewhere squeezed it finally out of the grasp of the re-captors. The Boers had brought their guns into action. The key of Spragge's position was two kopjes on the S.E. of the defence. The outer kopje was rushed by the enemy, the detachment occupying it being driven back towards the inner kopje. A panic-stricken non-commissioned officer in the connecting post between them raised the white flag without authority, and, it is said, was immediately shot for having done so. The officer in command on the inner kopje considered that he was bound by the act and recognized it, and only hastened the inevitable end. There was a last wriggle or two, and then Spragge, who was surrounded by 2,000 Boers with artillery, gave in.

Nearly 500 yeomen were added to the panel of British prisoners of war by the hawk-like swoop of De Wet and the brothers Prinsloo almost under the eyes of three Divisions of the British Army. For not only were Colvile and Rundle aware of Spragge's predicament, but as soon as it was reported to Lord Roberts, Methuen was ordered to the rescue.

Methuen, who only arrived at Kroonstad from the west on May 28, was already on the move to help Colvile, from whom a disquieting message had been received at Head Quarters. Colvile's safe arrival at Heilbron next day rendered assistance unnecessary, and Methuen, under instructions from Lord Roberts, turned towards Lindley. He was, however, too late, for as he approached the town the news of Spragge's surrender reached him on June 1. He ran into the rear of the Boers hurrying away with their prey, and even intercepted two guns and some wagons, but was unable to retain them.

The Lindley affair sent Colvile back to England in the wake of Gatacre. The responsibility of the surrender was fixed upon him and he was deprived of his command. He had no doubt been in a false position during the first fortnight of the advance from Bloemfontein when he was kept trailing behind a junior officer, and this slight perhaps affected his judgment, but he was constitutionally incapable of viewing a situation synoptically and perspectively. As at Sannah's Post, so again at Lindley the halation of a word or two in his orders fogged the image on his retina. He doggedly stared at the words Heilbron, May 29, as if the whole issue of the campaign depended upon them. There was nothing in the context to show that they were more than the details of an itinerary which he was expected to follow if circumstances permitted. He was urgently in need of the very mounted troops with which he made no effort to put himself in touch. Bis peccare in bello non licet. Lord Roberts could forgive once, but Colvile was superseded for having twice shown a "want of military capacity and initiative."[44]

Yet the disaster was not due to his default alone, although the contributory defaults of others were rightly not permitted to excuse him. He had good reason to think that a well-mounted force would be able to take care of itself, and to believe that proper staff arrangements had been made for Spragge's march; but in each of these warrantable assumptions he was wrong. Lindley was the first of a series of disasters which seemed to show that Lord Roberts had pushed on too hastily.

Rundle's endeavour to help Spragge by a demonstration in the direction of Bethlehem soon came to an end. It is said that a telegram in which he announced the movement to Brabant fell into the hands of the Boers, who promptly utilized the information. On May 29 he was seriously checked at the Biddulphsberg, where they had taken up a position. He failed in an attack on what he believed was the Boers' flank but which was in reality their front. During the engagement he received a telegram from Head Quarters, dated three days previously, ordering him to join Brabant in the Ficksburg district, and he withdrew from the action, having suffered 186 casualties, some of which were caused by a fire which broke out in the long grass through which he had advanced, and in which helpless wounded men were lying. A brigade of Tucker's Division under Clements took his place at Senekal.

De Wet now set himself in person to execute the task entrusted to him by Botha of getting behind the British force in the Transvaal and breaking or interrupting the line of communication in the Free State. He had not long to wait for opportunities. He left Frankfort with 800 men, and on June 2 placed himself in observation near Heilbron, where Colvile was awaiting a supply column from the railway at Roodeval. The convoy was harassed from the first by mischances. Against Colvile's orders it was despatched with but a small escort and without guns. When he heard that sufficient protection could not be given, he counter-ordered the convoy, but the message did not arrive until after it had started.

On the second day of the march a body of the enemy was found blocking the road at Zwavel Kranz between Heilbron and Heilbron Road Station. It was De Wet waiting for the convoy.

The news of its plight reached Heilbron Road Station,[45] and a relieving column was sent out, which came within four miles of Zwavel Kranz. No firing, however, was heard, and the officer in command, hastily concluding that all was well, returned to the railway without finding the convoy, which next morning surrendered, the victim of easy-going indifference and neglect.

So far De Wet had done well, but he was only beginning his work. The railway between Bloemfontein and Vereeniging was weakly held by regiments of militia threaded like beads on a string in posts along the line. At Roodeval supplies and stores in large quantities, urgently needed by the Army in the Transvaal, were waiting until the bridge over the Rhenoster River, which had been destroyed by the Boers retreating before Lord Roberts, could be rebuilt. There was scarcely a post that did not beckon to De Wet to come to it.

He was within reach of the railway at three vulnerable points, and he divided the force to attack them simultaneously; himself taking command of the raid on Roodeval, which was held by casual details of departmental troops stiffened by a detachment of militia. Thus an important link in the chain was unable to bear a comparatively slight tension. No one was recognized as being definitely responsible for the railway north of Bloemfontein. The charge of it had been given to an officer who, unknown to the staff, was at the time in hospital and unable to take over his command; detachments were moved promiscuously by orders which came now from Pretoria and now from Bloemfontein; and in the chaos De Wet wriggled in between Colvile and Methuen.

On June 7 Heilbron Road Station, Rhenoster River Bridge, and Roodeval were captured in succession. At the Bridge the Derbyshire Militia fought gallantly for several hours, but were overpowered in a hopeless position, and soon afterwards Roodeval and its accumulated booty fell into the hands of De Wet,[46] who on that day severed Bloemfontein from Pretoria for a week and added nearly 500 men to the muster-roll of his prisoners of war.

It was evident to Lord Roberts that things had taken a serious turn, and that his position in the Transvaal was unsound. In framing his plans for the advance from Bloemfontein, he had naturally expected that the Natal railway would be available as an alternative line of communication soon after he entered the Transvaal; but the movements of Buller were deliberate, and nearly a third of it was still in the enemy's hands. It is probable that Lord Roberts would have been less disinclined to the "steam-rollering" policy if he could have foreseen that on the day he entered Pretoria the Natal Army would be still south of Laing's Nek.

As a preliminary measure pending, the elaboration of a definite scheme to put the Free State in order, Kitchener, who was always held in readiness with steam up to proceed to districts in difficulties and hustle local commandants and their staffs, was sent across the Vaal with a column; and Methuen's Division was set in motion.

On the Bloemfontein side, Kelly-Kenny took temporary charge of all the troops south of Kroonstad, whither a brigade under C. Knox was sent to protect the stores and supplies; and Winburg was strengthened. While C. De Wet was engaged upon his own work his brother P. De Wet, whom he threatened to shoot if he gave in, was discussing terms of surrender with Methuen at Lindley, but as in the contemporaneous negotiations between C. Botha and Buller at Laing's Nek, and between L. Botha and Lord Roberts in the Transvaal, no terms of settlement were arranged; and Methuen quitted a pacificatory colloquy with one brother to encounter the other in arms, and joined Kitchener at Heilbron Road Station on June 10.

De Wet was elbowed away westwards from the railway, but he soon circled back, recrossing it at Lieuw Spruit between Rhenoster River Bridge and Heilbron Road Station, where he not only took fifty prisoners, but almost captured Kitchener, who chanced to be passing through at the time.

It is interesting to speculate briefly on the effect which such a notable capture might have had upon the general situation. The Boers themselves would hardly have realized its importance. They were unaware of the position held by Kitchener in the British Army, and his name was unfamiliar to them. He had been here and there like many another commander whom they had met in the field. Still, they had never yet captured an unwounded general officer, and they would no doubt have made a great effort to prevent his services being again available against them.[47] It is, however, unlikely that De Wet would have been able to retain his prisoner for more than a few weeks at most. But no one can say what De Wet could not do. At home it is probable that a disastrous reaction would have followed the news of the railway broken, of Lord Roberts insolated in the Transvaal, and of Lord Kitchener of Khartoum a prisoner of war and possibly a hostage. It is very doubtful whether the nation, entangled by fresh difficulties and deafened by pro-Boer yells growing shriller and shriller every hour, would have remained firm of purpose. It is hardly too much to say that June 12, 1900, was one of the most critical dates in the history of the war.

During the next fortnight, attacks on a convoy for Colvile at Heilbron, on the railway a few miles north of Kroonstad, a threat on Lindley which almost became a siege, and a raid on Virginia Siding by a commando under Roux, which sprang out of the Senekal district, maintained the mutiny, and again showed that however tightly the Boers might seem to be grasped in the hand, some of them were sure to wriggle through the fingers.

It was soon apparent that the Free State would not be brought into subjection by haphazard divagations of brigades and columns; and about the middle of June Lord Roberts planned a systematic and simple campaign. The towns and strategical points were to be strongly held while flying columns shepherded De Wet and his commandos and endeavoured to enfold them. Buller, who arrived at Standerton on June 23, would bar the way should they attempt to retreat into the Transvaal, and a retreat southwards would throw them on to Rundle and Brabant. The four flying columns were based on the line of garrisons which extended from Heidelberg in the Transvaal to Winburg and Senekal in the Free State.

The command of the Heidelberg column, which was strong in mounted troops, was given to Ian Hamilton, but an accident compelled him to hand it over to Hunter, who had come up into the Transvaal after the relief of Mafeking. The Heilbron column was the Highland Brigade of the late IXth Division, which was broken up when Colvile returned to England. At Rhenoster River was Methuen to prevent a break out towards the west. When the Winburg district was cleared by a strong column under Clements, who, a few weeks before, had relieved Rundle at Senekal, he would advance on Bethlehem, Paget at Lindley co-operating with him. As soon as Hunter, who was put in general charge of all the troops engaged, entered the Free State, Macdonald was ordered to join him with the Highland Brigade. Methuen's force at Rhenoster River was soon found to be unnecessary, as the enemy was retreating in the opposite direction, and it was sent into the Transvaal.

At the end of June the columns began to move. Each of them was, as it were, the head of a spear prodding the mob of commandos towards the pen which had been assigned to them. With them, union was not strength, but weakness: the more they were agglomerated the less were they to be feared.



Clements herded Roux, whose commando was the only body known to be at large, towards the kraal, and advanced with Paget to Bethlehem, which was occupied on July 7. The Boers opposed with delaying actions only, capturing but being unable to retain two of Paget's guns, and outside Bethlehem they brought into action and lost a field gun which had been taken from Gatacre at Stormberg, and which now, after half a year's exile in partibus inimicorum, was restored to the British Service. Two days after Clement's entry into Bethlehem, he was joined by Hunter, who had crossed the Vaal on June 29 and had picked up Macdonald at Frankfort.

The Brandwater Basin, into which the Boers had retreated from Bethlehem, taking with them Steyn and the Free State Government, which was set up at Fouriesburg, is a semicircle formed by the Witteberg and Roodeberg at the head-waters of two tributaries of the Caledon, the Little Caledon and the Brandwater; the Caledon being the diameter and the mountains the circumference of the area. The river section of the perimeter lies on the Basuto border, and the mountain section is wild and difficult, there being but four wagon roads into it in nearly seventy-five miles: at Commando, Slabbert's, Retief's, and Naauwpoort Neks. The passes at Witnek, Nelspoort, and the Golden Gate are scarcely better than rough bridle-paths.

The strength of the enemy holding the Basin and the Neks was about 7,000. The Boers had indeed established themselves in an apparently strong defensive position, but they had not been there many days before they began to ask each other what was the good of it to them. They had taken it up against the advice of De Wet, who saw that it was playing the game of Lord Roberts. They had deprived themselves of their mobility and were confined in a house of detention, where they could do no mischief except to each other. They realized too late that De Wet was right. The commandants were at variance and there was indiscipline in the laagers.

De Wet saw that the Brandwater Basin was no place for him. He was beating his wings in a vacuum, and he resolved to get out of it as soon as possible. After a Council of War orders to decamp were issued. The general idea was that a column under De Wet should break out through Slabbert's Nek and make for Kroonstad, and that Roux should take out another column and march on Bloemfontein, a portion of the force being left behind to guard the passes.

On the night of July 15 De Wet, accompanied by Steyn, who went out to establish yet another seat of government, pulled his column, which included 2,600 burghers and 460 vehicles and was nearly three miles long, out of the Basin through Slabbert's Nek. He met with no opposition, and successfully carried out the first episode of the programme.

Hunter at Bethlehem was standing sentry over the northward passes, but want of supplies and deficiency of ammunition prevented him advancing at once on the Basin: and of the range before him he had no accurate maps and knew less about its topography than an astronomer knows of the Mountains of the Moon. While formulating a scheme for blocking the passes, De Wet's sudden outbreak took him by surprise, and he was unable to head the Free State leader, who passed northwards between Bethlehem and Senekal, pursued by Broadwood's cavalry. The hounds were on the scent of the first De Wet hunt.

Rundle, who for two months had been painfully, but not with unnecessary deliberation, pushing his force up the right bank of the Caledon, was at first ordered by Hunter to watch Slabbert's Nek, but on a report that the Boers were about to come out through Commando Nek, he was sent back. The movement, though justified on the assumption that the report, which came on good authority, was correct, was unfortunate, as it left the key of the gate at Slabbert's Nek in the enemy's hands, and allowed De Wet to escape.

De Wet had assigned to himself the initial movement of the withdrawal, and left the rest of the programme to develop itself without him. Roux was put in charge of the Brandwater Basin. De Wet was an unpopular leader. His attempts to leaven the commandos with a little of the military spirit were resented. He had from the first, with only partial success, set his face against the incumbrance of wagons which marched with every commando. On the way to Sannah's Post he had cashiered a commandant named Vilonel for disobeying his orders with regard to transport. His nomination of Roux did not give satisfaction. The partisans of other leaders protested, and it was determined to settle by election the question of the Chief Command. In the meantime, the management was in the hands of a triumvirate composed of Roux, Olivier, and Martin Prinsloo.

In the chaos, the commandos which De Wet had arranged should break out remained in the trap and simplified Hunter's task. In succession, Retief's Nek, Slabbert's Nek, and Commando Nek were taken, the latter by Rundle, who on July 28 joined Hunter at Fouriesburg. Witnek had been abandoned by the Boers, who now had only Naauwpoort Nek and the scarcely practicable Golden Gate open to them.

The Nek was closed by Hunter on July 27, and a position outside the Golden Gate, but not the Gate itself, was occupied. The greater part of the Boer force was now practically sealed up in the Basin.

A Council of War was held to elect a new chief commandant. Had the vote been taken ten days earlier the situation might possibly have been saved, but the belated proceedings which displayed the weakness of a democratically organized army, and which, in the absence of representatives of the commandos not on the spot, were of doubtful validity, only added to the existing confusion. Prinsloo, however, seems to have been informally chosen.

His first act was to endeavour to obtain an armistice from Hunter, who naturally refused it. A few hours later Prinsloo agreed to surrender, and on July 30 the main body of the Boers in the Basin laid down their arms at Slapkranz. Roux, the rival candidate for the Chief Command, protested against the surrender, not only to Prinsloo, but also in person to Hunter, to whom he pleaded, that as Prinsloo had not been duly elected, the act was unauthorized and therefore was not binding on him. Hunter refused to listen to such quibbles. On several occasions during the war the Boers had profited by the honourable reluctance of the British commanders to repudiate an unauthorized raising of the white flag, lest they should be accused of having laid a trap to lure on the enemy. Hunter rightly held that Roux's plea for local option was inadmissible, and that the surrender must apply to the whole force. Roux then yielded.

A large number of burghers, however, as soon as they heard that Prinsloo had agreed to surrender, hurried away under Haasbroek, and scraped through the Golden Gate and joined Olivier and Hattingh outside the Basin. They were successful in evading the capitulation, for Olivier, when informed of it officially under a flag of truce, also declined to be bound by Prinsloo's act, and Hunter was unable to insist upon it. He trekked away towards Harrismith unmolested by the troops watching the Golden Gate, and he baffled for four weeks the columns sent in pursuit by Hunter, who, however, prevented him joining De Wet. He was taken prisoner near Winburg on August 27.

The tangible result of the Brandwater Basin operations was the capture of more than 4,000 Boers and of three guns, two of which had been lost at Sannah's Post. The mountains in which the burghers had taken refuge became a prison, from which they were taken when Hunter came on circuit for the gaol delivery, and on conviction they were sent beyond the seas.

Yet subsequent events showed that Lord Roberts would have made a good bargain if he could have exchanged all the burghers and the guns, and all the loot of horses, cattle, and sheep, for one man who had slipped through Slabbert's Nek on July 15, 1900.

Notes:

[Footnote 44: Napoleon said that "a military order must not be passively obeyed except when it is given by a superior who is on the spot at the moment the order is given, knows the state of things, and can hear objections and give full explanations to the officer charged with executing the order."]

[Footnote 45: Also called Vredefort Road Station.]

[Footnote 46: 660,000 rounds of Lee-Metford ammunition were buried by him for future use.]

[Footnote 47: In the Russian War the Japanese gave orders that a Russian admiral, who was a wounded prisoner of war on board a Japanese torpedo boat, was to be shot if any attempt was made by the Russians to capture it.]



CHAPTER XIII

Nec Celer nec Audax

[Sidenote: Map, p. 50.]

Lord Roberts had almost as much difficulty in bringing Buller out of Ladysmith as he had had in putting him into it. The relieved garrison, wasted and enfeebled by the rigours of the siege, was unfit to take the field, but there does not seem to have been any good reason why the relieving force, or at least a portion of it, should not have been pushed forward boldly without delay. The inaction invited the retreating enemy to halt and occupy the Biggarsberg Range; only a few days after Buller had informed Lord Roberts that he did not expect that any stand would be made south of Laing's Nek. Buller did indeed propose on March 3 to advance on Northern Natal, as well as to attack the Drakensberg passes leading into the Free State; but Lord Roberts thought the scheme premature and ordered him to remain on the defensive, to police the country adjacent to the Harrismith railway with the greater part of his available force, and to send one division round by way of East London to join the central advance under Gatacre. Warren's Division therefore left Ladysmith on March 6. White, to whom Lord Roberts had intended to give a command in the Free State, was compelled by ill health to return to England. The order to "remain strictly on the defensive" was afterwards not unreasonably quoted by Buller in justification of two months of inaction, which, however, Lord Roberts ascribed to other causes, as he had agreed to subsequent proposals made by Buller for offensive action.

The Boers on the Biggarsberg at first numbered about 15,000, but by the end of March many commandos had been attracted away by Lord Roberts' advance to more strenuous fields. Some time passed without any definite action having been agreed upon between Lord Roberts and Buller. The latter objected to almost every proposal made by the former, and sometimes even on reconsideration criticized his own proposals. He was allowed to recall the Vth Division, which after a brief absence rejoined his command; but even with it he protested against an advance on Van Reenen's Pass, which he had himself proposed and which he was instructed to make at the beginning of April, because Lord Roberts would consent to the employment of one division only in it. Lord Roberts did not insist on the movement, as Buller now said that it would endanger not only his own force, but also Natal; and finding that Buller had far more troops than he could usefully employ, ordered him to send the Xth Division under Hunter round to Kimberley. Even after its departure Buller outnumbered the enemy by more than five to one.

He was still haunted by the troubles of the Tugela, and was unable to nerve himself for the risks that every leader must run. The Boers bewildered him. He could plan no scheme without a conviction that somehow their "knavish tricks" would frustrate it, and his inactivity made him more prone than ever to brood over possible mischances. He remained in Ladysmith because it was the only course open to him after he had by a process of elimination considered and rejected all the alternatives. Each of them had its disadvantages and its dangers, therefore it were better to stay where he was. During a critical period the Natal Army was of as little use to Lord Roberts as were the Spanish contingents to Wellington in the Peninsula; and its laggard action retarded the progress of the war. Lord Roberts laid his plans for the advance on the assumption that it would be in operation on his right flank when he reached Pretoria, and if L. Botha had found it pressing on him when he was playing at peace-making in June, instead of engaged in equally fruitless negotiations with his brother 180 miles away at Laing's Nek, it is improbable that he would have continued the struggle.

On May 2 Lord Roberts informed Buller that he was ready to start from Bloemfontein, and that he expected the Natal Army to co-operate with him by attacking the Boers on the Biggarsberg, and then advancing towards the Transvaal. For this movement Buller considered that his force, which consisted of three divisions of infantry and three brigades of mounted troops, in all about 45,000 men, was insufficient; but he proceeded to carry it out. The Boers were in occupation of the whole line of the Biggarsberg from Helpmakaar westwards, and commanded the roads as well as the railway running through the range.

Buller on this occasion determined rightly upon a turning movement. All his previous attacks had either been frontal or had been made so by the enemy. His plan was to move eastwards with the IInd Division under Clery, while the Vth Division under Hildyard, who succeeded Warren when the latter was called away to Bechuanaland, advanced up the railway against the Boer centre. The IVth Division under Lyttelton, composed of the infantry which had been in Ladysmith during the siege, was kept in reserve pending the development of the turning movement, which began on May 11, and was skilfully conducted by Buller and was entirely successful. Places and rivers which had not been named in the chronicle of the war since October of the previous year now emerged from their obscurity. Elandslaagte became the fulcrum of an aggressive operation. Sunday's River and the Waschbank River after an interval of seven months were again crossed by British troops, not, like Yule's force, in hasty retreat, but in confident advance.

The Boers prepared for, and fully expected, a direct advance on Beith by way of Van Tender's Pass, but Buller made for the extreme flank of the range near Helpmakaar, which they held but lightly. It was rendered untenable on May 13, and after dark they retired on Beith, setting fire to the veld to mask the movement and hinder pursuit. At dawn Dundonald pushed on through the flames and smoke with his mounted infantry, but was checked by a body of Irish traitors who were acting as rearguard to their flying employers, and was unable to come up with the burghers. On the following night his patrols reported that Dundee was clear, and Buller occupied the town and reached Newcastle on May 18. The success of the turning movement was due in a great measure to a small force under Bethune, which had been lying for some months lower down the Tugela, and which Buller called up to threaten Helpmakaar from the south while he advanced from the west. It had been originally detached to protect his right flank during the advance on Ladysmith, and after long inaction as a watching force was restored to the strenuous campaign.

Of the rest of Buller's troops, one portion only, namely Hildyard's Division, was actively engaged in the movement. Its menace to the Boer centre near Glencoe, through which passed the railway to the north, attracted commandos away from the enemy's left flank at Helpmakaar and facilitated the turning movement. Lyttelton's Division and two cavalry brigades, which although Buller had informed Lord Roberts that he "was short of his proper strength" for the advance he had left behind near Ladysmith, took no part in it; and the absence of the cavalry allowed the enemy to retreat without molestation. The advance of Hildyard's Division was retarded, not by opposition, but by the duty which fell upon it of repairing the railway along which it advanced, and it did not reach Newcastle until May 27. On the 23rd Lytteltonand most of the cavalry were ordered up from Ladysmith.

As soon as Buller reached Newcastle he sent on Dundonald to reconnoitre the Laing's Nek position. On the west it was flanked by Majuba Hill, on the east by Pougwana, and was found to be strongly held. He therefore decided to make no further advance until he had concentrated his force at Newcastle. The cutting edge of the reconstructed Natal wedge had not as yet sufficient substance behind it to warrant its being put into operation. Pending the assembly of the Army Buller prodded across the Buffalo at Vryheid and Utrecht in order to safeguard his right flank. The expedition against the former town was ambushed and compelled to retire; while the two strong columns which were sent against Utrecht were hardly more successful. The town did indeed profess to surrender, but no garrison was left to enforce the submission, and on the withdrawal of the troops the Boers hovering in the hills returned like birds who have been temporarily scared out of their nests.

By the end of May, Buller's Army was concentrated in the northern corner of Natal. Towering over his left front was the Drakensberg Range through which Botha's Pass runs into the Orange Free State; on his right front was the Buffalo River with a difficult country beyond; and on his front was Majuba of ill-omened memory and Laing's Nek, over which the road to Volksrust and the Transvaal passed.

Buller remained at Newcastle for eighteen days, of which three were an armistice during negotiations for surrender with C. Botha, who was unable to accept the terms offered. On June 5 the advance was resumed, Laing's Nek being the immediate objective. At first Buller proposed to attack it directly, but soon after reaching Newcastle he found that the enemy was unassailably established on the position, and that it must be turned either from the east or from the west. The former movement would involve a wider detour through difficult country to the line of advance which would be taken up after the Transvaal was entered, and the western movement through Botha's Pass was therefore selected. Lord Roberts had for some time been in favour of it, but he had intended that it should be more than a mere turning operation. His advance from Bloemfontein had driven many of the commandos into the N.E. corner of the Free State, and he asked Buller to cross the Drakensberg and take them in rear by passing into the Transvaal by way of Vrede; but Buller could not be persuaded to remove himself so far from the railway. He had already missed an opportunity of co-operating with the main advance by a westward movement from Ladysmith to Van Reenen's Pass along the railway to Harrismith, where the presence of a division of the Natal Army would have been of the greatest use. The relations between Lord Roberts and Buller during the Natal campaign were rather those of leaders commanding the armies of allied nations than of superior officer and subordinate.

Thus the westward movement, instead of being a helpful operation at large in support of the main advance, was whittled down to the turning of Laing's Nek. Between Botha's Pass and Laing's Nek the dominant contours roughly assume the outline of a sickle and its handle, the Pass being at the end of the handle and the Nek near the point of the blade. Within the curve of the blade stands the high Inkwelo Mountain facing Majuba Hill, and at the upper end of the handle is a mountain of less elevation called Inkweloane. The Ingogo River, which rises near the Pass, is flanked on its right bank by Van Wyk's Hill, which commands the eastern approach to the Pass, and on its left bank by Spitz Kop, a detached hill of the main range.

Inkwelo had been held for some days by a portion of Clery's Division. The Boers occupied Spitz Kop and the ridge from Inkweloane to the Pass and a short section beyond it, but their line was thin. The Vryheid and Utrecht affairs had deceived them into the belief that an eastward turning movement was in contemplation. On June 6 Van Wyk's Hill was occupied by Hildyard and held against the enemy on Spitz Kop, who attempted to dislodge him; and by the following morning artillery had been brought up, and the Pass and the enemy's position on the adjacent crestline were commanded. These on June 8 were carried by an infantry movement in echelon with loss of two men killed. Spitz Kop offered no resistance. A fusillade broke out on Inkweloane, but Dundonald's brigade soon quenched it by a determined ascent up alpine slopes to the crestline As at Helpmakaar the enemy set fire to the grass and passed away behind a veil of smoke.

The capture of Botha's Pass was an affair which did credit to Buller. It showed that since Colenso he had learnt how to use artillery, and his disposition of his guns was admirable. They rendered the enemy's position untenable and left little but hard climbing to the infantry. It can hardly be termed a battle, it was rather an autumn manoeuvre engagement, conducted on Lord Roberts' principles. A very important position was won and the enemy driven back with scarcely the shedding of a drop of blood on either side. Hildyard was in executive charge of the operations.

Thus, after eight months' fighting, the main body of the Natal Army was at last in bivouac in the enemy's country. Buller had taken Botha's Pass with three infantry and two cavalry brigades; and with these he made for his next objective, the town of Volksrust in the Transvaal, a few miles north of Laing's Nek, which Clery at Ingogo was watching from the south. Lyttelton was posted on the left bank of the Buffalo watching the right flank of the advance.

Buller's operations in the Free State lasted two days only. On June 10 he engaged a small body of the retreating enemy and entered the Transvaal. In front of him was the Versamelberg, a spur of the Drakensberg, over which the road from Vrede to Volksrust passes at Alleman's Nek, where 2,000 Boers with four guns had taken up a very strong position. The road rises to the Nek between heights, and the initial movements of the attack had to be made across two miles of open veld. The burghers had not had the time, or did not think it necessary, to strengthen the position artificially, but they were observed throwing up some entrenchments when Buller approached.

His bivouac on June 10 was at the Gansvlei Spruit on the Transvaal-Free State border, and next day at dawn he resumed his march on Volksrust. No serious opposition was encountered until early in the afternoon, when Dundonald, who was operating on the right front, came under artillery fire from the Nek. The infantry, whose left flank was watched by Brocklehurst with a cavalry brigade, was then ordered to advance, the objective of the 2nd Brigade under E. Hamilton being the ridge on the left of the Nek, and that of the 10th Brigade under Talbot Coke the ridges on the right of it, the 11th Brigade under Wynne being kept in reserve.

The advance was made under a heavy and worrying but not very effective fire from each section of the ridge. The key of the position proved to be a conical hill on the right of the road at the entrance to the Nek. The Dorsets of Coke's brigade gallantly climbed the slopes, and aided by artillery fire carried it with the bayonet. The fight, however, was far from ended. The Boers beyond remained until the shells which had been pouring on the conical hill followed them to the crestline. Then again the Dorsets threw themselves upon the enemy, and by sunset the heights on the right of the Nek were in possession of Coke. Almost simultaneously E. Hamilton established himself on the left of it. The resistance offered to Dundonald on the right flank was more effective; and as between him and his immediate opponents the day waned upon an uncertain issue. He had driven them out of successive positions though not actually off the ridge; but the occupation of the Nek made further opposition useless and they withdrew during the night.

The capture of Alleman's Nek rendered Laing's Nek untenable, and Clery closing up from Ingogo next day found it abandoned. The enemy had evacuated the whole of the Majuba-Laing's Nek-Pougwana position, leaving scarcely so much as a wagon behind him, and was retreating northwards. The westward turning movement was tactically a success but strategically a failure. With three brigades of mounted troops under his orders, including some regiments of regular cavalry which were lying idle at Ladysmith and elsewhere, Buller made no attempt to cut off the retreating Boers. A daring raid, such as had been twice made by French on the Modder four months before, concurrently with the Botha's Pass operations would have had a good chance of crushing C. Botha; and Brockleburst's cavalry, which during the attack on the Nek was working somewhat widely on the left flank, might well have been sent to bar the way. The ponderous movements of Buller were in strange contrast to the activity of his ally Lord Roberts. The Natal Army made its way through the country like an elephant trampling through a sugar-cane plantation.

On June 13 Buller entered Volksrust and next day established his Head Quarters at Laing's Nek. Wakkerstroom, a town which threatened his right flank, surrendered pro form to Lyttelton on June 13, and again to Hildyard four days later; and no doubt would have been equally ready to accommodate itself to the wishes of any other column sent to it, but after each surrender it reasserted itself, and Buller was obliged to leave it in charge of the commandos.

With the occupation of Laing's Nek the Natal campaign, which had lasted eight months, came to an end, and Buller, having left a strong force under Lyttelton in charge of Natal, passed up the railway to Heidelberg; where on July 4 he for the first time came into physical touch with the main Army under Lord Roberts. By a curious coincidence he here met Hart's Brigade of the Xth Division, which had left his command three months previously at Ladysmith, and which had in the meantime marched up from Kimberley.

[Sidenote: Map, p. 292.]

Lord Roberts' plan for the Natal Army was that it should march across the veld to the Delagoa Bay railway and co-operate in his movement to clear the Eastern Transvaal. The Brandwater Basin surrender relieved the railway in Natal from immediate danger and allowed the ample force holding it to be reduced. At the end of July Buller was instructed to lead 11,000 of his men across a sparsely populated country where no railway was. It was for him a novel phase of warfare. Hitherto he had hardly dared trust himself out of sight of a culvert. But he was a man from whom the terror of the unknown very soon passed away when he had no choice but to face it. In Natal he would have stood aghast at a suggestion that he should cut away his moorings and be wafted by the winds of war for ten days or more across a strange ocean. If hitherto he had been nec celer nec audax now he became at least audax. Lord Roberts had imbued him with the progressive spirit. He raised no difficulties of his own, and he encountered those arising out of the situation resolutely and successfully. His army was strung out upon the railway from Ladysmith to Heidelberg; his transport was still organized regimentally, a system which had hampered Lord Roberts' movements and was soon abolished in the main body; and oxen, mules, and wagons were scarce. For infantry he chose the IVth Division under Lyttelton, and for cavalry the brigades under Brocklehurst and Dundonald.

On August 7 Buller's column quitted the Natal line;[48] its destination being Belfast on the Delagoa Bay line, along which Lord Roberts was now advancing.

Its progress may be compared to the course of a steamer across an unquiet ocean. The waves raised by a fresh gale on the starboard bow were cleft by the stem, only to reunite behind the churn of the propeller. They were powerless to abridge the day's run by many miles, but they could still swing forwards to the shore. On one occasion the ship was slowed down to a standstill by a fog.

The waves were the commandos of the district, most of which had retired under C. Botha from the Laing's Nek positions. Buller had not much difficulty in dealing with them as obstructions to his advance, and in succession he occupied Amersfort, Ermelo, and Carolina; but they soon returned to their stations. His own inclinations would probably have persuaded him to halt and smash them, but he was marching against time between two widely separated bases. Near Carolina on August 14 he came in touch with French, who was acting with Lord Roberts' eastward movement from Pretoria, and from that date the operations of the Natal Army were merged in those of the main Army, and came under the immediate direction of the Commander-in-Chief.

A scheme proposed by French and sanctioned in substance by Lord Roberts, for an immediate cavalry turning movement round the left flank of the enemy, who was strongly posted astride the railway near Belfast; in conjunction with a central infantry advance to be made by Buller and Pole-Carew, whose Division was within reach, was discountenanced by Buller, and a simple frontal movement was substituted for it. Its practicability was doubtful owing to the marshy character of the ground.

On August 25 Buller, French, and Pole-Carew entered Belfast, where they were joined by Lord Roberts.

Notes:

[Footnote 48: i.e. the section of the railway from Johannesburg to Natal which is in the Transvaal.]



CHAPTER XIV

The Taming of the Transvaal

The course of the war north of the Vaal after the battle of Diamond Hill up to the date of Lord Roberts' arrival at Belfast seven weeks later was tortuous and difficult. The main Army changed front as soon as Pretoria was reached and faced to the east in the direction of the retreating Transvaal Government. Its line of communication became a prolongation of its front; its left flank towards the north was open; and on its rear was the unsubdued country west of the capital in the direction of Mafeking and Vryburg.

Through this district, which is intersected by ranges running generally east and west, and which contains some towns of importance, the troops set free by the relief of Mafeking advanced in two columns towards Pretoria and Johannesburg. The southern column was Hunter's Xth Division, which after easily occupying Potchefstroom and Krugersdorp, passed through Johannesburg, and on Hunter's being sent into the Free State was broken up at Heidelberg. The northern column, under Baden-Powell, occupied Rustenburg and met with little opposition during the month of June. It was intended by Lord Roberts, if all went well, that this column should eventually take up a position on the Pietersburg railway, north of Pretoria, which was unprotected in that direction.

The inactivity of the Boers seemed to show that they had really lost heart, and that an awakening such as that which came a few weeks after the entry into Bloemfontein was improbable. Earlier in the month of June there had been negotiations for peace, not only between subordinate leaders in the Free State and Natal, but also between the two Commanders-in-Chief in Pretoria; and although they were broken off, the fact that they had occurred made the silence more significant and gave hope that the enemy was reconsidering his position.

The illusion was soon dispelled. Whether owing to the natural resilience of the Boer character after a brief phase of doubt, or to the news of De Wet's successful attacks on the railway in the Free State, the smouldering fires broke out anew early in July. Delarey, who had checked French at Diamond Hill, came out of the east to quicken the west; the baffled burghers of Snyman, released from the siege of Mafeking, were trickling vaguely into the district; a force under Grobler of Waterberg was reported north of Pretoria; an incursion was made across the Vaal from the Free State; and commandos appeared south of the Magaliesberg near Olifant's Nek and Commando Nek, thus threatening the movements of Baden-Powell, who was operating north of the range and who had occupied Commando Nek and the adjacent Zilikat's Nek on July 2, leaving only a small force at Rustenburg. Five days later the Boers failed in an attempt to recapture the town, which was saved by a detachment of the Rhodesian Field Force.

This force, which was under the command of Sir F. Carrington, was composed mainly of mounted contingents from the Colonies. It had been raised a few months before at the instance of the British South Africa Company to hold the northern frontier of the Transvaal, which after Plumer's departure for the south was unguarded, and to deny Rhodesia to the Boers should they attempt to break out northwards. It was from the first under a sort of dual control which militated against its efficiency. The Company made the arrangements for its enrolment and equipment, while the War Office provided the staff. It was in difficulties from the first. By a somewhat strained interpretation of a treaty between Great Britain and Portugal, and after some weeks of diplomatic discussion and in spite of a protest naturally made by the Transvaal Government, the Rhodesian Field Force was permitted to land on Portuguese territory at Beira in April and to move up country. Its advance was further delayed by a break of gauge on the railway between Beira and Buluwayo; it was pulled hither and thither, and was never able to co-operate effectively with the general operations. It was moved in driblets, and some details did not reach Buluwayo until September. A portion of it came along the Western line, and Rustenburg was saved by the Imperial Bushmen. At the end of the year it was disbanded.

[Sidenote: Map, p. 240.]

On July 11 three blows were struck by the Boers with success. The attempt on Rustenburg drew back Baden-Powell, whose place at Zilikat's and Commando Neks was taken by a regiment of regular cavalry which happened to be passing that way. As it was required elsewhere, a body of infantry was sent out from Pretoria to take over the Neks, and on the night of July 10 Zilikat's Nek was held by three companies and a squadron. Next day, after a struggle which lasted throughout the day, it was captured by Delarey, and two guns and nearly 200 prisoners of war fell into his hands. The disaster, the first of its kind in the Transvaal, was due to two causes. The British force actually at the Nek was insufficient to hold it; and the main body of the cavalry stood aloof. The latter was no doubt in a dubious position. It was under orders, which were brought by the infantry relief, to meet Smith-Dorrien nearly twenty-five miles away on July 11; and when the enemy was seen occupying a strong position on the Nek, it assumed that assistance would be of no avail, and beyond a short artillery bombardment nothing was done. Even the squadron holding Commando Nek was ordered to retire at midday. A relieving force was sent out from Pretoria, but it arrived too late to avert the disaster.

The cavalry thus delayed was intended to reinforce a column under Smith-Dorrien, who had come up into the Transvaal with Ian Hamilton's column, and who was marching from Krugersdorp to take off the pressure from the south on Baden-Powell at Rustenburg; Olifant's Nek, over which the road to the town passed, being in the possession of the Boers. On July 11, when Smith-Dorrien had marched about ten miles from his starting point, he met a commando at Dwarsvlei, which was so well handled that not only was he compelled to retire on Krugersdorp, but also had much difficulty in bringing away his guns. The failure was chiefly due to the non-appearance of the cavalry, without which he did not feel himself justified in standing up to the enemy.

On the same day another cavalry regiment was in trouble. Onderste Poort, a few miles north of Pretoria, was attacked by Grobler of Waterberg, and while reinforcements were on their way he drove back still nearer to the capital the force which was holding the outpost, and forced one troop to surrender.

The situation was alarming. The districts west and south-west of the capital were infested by energetic commandos which had thwarted all Baden-Powell's and Smith-Dorrien's efforts to suppress them, and Grobler was threatening Pretoria from the north. There were indications that the enemy's plan was to transfer the opposition from the east to the west; and if so, then Lord Roberts' force, whose front after Diamond Hill faced eastwards, would have to conform to the movement. A few weeks previously it had been weakened by the departure of Hunter's strong column for the Free State, and now Lord Roberts was compelled to redress the balance by calling up Methuen's Division from Lindley to Krugersdorp, where it arrived on July 18. French was ordered to operate north of Pretoria with cavalry, and a column under Ian Hamilton[49] was also sent up.

Methuen marched at once on Rustenburg, and cleared Olifant's Nek on July 21. The scheme of shutting up the Boers in it failed, as Baden-Powell was unable to close the northern exit, and they escaped with slight loss.

At the beginning of August the situation was, if anything, worse. The events which succeeded the occupation of Bloemfontein were repeating themselves in the Western Transvaal. Methuen had been recalled from the Rustenburg expedition to deal with an outbreak on the line from Johannesburg to Klerksdorp, which fell into the hands of the enemy; 5,000 Boers were reported to be on or near the Magaliesberg; a small British force was besieged in Brakfontein, west of Rustenburg, on the road to Mafeking; De Wet was at large in the Free State, and it seemed probable that he would come up into the Transvaal and add to the trouble.

At the end of July Ian Hamilton's force was diverted from its movement towards the north and ordered westward to relieve and bring away Baden-Powell; and Carrington was instructed to co-operate from Mafeking. Lord Roberts had decided to abandon Rustenburg and Olifant's Nek and the greater part of the Magaliesberg. These detached positions detained more troops than he could spare[50] and were difficult to supply. Ian Hamilton's trek lasted only a few days. He recaptured Zilikat's Nek, and on August 5 brought away Baden-Powell, who left Rustenburg most unwillingly and who was ready to sustain another siege in it. Lord Roberts, however, would not heed his repeated protests, and the only section of the Magaliesberg held after the withdrawal from Rustenburg was that lying between Pretoria and Zilikat's and Commando Neks. Rustenburg and Olifant's Nek had called for the diversion of three columns in succession: Smith-Dorrien's, which did not reach them, and then Methuen's and Ian Hamilton's; and the abandonment of them was imperative. From the west Carrington made an attempt to relieve Brakfontein on August 5, but was compelled by the presence of the enemy in superior force to return to Mafeking. The relief was effected ten days later, not from the west, but by Lord Kitchener with a column that had been engaged in the pursuit of De Wet.

Suddenly all the operations were deranged by the news that De Wet had crossed the Vaal at Schoeman's Drift on August 6, and the greater part of the British Army in the Transvaal was either directly or indirectly turned on to the pursuit of one man; Lord Kitchener, as usual when energy and pushing power rather than tactical skill were looked for, being placed in general charge of the operations. The two most determined and unfaltering men in South Africa were now pitted against one another.

De Wet's escape from the Brandwater Basin on July 15 was soon discovered and he was unable to get a good start. Broadwood's and Little's mounted brigades were sent after him, now and then taking long shots at him or worrying his rearguard. His object was to conduct Steyn and the Free State Government officials into the Transvaal, where they could co-operate with Kruger. He chose the route which appeared to him, and rightly so, to be the line of least resistance, namely, towards the Vaal Drifts near Potchefstroom; instead of making for the upper reaches of the river, on the other side of which Buller was established on the Natal railway.

It was soon found impossible to overtake him, even with mounted troops. The only course was to shepherd him into a fold from which he could not escape. The tracery on the map of his movements and of those of his chief scout Theron, intersected by the reticulations of the pursuing columns, resembles a spider's web in disorder.

[Sidenote: Map, p. 292.]

Finally he was hemmed in on the left bank of the Vaal near Reitzburg. On the right bank Methuen, supported by Smith-Dorrien, was watching the drifts. He did his best, but his force was insufficient for the purpose, and on August 6 De Wet, with it is said no less than 400 wagons, entered the Transvaal at Schoeman's Drift, the greater part of Methuen's force having been sent to hold a drift lower down. Methuen doubled back and fell upon the Boer rearguard, which, though driven out of successive positions, maintained itself long enough to allow the main body to escape unscathed.

De Wet's subsequent movements greatly puzzled his pursuers. He divided his column into two portions which did not always march in the same direction, and it was therefore difficult to discern the ruling movement of his trek. At one time it appeared that he was about to re-cross into the Free State, and the plans for the northward pursuit were temporarily suspended; to be resumed when he had received an allowance of one day's start. It is probable that his original intention had been to return to his own country as soon as he had put Steyn and the officials into the Transvaal, leaving them with an escort to find their own way to Kruger, and that he was prevented by the appearance of a strong column under Kitchener on the left bank. As a Free Stater, moreover, he would be disinclined to give his services to the Transvaal.

Kitchener crossed the Vaal on August 8, and hung to De Wet's right rear, Methuen hanging on to the left rear; but neither was able to do more than clutch vainly at the skirts of the elusive column. In front of De Wet, Smith-Dorrien was holding the Klerksdorp railway, but again he misled his pursuers, and instead of trekking north after he had crossed the Gatsrand, a movement which Smith-Dorrien anticipated and provided for, he changed direction, and on August 11 passed over the railway at a section which had been left unoccupied on Smith-Dorrien's right flank.

[Sidenote: Map, p. 240.]

Lord Roberts saw that Methuen's and Kitchener's pursuit would probably fail, and that De Wet would reach the Magaliesberg. Ian Hamilton was instructed to prevent him crossing it, and on August 11 he was specifically ordered to occupy Olifant's Nek. Commando Nek was held by Baden-Powell. There was a third pass, the Magato Nek, a few miles west of Rustenburg, for which De Wet was apparently making, and which seemed to be his only possible way of escape, as it was confidently assumed that the other passes were held by British troops. It was, therefore, only necessary to head him from Magato Nek, and this was done by Methuen. But the movement threw De Wet towards Olifant's Nek, which to his great astonishment was not occupied, and through which he passed with Steyn on August 14 and shook off his pursuers. Ian Hamilton had not been made to understand that the actual closing of Olifant's Nek was an urgent matter; and he, in fact, informed Lord Roberts that he did not propose to do so except indirectly by a movement which would command the approach to it.

In this, the first of the De Wet hunts, nearly 30,000 British troops were directly or indirectly engaged in heading or pursuing over an area of 7,000 square miles. Nine columns blindly zigzagged and divagated to false scents and imperfect information in chase of one man encumbered with a civil government on the run and several hundred wagons. Again and again the fowler's net was cast upon the migrant, who always wriggled through the meshes. In one month he trekked 270 miles from the Brandwater Basin to the north of the Magaliesberg, with British troops continuously to his flanks, his front, and his rear.

It would have been regarded as the most notable personal exploit of the war if De Wet had not himself twice repeated it under circumstances of even greater difficulty. It must be acknowledged that his daring and resolution deserved success. He did not attain it by the means of followers eager to serve a trusted and beloved leader, for they by no means rose to him. When he reached the Vaal he was careful to throw the burghers' wagons across the river first of all, knowing that their unwillingness to leave the Free State would be overcome by their greater reluctance to sever themselves from their oxen and stuff. He owed his success mainly to the power of a strong will to make weaker wills work for it; and in a less degree to the accuracy of the information which Theron, his chief scout, obtained for him.

It is at least doubtful whether Lord Roberts did not take De Wet too seriously. Was the capture of a guerilla leader worth the withdrawal of so many British troops from the main operations, and would not the sounder strategy have been to ignore him? If he had been severely let alone, he would hardly have done more than that which he did with the strength of an Army Corps against him, and his prestige with his own people would not have been so surely set up.

The escape of De Wet was an incident of war, which, having regard to all the circumstances of the campaign, could not be made impossible. Columns working independently under directions from Head Quarters cannot be made aware of all that each has or has not done, and must take many things for granted; and the information of the enemy's movements which reaches them from the same source must often be received too late for effective action. If Lord Roberts had listened to Baden-Powell's protest against the evacuation of Rustenburg and Olifant's Nek, De Wet would probably have followed Cronje to St. Helena; but that does not prove that the policy of withdrawing from remote and exposed positions was unsound. All that can be said against it is that it chanced to be carried out a few days too soon.

Steyn and the officials left for Machadodorp. De Wet felt that his own country had a claim upon his services, and desired to return to it without delay. He divided his force, leaving the greater part under Steenekamp north of the Magaliesberg, himself going south with a small commando. The division materially aided his return, for it was not known for certain at Head Quarters with which portion he was marching. While he was in imagination being chased north of Pretoria, he was in fact scaling a rough mountain path, for all the passes had been closed, near Commando Nek, and looking down from the heights upon a British force by which he was not discovered. On August 21, after an absence of sixteen days, he recrossed the Vaal, and entered the Free State. The net result of all the labour, all the efforts, and all the consequent distress and exhaustion to which the British troops had willingly subjected themselves, was to re-establish De Wet as a greater power for mischief than ever.

The Free Staters under Steenekamp joined Grobler of Waterberg, but the combination was hustled to the north out of striking distance of Pretoria by Baden-Powell, whose purely military service in South Africa ceased soon after. He had been selected to raise and to command the South African Constabulary, a semi-military body, which it was hoped the approaching end of the war would ere long permit to take over some of the duties of the troops.

For some weeks after the escape of De Wet the various columns operating north and west of Pretoria were engaged in patrolling the country. They nowhere encountered serious resistance, but Delarey was neither taken nor crippled.

[Sidenote: Map, p. 292.]

While these events were occurring in Lord Roberts' rear, he was advancing eastwards from Pretoria. The battle of Diamond Hill was followed by a brief period of quietude in the east as well as the west. The objective of the British Army was the railway from Pretoria to Komati Poort, on which the Transvaal Government, covered by Botha at Balmoral, was now dwelling at Machadodorp. The movements of Lord Roberts were for some time controlled by the situation in the Free State and the Western Transvaal, which called more pressingly for attention than the eastward advance.

Early in July a column under Hutton was sent out to feel towards Botha's left. As he was opposed and made little progress, Lord Roberts a few days later reinforced him with French and a cavalry brigade, and on July 11 the combined columns thrust back the Boers from their positions at Witpoort, a few miles south of Diamond Hill. Botha had arranged with the commandants on the other side of Pretoria for concurrent attacks on the British forces in the vicinity of the capital, and his own was the only operation that was foiled on July 11. French's success, however, could not be followed up. He proposed to raid the railway near Balmoral, but Lord Roberts had been made anxious for the safety of Pretoria by the news of the affairs of Zilikat's Nek and Onderste Poort, and recalled him. Hutton was ordered to remain where he was, about twenty-five miles south-east of the capital, with a reduced force.

There were indications that an attack not only on Pretoria but also on Johannesburg was contemplated by the enemy, in collusion with plots for risings against the British which were hatching in each city. It was no time yet for an eastward advance. The successes north and west of Pretoria stimulated Botha to attack what he supposed would strategically now be the most vulnerable section of the perimeter of defence, namely, the section facing him. If it had not been weakened by the withdrawal of troops to the west, troops would probably have been withdrawn from the west to meet him, and the task of Delarey thereby lightened. Either alternative would forward his policy.

[Sidenote: Map, p. 240.]

East of Pretoria Pole-Carew with the XIth Division was in touch with Hutton. Botha recalled Grobler of Waterberg from the north, and on July 16 threw himself upon Pole-Carew and Hutton, near Witpoort. The brunt of the attack fell upon the latter, who, though at first pressed back and outflanked on his right, recovered himself and forced the enemy to retire. His immediate opponent was B. Viljoen, a leader who showed great military capacity in his management of the action. Against the XIth Division Botha demonstrated only. The chief incident of the affair was the holding of an outflanked and commanded kopje position by a few companies of the Royal Irish Fusiliers for six hours.

The scheme for the eastward advance, which Lord Roberts did not feel himself justified in initiating until after the affair of July 16, was that French should rejoin Hutton and take charge of the right; with Ian Hamilton, brought down from his northward demonstration against Grobler, on the extreme left north of the railway, while Pole-Carew advanced with Lord Roberts centrally along it.

[Sidenote: Map, p. 292.]

The advance began on July 23. French, with the natural spirit of a cavalry officer, chafed at being restricted to the slower progress of Pole-Carew's infantry and proposed to push forward boldly and cut the railway east of Middelburg, but Lord Roberts was reluctant to part with the only cavalry he had, and vetoed the movement. Botha was soon frightened out of Balmoral, which had been his Head Quarters since the battle of Diamond Hill, and which was entered by Lord Roberts on July 25. Two days later French rode into Middelburg.

The eastward advance had now gained possession of eighty miles of the Delagoa Bay railway, but the De Wet trouble and the disturbed state of the Western Transvaal made the continuation of the movement unsafe, and Lord Roberts called a halt. It was also advisable to wait until supplies had been collected at Middelburg, and until Buller, who was coming up from the south, was in a position to co-operate. Lord Roberts returned to Pretoria, leaving French in charge. Ian Hamilton, the emergency man, was sent to the west to deal with Delarey and De Wet. Towards the end of August Pole-Carew advanced to near Belfast, where he hoped soon to report himself to Buller.

Nearly three months had now elapsed since the battle of Diamond Hill. The progress of the Transvaal campaign was not very apparent, but it was real. Botha had been driven back along the Delagoa Bay railway, and neither the outbreaks in the Western Transvaal nor the meteoric incursion of De Wet had availed him. Nothing that had occurred elsewhere weakened the western advance to an extent that gave him an opportunity of effectively withstanding it. Buller was approaching, and Lord Roberts was no longer dependent upon one line of communication. The fugitive Free State Government had been driven into asylum with the fugitive Transvaal Government. No commandos were at large which could seriously threaten Bloemfontein, Johannesburg, or Pretoria; and the only organized body which the enemy could bring into the field was confronted by a British Army and had the barrier of the Portuguese frontier behind it. There was good hope that in a few weeks the already undermined fabric of Boerdom would totter to the ground, and that the worst that could happen was that some of the fragments might not fall clear of the British troops.

The arrival of Buller's force from the south gave Lord Roberts, who returned from Pretoria on August 25, the reinforcement justifying the resumption of the eastward advance. He found the troops unfavourably placed for immediate action. Botha was posted on each side of the railway near Belfast; the junction of his right with his left, which had different fronts, forming an obtuse salient angle. The greater part of the British force was south of the line and prevented by the nature of the ground from undertaking an enveloping movement on the enemy's left. Buller had kept the cavalry to heel, and it was lying compressed between him and Pole-Carew, who was entrenched round Belfast.

Lord Roberts' first act was to distribute over a wider front the conglomeration of troops, which were hampering each other's movements. French with his own cavalry, but without Buller's, was sent north of the line to face Botha's right flank and to clear Pole-Carew's left flank, while Buller worked up from the south towards the line.

The movement began on August 26, and by the afternoon French, having made a wide detour, had established himself north of Belfast; thus enabling Pole-Carew to leave the town and extend his division in front of the enemy's right. Buller's movement was at first directly northwards, on account of the soft ground. His march, like that of Pole-Carew on the other flank, was across the enemy's front, but neither of them was seriously checked and the casualties were few.

Buller had proposed to move eastward in the direction of Dalmanutha as soon as the ground permitted, but a cavalry reconnaissance discovered the enemy posted at Bergendal, close to the railway. The position was, in fact, the point of the obtuse angle formed by the two sections of the Boer front, one of which faced S.W. towards Buller, and the other west, towards Pole-Carew; and if it could be carried not only would Botha's line be broken, but Buller would be in a good position to deal with a retreat from either section,

The battle of Bergendal on August 27 was mainly a struggle between less than fourscore Transvaal Police and two battalions and forty guns of Buller's Division. The "Zarps" held a rocky ridge at the end of a spur, where they were bombarded for three hours, yet when the infantry advanced it was met with a vigorous rifle fire, which was continued almost without intermission until at last the kopje was carried by assault. The defence of the kopje was one of the most conspicuous feats of the war on the Boer side, and it is noteworthy that it was made by a body of regularly disciplined men. Owing partly no doubt to the difficulty of reinforcing such an isolated position, no effective support was given by Botha to the gallant little band, neither did he trouble Buller seriously with artillery fire; and the commandos east and north of the Zarps' kopje did little. He does not seem to have recognized that Bergendal was not a mere strong post, but the key of an unsound position which should at all hazards have been safeguarded. This Buller saw at once, and he moved so as to meet with the least interference from the enemy, who, having two fronts, could not act solidly upon either of them.

The capture of Bergendal dissolved the Boer position. The commandos facing Buller were driven off; and the right, which had been opposing French and Pole-Carew so feebly that neither of them suffered a single casualty, fell away. Buller went in pursuit, but was unable to worry the retreat. Some commandos withdrew eastwards along the line, others broke off towards Lydenburg and Barberton. The Boer Governments retired from Machadodorp to Nelspruit. Buller crossed the railway, and on August 29 Helvetia was taken. Next day the British prisoners of war, whom the Boers had brought away in the scuttle from Pretoria when Lord Roberts entered the city, were released at Noitgedacht by their captors, who were no longer in a position to detain them.

Botha had indeed been forced into retreat, but not cut off, and he escaped with all his guns and his losses were comparatively slight. His burghers were, as usual after a lost battle, demoralized and disheartened for the time being, but not, as was thought by the British Army, scared by their reverses into abject impotence. From the time of the occupation of Bloemfontein guerilla had been gradually taking the place of organized warfare, of which Bergendal was the last act, and which the burghers saw that they could not hope to wage successfully. The history of the previous seven months showed what could be won by guerilla, and what could be lost by pretending to be an Army. The fact that they were no longer able to act as a coherent military body did not permanently discourage them, and the struggle had not yet run more than one-third of its weary course.

It was, however, the general belief not only in Great Britain but also in the Army in South Africa, that the Boers had kicked their last kick at Bergendal. There might be a final wriggle or two; but the end was in sight, and before the first anniversary of the declaration of war, peace would again reign in the land. These not ill-founded hopes justified Lord Roberts' Proclamation of September 1, by which the Transvaal was formally incorporated in the British Empire.

To prevent the enemy escaping to the north or to the south, and to impale him upon the stakes of the Portuguese frontier, Lord Roberts pushed forward three columns; one under Pole-Carew to follow the railway towards Komati Poort, another under French to march towards Barberton, and a third under Buller to occupy the Lydenburg district; to which Botha had gone after the battle of Bergendal, and which if held by him would leave in the possession of the Boers the best line of retreat from the railway to the northern Transvaal.

Ian Hamilton, on his return from the west after the escape of De Wet, was lent to Buller for a few days. The occupation of Lydenburg on September 7, and of Spitz Kop four days later, drove Botha back to the line at Nelspruit. Buller's operations were carried out with success in a country more difficult than any that had yet been entered by the British Army in South Africa. South of the railway, French spread the net, casting it from Carolina to Barberton, which he entered on September 13, and where he not only captured a considerable amount of rolling stock and supplies which the Boers had shoved into the little branch line, but also released a final remnant of about a hundred British prisoners of war, most of whom were officers. He had advanced through a country almost as difficult as that in which Buller was engaged, and although the commandos opposing him had at first been drawn away to the south by the report that he was making for Ermelo, they returned in time to offer some resistance east of Carolina; but he entered Barberton without the discharge of a rifle. Botha had sounded the Cease Fire.

The Boers had found it necessary to consider the situation seriously. They had been driven into a relatively minute area, which was morally congested with a pair of Presidents and their parasites, remnants of Government offices, superfluous commandants, and commandos some of which were eager and some of which were not eager to continue the struggle; and physically by the accumulation of stores, supplies, guns, ammunition, and rolling stock which had been rammed down into the last section of the Delagoa Bay railway.

Kruger was induced to lighten the ship which he had so signally failed to keep on her course. He left Nelspruit on September 11 for Lorenzo Marques, where he was taken under the protection of the Portuguese Government, and where he remained until the eve of the first anniversary of the opening scene of the drama, the battle of Talana Hill. On October 19 another nation offered him asylum, and he sailed for Marseilles in the Guelderland, a cruiser of the Dutch Navy; thus symbolically repatriating the French and Dutch emigrants who had quitted Europe for South Africa in the seventeenth century.

The positions of Buller on the north of the railway, of French at Barberton, and of Pole-Carew ready to advance centrally, made immediate action imperative; but Botha was hampered by the presence of not a few unwilling and unmounted commandos. These he sent under Koetzee to Komati Poort and left to arrange their own destiny; and with the rest, which numbered 4,000 burghers, he broke away in two directions, himself with B. Viljoen leading the northward trek, while T. Smuts endeavoured to escape southward into Swaziland.

Thus when Pole-Carew, who had been joined by Ian Hamilton and whose advance had been delayed to allow French and Buller to get into position on his flanks, reached Komati Poort on September 24, he found himself hitting at vacancy with the wreckage of two lost republics around him, derelict railway stock, disabled guns, abandoned ammunition, and burning stores. Koetzee's men had disappeared, most of them into Portuguese territory, which they had been partly persuaded and partly compelled to enter by the Portuguese authorities, who, although they had regarded the Boer cause with a more than benevolent neutrality during the earlier stages of the war, now saw that a fight near the frontier would be a most embarrassing episode; and, while offering an asylum to the fugitives, threatened to allow Lord Roberts to land troops at Lorenzo Marques if it were not accepted. On the 28th Pole-Carew was engaged not in battle with the Boers, but in celebrating the birthday of the King of Portugal, a singular interlude between the acts of the war drama.

Botha in making for the north hoped to establish his remnant and cultivate the germs somewhere in the Leydsdorp or Pietersburg districts, which were the only portions of the Transvaal not occupied by British troops. Lord Roberts' expectations that they would be denied to the enemy by the Rhodesian Field Force under Carrington were not fulfilled, and he could not spare any of his own troops to occupy them.

Botha, preceded by a few days by Steyn, left the Delagoa Bay line on September 17, and succeeded in scraping past Buller without serious excoriation, but he was compelled to send the greater part of his force under B. Viljoen by a circuitous route through the unhealthy lower veld.

The enemy was now to all appearances chased to the ends of the earth, but throughout October and November roving bodies worried the railway and detained a considerable British force upon it.

Commandos that could not be accounted for by the British Intelligence Staff seemed to spring out of the ground. Trains were de-railed, raids and counter-raids north and south were the order of the day. Lydenburg was prowled upon. Botha and Viljoen, stirred by Steyn, hovered in the north, and Viljoen went south to co-ordinate the several activities. On November 19 he effected a temporary success at Balmoral, capturing a small post and cutting the railway, but it served him little and he soon retired.

Of the force engaged in the Komati Poort advance, the Guards' Brigade, which the hopeful situation would soon, it was thought, allow to be sent home, as well as French's cavalry and other troops, had been withdrawn; and a column under Paget which was operating west of Pretoria had to be called up to expel Viljoen from a position which he afterwards took up twenty miles north of the railway at Rhenosterkop. The affair was the only serious action during October and November.

French did not advance beyond Barberton. Early in October he was ordered to clear the country lying between the Natal and the Delagoa Bay railways. At first opposed by Smuts and subsequently impeded by bad weather, transport difficulties, and constant sniping, his movement resembled a retreat rather than a voluntary advance, and it was so regarded by the commandos. When he reached Heidelberg on October 26, he had lost half his oxen and a third of his wagons.

After the conclusion of the Komati Poort operations Buller returned to England. No general officer serving in South Africa was regarded by the non-commissioned officers and men under his command with greater affection and admiration. The Natal Army was held together in spite of disasters and failures by the personality of its leader. He had made not a few mistakes, but they never lost him the confidence of his troops, who, when he left their camp at Lydenburg, said farewell to him with an extraordinary demonstration of genuine regret.

At the end of November the command of the British Forces in South Africa was taken over by Lord Kitchener from Lord Roberts, who sailed for England in the belief that the war was practically over. He had completed the task which he had set himself when he landed at Capetown ten months before. At that time hardly even a scout had quitted British territory; now almost every mile of railway and every considerable town of the two republics, except Pietersburg, was in the possession of the British Army; the Boer Governments had been expelled; Natal was free; organized resistance had ceased; the remnants of a baffled and bewildered enemy were prowling aimlessly in small bodies. All the precedents indicated a speedy termination of the War.

When Lord Roberts left the shadow of Table Mountain the last word in Strategy and Tactics had been spoken, and the war gradually became a problem in Mechanics. His strategy was freely criticized at first, but it proved to be sound; and the only fault that could be found with his tactics was that like a skilful chess player he always endeavoured to defeat his opponent with the least possible loss on either side.

The organization of a European Army had been found inefficient for dealing with Boer guerilla. The Army Corps fell to pieces as soon as it landed in South Africa; and as time went on the Divisions, the Brigades, and even many of the regimental units were one by one liquidated and re-shuffled into columns.[51]