The president had resolved that he would not go to Lima till he had completed the purposes of his mission, by the final conquest of Gonzalo and his adherents, and the restoration of peace and order in the kingdom of Peru; on which account he transmitted orders to all quarters, that all who had declared for his majesty should meet him in the valley of Jauja, which he considered to be a convenient situation in which to assemble the whole loyal force of the kingdom, as in that place abundance of provisions could easily be procured. For this purpose, he sent orders to Lorenzo de Aldana, then at Lima, to march with all his force for Jauja; and joining the army under Hinojosa, now exceeding a thousand men, he marched for Jauja, all the army expressing the utmost satisfaction at the prospect of being freed from the tyranny of Gonzalo. Many of the principal persons who had joined with Gonzalo at the beginning of the troubles, were now exceedingly offended and displeased by the cruel murders of so many of their friends and neighbours; above five hundred men having been put to death, many of whom were persons of consideration and importance; insomuch that those who still remained along with him were continually in fear of their lives.

On his arrival at Arequipa, Gonzalo found that city entirely deserted, as most of the inhabitants had gone to join Diego Centeno after that officer got possession of Cuzco. Hearing that Centeno was in the Collao, near the lake of Titicaca, where after his junction with Mendoza, he had an army of near a thousand men, composed of the troops of Cuzco Las Charcas and Arequipa, and with which they occupied all the passes towards the interior, Gonzalo believed it almost impossible to attack these officers with any probability of success. He waited therefore at Arequipa about three weeks, expecting the junction of D'Acosta, who at length arrived, but with very diminished numbers, as already related, many having abandoned him, and having put many of his followers to death on suspicion that they intended to desert. After the junction of D'Acosta, Gonzalo found himself at the head of five hundred men. He now wrote to Centeno, giving a recital of all the events which had occurred during the troubles, and dwelt particularly on the favour he had always shewn him, and particularly instanced the pardon he had granted him when Gaspard Rodriguez and Philip Guttierrez were executed, though equally guilty with them, and although all his officers had urged him to put Centeno to death. In addition, Gonzalo made high offers to Centeno, promising to accede to every demand he might choose to make, if he would now join him. He sent this letter to Centeno by a person named Francisco Vaso, who immediately offered his services to Centeno, to whom he intimated that Diego Alvarez his standard-bearer was in correspondence with Gonzalo. Centeno was already informed of this circumstance by Alvarez himself, who assured him he had entered into this correspondence for a quite different purpose than that of betraying him or the royal cause.

Centeno thought proper to send a civil answer to Gonzalo, giving him many thanks for his offers, and freely acknowledging the favour he had formerly experienced. That as a mark of his gratitude, therefore, he now earnestly entreated him to reflect seriously on the present situation of affairs, to consider the gracious clemency of the king, who had granted a free pardon to him and all those who had taken any part in the past troubles. He assured Gonzalo, if he would abandon the insurrection, now evidently hopeless, and submit to the royal orders, that he would use his utmost endeavours to procure him an honourable and advantageous situation, and at the same time endeavoured to convince him that he would run no risk either in his person or property by following the present advice. On his return to Gonzalo with this letter, Vaso was met by the lieutenant-general Carvajal, who made minute inquiry respecting every thing he had seen and learnt, and gave him strict injunctions not to let it be known to the followers of Gonzalo that the force of Centeno exceeded seven hundred men. On being informed that Centeno refused to join him, Gonzalo disdained to read his letter, and ordered it immediately to be burnt in presence of several of his officers.

Immediately after this, Gonzalo determined to march into the province of Las Charcas, and accordingly took the direct road towards the pass occupied by Centeno and Mendoza. In this march the van-guard was commanded by the lieutenant-general, who took and hanged more than twenty persons whom he fell in with during the march. Among these was a priest named Pantaleon, who carried some letters for Centeno, and whom Carvajal ordered to be hung up, with his breviary and ink-horn suspended from his neck. Continuing this march, the scouts of the two armies fell in with each other on Thursday the 19th of October 1547. Gonzalo immediately sent one of his chaplains with a message to Centeno, demanding leave to continue his march through the pass, without being obliged to give battle[32]. The chaplain was conducted by the bishop of Cuzco, who happened to be in the army of Centeno, to his tent; and Centeno gave strict charges to his troops to be on their guard and always in good order to receive the enemy in case of an attack. For above a month Centeno had been afflicted by an obstinate fever, for which he had been six times blooded without any relief, and was not expected to recover; so that he was quite incapable of acting on the present emergency, being confined constantly to bed.

[Footnote 32: No consequences seem to have followed from this demand, which does not appear to have been acceded or even listened to.—E.]

The illness of Centeno was known in the army of Gonzalo, and that his tent was pitched at some distance from the rest, to avoid the noise and bustle of the camp. Founding on this intelligence, Juan d'Acosta was detached with twenty picked men, with orders to approach silently in the night to the camp of the royalists, and to endeavour to carry off Centeno. Acosta accordingly drew near with so much caution that he surprised the centinels that were on guard over Centeno, and had very near reached his tent when the alarm was given by some negro servants. Being thus discovered, Acosta ordered his men to fire off their musquets, and immediately retreated back to the camp of Gonzalo without losing a man. In the confusion occasioned by this exploit, great numbers of the royalists hastened towards the tent occupied by Centeno; but on this occasion several of the soldiers belonging to Valdivia threw away their arms and fled. Next morning the scouts of both armies approached each other, followed by the respective armies, which at length came in sight. The army of Centeno consisted of about a thousand men, two hundred of whom were cavalry, an hundred and fifty armed with musquets, and all the rest with pikes. Of this army, Luis de Ribera was major-general, Pedro de Rios, Jerom Villegas, and Pedro de Ulloa, captains of cavalry, and Diego Alvarez carried the grand-standard. The captains of infantry were Juan de Vargas, Francisco Retamoso, Negral, Pantoia, and Diego Lopez de Zuniga; Luis Garcias being sergeant-major, or adjutant-general[33]. The army of Gonzalo consisted only of five hundred men, of which three hundred were musqueteers, and eighty cavalry, the remainder being armed with pikes. Of this army Carvajal was lieutenant-general; the licentiate Cepeda and Juan Velez de Guevara were captains of horse; and Juan d'Acosta, Ferdinand Bachicao, and Juan de la Torre captains of foot.

[Footnote 33: It is not easy to understand how Mendoza, who had joined Centeno some time before, happens to be omitted in this enumeration—E.]

Both armies being drawn up in good order, the insurgents advanced, to the sound of trumpets and other musical instruments, till within six hundred paces of the enemy, when Carvajal ordered them to halt. The royalists continued to advance till within a hundred paces less, and then halted likewise. At this time, forty musqueteers were detached from the army of Gonzalo, with orders to begin the engagement; and two other parties of musqueteers, of forty men each, were posted on the wings, Pizarro taking his station between his cavalry and infantry. Thirty musqueteers were likewise advanced from the army of Centeno, to skirmish with those of the insurgents. As Carvajal observed that the royalists waited the attack in good order, he ordered his troops to advance a few steps very slowly, in hopes of inducing the enemy to make some movement or evolution which might occasion confusion in their ranks. This had the desired, effect, as the royalists, believing that their enemies, though interior in number, wished to have the honour of making the attack, they began immediately to advance, and the insurgents by order of Carvajal stood firm to receive them. When tolerably near, Carvajal gave orders for a small number of his troops to fire their musquets, on which the royalists made a general discharge, and marched forwards at a quick step with levelled pikes, during which the royalist musqueteers made a second discharge without occasioning any loss to the enemy, as they were still three hundred paces distant. Carvajal made his men reserve their fire till the enemy was within about an hundred paces; when, with a few pieces of artillery, and the whole of his musqueteers, he threw in so destructive a volley that above an hundred and fifty of the royalists were slain, among whom were two of their captains. By this terrible slaughter, the whole infantry of the royalist army was thrown into disorder, entirely defeated, and took to flight, in spite of every effort of Captain Retimoso to rally them, who lay wounded in the field. Notwithstanding the defeat of the infantry, the royalist cavalry made a brave charge against the insurgents, of whom they killed and wounded a considerable number. On this occasion Gonzalo had his horse killed and was thrown to the ground, yet escaped unhurt. Pedro de Rios and Pedro de Ulloa, captains of cavalry belonging to Centeno, wheeled with their squadrons round the wing of the insurgent infantry, intending to charge their flank; but were opposed by the detachments of musqueteers which were posted on the wings, on which occasion De Rios and several others were slain. Being thus repulsed, and seeing their own infantry entirely defeated, the cavalry took likewise to flight and dispersed, every one endeavouring to save himself as he best could.

Gonzalo Pizarro, having thus gained an easy victory, marched on with his army in good order to the camp of Centeno, putting every person to death that came in the way. A considerable number of the dispersed royalists happened to seek safety in passing by the camp of Pizarro, which they found entirely deserted, insomuch that they were able to make use of the horses and mules belonging to the insurgent infantry to facilitate their flight, and even made a considerable booty in gold and silver. While the royalist cavalry were engaged vigorously with the insurgents, Bachicao, one of Gonzalos captains, believing that the royalists would be victorious, went over to them. After the victory was decided in favour of Gonzalo, Bachicao, imagining that his conduct had not been observed, and would remain unknown, or that he would be able to justify himself under some colourable pretence, returned to his post. But as his defection was known to Carvajal, he caused him to be instantly hung up, adding insulting raillery to his cruelty, calling him his dear comrade and using many other bantering expressions.

During this unfortunate battle, Centeno was so ill that he was carried on a kind of litter by six Indians, almost in a state of insensibility; yet, by the care and attention of some of his friends, he was saved after the defeat of his army. In this bloody engagement, which was fought near a place called Guarina, above three hundred and fifty men were slain on the side of the royalists, besides thirty more who were put to death in the pursuit by the insurgent cavalry. Among these were, the major-general Luis de Ribera, the captains Retamoso, Diego Lopez de Zuniga, Negral, Pantoia, and Diego Alvarez, with Friar Gonzalo of the order of Mercy, and several other persons of condition. The insurgents lost about an hundred men. After the battle, Carvajal pursued the fugitives at the head of the insurgent cavalry for several days, on the road towards Cuzco. He was very anxious to take the bishop of Cuzco, against whom he was much incensed for having joined Centeno and being present in the battle. The bishop however made his escape; but Carvajal gratified his revenge on several royalists whom he got up with, all of whom he hung up without mercy, among whom were a brother of the bishop and a Dominican friar. After the return of Carvajal from the pursuit, Gonzalo made a distribution of lands and Indians among his troops, engaging to put them into possession at a convenient opportunity. He likewise took great care of his wounded men, and caused the slain to be buried. He then sent Bovadilla with a detachment to the city of La Plata and the mines, to collect all the gold and silver that could be procured, and dispatched Diego de Carvajal, usually called the Beau, on a similar mission to Arequipa. Juan de la Torre was sent to take possession of Cuzco, where he put to death Vasquez de Tapia and the licentiate Martel.

After this favourable turn of affairs, Pizarro issued a proclamation by which all the soldiers who had served under Centeno were commanded to join his standard, under pain of death; granting an amnesty for all that passed, with the exception only of those principal leaders who had particularly exerted themselves for the royal cause. He then sent Pedro de Bustincia with a detachment, to oblige the curacas of Andaguaylas and the neighbouring districts to furnish provisions for his army. A few days afterwards Gonzalo repaired to Cuzco with about four hundred men, and used every effort to put himself into a situation for opposing the president; being so elated by the victory he had gained at Guarina over such superior numbers, that he and his followers believed themselves almost invincible.

While these things were going on in the south of Peru, the president marched by the mountain road for the valley of Jauja, accompanied by the troops which he had brought from the Tierra Firma, and those of the captains Diego de Mora, Gomez de Alvarado, Juan de Saavedra, Porcel, and the others that had assembled in Caxamarca. He sent orders likewise to Salazar, who now commanded at Quito, to join him with all his men; and ordered Lorenzo de Aldana to join him from Lima with all the soldiers from the fleet and those he had drawn together after the flight of Gonzalo to Arequipa. The president arrived first of all at Jauja with an escort of an hundred men, where he immediately took the proper measures for collecting arms and military stores, and provisions. On the same day he was joined by the licentiate Carvajal and Gabriel de Royas; and soon afterwards Ferdinand Mexia de Guzman, and Juan Alphonzo Palamino arrived with their companies. Lorenzo de Aldana remained at Lima with his own company, it being of great importance to keep possession of that city and its post. In a short time the president had collected an army of above fifteen hundred men in Jauja, and employed all the forges and artists he could procure to fabricate new musquets, to put all the old ones into good repair, and to provide abundance of pikes and all other arms, both offensive and defensive. In these preparations he not only exerted the utmost diligence, but shewed a great deal of intelligence and knowledge, far beyond what could tare been expected from a person who had hitherto been entirely occupied in civil and religious pursuits. He carefully visited his camps, and inspected the workmen who were employed by his orders, taking at the same time every possible care of such of his soldiers as were sick, exerting himself to the utmost in every thing relative to the good of the service, beyond what could have been expected from any single person, by which means he acquired the entire confidence and affection of all who were under his command. His army had always been in hope that their services would not be required, and even at one time believed that the president would not have had occasion to assemble an army, as they thought that Centeno was strong enough to have conquered Gonzalo.

Immediately on receiving intelligence of the victory which Gonzalo had gained at Guarina, the president sent the captains Lope Martin and Mercadillo, with a detachment of fifty men, to occupy the passes of Guamanga, about thirty leagues from Jauja on the way to Cuzco, to learn the motions of the enemy, and to collect all who might have been able to escape from Cuzco. While at Guamanga, Lope Martin got notice that Pedro de Bustincia was in the district of Andahuaylas collecting provisions for the army of Gonzalo, as formerly mentioned. Accompanied by fifteen mounted musqueteers, Martin went into that district, where he unexpectedly attacked Bustincia during the night, and made him and all his people prisoners. After hanging some of these men, he returned to Guamanga, bringing all the curacas of the neighbourhood along with him, by whose means intelligence was conveyed to all parts of the country, giving notice of the arrival of the president in the valley of Jauja, and the great preparations he was making in that place.

From Jauja the president sent his lieutenant-general, Alfonzo de Alvarado, to bring up from Lima all the soldiers that could be spared from that place, together with some pieces of artillery from the ships, and clothes and money for the supply of such of the soldiers as were in want; all of which services were performed by Alvarado in a short time. The president now mustered his army, of which Pedro Alfonzo de Hinojosa was lieutenant-general, and the licenciate Bendicto de Carvajal carried the royal standard, Don Pedro de Cabrera, Gomez de Alvarado, Juan de Saavedra, Diego de Mora, Francisco Hernandez, Rodrigo de Salazar, and Alfonzo de Mendoza were captains of cavalry; Don Balthazar de Castillo, Pablo de Menezes, Hernando Mexia de Guzman, Juan Alfonzo Palomino, Gomez de Solis, Francisco Mosquera, Don Ferdinand de Cardinas, the adelantado Andagoya, Francisco d'Olmos, Gomez d'Arias, and three other captains, Porcel, Pardaval, and Serna, commanded the infantry. Gabriel de Royas was appointed to command the artillery. Besides the military officers already mentioned, the president was attended by the archbishop of Lima, the bishops of Cuzco and Quito, the provincials of the Dominicans and of the order of Mercy, and by several other ecclesiastics, both priests and friars. On a general muster and review of the army, it was found to consist of seven hundred musqueteers, five hundred pikemen, and four hundred cavalry. Afterwards, on arriving at Xaquixaguana on the march towards Cuzco, it was augmented to nineteen hundred men, by the junction of several other detachments, forming the largest and best appointed array hitherto seen in Peru.

The president, having completed his preparations, began his march from Jauja in good order on the 19th of December 1547, taking the route of Cuzco, and especially desirous of crossing the river Abancay[34] in some safe place. In this part of his march he was joined by Pedro de Valdivia, the governor of Chili. Valdivia had come by sea to Lima, on purpose to raise men, and to procure various stores of which he was in want, with clothing and ammunition, on purpose to enable him to proceed in the conquest of Chili. On his arrival at Lima, and learning the situation of affairs in Peru, he determined upon joining the president. His arrival was considered as an indication of good fortune; for, although the president had already in his army many officers of merit and capacity, and of eminent rank and fortune, there was not any one in Peru who possessed so much experience in the manner of conducting warlike operations in that country as Valdivia, on which account he was considered as a fit person to be opposed to the experience and stratagems of Carvajal, who was much dreaded by every one in the presidents army, more especially since the late defeat of Centeno, which was entirely attributed to the talents of Carvajal. About the same time Centeno joined the president with more than thirty horse, who had accompanied him ever since the defeat of Guarina. Continuing his march amid considerable difficulties, owing to the scarcity of provisions, the president at length reached the province of Andahuaylas, where he judged it proper to remain during the winter, on account of the violent rains which fell night and day almost without ceasing, by which the tents were all rotted. The maize which they procured as food for the troops was all wet and spoiled, by which a considerable number of the soldiers were afflicted with dysentery, of which some died, notwithstanding the care taken of the sick by Francisco de la Rocha, a Trinitarian monk, who acted as physician to the army. Although there were above four hundred sick at one time, so great was the care bestowed, that they were as well attended and as plentifully supplied with medicines as if in a populous city, insomuch that they almost all recovered.

[Footnote 34: Rather the Pachacamac, near which the town or city of Abancay is situated, and where probably the president proposed to pass that river.—E.]

The arrival of Valdivia and Centeno diffused much joy through the army, which was expressed in frequent feasts and entertainments, with concerts of music, running at the ring, and similar amusements. During the continuance of the army in winter quarters at Andahuaylas, the general Hinojosa with Alfonzo de Alvarado and Valdivia applied themselves indefatigably to have every thing in the best possible order for taking the field. On the commencement of spring, and when the rains began sensibly to diminish, the army broke up from Andahuaylas and marched to the bridge of Abancay, about twenty leagues from Cuzco, where it halted until bridges were constructed across the Apurimac at the distance of twelve leagues from Cuzco[35], as the enemy had broken down all the bridges over that river, and it was necessary either to construct new ones, or to make a circuit of more than seventy leagues to get to Cuzco. On purpose to distract the enemy, the president caused materials for the construction of bridges to be carried to three different points on the Apurimac; one on the great road of the Incas[36], a second in the valley of Cotabamba, about twelve leagues farther up the river, and a third still farther up the Apurimac, at a village belonging to Don Pedro de Puertocarrero, where that officer was posted with a hundred men to guard the passage. For the construction of these bridges cables and ropes were prepared, after the manner of the native Peruvians as formerly described in our general account of the country; and beams and pillars were got ready on which to fix the cables when the army should be collected at the intended place of passing the river. Had Gonzalo been able to ascertain the place at which it was intended to pass, he had assuredly opposed the royalists, and would at least have made it exceedingly difficult for them to construct a bridge; but as he could not ascertain the actual point fixed on, he did not consider it safe to divide his force so as to oppose the royalists at the three points of demonstration, and satisfied himself therefore by posting spies at the different places, to bring him immediate notice of the place where the royalists might begin their operations, that he might know where to march to oppose them. But the secret was confined to the knowledge of the president, and the members of his council of war.

[Footnote 35: Abancay on the Pachacamac is not above 14 Spanish leagues from Cuzco in a straight line. The other bridges mentioned in the text must have been thrown over the Apurimac Proper, somewhere near the town or village of Limatambo.—E.]

[Footnote 36: This was probably by Limatambo, as on the great road the Incas had palaces for lodging in with their attendants, called tambos.—E.]

When all the materials were in readiness, the army began its march for Cotabamba, at which place it was determined to pass the river. In this march the army had to encounter very considerable difficulties in passing through mountains covered with snow. Several of the captains were of opinion that this was an improper route, and proposed another place almost fifty[37], leagues higher up; but Lope Martin, who guarded the pass of Cotabamba, always insisted that the securest passage was to be had at that place. In consequence of this difference of opinion, the president sent Valdivia and three other captains to examine the different places; and on their report that Cotabamba was attended by the least difficulty and danger, that place was fixed upon. When Lope Martin got information that the army approached to Cotabamba, he set to work with the Spaniards and Indians of his detachment, to extend and tighten the cables and ropes across the river, of which the main support of the bridge was to be composed. Three of the cables were already fixed, when the spies employed by Gonzalo came to the place, and cut two of them without resistance. On this intelligence being communicated to the army, it gave much concern to the president and his officers, lest Gonzalo might bring up his forces to dispute the passage before the army could be able to get over. The president, therefore, accompanied by his principal officers, Hinojosa Alvarado and Valdivia, hastened to the scite of the bridge, where he immediately gave orders for some companies of infantry to pass the river on Peruvian flat boats or rafts, which was deemed a very hazardous enterprize, both on account of the rapidity of the current, and because it was believed the enemy might be in some force on the other side. Among the first who got over was Hondegardo with a few soldiers, after whom several other captains of infantry got across with their men, so that before night above four hundred men were got over, some of whom swam over their horses along with the flat boats, holding them by the bridles, and having their musquets and other arms tied to the saddles. Yet so rapid was the current, that above sixty horses were lost on this occasion, either drowned or dashed against the rocks.

[Footnote 37: This may probably be an error of the press in the original for fifteen leagues. Fifty leagues even from Abancay would have carried the army almost to Arequipa, to turn the head of the Apurimac, and among the highest mountains of Peru.—E.]

On receiving notice from his spies that a part of the royalists had got across the river, Gonzalo sent off Juan d'Acosta with two hundred mounted musqueteers, with orders to give no quarter to any of those who had passed the river, excepting such as had newly come from Spain. On the approach of Acosta, as the royalists then on that side of the river were not numerous, they mounted a considerable number of Indians and negroes on the horses which had been got over, arming them with lances, and by that means presented the appearance of a formidable squadron drawn up on a height, the few Spanish troops who were on that side of the river being placed in the front rank; insomuch that, when Acosta went to reconnoitre, they appeared so numerous that he did not venture to attack; and returned for a reinforcement. In the mean time, the bridge being got ready with the utmost possible diligence, most of the royalists passed the river, every one expressing the utmost astonishment at the negligence of Gonzalo in not being at hand to dispute the passage, as a hundred men at each of the three places where preparations had been made for passing, might have rendered the attempt exceedingly hazardous.

Next day, when all the army with its stores and followers had passed the river, Don Juan de Sandoval was sent out upon discovery, who reported on his return that he had advanced three leagues into the country without seeing any thing of the insurgents. Hinojosa and Valdivia were then ordered to advance with several companies of infantry to occupy the passes in the neighbouring mountain, as Gonzalo might have given them much trouble if he had taken possession of these heights, which were above a league and a half in ascent; and this order was happily executed without meeting with any resistance. When Acosta retreated from the river, in consequence of believing himself too weak to attack those who had passed, he sent to demand a reinforcement from Gonzalo of a hundred musqueteers, with the aid of whom he alleged he would be enabled to defeat the royalist party which had crossed. At this time one Juan Nunnez de Prado deserted from him to the president, and gave him notice of the succours which were expected by Acosta. Believing therefore that Gonzalo would advance with all his forces, the president took post on the ridge of the mountain with above nine hundred men, both cavalry and infantry, and remained under arms all night. Next morning, Acosta advanced with the reinforcement he had demanded, and the scouts of the president brought notice of his approach. On this intelligence, believing the whole army of the insurgents at hand, the president sent his major-general Alfonzo de Alvarado back to the river, to bring up the artillery and the rest of the army: And as the colours of Pizarro came in sight, before the return of Alvarado, the president drew up his nine hundred men in order of battle, giving all the necessary orders in case of being attacked. But in a short time, it was discovered that these precautions were unnecessary, as Acosta soon retreated with his three hundred men, on seeing the greatly superior force of the royalists.

The president remained two or three days in the position he had taken on the summit of the mountain, waiting for his artillery and the rest of his army. While at that place, Gonzalo sent him a message by a priest, demanding that he should dismiss his army, and refrain from making war against him till he should receive new orders from his majesty. On this occasion, the bishop of Cuzco, who was along with the president, ordered the priest into confinement. A little time before this, Gonzalo had dispatched another priest, to endeavour to gain over Hinojosa and Alvarado to his party, But that messenger, being resolved to desert the party of the insurgents, had taken measures in concert with his brother to go off in company with all their effects, in which they succeeded. At this time likewise the president wrote to Gonzalo, as he had repeatedly done during his march, earnestly entreating him to submit to the orders of his majesty, and sending him at the same time a copy of the amnesty. The usual manner in which these dispatches was forwarded to Gonzalo, was by means of the scouts of the army, who had orders to give them to those belonging to Gonzalo when they chanced to meet.

When it was known at Cuzco that the president had crossed the river Apurimac with all his army, and had taken possession of the pass in the high mountain, Gonzalo Pizarro immediately marched out from that city with his army and encamped at Xaquixaguana, about five leagues from Cuzco, in a plain through which the road passed by which the royalists would have to march on their way from the mountain towards Cuzco. His army at this time consisted of five hundred and fifty musqueteers, with six pieces of cannon, and three hundred and fifty cavalry and pikemen. Gonzalo established his camp in a very strong position, as it was only accessible in front by means of a very narrow defile, one flank being secured by a river and morass, the other flank by the mountain, and the rear by precipitous rocks. During two or three days, that the two armies remained near each other before the battle, Gonzalo sometimes detached a hundred and sometimes two hundred men to skirmish with similar parties of the enemy. As the royalist army was now encamped only at a short distance from the insurgents, Gonzalo was afraid his troops might lose courage by noticing the vast superiority of the enemy in number, and that many of his men might abandon him; for which reason he always drew up his men under cover of a rising ground near his camp, pretending that he did so to induce the president to attack him in his present advantageous post, confiding in his numbers and believing the insurgents much fewer than they really were.

After the president had passed the mountains and pitched his camp on the descent towards the plain, within view of the insurgents, Gonzalo drew up his army in order of battle, and caused some discharges to be made from his cannon and musquetry. On that day there arose so thick a mist, that the scouts and spies of the two armies often came against each other unexpectedly. Seeing that the insurgents were disposed to await his attack, or even to give battle, the president was inclined to defer bringing matters to that extremity for some time, in the hope that a considerable number of the enemy might come over to him if they could find an opportunity. Yet, as the season was exceedingly cold, even accompanied with strong frost, and as wood could not be procured for making fires, and provisions were scarce, it was impossible to remain long in a state of inaction. The army of Gonzalo was not subject to any of these inconveniencies, having plenty of provisions brought regularly from Cuzco, and being encamped in a comfortable and temperate situation in comparison with the position of the president, whose camp was on the slope of the mountain, while that of the insurgents was in the plain or valley below. Such is the difference in the temperature of Peru at very inconsiderable distances, that on the mountains a severe cold is experienced, accompanied by frost and snow, while only at eight or ten miles distance in the valley the inhabitants are obliged to use precautions to relieve them from excessive heat.

Gonzalo and his lieutenant-general, Carvajal, had formed an arrangement for a night attack upon the president, intending to have assailed his camp in three points at the same time; but they were induced to abandon this project, in consequence of the desertion of one of their soldiers named Nava, who communicated their intentions to the president. By this person and some others who had joined him from the army of Gonzalo, the president was advised to delay coming to battle as long as possible; as they were certain that many of the followers of Gonzalo would take the first favourable opportunity of returning to their duty, more especially those soldiers who had served under Centeno, and who had been constrained after his defeat to enter into the ranks of the insurgents to save their lives. In expectation of the proposed attack, the president kept his army the whole of that night under arms, by which they suffered, much distress from the extreme coldness of the weather on the mountain, so that many of the soldiers were hardly able to keep hold of their arms, and waited impatiently for day. At daylight, a party of musqueteers belonging to Gonzalo was observed in march to gain possession of a height in the neighbourhood of the royal camp. Mexia and Palomino were immediately detached, with three hundred musqueteers, to dislodge them, and Valdivia and Alvarado advanced in the same direction, so that the enemy were soon forced to retire. During this skirmish, the president marched down from the mountain with the main body of his army, in the direction of Cuzco, under cover of the hill on which the skirmish had taken place; and, to distract the attention of the enemy, a small detachment of cavalry and infantry was ordered to advance in view of the insurgent camp from that hill. On the arrival of Valdivia and Alvarado at the top of the hill, observing that it was possible to cannonade the camp of the enemy from that place, they sent orders to Gabriel de Royas to bring up the artillery. On this occasion, De Royas promised a reward of five hundred crowns for each ball that should reach the enemy: In fact he paid that sum about a year afterwards to one of his gunners, who sent a ball through the tent of Gonzalo, which was exceedingly conspicuous, by which one of his pages was slain. In consequence of this incident, Gonzalo ordered all the tents to be struck, that they might not serve as marks for the cannoneers of the president. He likewise ordered his own artillery to commence firing, and drew up his army in order of battle, taking his own station at the head of his cavalry, which was commanded by the licentiate Cepeda and Juan d'Acosta. Carvajal was at the head of the infantry, having under him the captains Juan de la Torre, Diego Guillen, Juan Velasquez de Guevara, Francisco Maldonado, and Sebastian de Vergara. Pedro de Soria commanded his artillery. When the insurgent army was drawn up in order of battle, the numerous Indians that were attached to it quitted the camp, and posted themselves in view of both armies on the slope of a neighbouring hill.

While the artillery on both sides kept up a constant fire, the royalist army descended from the mountain without keeping any regular order, and in all possible haste, the cavalry all on foot leading their horses, both on account of the ruggedness of the ground and the better to avoid the cannonade from the enemy, as they had no shelter from the balls. Immediately on getting down to the plain, the troops were drawn up in order of battle; the infantry in two battalions in the centre, and the cavalry on the two wings. The cavalry of the left wing was commanded by the captains Juan Saavedra, Diego de Mora, Rodrigo Salazar, and Francisco Hernandez de Aldana. The royal standard was displayed by the licentiate Carvajal in the right wing, in which likewise were posted the captains Don Pedro de Cabrera, Alfonso Mercadillo, and Gomez de Alvarado. The infantry marched between the wings of horse, but a little farther in advance, under the captains Ramirez, De Castro, De Solis, Cardenas, Menezes, Mosquera, De la Cerna, Urbina, Aliaga, De Robles, De Arias, and De Olmos. A little in advance of the infantry, Alfonso de Mendoza marched with his troop of horse to commence the attack, accompanied by Centeno, who was determined to exert himself on this occasion in revenge for his defeat at Guarina. Pedro de Villavicentio acted as serjeant-major or adjutant-general of the army. The president, accompanied by the archbishop of Lima, was a little on one side, on the slope of the mountain, by which the major-general Alvarado and Valdivia brought down the artillery and the three hundred musqueteers commanded by Mexia and Palomino. On getting into the plain, this body of musqueteers divided in two, Mexia marching to the right along the river, and Palomino keeping to the left along the skirts of the mountain.

While the royalist artillery was coming down the mountain, the licentiate Cepeda, Garcilasso de la Vega, and Alfonso de Piedra, with several other persons of rank and some private soldiers, abandoned Gonzalo to surrender themselves to the president. They were closely pursued by Pedro Martin de Cicilia and some others of the insurgents, who wounded several of these deserters. The horse of Cepeda was killed under him by the thrust of a lance, and himself wounded, and he had assuredly been either taken or killed unless promptly succoured by order of the president. In the mean time Gonzalo kept his troops in firm array, waiting for the enemy, and in expectation that they might attack him in confusion and be easily defeated, as had happened in the battle of Guarina. Hinojosa on his side, advanced with the royalists in the best order and at a slow pace, to within musquet-shot of the insurgents, where he halted in some low ground, in such a situation that his men were secure from the cannon-balls of the enemy, which all flew over their heads, although the gunners used every effort to depress their guns so as to fire low. At this time the platoons of musquetry on the wings of both armies kept up a close fire, Alvarado and Valdivia using every effort to cause their men take good aim, while the president and archbishop encouraged their gunners to fire quickly and to purpose; making them often change the direction of their guns, as circumstances appeared to require.

Observing that several of the soldiers of Gonzalo were endeavouring to abandon him and were hotly pursued, Centeno and Mendoza advanced with the cavalry under their command, on purpose to protect all who wished to come over. All those who quitted the insurgents, urged the commanders of the royal army not to advance to the charge, as they were certain the far greater part of the army of Gonzalo would abandon him, so that he would be easily defeated without any danger to the royalists, and with little effusion of blood. At this time, a platoon of thirty musqueteers, finding themselves near the royal army, came over in a body and surrendered themselves. Gonzalo wished to have these men pursued and brought back; but the attempt threw his troops into confusion, and his whole army began instantly to break up, some fleeing towards Cuzco, while others went over to the president and surrendered themselves. Some of the insurgent officers were so confounded by this sudden and universal derout, that they neither had presence of mind to flee or to fight. On seeing this hopeless turn of his affairs, Gonzalo lost all courage, and exclaimed in despair, "Since all surrender to the king, so must I also." It is reported, that Juan d'Acosta endeavoured to encourage him, saying, "let us rush upon the thickest of the enemy, and die like Romans;" to which Gonzalo is reported to have answered, "It is better to die like Christians."

At this time, Gonzalo observing the serjeant-major of the royalists near him, surrendered to him, giving up a long small sword which he had used instead of a lance, as he had previously broken his lance upon some of his own men who were running away. He was immediately conducted to the president, to whom he used some very imprudent expressions, and by whom he was committed to the custody of Centeno. About the same time with Gonzalo, most of his officers were made prisoners. The lieutenant-general Carvajal endeavoured to save himself by flight, meaning to hide himself among some tall reeds in a marsh during the night; but his horse stuck fast in the morass, and he was brought prisoner to the president by some of his own men. In the pursuit, some of the insurgents were killed, but most of their officers were made prisoners.

After the entire derout of the enemy, the soldiers of the royal army pillaged the camp of the insurgents, where they made a prodigious plunder in gold, silver, horses, mules, and rich baggage, by which many of them acquired considerable riches, some individuals having acquired so much as five or six thousand ducats. One of the soldiers happened to fall in with a fine mule having a load on his back, which seemed to consist only of clothes, he therefore cut the cords and threw off the load, carrying off the mule alone; immediately after which three other soldiers, more experienced in such matters, opened up the pack, which they found to contain a considerable quantity of gold and silver wrapped up in Indian cloaks for better concealment, worth five or six thousand ducats.

As the army was much fatigued by the operations of that day; besides being under arms all night, the president allowed the men to rest one day, yet thought it necessary to dispatch the two Captains Mexia and De Robles with their companies to Cuzco, to prevent those soldiers who had pursued the fugitives towards that place from entering and plundering the city and killing a number of the inhabitants; more especially as many might now feel inclined to act from particular enmity towards such as had given them offence during the late troubles, under pretence of following up the victory. Those captains were likewise directed to secure such of the officers and soldiers of the defeated army as had fled in that direction. Next day, the president gave orders to the licentiate Cianca, one of the new oydors, and Alfonzo de Alvarado, his major-general, to bring the prisoners to trial. No other proof was requisite against Gonzalo Pizarro than his own acknowledgment and the notoriety of his having been in open rebellion against the sovereign. He was condemned to be beheaded, and that his head should be fixed in a niche or recess on the gibbet at Lima, secured by a trellis or net-work of iron through which it might be visible, with this inscription above. "The head of Gonzalo Pizarro, a traitor and rebel, who revolted against the royal authority in Peru, and presumed to give battle to the army under the royal standard in the valley of Xaquixaguana." His whole estates and property of every kind were confiscated; and his house in Cuzco was ordered to be rased, and salt sown upon its scite, on which a pillar or monument was to be erected with a suitable inscription to perpetuate the remembrance of his crime and condign punishment. Gonzalo was executed on the day of his trial, dying like a good Christian.

While in prison and till his death, Centeno, to whose custody he had been committed, treated him with much civility, and would not allow any one to insult his fallen greatness. When about to be put to death, Gonzalo made a gift of the magnificent dress which he then wore to the executioner; but Centeno paid its full value to the executioner, that the body might not be stripped and exposed till carried away for interment; and next day he had it carried to Cuzco and respectfully buried. But the head, pursuant to the sentence, was carried to Lima.

On the same day in which Pizarro was beheaded, his lieutenant-general Carvajal was drawn and quartered, and eight or nine of the insurgent captains were hanged; and in the sequel several others of the principal persons concerned in the revolt were punished when taken[38]. On the day following the president went to Cuzco with all his army, whence he sent Alfonzo de Mendoza with a detachment into Las Charcas, to make prisoners of those who had been sent into that district by Gonzalo in quest of silver, and such as might have fled thither from the battle. On account of the rich mines in the province of Las Charcas, especially Potosi, it was supposed that many of the fugitives had taken refuge in that place, to which Hondegardo was sent as lieutenant-governor and captain-general, with orders to chastise all those of the inhabitants who had been guilty either of favouring Gonzalo, or of neglecting to repair to the royal standard on the summons of the president. Along with Hondegardo, Gabriel de Royas was sent as receiver of the royal fifth and other tributes belonging to the king, and of the fines which the governor might inflict on the disaffected and recusants. As De Royas soon died, Hondegardo had to discharge the united functions of governor and receiver of the province, and in a short space of time he amassed treasure to the amount of 3,600,000 livres[39], which he transmitted to the president.

[Footnote 38: Yet the Historian of American, II. 392., says that "Gasca, happy in his bloodless victory, did not stain it with cruelty; Pizarro, Carvajal, and a small number of the most distinguished or notorious offenders being punished capitally." The executions seem however to have been sufficiently numerous, considering that the whole rebel army before the battle was only nine hundred strong, many of whom went over to the victor, and all the rest disbanded without fighting.—E.]

[Footnote 39: L.157,000, if French livres are to be understood, and worth near a million sterling at the present value of money compared with that period,—E.]

The president remained for some time at Guzco, occupied in punishing the insurgents according to the greatness of their crimes. Those whom he deemed most guilty, he condemned to be drawn in pieces by four horses, others he ordered to be hanged; some to be whipt, and others were sent to the galleys. He applied himself likewise with much attention to restore the kingdom to good order. In virtue of the authority confided to him by the king, he granted pardons to all who, having been in arms in the valley of Xaquixaguana, had abandoned Gonzalo and joined the royal standard. These pardons referred to all public crimes of which they had been guilty during the rebellion of Gonzalo Pizarro, yet leaving them liable to answer in civil actions for every thing respecting their conduct to individuals. This battle of Xaquixaguana, which will be long famous in Peru, was fought on Monday the 9th of April 1548.

When the president had dispatched the most urgent affairs connected with the suppression of the rebellion, there yet remained an object of great importance for the quiet of the kingdom, which was surrounded with many difficulties. This was with regard to the dismissal of the army, in such a manner that so great a number of soldiers set free from the restraints of discipline might not occasion troubles similar to those now put an end to. On purpose to succeed in this delicate affair, the utmost prudence was requisite, as almost every soldier in the army considered himself entitled to one of the best of the vacant repartimientos, and as the number of the troops exceeded 2500 men, while there were only 150 repartimientos to distribute. Hence it was quite obvious, that instead of being able to gratify every claimant, far the greater part must be dissatisfied. After a serious deliberation on this important subject, the president went to a place in the province of Apurimac, about twelve leagues from Cuzco, accompanied only by the archbishop and one secretary, on purpose to have leisure for mature reflection at a distance from the perpetual importunities of the claimants. In this place, they made the best distribution in their power of the vacant repartitions, giving sufficient means of living in a respectable manner to the captains and other persons of consideration, each in proportion to their respective merits and the services they had been of in suppressing the late rebellion, giving new repartitions to those who had none, and increasing those of others. On this occasion it was found that they had vacant repartitions to distribute to the value of a million of gold crowns in yearly rent. The greater number of the most valuable and extensive repartitions had become vacant during the troubles, partly from their former possessors having been put to death by Gonzalo, either under pretence of guilt in opposing his rebellion, or in the various engagements during the troubles. The president had likewise capitally punished several to whom Gonzalo had given repartitions. It must however be remarked, that several of these most valuable repartimientos had been retained by Gonzalo for his own benefit, under pretence of providing for the expences of the war.

In making the new grants, the president retained the power of granting pensions upon some of the most extensive repartitions, of three or four thousand ducats from each, more or less according to their respective values, on purpose to have the power of dividing the money among such soldiers as he could not otherwise reward, to enable them to procure arms, horses, and other necessaries, meaning to send them off in various directions to discover and subdue the country which was hitherto unoccupied. Having thus regulated every thing to the best of his power, the president thought proper to retire to Lima, and sent the archbishop to Cuzco to publish the regulations and distribution of repartimientos, and to make payment of the several rewards in money which had been agreed upon. The arrangement of this affair occasioned much dissatisfaction among the soldiers, every one believing himself better entitled to some allotments of lands and Indians than several of those who had acquired such grants. All the fair speeches and promises of the archbishop and the principal officers were insufficient to quiet the murmurs and discontents of the troops, which even produced some commotions and seditious conspiracies, in which it was proposed to seize upon the archbishop and the chief officers of the army and government, and to send the licentiate Cienca with a remonstrance to the president, demanding of him to recal the repartition which he had decreed, and to make a new one more favourable to their wishes. They even threatened to revolt, and to take possession by force of what they considered due to their services. The licentiate Cienca, who had been appointed chief justice at Cuzco, had established so excellent a system of police that he had immediate notice of all these plots and commotions, and was soon enabled to restore order and tranquillity by arresting and punishing the principal agitators of these threatened troubles, by which he effectually checked the spirit of mutiny and insubordination, and averted at least for the present the danger of a new civil war in the kingdom.

Before leaving Cuzco, the president had renewed the commission of Valdivia as governor of Chili, as a reward for the services he had rendered in the late war against Gonzalo. On purpose to provide the reinforcements of men, horses, and arms, which were necessary for defending and extending his conquests in that province, Valdivia went to Lima as the most convenient situation for procuring what he wanted. Having completed all his preparations, he embarked all his men and military stores at the port of Callao, and sent them off for Chili; but chose to go himself by land to Arequipa, where he proposed to take shipping in his way back to his government. A report was made to the president, that Valdivia had engaged some officers and soldiers from among those who had been sentenced to banishment from Peru, and even some of those who had been condemned to the galleys, on account of the share they had taken in the late rebellion. In consequence of this information, the president sent his lieutenant-general Hinojosa with orders to bring Valdivia before him to answer for his conduct in these things which were laid to his charge. As Valdivia was accompanied by a considerable number of men he believed himself in condition to resist this mandate, and refused the earnest solicitations of Hinojosa to go back along with him to the president. But, as Hinojosa observed that Valdivia took no precautions to prevent his arrest, and had no suspicions that any force would be used against him, he resolved to attempt to make him prisoner with the assistance only of six musqueteers, in which he succeeded without opposition. In this situation, Valdivia very properly determined to submit with a good grace, and so satisfactorily explained his conduct to the president, that he was allowed to resume his voyage, and to take all those people along with him whom he had engaged.

Every thing in Peru being now reduced to good order, the president gave permission to all the citizens and other inhabitants of the country, who had hitherto served in his army, to retire to their homes, to look after the re-establishment of their private affairs, which had, suffered great injury from the unavoidable losses experienced during the rebellion, and their own necessary expences in the field. He likewise sent off several officers with detachments upon new discoveries, and appointed the licentiate Carvajal lieutenant-governor of Cuzco, taking up his own residence at Lima, which was the seat of government. About this time an hundred and fifty Spaniards arrived at the city of La Plata, having travelled all the way from the mouth of the Rio Plata under the command of Domingo de Yrala to that part of the country which had formerly been discovered by Diego de Royas, and were now come into Peru to solicit the president to appoint some one to act as governor of the country on the Rio Plata which they proposed to settle. He accordingly nominated Diego de Centeno to that new government, with authority to raise as many more men as he could procure, to enable him to complete the discovery and conquest of that country. When all their preparations were completed, and they were on the point of setting out on the march, Centeno died, and the president appointed another captain in his place.

The Rio Plata, or River of Silver, derives its source from the high mountains continually covered with snow which lie between the cities of Lima and Cuzco[40]. From these mountains four principal rivers flow, which derive their names from the provinces through which they pass. The Apurimac, Vilcas, Abancay, and Jauja. This last derives its source from a lake in the province of Bombon[41], the most level and yet the highest plain in all Peru, where accordingly it snows or hails almost continually. This lake is quite crowded with small islands, which are covered with reeds, flags, and other aquatic plants, and the borders of the lake are inhabited by many Indians.

[Footnote 40: Zarate is extremely erroneous in his account of the sources of the Rio Plata. All the streams which rise from the Peruvian mountains in the situation indicated, and for seven or eight degrees farther south, and which run to the eastwards, contribute towards the mighty Maranon or River of the Amazons.—E.]

[Footnote 41: This is an egregious mistake; the Rio Jauja rises from the lake of Chinchay Cocha in the province of Tarma, and runs south to join the Apurimac. The river Guanuco rises in the elevated plain of Bombon, and runs north to form the Gualagua, which joins the Lauricocha or Tanguragua.—E.]

In the late war against Gonzalo Pizarro, the president incurred enormous expences for the pay and equipment of his troops, for the purchase of horses, arms, and warlike stores, and the fitting out and provisioning of the ships which he employed. From his landing in the Tierra Firma to the day of his final victory over Gonzalo, he had expended on these necessary affairs more than nine hundred thousand dollars, most of which he had borrowed from the merchants and other private individuals, as all the royal revenues had been appropriated and dissipated by Gonzalo. After the re-establishment of tranquillity, he applied himself to amass treasure with the utmost diligence, both from the fifths belonging to the king, and by means of fines and confiscations; insomuch that after payment of his debts, he had a surplus of above a million and a half of ducats, chiefly derived from the province of Las Charcas.

In his arrangements for the future government of the country, in conformity with the royal ordinance, he took much care to prevent the Indians from being oppressed. In consequence of the fatigues which they underwent, in the carriage of immense loads, and by numbers of the Spaniards wandering continually about the country attended by a train of Indians to carry their baggage, vast numbers of them had perished. Having re-established the royal audience, or supreme court of justice, in Lima, he applied earnestly to regulate the tributes which were to be paid by the Indians to the Spaniards upon fixed principles, which had not been hitherto done on account of the wars and revolutions which had distracted the country ever since its discovery and conquest. Before this new arrangement, every Spaniard who possessed a repartimiento or allotment of lands and Indians, used to receive from the curaca or cacique of his district such tribute as he was able or willing to pay, and many of the Spaniards often exacted larger sums from their Indians than they were well able to afford, frequently plundering them of their hard-earned property with lawless violence. Some even went so far as to inflict tortures on their Indians, to compel them to give up every thing they possessed, often carrying their cruelty to such a pitch as to put them to death in the most wanton and unjustifiable manner. To put a stop to these violent proceedings, the taxes of each province and district were regulated in proportion to the number of Indian and Spanish inhabitants which they respectively contained; and, in forming their arrangements, the president and judges carefully inquired into the productions of each province; such as its mines of gold and silver, the quantity of its cattle, and other things of a similar nature, the taxes on which were all regulated according to circumstances in the most reasonable and equitable manner.

Having thus reduced the affairs of the kingdom to good order, all the unemployed soldiers being sent off to different places, some to Chili, others to the new province on the Rio Plata, and others to various new discoveries under different commanders, and all who remained in Peru being established in various occupations by which they might maintain themselves, according to their inclinations and capacities, mostly in the concerns of the mines, the president resolved to return, into Spain, pursuant to the authority he had received from his majesty to do so when he might see proper. One of his most powerful motives for returning to Spain proceeded from his anxiety to preserve the large treasure he had amassed for the king: as, having no military force for its protection, he was afraid such great riches might excite fresh troubles and commotions in the country. Having made all the necessary preparations for his voyage, and embarked his treasure, without communicating his intentions hitherto to any one, he assembled the magistrates of Lima, and informed them of his intended voyage. They started many objections to this measure; representing the inconveniencies which might arise from his departure, before his majesty had sent out some other person to replace him, either in the capacity of viceroy or president. He answered all their objections, stating that the court of royal audience, and the governors of the different provinces which they were authorized to nominate, were sufficient to dispense justice and to regulate all affairs, they at last consented; and immediately embarking, he set sail for Panama.

Just before he sailed and while on board ship, the president made a new partition of such lands and Indians as had become vacant since the former distribution which he made at Cuzco. The number of vacant repartimientos was considerable, in consequence of the death of Centeno, De Royas, the licentiate Carvajal, and several other persons of rank; and as there were many candidates who demanded loudly to be preferred, he chose to defer the repartition till after he had embarked, as he was unable to satisfy all the claimants, and was unwilling to expose himself to the clamours of those whom he was unable to gratify. Having settled all these distributions, he left the different deeds signed and sealed with the secretary of the royal audience, with strict injunctions that they should not be opened until eight days after his departure. Every thing being finally concluded, he set sail from the port of Callao in December 1549, accompanied by the Provincial of the Dominicans and Jerom de Aliaga, who were appointed agents for the affairs of Peru at the court of Spain. He was likewise accompanied by several gentlemen and other considerable persons, who meant to return to Spain, carrying with them all the wealth they had been able to acquire.

The voyage to Panama was prosperous. The president and all who were along with him immediately landed at that place, and used the utmost diligence to transport all the wealth belonging to his majesty and to individuals, to Nombre de Dios, to which place they all went, and made proper preparations for returning to Spain. Every one treated the president with the same respect as when he resided in Peru, and he behaved towards them with much civility and attention, keeping open table for all who chose to visit him. This was at the royal expence; as the president had stipulated for all his expences being defrayed by his majesty, before leaving Spain on his mission to Peru. In this he acted with much and prudent precaution; considering that the former governors had been accused of living penuriously in proportion to their rich appointments, and being satisfied that the administration in Spain would not allow him a sufficient income to defray the great expences he must incur in a country where every thing was enormously dear, he declined accepting any specified salary, but demanded and obtained authority to take from the royal funds all that was necessary for his personal expence and the support of his household. He even used the precaution to have this arrangement formally reduced to writing; and in the exercise of this permission he employed a person expressly for the purpose of keeping an exact account of all his expences, and of every thing that was purchased for his table or otherwise, which were all accordingly paid for from the royal coffers.

SECTION VII.

Insurrection of Ferdinand and Pedro de Contreras in Nicaragua, and their unsuccessful attempt upon the Royal Treasure in the Tierra Firma.

At this period an extraordinary attempt was made to intercept the president in his passage through the Tierra Firma, and to gain possession of the royal treasure under his charge, which will require some elucidation for its distinct explanation. When Pedro Arias de Avilla discovered the province of Nicaragua, of which he was appointed governor, he married his daughter Donna Maria de Penalosa to Rodrigo de Contreras, a respectable gentleman of Segovia. Some time afterwards, Pedro Arias died, after having appointed his son-in-law to succeed him in the government, and this appointment was confirmed by the court in consideration of the merits and services of Contreras, who accordingly continued governor of Nicaragua for several years. On the appointment of a royal audience on the confines of Nicaragua and Guatimala, Contreras was displaced from his government; and, in pursuance of the ordinance which had occasioned so much commotion in Peru, both he and his wife were deprived of their repartitions of lands and Indians, and the grants which had been made to their children were likewise recalled. Contreras went in consequence to Spain, to solicit a reparation of the injury he had sustained, representing the services which had been performed to the crown by the discovery, conquest, and settlement of Nicaragua, by his father-in-law and himself; but his majesty and the council of the Indies confirmed the decision of the royal audience, as conformable with the regulations.

On receiving information of the bad success of their father, Ferdinand and Pedro de Contreras were much chagrined, and rashly determined to revolt and seize the government of the province. They persuaded themselves with being joined by a sufficient force for this purpose, confiding in the advice and assistance of a person named Juan de Bermejo, and some other soldiers his companions, who had quitted Peru in much discontent against the president, for not having sufficiently rewarded them, in their own opinions, for their services in the war against Gonzalo. Besides these men, several of those who had fought under Gonzalo had taken refuge in Nicaragua, having been banished by the president from Peru, all of whom joined themselves to the Contreras on this occasion. By these people the young men were encouraged to erect the standard of rebellion, assuring them, if they, could pass over into Peru with two or three hundred men, sufficiently armed, that almost the whole population of the kingdom would join their standards, as all were exceedingly dissatisfied with the president for not rewarding their services sufficiently. The Contreras accordingly began secretly to collect soldiers, and to provide arms for this enterprize; and deeming themselves sufficiently powerful to set justice at defiance, they resolved to commence their revolt. As they considered the bishop of Nicaragua among the most determined enemies of their father, they began their operations by taking vengeance on him; for which purpose they sent some soldiers to his house, who assassinated him while playing chess. After this, they openly collected their followers and displayed their standard, assuming the title of the Army of Liberty; and seizing a sufficient number of vessels, they embarked on the Pacific Ocean with the intention of intercepting the viceroy on his voyage from Lima to Panama, intending to plunder him of all the treasure he was conveying to Spain. For this purpose they steered in the first place for Panama, both to gain intelligence of the proceedings of the president, and because the navigation from thence to Peru was easier than from Nicaragua.

Embarking therefore with about three hundred men, they made sail for Panama, and on their arrival at that place they learnt that the president had already disembarked with all his treasure and attendants. They now believed that every thing was favourable to their intentions, and that by good fortune their desired prey had fallen into their hands. Waiting therefore till night, they entered the port as quietly as possible, believing that the president was still in Panama, and that they might easily execute their enterprize without danger or resistance. Their intelligence however was exceedingly defective, and their hopes ill founded; for the president had left Panama with all his people three days before, having previously sent off all his treasure to Nombre de Dios, to which place he was likewise gone. In fact, by this diligence, the president avoided the impending danger, without having the slightest suspicion that any such might befal. Immediately on landing, the brothers were informed that the president had already left the place; on which they went to the house of Martin Ruiz de Marchena, treasurer of the province, where they took possession of the money in the royal coffers, amounting to 400,000 pesos in base silver, which had been left there by the president in consequence of not having sufficient means of transporting it to Nombre de Dios along with the rest. After this they dragged Marchena, Juan de Larez, and some other respectable inhabitants to the public square, threatening to hang them all unless they gave immediate notice where the arms and money belonging to the province were deposited. But all their threats were unable to force any discovery, and they carried on board their ships all the treasure and other valuable plunder they had procured.

Believing that the farther success of their enterprize depended on the diligence they should exert in reaching Nombre de Dios to surprize the president, before he might have time to embark or prepare for his defence, they determined to proceed to that place without delay. For this purpose, it was arranged that Ferdinand de Contreras should march to Nombre de Dios with the greater part of the troops, while Juan de Bermejo was to take post with an hundred men on a height near Panama, to protect the rear of Ferdinand, to prevent pursuit, to be in readiness to receive the valuable booty they expected, and to intercept such of the attendants on the president as might escape in that direction from Nombre de Dios. In the mean time, Pedro de Contreras was to remain on board with a small number of men to protect the ships. All this was done accordingly; but matters turned out in quite a different manner from their expectations. Marchena got some information respecting their plan of operations, and sent off two confidential intelligent negroes to give notice to the president of what had occurred in Panama, and of the ulterior designs of the Contreras. One of these negroes was directed to travel the whole way by land, and the other to go by way of the small river Chagre, which route had been taken by the president.

This river has its source in the mountains between Panama and Nombre de Dios. Its course at first seems tending towards the Pacific Ocean; but it suddenly makes a turn at a cataract, and after a farther run of fourteen leagues it falls into the Atlantic; so that by means of a canal only five leagues in length, from that river to the South Sea, a navigation might be easily established between the two seas. It is true that it would be necessary to cut this canal through mountains, and in a country exceedingly uneven and full of rocks, so that the design has hitherto appeared impracticable. Hence, in going from Panama to Nombre de Dios by the river Chagre, it is necessary to travel by land in the first place to that river below the fall, a distance of five leagues. After descending to the mouth of the river, there still remains five or six leagues to go by sea to Nombre de Dios. The messenger who was sent by this road came up with the president before his arrival at Nombre de Dios, and gave him an account of the events which had taken place at Panama. Though much alarmed by this intelligence, he communicated it to the provincial and the officers who accompanied him without appearing to be under any apprehensions; but, on embarking on the North Sea, it fell so dead a calm that they could make no progress, and he could not then conceal his fears of the event. Still however preserving his presence of mind, he sent off Hernan Nunnez de Segura by land to Nombre de Dios, accompanied by some negroes who knew the country, with orders for all the inhabitants of that place to take up arms for the protection of the treasure which had been sent there. Segura had a most difficult and fatiguing journey on foot, having several rivers to cross, some of them by swimming, and to pass through woods and marshes in a road through which no person had travelled for a long while. On his arrival at Nombre de Dios, he found the news already communicated to that place, by the other negro, and that the inhabitants were already in arms, and had prepared as well as they were able to defend themselves, having landed the crews of nine or ten vessels which were in the harbour to give their assistance in repelling the rebels. The president arrived shortly afterwards, where he found every thing in order for defence; and immediately marched out at the head of the armed inhabitants on the road towards Panama, determined to give battle to Contrera in case of his approach.

When Ferdinand de Contrera marched for Nombre Dios, and Bermejo took post on the hill near Panama, as formerly mentioned, Marchena and De Larez believed they might be able to defeat Bermejo in the divided state of the rebels. For this purpose they re-assembled all the inhabitants of Panama, most of whom had taken refuge in the mountains, with whom they joined a considerable number of negroes who were employed as labourers in husbandry and in driving mules with goods between Panama and Nombre de Dios. By these means they assembled a respectable force, which they armed as well as circumstances would allow. Having thrown up some intrenchments of earth and fascines in the streets, and leaving some confidential persons to protect the town against the small number of rebels left in the ships with Pedro de Contreras, they marched out boldly against Bermejo, whom they vigorously attacked. After some resistance, they gained a complete victory, killing or making prisoners of the whole of that detachment. After this complete success, Marchena determined immediately to march for Nombre de Dios, believing that the inhabitants of that city, on learning the late events at Panama, would have armed for their defence, and would even take the field against Ferdinand de Contreras, and being more numerous than his detachment, would oblige him to retire to form a junction with Bermejo. Accordingly, when Ferdinand de Contreras had proceeded about half way to Nombre de Dios, he learnt that the president had got notice of the approach of the rebels, and had marched out against them with a superior force; on which Ferdinand de Contreras resolved to return to Panama.

While on his return, he took some negroes from whom he got notice of the entire defeat of Bermejo, and of the advance of Marchena against himself. He was so disconcerted by this intelligence, that he allowed all his men to disperse, desiring them to save themselves as they best might, and to endeavour to get to the shore, where his brother would take them on board the ships. They all separated, and Ferdinand with some of his people struck into the woods, avoiding the public road, that they might escape Marchena. As the country was much intersected with rivers, and Ferdinand was little accustomed to encounter such difficulties, he was drowned in an endeavour to pass one of the rivers. Several of the followers of Ferdinand were made prisoners, and it was never known what became of the others. The prisoners were carried to Panama, where they, and those others who were taken at the defeat of Bermejo, were all put to death.

When Pedro de Contreras, who remained on board the ships, got intelligence of the miserable fete of his comrades, he was so much alarmed that he would not take time to hoist anchor and make seal, but threw himself into a boat with some of his men, leaving the ships at anchor with all the plunder untouched. He coasted along for a considerable way to the province of Nata; after which no farther intelligence was ever received either of him or any of those who were along with him, but it was supposed they were all massacred by the Indians of that country. On getting intelligence of the favourable termination of this threatening affair, the president returned to Nombre de Dios, giving thanks to God for having delivered him from this unforseen danger. Had the rebels arrived at Panama only a few days sooner, they might easily have made him prisoner, and would have acquired a much larger booty then ever fell into the hands of pirates.

Tranquillity being entirely restored, the president embarked with his treasure, and arrived safely in Spain. One of his vessels, in which Juan Gomez de Anuaya was embarked, with part of the royal treasure, was obliged to put back to Nombre de Dios: But, having refitted at that port, she likewise arrived in Spain. Immediately on landing at San Lucar, the president sent Captain Lope Martin into Germany, where the emperor then was, to inform his majesty of his safe arrival from Peru. This news was exceedingly agreeable to the court, and occasioned much astonishment at the prompt and happy termination of the troubles, which had appeared so formidable and difficult to appease. Soon after the arrival of the president at Valladolid, he was appointed bishop of Placentia[42], then vacant in consequence of the death of Don Luis Cabeza de Vaca; and his majesty sent orders that he should come to court, to give a minute account of all the affairs in which he had been engaged. He went there accordingly, accompanied by the provincial of the Dominicans, and Jerom de Aliaga, the deputies or agents of the kingdom of Peru, and by several other gentlemen and persons of consideration, who were in expectation of getting some rewards from his majesty for their loyal services during the late commotions. The new bishop accordingly embarked at Barcelona, along with his companions, in some galleys which were appointed for the purpose; taking along with him, by order of his majesty, half a million of dollars of the treasure he had brought from Peru. Shortly afterwards, his majesty appointed Don Antonio de Mendoza, the viceroy of New Spain, to assume that office in Peru; sending Don Luis de Velasco, commissary-general of the customs of Castille, to succeed Mendoza in the viceroyalty of New Spain.

[Footnote 42: In the Royal Commentaries of Garcilasso de la Vega, p. 876, he is said to have been first appointed to the bishopric of Placentia, and to have been afterwards translated to that of Ciguenza in 1561 by Philip II which he enjoyed till his death in 1577.]

END OF THE DISCOVERY AND CONQUEST OF PERU,

BY AUGUSTINO ZARATE.

* * * * *



CHAPTER VIII.

CONTINUATION OF THE EARLY HISTORY OF PERU, FROM THE RESTORATION OF TRANQUILLITY BY GASCA IN 1549, TO THE DEATH OF THE INCA TUPAC AMARU; EXTRACTED FROM GARCILASSO DE LA VEGA.

INTRODUCTION.

Having now given at considerable length the authentic histories of the discovery and conquest of the two greatest of the European colonies in the New World, Mexico and Peru, from original and contemporary authors whose works had not before appeared in any English Collection of Voyages and Travels, we now propose to give, as a kind of supplement or appendix to the excellent history of Zarate, an abridged deduction of the principal events in Peru for some time after the departure of the president De la Gasca from that kingdom, extracted from the conclusion of the Royal Commentaries of Peru by Garcilasso de la Vega Inca, Part II. Book VI. VII. and VIII. Having formerly given some account of that work, not very favourable to the character of that descendant of the Incas as a historian, it may only be here mentioned that the events to be now related on his authority all occurred in his own time, and that the relation of them which he has left would have been greatly more valuable if he had been pleased to favour us more frequently with their dates.

In the present eventful period, while Spain, once the terror of Europe, seems in danger of sinking under the tyrannical grasp of the usurper of France, a vast revolution appears about to elevate the Spanish American colonies into extensive independent states; if the jealous collision of rights, interests, and pretensions between the various races of their inhabitants do not plunge them into all the horrors of civil war and anarchy. The crisis is peculiarly interesting to all the friends of humanity, and it is to be wished that the present commotions may soon subside into a permanent state of peace and good government, advantageous to all the best interests of the colonists, and beneficial to the commerce and industry of the rest of the world.

Before proceeding to the abridged history of events in Peru, subsequent to the departure of the president De la Gasca, the following reflections on the state of manners among the early Spanish settlers in that opulent region, during the period of which we have already given the history, as drawn by the eloquent pen of the illustrious Historian of America, have appeared most worthy of insertion[43].

[Footnote 43: Hist of America, II. p. 393.]

"Though the Spaniards who first invaded Peru were of the lowest order in society, and the greater part of those who afterwards joined them were persons of desperate fortune, yet in all the bodies of troops brought into the field by the different leaders who contended for superiority, not one acted as a hired soldier or followed his standard for pay. Every adventurer in Peru considered himself as a conqueror, entitled by his services to an establishment in that country which had been acquired by his valour. In the contests between the rival chiefs, each chose his side as he was directed by his own judgment or affections. He joined his commander as a companion of his fortune, and disdained to degrade himself by receiving the wages of a mercenary. It was to their sword, not to pre-eminence in office or nobility of birth that most of the leaders whom they followed were indebted for their elevation; and each of their adherents hoped, by the same means, to open a way for himself to the possession of power and wealth."