At this time, Gonzalo Pizarro was very anxious to devise some stratagem for inveigling the viceroy into his hands, as he considered his usurpation unsafe so long as that officer remained alive and at the head of a military force. With this view, that the viceroy might return into Peru where he might have it in his power to bring him to action, Gonzalo gave out that he intended to proceed to Las Charcas at the southern extremity of Peru, to repress the disorders occasioned by Centeno, leaving Captain Pedro de Puelles at Quito with three hundred men to oppose the viceroy. He proceeded even ostensibly to take such measures as were proper for executing this design; selecting such troops as were to accompany himself to the south, and those who were to remain at Quito; even distributing money to both divisions, and set off on his march for the south after a general muster and review of his army. Gonzalo contrived that intelligence of these proceedings should be conveyed to the viceroy, by means of a spy in the employment of that officer, who had betrayed his trust, and had even communicated to Gonzalo the cypher which he used in corresponding with his employer. Gonzalo made this person send intelligence to the viceroy of these pretended motions; and Puelles wrote likewise to some friends in Popayan, as if privately to inform them that he was left in the command at Quito with three hundred men, with which he believed himself able to resist all the force the viceroy might be able to bring against him; and these letters were sent purposely in such a manner that they might fall into the hands of the viceroy. Gonzalo likewise took care to spread these reports among the Indians who were present at the review, and who, having seen Gonzalo set off on his march to the south, were perfectly acquainted with the number of troops which accompanied him on the march, and of those which remained under Puelles at Quito. To give the greater appearance of truth to these reports, Gonzalo actually set out on his march; but halted at two or three days journey from Quito, under pretence of falling sick.

On receiving intelligence of these circumstances, which he implicitly believed, the viceroy determined to march from Popayan to Quito, satisfied that he should be easily able to overpower the small force left there under Puelles, who had no means of being reinforced. He accordingly began his march, during which he was unable to procure any intelligence whatever respecting Gonzalo and his troops, so carefully were all the passes guarded to prevent either Christians or Indians from conveying advices on the road towards Popayan. While, on the contrary, Gonzalo procured regular notice of every step taken by the viceroy, by means of the Indians called Cagnares, a cunning and intelligent race. Accordingly, when the viceroy was arrived within a few days march of Quito, Gonzalo returned thither with his troops to join Puelles, and they marched together to meet the viceroy, who was then at Oravalo about twelve leagues from Quito. Although the viceroy was at the head of eight hundred men, and his force increased daily on his approach to Quito, Gonzalo confided in the valour and experience of his troops, among which were many of the principal persons in Peru, his soldiers being inured to war, accustomed to hardships and fatigue, and full of confidence in themselves from the many victories they had gained. Gonzalo did every thing in his power to satisfy his troops of the justice of the cause in which he and they were engaged; representing to them that Peru had been conquered by him and his brothers; recalling to their remembrance the cruelties which had been exercised by the viceroy, particularly in putting to death the commissary Yllan Suarez and several of his own captains. In the next place, he gave an exaggerated picture of the tyrannical conduct of the viceroy during the whole period of his government, owing to which he had been deposed by the royal audience, and sent out of the country to give an account to the king of his conduct: Instead of which, he now endeavoured to disturb the colony by sowing dissensions and encouraging insurrections, and had even levied an army in other provinces, with which he intended to reduce the country under his tyrannous rule, and to ruin all its inhabitants. After a long speech, by which he endeavoured to animate his troops with resentment against the viceroy, they all declared their readiness to march against him and bring him to battle. Some were actuated by interested motives, to prevent the enforcement of the obnoxious regulations; others by a desire of avenging private injuries; and others again by the fear of punishment for having taken up arms. But it is not to be concealed, that the majority acted from dread of the severity of Gonzalo and his officers, who had already put several persons to death, merely for having shewn some degree of coldness or disinclination towards the cause of the insurgents.

On reviewing and mustering his force, Gonzalo found himself at the head of 130 well mounted cavalry, 200 musqueteers, and 350 armed with pikes, or near 700 in all, with abundance of excellent gun-powder[19]. Learning that the viceroy had encamped on the banks of the river about two leagues from Quito, Gonzalo advanced to meet him. Juan de Acosta and Juan Velez de Guevara were his captains of musqueteers, Hernando Bachicao commanded the pikemen, and the horse were led by Pedro de Puelles and Gomez de Alvarado. On this occasion there was no person appointed to the office of major-general, the duties of which Gonzalo chose to execute in person. He detached seventy of his cavalry to occupy a ford of the river, by which he meant to cross over towards the camp of the viceroy, over whom he expected to gain an easy victory. It was now Saturday the 15th of January 1546, and the two armies remained all night so near each other that the advanced posts were able to converse, each calling the other rebels and traitors, those on each side pretending that they only were loyal subjects to the king.

[Footnote 19: According to Garcilasso, the army of Gonzalo on this occasion amounted to 700 men, 200 of whom were armed with firelocks, 350 with pikes, and 150 were cavalry. In the History of America, II. 375, the force under the viceroy is only stated at 400; but both in Zarate and Garcilasso the royalists are mentioned as 800 strong.—E.]

At this time, Gonzalo Pizarro was accompanied by the licentiate Benedict Suarez de Carvajal brother to the commissary Yllan Suarez de Carvajal who had formerly been put to death at Lima in presence of the viceroy. At that former period Benedict was on his journey from Cuzco to Lima, intending to have joined the viceroy against Gonzalo, and had arrived within twenty leagues of Lima when he learnt the murder of his brother, after which he dared not to trust himself in that city until the viceroy had been deposed and sent on board ship. He was afterwards made prisoner by Gonzalo, who was even on the point of putting him to death; but on setting out for Quito, Gonzalo took him into favour. Carvajal now followed him with good will against the viceroy, upon whom he was eager to take signal vengeance for the unmerited death of his brother; and was even followed on this occasion by about thirty of his friends and relations, who formed a separate company under his immediate command.

The viceroy had arrived at a village called Tuza, about twenty leagues from Quito, when he learnt that Gonzalo Pizarro was returned to that city, and was now at the head of about seven hundred men. Believing himself however in sufficient force to attempt the recovery of his authority in Peru, the viceroy communicated this intelligence to his principal officers, whom he commanded to have every thing in readiness for battle. On his arrival at the river within two leagues of Quito, and in presence of the enemy who occupied the slope of a hill on the other side, he determined to endeavour to get into their rear, for which purpose he advanced with his troops by a road in a different direction from that on which the insurgents were posted, expecting to derive great advantages from this measure, as the whole infantry of Gonzalo, which formed his principal force, were posted on the slope of the hill directly in front, and his rear-guard of cavalry could have no suspicion of being liable to attack. The viceroy accordingly began his march on the night of the 15th January, leaving his camp standing with all his Indians and dogs, and with fires burning in many places, to deceive the enemy into a belief that he still remained in the camp. Marching therefore in perfect silence by the road which had been pointed out to him for gaining the rear of the insurgents, he expected to have attained his object before day: But as the road, had not been frequented for a long time, he encountered so many obstructions and difficulties, in consequence of the road being broken up in many places, that when day broke he was still a league from the enemy, by which all hope or opportunity of surprizing them was entirely lost. In this dilemma, he came to the resolution of marching straight upon Quito, in which there were very few to oppose him, and which was in no situation to give any resistance. He was in hopes of finding several loyal subjects in that place, who might have contrived to elude following the usurper to the field, and might now join his army, and he expected to find some arms and military stores left there by Gonzalo. On arriving at Quito, the soldiers of the viceroy learnt that Gonzalo was present with all his troops, which circumstance had hitherto been carefully concealed from their knowledge.

In the morning of the 16th, the scouts of Gonzalo were surprised to hear so little noise in the camp of the viceroy; and having cautiously advanced, they learnt from the Indian followers of the royalist army in what manner the viceroy had passed the insurgents during the night. The scouts therefore made haste to apprize Gonzalo of this event, who learnt soon afterwards by messengers from Quito that the viceroy had taken possession of that city. Gonzalo therefore immediately marched for Quito, determined to give battle to the viceroy without delay; and although the viceroy was perfectly aware of the advantages possessed by Pizarro in the superior discipline and equipment of his troops, he courageously resolved to run the risk of battle, and even to expose himself personally to all its dangers. In this determination, he boldly marched from the city of Quito directly towards the enemy, as if assured of gaining a victory. To Don Alfonzo de Montemayor, who commanded his first company with the royal standard, he assigned the office of lieutenant-general, commanding every one to obey him in that capacity. Cepeda and Bazan led the cavalry, and Ahumada carried the great standard. Sancho Sanchez de Avila, Hernandez Giron, Pedro Heredia, and Rodrigo Nunnez de Bonilla were captains of infantry, over which Juan de Cabrera commanded as major-general. The viceroy was earnestly requested by all his officers not to engage in the front of battle as he intended, but to take post in the rear with fifteen horsemen, whence he might send succours to wherever they might be required; yet, when the engagement was about to commence, the viceroy rode up to the vanguard, and took his place beside the lieutenant-general, Don Alfonzo, in front of the royal standard. On this occasion the viceroy was mounted on a grey horse, dressed in an upper garment of white muslin, with large slashes, shewing an under vest of crimson satin fringed with gold. Just before beginning the engagement, he addressed his troops to the following effect: "I do not pretend, my loyal friends, to encourage you by my words and example, as I rather look for an example of bravery from your courageous efforts, and am fully convinced you will do your duty as brave and faithful subjects of our gracious sovereign. Knowing therefore your inviolable fidelity to the king our common master, I have only to say that we are engaged in the cause of God." These last words he repeated several times, exclaiming, "It is the cause of God! It is the cause of God!"

After this short exhortation, the viceroy with Don Alfonzo and Bazan advanced to the charge, being opposed on the other side by the licentiate Carvajal. Gonzalo Pizarro had likewise intended to have taken post in the front of battle, but his officers insisted upon his remaining in the rear with eight or ten horsemen. In the first charge the cavalry shivered their lances, after which they continued to fight obstinately with swords, battle-axes and war-clubs or maces. In this part of the battle the cavalry of the viceroy were much galled by a line of musqueteers of the adverse army which plied them in flank. While fighting bravely, the viceroy beat down one of the insurgents named Montalva; but immediately afterwards received so severe a blow on the head with a battle-axe from Ferdinand de Torres, that he fell stunned from his horse. Indeed, both he and his horse had been so excessively fatigued by the difficult march of the preceding night, in which they had neither been able to take food or rest, that they were both easily overthrown. While this was passing with the cavalry of the van, the infantry on both sides advanced to engage, setting up such loud shouts, that one would have believed them much more numerous than they were in reality. Juan de Cabrera was slain at the very commencement of this part of the battle. Sancho de Avilla, advanced boldly at the head of his company to attack the enemy, brandishing a two-handed sword, which he employed with so much strength and address that he soon broke through and defeated half of the company by which he was opposed. But as the soldiers of Pizarro were more numerous in this part of the field than those who followed Avilla, he was surrounded on all sides, and he and most of his men slain. Until the death of the viceroy was known, the battle was very bravely contested by his infantry; but as soon as the knowledge of that unfortunate event had spread through their ranks, they lost heart and relaxed in their efforts, and were soon entirely defeated with considerable slaughter. At this time, the licentiate Carvajal observed Pedro de Puelles about to end the life of the unfortunate viceroy, already insensible and almost dead in consequence of the blow he had received from De Torres and a wound from a musquet ball: Carvajal immediately dismounted and cut off his head, saying, "That his only object in joining the party of Gonzalo was to take vengeance for the death of his brother."

When the victory was completely decided, Gonzalo Pizarro ordered a retreat to be sounded to recal his troops who were engaged in pursuit of the enemy. In this battle, the royalists lost about two hundred men, while only seven were slain on the side of the victors. Pizarro ordered the slain to be buried on the field of battle, and caused the bodies of the viceroy and Sancho de Avilla to be carried to Quito, where they were buried with much solemn pomp, attending himself at the funeral and in mourning[20]. He soon afterwards ordered ten or twelve of the principal royalists to be hanged, who had taken shelter in the churches of Quito, or had concealed themselves in other places. The oydor Alvarez, Benalcazar governor of Popayan, and Don Alfonzo de Montemayor, were wounded and made prisoners in the battle. Gonzalo intended to have ordered Don Alfonzo to be beheaded; but as he had many friends among the insurgents who interceded for his life, and who assured Gonzalo that he could not possibly recover from his wounds, he was spared. Some time afterwards, Gomez de Alvarado sent notice to Benalcazar that it was intended to administer poison to these three prisoners in the dressings applied to their wounds or in their food; and accordingly he and Don Alfonzo took great precautions to avoid this treachery. As the oydor Alvarez was lodged in the same house with his brother judge Cepeda, he had not in his power to use similar precautions, and died soon after; and every one believed that he was poisoned in some almond soup.

[Footnote 20: This authentic circumstance by no means agrees with the assertion in the History of America, II. 376, that the head of the viceroy was affixed on the public gibbet in Quito. From the text of Zarate, this battle appears to have been fought on the 16th January 1546. In the History of America, it is dated on the 18th; but the difference is quite immaterial.—E.]

Finding that he could not get secretly rid of Don Alfonzo as he wished, and having no hope of gaining him over to his party, Pizarro resolved to banish him into Chili, above a thousand leagues from Quito, and to send to the same place Rodrigo de Bonilla the treasurer of Quito, and seven or eight other persons of importance, who had always faithfully accompanied the viceroy under every change of fortune. Gonzalo did not put these men to death, as several of his own partizans interceded for their lives; and he did not deem it prudent to keep them near his person, or to permit them to remain in Peru. These exiles were accordingly sent off for Chili, under the charge of Antonio de Ulloa with a party of soldiers. After a march of more than four hundred leagues, mostly on foot, although their wounds were not entirely healed, these prisoners determined to make an effort to recover their liberty, or to lose their lives in the attempt. They accordingly rose against Ulloa and his men with so much courage and resolution that they succeeded in making him and most of his men prisoners. Being near a sea-port, they contrived by great address to gain possession of a vessel, in which were several soldiers and others of the insurgent party whom they overpowered; and leaving all their prisoners, they embarked without either sailors or pilot, and though none of them were in the least acquainted with navigation, they had the good fortune to reach New Spain.

Not satisfied with wreaking his vengeance on those of his enemies who had fallen into his hands in consequence of the victory of Quito, Gonzalo sent Guevara to the city of Parto to apprehend some of his enemies who resided in that place, one of whom only was put to death, and all the rest sent into exile. He pardoned Benalcazar, who promised faithfully to become attached to his party, and sent him back to his government of Popayan, with part of the troops he had brought from thence in the service of the viceroy. He likewise assembled all the fugitive troops of the viceroy, to whom he in the first place urged the many causes of displeasure which he had for their past conduct, yet pardoned them as he knew they had either been misled or forced to act against him, and promised, if they served him faithfully in the sequel, that he would treat them as well as those who had been on his side from the beginning, and would reward them equally when the country was restored to peace. He sent off messengers in every direction, to announce the victory he had obtained, and to encourage his partizans, so that his usurpation seemed established in greater security than ever. Captain Alarcon was sent to Panama, to communicate the intelligence to Hinojosa, with orders to bring back along with him Vela Nunnez and the others who had been made prisoners in that quarter.

SECTION V.

Continuation of the Usurpation of Gonzalo Pizarro, to the arrival of Gasca in Peru with full powers to restore the Colony to order.

At this period, some of Gonzalo's adherents advised him to send his fleet to scour the coasts of Nicaragua and New Spain, on purpose to take or burn all the vessels which might be found in these parts, by which he would effectually secure himself from any attack by sea. By this means, they alleged, when the dispatches and orders from his majesty should arrive in the Tierra Firma, finding no means of sending these into Peru, the ministers of the crown would be under the necessity of granting him favourable terms of accommodation almost equal to his wishes. Pizarro however had great confidence in the fidelity and attachment of Hinojosa and those who were with him, believing that he might trust implicitly to their vigilance, and refused to follow the measures proposed, as tending to evince too much weakness and want of confidence in the goodness of the cause in which he was engaged. He was besides so puffed up by the victory which he had gained over the viceroy, that he believed himself able to resist any power which could now be brought against him.

Alarcon went accordingly to Panama, whence he brought back to Peru the prisoners who had been taken at that place by Hinojosa, and was accompanied on his return by the son of Gonzalo. When near Puerto Viejo on his voyage back, Alarcon ordered Saavedra and Lerma, two of his chief prisoners, to be hanged on account of some words they were said to have spoken against the insurgents. He was disposed to have put Rodrigo Mexia, another of these prisoners, to death at the same time; but the son of Gonzalo pleaded strongly to save his life, by representing how kindly he had been used by Mexia while in his custody. Vela Nunnez was conducted to Quito, where he was pardoned by Gonzalo, yet admonished to behave very carefully for the future, as the slightest suspicion would be fatal. Cepeda, one of the oydors of the royal audience, always continued to accompany Gonzalo, so that Ortiz de Zarate, the only judge who remained in Lima was unable to act in the absence of all the other judges. Indeed he was now less feared, ever since Gonzalo Pizarro had almost by force procured a marriage between one of the daughters of that judge and his brother Blas Soto[21]. Still however this judge retained every proper sentiment of loyalty to the king, although constrained by the exigency of the times to conceal his principles, and to seem in some measure reconciled to the usurper.

[Footnote 21: Of this brother of the Pizarro family, no other notice occurs in Zarate.—E.]

While these transactions were going on in the north of Peru, the lieutenant-general Carvajal continued his operations in the south against Centeno. As formerly related, he departed from Cuzeo with three hundred men, well provided with horses, musquets and other arms, marching by way of the Collao for the province of Paria, in which Centeno then was with about two hundred and fifty men, determined to await the arrival of the enemy and to run the chance of battle. When Carvajal was come within about two leagues of that place, Centeno retired a short space to the other side of the city, taking post on the side of a river in what appeared to him strong ground, and Carvajal took possession of the tambo of Paria, about a league from the camp of Centeno. Next day, Centeno sent fifteen well mounted musqueteers to bid defiance to Carvajal, and to challenge him to battle. On arriving within a stones throw of the tambo, they required a conference with Carvajal, to whom they delivered the following message: "That Centeno was ready to give battle in the cause of his majesty; but if Carvajal, who had grown old in the royal service, would return to his duty and abandon the service of the usurper, Centeno and all his followers would be happy to serve under his command." To this message Carvajal only returned abusive language, and the two parties mutually reproached each other as rebels and traitors. After some time spent in this manner, the fifteen royalists discharged their musquets and returned to Centeno, to whom they gave an account of the number and disposition of the enemy. This occurrence took place on Holy Friday in the year 1546.

Immediately after this defiance, Carvajal put his troops in motion to attack the royalists, but Centeno thought proper to retire to a more advantageous post, not deeming it prudent to run the risk of a pitched battle, and meaning rather to harass the enemy by means of skirmishes and night attacks. He was likewise in hopes that a good many of those who followed Carvajal might come over to his side as opportunity offered, as he understood many of them were much discontented with the harsh and brutal behaviour of the lieutenant-general, whom they served from fear and constraint, not from attachment. Besides, Centeno was unwilling to run the risk of battle, as Carvajal though inferior in cavalry to the royalist party was greatly superior in point of fire arms. In fact this resolution of retreating was much against the inclination of Centeno, who wished to have given battle to Carvajal; but as all the inhabitants of La Plata on his side opposed that measure, he was obliged to conform to their wishes, yet always determined to give battle on the first favourable opportunity. Centeno accordingly retreated fifteen leagues that day, and was followed by Carvajal with great diligence, insomuch that the hostile parties encamped at night very near each other, on which occasion Carvajal confided the guard of his camp to such of his followers as he could most surely depend upon. Towards midnight, Centeno detached eighty horsemen to assault the camp of the insurgents, which they did accordingly with much spirit, making several discharges of their fire arms, but without any favourable impression; as Carvajal drew up his troops in order of battle, and kept them all night in their ranks, strictly forbidding any one to quit their post on any pretence, lest some might desert over to the enemy. At break of day, Centeno decamped and resumed his march, and was followed by Carvajal with equal diligence always very near. In this second day of the retreat the two parties marched ten leagues, or near forty miles; and towards evening Camijal came up with one of the soldiers belonging to Centeno, who had lagged behind owing to extreme fatigue. Carvajal ordered him immediately to be hanged, swearing that he would treat every one of the enemy who fell into his hands in the same manner.

Centeno continued always to retreat, and Carvajal to pursue close in his rear, both parties using the utmost possible diligence, insomuch that they every day marched twelve or fifteen long leagues, almost always within sight of each other. After some days, Centeno made a countermarch upon Paria by taking a different road, and even directed his march, towards the Collao, always followed by Carvajal. At Hayohayo[22] Carvajal came up with twelve soldiers belonging to Centeno, who had fallen behind, all of whom he ordered to be hanged. In consequence of these continued rapid marches, several of the soldiers of both sides used daily to lag behind from excessive fatigue, all of whom endeavoured to hide themselves as well as they could to avoid being made prisoners. Finding his force daily diminishing, Centeno complained loudly of his officers and followers for having prevented him from fighting; and as he found the whole country through which he now marched attached to the enemy, he determined to direct his march towards the coast intending to escape if possible by sea. For this purpose he took the direction of Arequipa, and sent off one of his officers named Ribadeneyra to endeavour to procure a ship somewhere on the coast, which he was to bring to Arequipa, that it might be in readiness to embark the whole remnant of the retreating party immediately on their arrival[23]. Ribadeneyra fell in with a ship on the coast which was ready to sail for Chili, of which he easily took possession, and found it well adapted for his purpose.

[Footnote 22: The Callao is a district at the north end of the great lake of Titicaca. Paria and Hayohayo are two towns on the east side of the Rio Desaguadero, which flows from the south into the lake of Titicaca.—E.]

[Footnote 23: Arequipa is not less than twenty-five miles from the nearest coast, at which place there is a bay or port named La Guata.—E.]

"In the course of this pursuit, it happened, one day that Centeno had to pass a deep dell or narrow valley between two mountains, as often happens in that country, the descent to which was about a league from the top to a stream of water in the bottom, yet the hills were so precipitous and close together that their tops hardly exceeded a musquet shot. As Carvajal was well acquainted with this pass, he was confident of catching his enemy at this place as in a trap; believing that while Centeno was descending to the bottom, he should be able to gain the top of the hill, whence he might greatly annoy Centeno and his men while clambering up the opposite hill. Centeno was however fully aware of his danger, and was accordingly very careful to provide against the mischief which he foresaw might occur. He therefore placed six of his best mounted cavalry in ambush near the top of the first mountain, with directions to assail the rear of Carvajal's troops after the van and main body were past, so as to make a diversion and oblige Carvajal to return to succour his people, by which he and his men would be enabled, to get beyond the pass in safety. The ambush accordingly remained concealed until Carvajal and the best part of his troops were gone past; after which they sallied forth, and fell with great resolution on the rear which was marching on in disorder, consisting of a mixed multitude of Indians, Negroes, and straggling Spaniards, with horses mules and other beasts of burden, all in confusion and disorder, among whom they did great execution. Although he heard the noise occasioned by this unexpected assault, Carvajal continued his march for some time, believing it only a false alarm. The six horsemen therefore continued their assault almost unopposed, carrying all before them, and doing incredible mischief. Among the rest they overthrew a loaded mule which carried several quintals of gun-powder, which they blew up with so violent a noise that Carvajal was convinced of the serious nature of the assault, and found it necessary to desist from the pursuit of Centeno, and to return for the protection of his rear. When the six horsemen belonging to Centeno observed the approach of the troops of Carvajal, they immediately fled by cross ways and bye paths, under the guidance of some friendly Indians, and rejoined Centeno six or seven days afterwards. By this successful stratagem Centeno was enabled to escape across the dangerous pass, and even gained considerably in the retreat, as Carvajal was obliged to remain on the top of the first mountain all the rest of that day and the following night. Carvajal was much displeased at being thus foiled by one so much less experienced than he in the art of war, and observed to his officers, that during forty years service in the wars of Italy, where he had seen many fine retreats, accomplished by the king of France, by Antonio de Leyva, Count Pedro de Navarro, Mark Antony Colona, and other famous captains, he had never seen one so excellently contrived as this by Centeno[24]."

[Footnote 24: This paragraph, marked by inverted commas, is inserted from Garcilasso de la Vega in the text, as too long for a note.—E.]

Centeno arrived soon afterwards at Arequipa, and in less than two days Carvajal arrived there in pursuit. As the vessel procured by Ribadeneyra was not come to that part of the coast, and Centeno had not even received notice of its capture, he determined to dismiss his followers, now reduced to eighty men, that they might endeavour to escape separately, being utterly unable to make head against the enemy who was fast approaching. Centeno, accompanied only by two friends, withdrew, into the mountains, where he remained concealed in a cave till the arrival of the licentiate Gasca, being all the time supplied with provisions by a friendly cacique. On arriving at the coast of Arequipa, Carvajal was informed that Centeno and his people were dispersed; and hearing that Lope de Mendoza was at no great distance with eight or ten of the royalists, he detached one of his officers with twenty mounted musqueteers in pursuit. Mendoza however fled with so much diligence, that although followed for more than eighty leagues, his pursuers were unable to overtake him, and were at last obliged to return. Mendoza continued his retreat beyond the ridge of the Andes, into the eastern plain of the Rio Plata, where we must leave him for the present to continue the narrative of events in Peru.

Soon after the arrival of Carvajal in Arequipa, the ship which, had been seized by Ribadeneyra appeared on the coast, and Carvajal was informed by some of the soldiers of Centeno who remained at Arequipa of the intention of this vessel, and of the signal which had been agreed, upon between Centeno and Ribadeneyra. Wishing to gain possession of the vessel, Carvajal concealed twenty musqueteers near the coast, and made the appointed signal. Ribadeneyra at first believed that the signal was made by order of Centeno and sent the boat on shore; but having some suspicions of the actual state of affairs, he directed the people in the boat to be extremely cautious against surprize before venturing on shore. They accordingly, refused to land, unless Centeno himself made his appearance; and as this of course could not be complied with, they returned to the ship, with which Ribadeneyra immediately set sail for Nicaragua. As no part of the late force under Centeno remained in the field, Carvajal resolved to take up his residence for some time in the city of La Plata, as he was informed that Centeno and his friends had concealed a large quantity of treasure at that place, and that he might both endeavour to discover that deposit, and might draw as large a sum as possible from the rich mines in that neighbourhood. Carvajal was willing to communicate to Gonzalo a portion of the wealth he expected to acquire in that district, for defraying the expences of the war; but he proposed especially to enrich himself on this occasion, being exceedingly covetous, as has been already remarked. He accordingly went to La Plata, which submitted without resistance, and remained there for a considerable time amassing wealth, till obliged to take the field against Mendoza.

Lope de Mendoza, as already mentioned, made his escape from Arequipa with a small number of followers, and was pursued for a long way. He for some time followed the line of the coast, and after he had eluded the pursuit of the party sent after him by Carvajal, he and his companions resolved so endeavour to penetrate into the government of Diego de Roias on the Rio Plata, as all the country of Peru had universally submitted to the domination of Gonzalo. For this purpose Mendoza followed the same route which Centeno had formerly taken when retreating from Alfonso de Toro; both because he thought his enemies would not pursue him by that road and because the Indians belonging to Centeno and himself dwelt in that part of the country, and he expected to procure provisions and other assistance from them. While travelling across these deserts, Mendoza met with Gabriel Bermudez, who had accompanied Diego de Roias on his expedition into the country on the Rio Plata. From this person Mendoza was informed of the events which had occurred to the expedition under De Roias, of which the following is an abstract:

Diego de Roias, Philip Gutierrez and Pedro de Heredia, who went upon this expedition, had to fight their way among hostile Indians, in the course of which De Roias was slain. After his death, violent disputes arose between Francisco de Mendoza who succeeded in the command and the other officers engaged in the expedition, in the course of which Gutierrez was cashiered and banished. They continued after this to prosecute their discoveries all the way to the Rio Plata, receiving information that great riches were to be found in some districts in the neighbourhood, in which there were certain Spaniards who had penetrated into the country by ascending the Rio Plata from the Atlantic, and had formed establishments in the interior. In prosecuting the exploration, of that great river, they had fallen in with some forts which were built by Sebastian Gabota; and reported many other surprizing and wonderful things which they had seen in that country. In the course of their proceedings, Francisco de Mendoza was assassinated by Pedro Heredia, owing to which violent disputes had taken place among them, by which and the smallness of their force they had been rendered unable to proceed in conquering the country, so that at length they had come to the resolution of returning into Peru, that his majesty or the viceroy of that kingdom might nominate a new commander. They were likewise persuaded, when the riches of the country in which they had been came to be known, that they would be able to procure a considerable accession of new adventurers, so as to enable them to atchieve the conquest.

In the course of their expedition they asserted that they had penetrated six hundred leagues to the eastwards of La Plata, through a champaign country of very easy access, and tolerably abounding in provisions and water. Bermudez added, that within a very few days they had learnt, from some Indians who occasionally traded into the province of Las Charcas, of the revolt which had taken place in Peru, but had been unable to procure information respecting the causes of this insurrection or as to who were chiefly engaged in it; for which reason he had been sent on before to inquire into these circumstances, and had received orders from the captains and other principal persons in the expedition, to offer their services to the party that acted for the royal interests, in which cause they might be of material importance, as they had a considerable number of excellent horses and plenty of arms. After the conclusion of this narrative, Mendoza gave Bermudez an account of all the late events in Peru; on which, in, virtue of the commission with which he had been entrusted, Bermudez promised in the name of all his companions to march against the lieutenant-general.

Lope Mendoza and Bermudez went after this to meet the troops which were returning from the Rio Plata, which were at no great distance. When they were informed of the situation of affairs in Peru, they received Lope with every demonstration of respect, and confirmed the offers of assistance which Bermudez had already made in their name, declaring their resolution to devote themselves heartily to the service of the king. Lope de Mendoza gave them hearty commendations for their loyalty, and represented to them how honourable and praiseworthy it was to exert their utmost endeavours in the cause of their lawful sovereign; assuring them that they might all depend upon being amply provided for, when the country was restored to obedience. Lope de Mendoza was unanimously received as their chief, and conducted them to the village of Pocona, about forty leagues to the north-east of La Plata; whence he sent some confidential persons to certain secret places where he and Centeno had hidden above a thousand marks of silver under ground. On recovering this treasure, he proposed to divide it among those persons who had so nobly offered to follow his orders; but most of them refused his preferred bounty, either because they were already sufficiently rich, or because hitherto the soldiers who had been engaged in the wars of Peru had been unused to any regular pay, and only accepted money to answer their immediate wants, and to provide themselves with horses and arms. Even the lowest soldier, in those days expected, when the enterprizes of their leaders succeeded, to be rewarded for his services in repartitions or advantageous establishments in the country, by which they flattered themselves to acquire riches, so great was the reputation of the richness of Peru. By means of these men from the Rio Plata, Lope Mendoza found himself unexpectedly at the head of an hundred and fifty well mounted cavalry; all excellently armed and equipped for service. It was a great misfortune to the royal cause, that Centeno was now concealed, instead of having retreated into the interior along with Mendoza as he had done formerly; as if he had now been at the head of the royalists, with this important reinforcement, affairs might have taken a better turn than they actually did.

While Carvajal was on his way from Arequipa for the city of La Plata, he received intelligence of the success of Gonzalo Pizarro at Quito, and that all Peru was entirely reduced under his command. He resolved therefore to repair to La Plata, as formerly mentioned, intending to regulate the affairs of the province of Las Charcas, and to collect treasure. On his arrival however at Paria on his way to La Plata he received intelligence of the arrival of the troops from the Rio Plata and of their junction with Lope Mendoza. Being informed at the same time that these unexpected opponents were by no means united among themselves, and that they marched very carelessly in separate and unconnected detachments, most of which refused to acknowledge any one as their commander, he determined to set out against them with the utmost diligence, that he might fall upon them in their present divided state. Being rejoined by the detachment which had pursued Lope Mendoza, and having put his men in order for a fresh expedition, Carvajal set out from La Plata and marched towards the enemy with the utmost possible speed, encouraging his troops by the assurance of an easy and bloodless victory, even asserting that he had received letters from the principal officers among the enemy in which they offered their services to him, so that they would only have the trouble of marching, without any danger of fighting.

During this march Carvajal was joined by thirty men in addition to his former force, so that he was now at the head of two hundred and fifty men. At length he came in sight of Pocona, which is eighty leagues from Paria, about four o'clock of an afternoon, and made his appearance in good order, on the top of a rising ground within view of Lope de Mendoza, who was then making a distribution of money among such of his new companions as were willing to accept his bounty: Mendoza had already got some intimation of the approach of Carvajal; and as his own force consisted entirely of cavalry, most of whom were persons of some consideration, remarkably well mounted and armed, he drew up his men in good order in a plain at some distance from the village, in which he left the baggage and his money; saying, that he trusted through their bravery to be soon able to recover both, and even to increase their store by that belonging to their enemies. Carvajal immediately descended from the hill he had first taken possession of, and took post in the place which Mendoza had just quitted, which was an inclosare of considerable extent surrounded with walls, in which there were openings in several places. Carvajal chose this as a convenient post for the night, in which the enemy would not be able to attack with their cavalry. On learning that Lope de Mendoza and his men had left their baggage in the town of Pocona, the troops of Carvajal immediately quitted their ranks to go in search of plunder, insomuch that Carvajal was left in his camp with hardly eight men. If Mendoza had availed himself of this opportunity to attack Carvajal, he might have gained an easy victory, and might have boasted of having left his baggage exposed to plunder as a stratagem of war, which on similar occasions had often been the cause of signal victories. On purpose to recall his troops to their duty, Carvajal ordered a false alarm to be sounded, which occasioned the return of the greater part of his men; but so strong was their avidity for spoil that most part of the night was spent before they all returned to the camp.

At this time there was a secret conspiracy entered into by many of Carvajal's followers, with the intention of putting him to death out of revenge for his harsh and tyrannical conduct towards them, and one Pedro de Avendano, his secretary, in whom he reposed entire confidence was the principal ringleader of the conspirators. To facilitate the execution of this enterprize, Avendano, sent a message by a clever fellow of an Indian to give Mendoza notice of the intentions of the conspirators, and to request he would make an attack upon Carvajal's camp in the course of the night, in the confusion attendant upon which he and the other conspirators might have an opportunity of executing their intended plot. Mendoza had previously determined upon withdrawing about four or five leagues from Pocona, to a level plain in which his cavalry would be able to act with much advantage. But on receiving the message of Avendano, he ordered his men to hold themselves in readiness to attack the camp of Carvajal at the going down of the moon, preferring the obscurity of night in order to avoid the danger of the more numerous firearms of the enemy. At that time he advanced in good order towards the enemy, sending some scouts in advance, who made prisoner of one of Carvajal's soldiers. After interrogating this man, they advanced to the openings of the wall which surrounded the camp, which they found guarded by some musqueteers and pikemen. Mendoza made a brisk attack, but was bravely resisted by the enemy, and so great was the confusion and noise that it was impossible to enter upon any parley, as no one could be heard by reason of the continual firing and the shouts of the combatants.

Immediately on the alarm, Carvajal used his utmost efforts to get his troops into order and to animate and encourage them to exert themselves against the enemy. At this period, Avendano pointed out Carvajal to a musqueteer who was one of the conspirators, and encouraged him to take a steady aim at the lieutenant-general; but owing to the darkness, the shot missed of its intended effect; and only wounded him in one of his thighs. Finding himself wounded, and being satisfied it had been done by one of his own people, Carvajal deemed it prudent to conceal the circumstance for the present; and retired along with Avendano, of whose fidelity he had no suspicion, on purpose to disguise himself in an old brown coat-and a shabby hat, that he might not be conspicuous, after which he returned to animate his men to defend the camp. Avendano again pointed him out to another conspirator, who fired a second time at Carvajal, but entirely missed his aim. In the meantime the assailants frequently called out to know if Carvajal were dead; but receiving no answer, and finding that all the avenues to the camp were bravely defended, Lope de Mendoza drew off his men. In this night engagement about fourteen were slain on both sides, and several wounded. Carvajal got his wound secretly dressed, so that none of his people knew that such a thing had happened.

After the cessation of the engagement, one Placentia deserted from Carvajal's camp, and informed Mendoza that all the baggage belonging to Carvajal and his troops had been left at a place which he described about five or six leagues from Pocona, among which was a large quantity of gold and silver, several horses, and some musquets and powder. On this information, Meodoza set off immediately with his troops for that place, guided by the deserter; and marching diligently all the remainder of the night, he arrived quite unexpectedly at the place where Carvajal had secured his baggage; but as the night was exceedingly dark, above seventy of his men lost their way and fell behind. Yet, with such of his people as had kept up with him, Mendoza took possession of the whole without any resistance. After this, being sensible that he was not in sufficient force to cope with Carvajal, Mendoza resolved to retreat by way of the desert in which Centeno had formerly taken shelter, which he did accordingly with about fifty men, all the rest of his troops having fallen behind during the night, as already mentioned. In the prosecution of this plan of retreat, Mendoza and his people reached a certain river about two leagues and a half from Pocona, where they halted to take some rest and refreshment after the excessive fatigues of the past night. Carvajal was soon apprised of the capture of his baggage and the route which Mendoza had taken, and immediately set off in pursuit with about fifty of his best mounted troops; and, using every possible diligence, he came to the place where Mendoza had halted, about noon of the next day, and immediately attacked the royalists, some of whom were asleep, while others were taking food. Thus unexpectedly assailed, and believing that Carvajal was followed by his whole force, the royalists made a feeble resistance, and very soon took to flight, dispersing themselves in every direction. Lope de Mendoza and Pedro de Heredia, with a good many others, were made prisoners and Carvajal immediately ordered these two chiefs, and six or seven other principal persons among the royalists to be beheaded.

On this occasion Carvajal recovered the whole of his own baggage, and got possession of all that had belonged to the enemy, with all of which and the prisoners he had made, he returned to Pocona, engaging to do no injury to those who had escaped from the soldiers in the late attack, and even restored their horses arms and baggage to his prisoners, most of whom he sent off to join Gonzalo Pizarro. On leaving Pocona, he took Alfonso de Camargo and Luis Pardamo along with him, who had formerly fled along with Mendoza, and whose lives he now spared, as they gave him information respecting a considerable treasure which Centeno had concealed under ground near Paria, and where in fact he discovered above 50,000 crowns. After this, he went with his troops to the city of La Plata, where he proposed to reside for some time. At this place he appointed persons in whom he could confide to the offices of judges and magistrates, and dispatched intelligence of the success of his arms over the whole kingdom of Peru. He remained for some time at La Plata, where he collected treasure from all the surrounding country, under pretence of supplying Gonzalo Pizarro, but in reality he retained much the larger share for himself.

Having thus succeeded, in all his enterprizes and established his authority in the south of Peru on such firm foundations that no opposition remained in the whole country, fortune seemed to determine to exalt him to the summit of his desires by the discovery of the richest mines which had ever been known. Some Indians who belonged to Juan de Villareal, an inhabitant of La Plata, happening to pass over a very high isolated mountain in the middle of a plain, about eighteen leagues from that city, named Potosi, noticed by some indications that it contained mines of silver. They accordingly took away some specimens of the ore for trial, from which they found that the mineral was exceedingly rich in pure silver; insomuch that the poorest of the ore produced eighty marks of pure silver from the quintal of native mineral[25], being a more abundant production than any that ever had been heard of before. When this discovery became known in the city of La Plata, the magistrates went to the mountain of Potosi, which they divided among the inhabitants of their city, setting up boundary marks to distinguish the allotments or each person in those places which appeared eligible for workings. So great was the resort to these new mines, that in a short time there were above seven thousand Yanaconas, or Indian labourers, established in the neighbourhood, who were employed by their Christian masters in the various operations of these mines. These men laboured with so much industry, that each Indian, by agreement, furnished two marks or sixteen ounces of silver weekly to their respective masters; and so rich was the mine, that they were able to do this and to retain an equal quantity to themselves[26]. Such is the nature of the ore extracted from the mineral veins of this mountain, that it cannot be reduced in the ordinary manner by means of bellows, as is customary in other places. It is here smelted in certain small furnaces, called guairas by the Indians, which are supplied with a mixed fuel of charcoal and sheeps dung, and are blown up by the wind only, without the use of any mechanical contrivance.

[Footnote 25: This produce is most extraordinarily large, being equal to four parts of pure silver from ten of ore, or 640 ounces of silver from the quintal or 1600 ounces of ore. At the present time, the silver mines in Mexico, which are the most productive of any that have ever been known, are remarkable for the poverty of the mineral they contain. A quintal or 1600 ounces of ore affording only at an average 3 or 4 ounces of pure silver. The profit therefore of these must depend upon the abundance of ore, and the facility with which it is procured and smelted.—E.]

[Footnote 26: The gross amount of this production of silver, on the data in the text, is 11,648,000 ounces yearly; worth, at 5s. 6d. per ounce, L. 3,203,200 sterling; and, estimating silver in those days, at six times its present efficacy, worth L. 19,219,200 of modern value. In the present day before the revolutionary troubles, Humboldt estimates the entire production of gold and silver from Spanish and Portuguese America at L. 9,787,500; only about three times the quantity said to have been at first extracted from Potosi alone, and only about half the effective value.—E.]

These rich mines are known by the name of Potosi, which is that of the district, or province in which the mountain is situated. Owing to the easy labour and great profit experienced by the Indians at these mines, when any of the Yanaconas was once established at this place it was found almost impossible to induce them to leave it or to work elsewhere; and indeed, they were here so entirely concealed from all dangers, and so much exempted from their usual severe drudgery and the unwholesome vapours they had been subjected to in other mines, that they preferred working at Potosi to any other situation. So great was the concourse of inhabitants to Potosi, and the consequent demand for provisions, _that the sack of maize was sold for twenty crowns, the sack of wheat for forty, and a small bag of _coca_ for thirty dollars; and these articles rose afterwards to a higher price. Owing to the astonishing productiveness of these new mines, all the others in that part of Peru were speedily abandoned. Even those of Porco, whence Ferdinand Pizarro had formerly procured great riches, were left unwrought. All the Yanaconas who had been employed in searching for gold in the province of Carabaya, and in the auriferous rivers in different parts of southern Peru, flocked to Potosi, where they were able to make vastly more profit by their labour than in any other place. From various indications, those who are most experienced in mining believe that Potosi will always continue productive and cannot be easily exhausted[27].

[Footnote 27: It has however become very much exhausted, and has been in a great measure abandoned. The mines of Lauricocha, in a different part of Peru, are now in greater estimation. But those of Guanaxuato and Zacatecas in Mexico, notwithstanding the poverty of their ore, have been long the most productive of the American mines.—E.]

Carvajal did not fail to take advantage of this favourable discovery, and immediately set about the acquisition of treasure for himself by every means which his present uncontroulable power afforded. In the first place, he appropriated to his own use all the Yanaconas, or Indian labourers in the mines, which had belonged, to such of the inhabitants as had opposed him, or to those who had died or fled from the province. He likewise appropriated to his own use above 10,000 Peruvian sheep, belonging to the Yanaconas of the crown or to individuals, which were employed in transporting provisions for the miners. By these means, he amassed in a short time near 200,000 crowns, all of which he retained to his own use. His soldiers were so much dissatisfied with his conduct, as he gave them no share of his exactions, that they plotted together against him. Luis Pardamo, Alfonso de Comargo, Diego de Balsameda, and Diego de Luxan, with thirty others, who had entered into this conspiracy, had determined to put him to death about a month after his arrival in La Plata from his expedition against Mendoza; but, owing to some obstacles, they had been induced to deter the execution of their enterprize to a future period. By some unknown means the circumstances of this plot came to the knowledge of Carvajal, who put to death the before-mentioned leaders of the conspiracy, and ten or twelve others, and banished all the rest. By these merciless executions, in which he indulged on all occasions, Carvajal inspired so much terror that no one dared in future to make any similar attempt; as he not only punished in the severest manner all who evinced any intention of revolt, but put people to death on the slightest suspicion. Owing to this the loyal servants of his majesty may assuredly be exculpated from the blame which has been imputed to them, for not putting Carvajal to death: In reality, there were many persons sufficiently anxious to have done so, on purpose to escape from the cruel tyranny under which they groaned in secret; and four or five conspiracies were entered into for the purpose, which were all discovered, and occasioned the destruction of at least fifty individuals. By these means every one was terrified from attempting any thing against him, more especially as he gave high rewards to all who communicated any intelligence of the kind, so that all were forced to temporize and to wait in anxious hope of some favourable opportunity to deliver them from his cruel tyranny. Carvajal continued to remain at La Plata, frequently publishing accounts of the successes of Gonzalo Pizarro, to whom he often sent large remittances; derived from his own resources, from the royal fifths which he appropriated, and from the confiscated estates of those whom he put to death, all of which he seized upon, under pretence of supplying funds for prosecuting the war.

From the 18th of January 1546, the day on which he defeated the viceroy, Gonzalo Pizarro continued to reside at Quito till the middle of July of that year, accompanied by a force of about five hundred men, occupied in almost continual feastings and revelry. Various reasons were assigned for his long residence in that place; some alleging that it was on purpose to be more at hand for receiving early intelligence from Spain; while others attribute it to the great profits he derived from the gold mines which had been recently discovered in that neighbourhood; and others again alleged that he was detained by attachment to the lady formerly mentioned, whose husband he had procured to be assassinated by Vincente Pablo. That woman was delivered, after the death of her husband, of a child which was put to death by her father; for which inhuman action he was ordered to be hanged by Pedro de Puelles.

During his residence in Quito, Gonzalo Pizarro sent off several detachments of soldiers to different places, giving commissions and instructions to their commanders in his own name as governor of Peru. Among these, the lieutenant Benalcazar was sent back to his former government; having been pardoned and even taken into favour by Gonzalo. A reinforcement was also sent to Pedro de Valdivia who commanded in Chili, under the command of Captain Ulloa, whom he had sent to ask assistance to enable him to continue and maintain his conquests in that country. Other officers and soldiers were sent to other parts, which are unnecessary to be particularized. At length Gonzalo determined to leave Quito, and to establish his residence in Lima; and it has been alleged that he was principally induced to take this step from suspicion of the fidelity of Lorenzo de Aldana, his lieutenant at Lima, who was so much beloved by all the inhabitants of that city as to be almost in condition to have revolted to the royal cause. Gonzalo is said likewise to have been somewhat suspicious of his lieutenant-general Carvajal, being afraid lest he might be so puffed up by the many victories he had gained, and by his immense distance, as to be induced to set up for himself. He accordingly left Quito under the command of Pedro de Puelles, whom he appointed his lieutenant and captain-general in that province, with a force of three hundred men, having great confidence in his attachment ever since he had succoured him when in straits on his march from Cuzco to Lima, and when his army was on the point of abandoning him. He reposed so entirely on Puelles, that he believed, if the king were to send any force against him by the route of the province in which Benalcazar commanded, that Puelles would prevent them from being able to penetrate into Peru.

While on his progress from Quito towards Lima, Gonzalo assumed in everything the deportment and authority of governor of Peru, and was treated in every respect as such by all the inhabitants of the country. He seemed to believe that his authority was so well and firmly established that he had nothing to fear from the attempts of his enemies, and that even the king would be obliged to grant him any terms he might require. All his officers soldiers and dependents obeyed and respected him entirely, as if satisfied that they were always to be subject to his authority, and to depend upon him alone for advancement and reward. In the exercise of his usurped authority, he made many grants or repartitions of lands and Indians, all of them for long periods, which every one considered as secure of being continued. He and his principal officers pretended that they frequently received letters from some of the highest of the nobles in Spain, praising his conduct and approving of every thing he had done, which these pretended letters justified on account of the infringements which had been made on the rights and privileges of the colonists. In these letters likewise, the pretended Spanish grandees were made to engage their favour and credit at court to support his interest and authority with the sovereign. The well informed among the followers of Gonzalo Pizarro saw clearly that these letters were mere fabrications to impose upon the vulgar, and had no foundation whatever in truth.

On his arrival at the city of San Miguel, Gonzalo learned that there were a considerable number of Indians in that neighbourhood who had not been reduced under subjection; for which reason he gave orders to establish a military post in the province of Garrochamba[28], the command of which he conferred on Captain Mercadillo, with a force of an hundred and thirty men, and gave him instructions for completing the conquest of that district, and for dividing the lands and Indians into repartitions like the rest of the country. At this time likewise, he detached Captain Porcel with sixty soldiers to complete the conquest of the Bracamoros. In these proceedings, he wished it to be believed that his sole object was for the advantage of the colony; but his real purpose was to keep his troops on foot and in employ, in case of needing them at a future period for his own defence in support of his usurpation. Before leaving Quito, Gonzalo sent off the licentiate Carvajal by sea with a party of soldiers, in the ships which Juan Alonzo Palomino had brought from Nicaragua after his pursuit of Verdugo. Carvajal was ordered to proceed along the coast towards Lima, and to settle all the maritime towns in his way in good order.

[Footnote 28: No such province or district is now found in the maps of Peru; but it appears to have been on the confines between the northern part of Peru Proper and the southern extremity of Quito, where Valladolid now stands.—E.]

The licentiate Carvajal after executing the before-mentioned orders, came to Truxillo to meet Gonzalo Pizarro, whence they went together to Lima, accompanied by a force of two hundred men. On approaching Lima, there was a diversity of opinions among the followers of Pizarro, respecting the ceremonies with which he should be received into the capital of Peru. Some of his officers were desirous that the magistracy should come out to meet him with a canopy, under which he should make his entry after the manner usually practised with kings. Some even proposed that a breach should be made in the walls, and some of the houses of the city thrown down, so as to make a new entrance on purpose in memory of his victory over the viceroy, as used to be done anciently in Rome for the reception of triumphant generals. In this, as in all other important affairs, Gonzalo was guided by the advice of the licentiate Carvajal, and entered the city on horseback, preceded by all his captains on foot leading their horses by the bridles. On this occasion he was accompanied by the archbishop of Lima, the bishops of Cuzco and Quito, and the bishop of Bogota, who had come into Peru by way of Carthagena on purpose to receive consecration. He was likewise accompanied by Lorenzo de Aldana, his lieutenant-governor of Lima, and by all the magistrates and inhabitants of the city; no one daring to remain at home lest they might be suspected of disaffection. The streets were all ornamented with green herbs and flowers; all the bells of the churches and monasteries were kept ringing; and the cavalcade was preceded by a numerous band of trumpets kettle-drums and other warlike instruments of music. In this pompous manner, Pizarro was conducted in the first place to the great church, and thence to his own residence.

From this time, Gonzalo Pizarro conducted himself with much more pride and haughtiness than formerly, conceiving high ideas of his own importance from these public ceremonials of respect, as usually happens to men of feeble minds on any sudden elevation. He had a guard for his person of eighty halberdiers, besides several horsemen, who acompanied him wherever he went. No person whatever was permitted to be seated in his presence; and there were very few persons whom he designed to honour so far as to return their salute. By these haughty manners, and still more by his frequent disobliging and even abusive manner of speaking, he displeased every one and became universally disliked. It must likewise be mentioned, that the soldiery, to whom he owed everything, became exceedingly discontented with him, as he gave them no pay. All this had a powerful influence on his downfall in the sequel; though for the present every one concealed their real sentiments, waiting for a more favourable opportunity.

* * * * *

"Following Garcilasso de la Vega and other authors, the Historian of America[29] alleges that Gonzalo Pizarro was urged by several of his adherents, and in particular by Carvajal, to assume the sovereignty of Peru; to attach the Spaniards to his interest by liberal grants of lands and Indians, and by the creation of titles of nobility similar to those in Europe; to establish military orders of knighthood, with privileges distinctions and pensions, resembling those in Spain, as gratifications to the officers in his service; and to gain the whole body of natives to his service, by marrying the Coya, or Peruvian princess next in relation to the reigning Inca. Thus at the head of the ancient inhabitants of the country and of the colonists, he might set the power of Spain at defiance, and could easily repel any force that might be sent from Spain to such a distance. These counsellors who urged Pizarro to adopt this plan, insisted that he had already gone too far to expect pardon from the emperor; and endeavoured to convince him that all the founders of great monarchies had risen by their personal merit and their own valour, without any pretensions to ancient lineage or valid rights of sovereignty; and that, besides, his family had a strong title to the dominion of Peru, founded on the rights of discovery and conquest. But the inferior talents of Gonzalo circumscribed his ambition within more narrow bounds, and confined his views to the obtaining a confirmation of the authority which he now possessed from the emperor; for which purpose he sent an officer of distinction to Spain, to give such a representation of his conduct and the state of the country, as might induce the court, from inclination or necessity, to continue him as governor of Peru for life. Although Garcilasso de la Vega gives full warrant for this account of the proposals of the insurgents, Zarate, who was then resident in a public character in Peru, makes no mention of any such plan having been agitated, which could hardly have happened without his knowledge: It is probable therefore that these additional circumstances were invented by the enemies of Gonzalo after his fall, on purpose to blacken his memory by the imputation of even deeper crimes than those he was actually guilty of."—E.

[Footnote 29: History of America, II. 378.]

SECTION VI.

History of the Expedition of Pedro de la Gasca, the Death of Gonzalo Pizarro, and the Restoration of Peru to Tranquillity.

While these things were transacting in Peru, the emperor Charles V. was residing in Germany, where he had gone on purpose to overthrow the party of the Lutherans and others who had separated from the church of Rome. The emperor was desirous to receive an account of the disturbances in that distant and valuable colony from Diego Alvarez Cueto, the brother-in-law of the late viceroy, and Francisco Maldonado the messenger of Gonzalo Pizarro, both of whom went into Germany for that purpose. At this time, however, though acquainted with the revolt of Peru, the imprisonment of the viceroy, and the usurpation of the government by Pizarro, the court necessarily remained ignorant of the death of the viceroy. Frequent deliberations were held for devising proper remedies to restore tranquillity to Peru; but the matter lay over for some considerable time, in consequence of the absence of the emperor from Spain, and because he was at this time frequently attacked by illness. At length it was determined to send over into Peru the licentiate Pedro de la Gasca, at that time a counsellor of inquisition. The prudent and intelligent character of this man was already well known, from the skill and success with which he had already conducted several affairs of consequence with which he had been entrusted, and particularly by the excellent dispositions and preparations which he had made, only a few years before, to defend the kingdom of Valencia against an expected invasion of the Turks and Moors, and in various matters respecting the new converts in that kingdom, which he took the management of while occupied in some of the affairs of the holy office on which he had been sent thither by the emperor.

The title granted to Gasca on occasion of going into Peru, was only that of president of the royal court of audience. But, by his commision, he was invested with full powers in every thing respecting the government of the country; to pacify the troubles and restore peace; and to pardon as he might see proper all crimes, whether committed before his arrival or during his residence in the country. Along with Gasca, the licentiates Ganas and Renteria went out to Peru, as judges or oydors of the supreme tribunal or royal court of audience. Gasca was likewise furnished with full powers to raise troops in case of necessity, and to do every thing that the exigency of affairs might require, without waiting for orders or instructions from Spain. His powers and orders however were kept secret, as it was wished to attempt the restoration of order by gentle means; for which reason nothing was spoken of but pardon and indemnity, and he was desired to endeavour to restore the colony to peace and tranquillity by means of clemency if possible.

Gasca embarked from Spain in the month of May 1546, on purpose to quell the formidable rebellion which had long subsisted in Peru, without either money or troops, and merely accompanied by such servants and officers of his household as were requisite to support the dignity of his office as president of the high court of audience. On arriving at St Martha, he received information of the defeat of Melchior Verdugo, formerly mentioned, and that Verdugo waited for him at Carthagena with the small remnant of his men who had escaped on that occasion. Knowing that Hinojosa and his people were exceedingly irritated against Verdugo, Gasca resolved to go by way of Nombre de Dios, to prevent the insurgents from entertaining any suspicions of his pacific intentions, as he believed they would prevent him from having any access into the country if he held any intercourse with Verdugo, and still more if he were joined by that obnoxious person. Gasca cast anchor in the harbour of Nombre de Dios on the 27th of July 1546, where Hernan Mexia had been posted by Hinojosa with an hundred and eighty men, to protect that place and neighbourhood against Melchior Verdugo. The president sent on shore Alfonzo de Alvarado, who had accompanied him from Spain, to notify his arrival and the purposes of his mission to Mexia. After some conference, they separated without communicating their real sentiments to each other, as both were suspicious and kept up much reserve. On the return of Alvarado to the ship, Mexia sent to request the president to disembark, which he did accordingly. On this occasion Mexia went to meet him, in a barge attended by twenty musqueteers, leaving the rest of his troops drawn up on the beach. Mexia immediately left his own barge, and accompanied the president in his boat to the shore, where he caused him to be received with every mark of respect, under a salute from the troops.

After landing, the president, in a private conference, gave Mexia an account of the object of his voyage to Peru; on which Mexia expressed his determined resolution to yield implicit obedience to the royal orders, and to devote his services accordingly to the president. He declared, that he had long and anxiously waited the arrival of some person possessing authority to put an end to the troubles; and that, fortunately, circumstances were now extremely favourable for this purpose, without any one to oppose, as he was now the sole commander of most of the troops belonging to Gonzalo Pizarro in that neighbourhood, the greater part of which were now in Nombre de Dios. Mexia said farther that, Hinojosa and the other captains having gone to Panama, he found himself at liberty to declare himself openly for his majesty, if that were judged proper by the president; and that they might then go in company to Panama, where they would easily become masters of the fleet in that port, by means which he explained; and that he was likewise convinced that, when Hinojosa and the other captains were informed of the powers and intentions of the president, they would receive him with all submission. The president thanked Mexia for his good intentions, observing that it was necessary to use lenient measures on this occasion, as his majesty was very desirous to restore the country to peace and good order, without having recourse to warlike measures, if it could possibly be accomplished. As it was obvious to every one, that the chief cause of the disturbances was owing to the inflexible rigour of the late viceroy, he wished, therefore, that it might be known by all, that his majesty wished to remedy all grievances in the most gracious manner; and he trusted, therefore, when it was publickly known that all might expect safety and pardon by returning to their duty, that all the colonists would evince their respectful loyalty by tendering their services, rather than continue in rebellion against the sovereign. The president concluded by declaring his resolution to refrain from any endeavour to use force, till all the colonists were apprized of his intentions as now expressed.

Mexia assured the president, that he was ready to obey his orders in all things; yet considered it proper for him to observe, that although he was now able to command the soldiers then at Nombre de Dios; matters might assume a very different aspect on proceeding to Panama, where the soldiers would be under the orders of Hinojosa. The president expressed his determination, however, to proceed in his enterprize, to which Mexia consented; and they mutually agreed to keep their intentions secret till affairs should take a favourable turn, as will be seen in the sequel.

When Hinojosa, who acted as general under Pizarro in the Tierra Firma, learnt the reception which the president had met with from Mexia, he was much dissatisfied, both because he was ignorant of the orders and instructions under which the president acted, and because Mexia had not communicated his intentions. Hinojosa wrote therefore to Mexia in a harsh and peremptory manner, reflecting bitterly on his conduct, and, at the same time, some friends of Mexia, who were then resident in Panama, wrote to dissuade him from coming to that place, as Hinojosa was much irritated against him for the friendly reception he had given to the president. Notwithstanding this, it was agreed upon in a conference between the president and Mexia, that the latter should go immediately to Panama to confer with Hinojosa, lest the minds of the soldiery should take any adverse turn by delay. Despising the dangers with which he was threatened, and the suspicions that had been endeavoured to be instilled into his mind, Mexia set out for Panama, confiding in the friendship which subsisted between him and Hinojosa, and in his knowledge of the character and dispositions of that officer. In an interview with Hinojosa, he fully explained the reasons of his conduct in receiving the president; adding, that whatever party they might choose ultimately to favour, all that had hitherto been done could do no harm. Hinojosa was entirely satisfied with this explanation, and allowed Mexia to return to Nombre de Dios.

After the return of Mexia, the president went across the isthmus to Panama, where he held separate conferences with Hinojosa and the different captains, which he conducted with so much prudence and secrecy, that he gained them all over to the royal cause, without any of them having any communication with the others on the subject, so that he was soon in condition to speak with them publickly on the objects of his mission, having brought them all over to his sentiments and engaged them to second his intentions. By supplying the soldiers with every thing of which they were in need, he brought them all easily into his measures, believing that the most effectual means of succeeding in his mission, was by acting gently and in a conciliating manner with every one: yet in all this he acted without meanness or servility, constantly preserving the dignity becoming his rank and authority. In all his negociations, the president was ably and faithfully seconded by his major-general Alfonzo de Alvarado, who was exceedingly serviceable on every occasion, both in consequence of having many friends among the officers, and because those even who were not among the number were much influenced by his authority and character. At first Hinojosa hesitated about declaring for the president, and even notified his arrival to Gonzalo Pizarro. Some of the captains and other principal persons at Panama had likewise written to Gonzalo, even before the arrival of the president at Panama, giving it as their advice that he ought not to be allowed to enter Peru; but in the sequel these persons changed their opinion by the persuasion of Gasca. During his residence at Panama, the president contrived to manage so judiciously with Hinojosa, whom he frequently visited, that he procured his consent to send Pedro Hernandez Paniagua, a gentleman who had accompanied him from Spain, with letters to Gonzalo Pizarro apprizing him of his arrival in Tierra Firma, and the object of his mission. Among these letters was one from the king, to the following effect:

THE KING, TO GONZALO PIZARRO.

"Gonzalo Pizarro, from your letters and the information of other persons, we have been informed of the commotions and disorders which have arisen in all the provinces of Peru, since the arrival of the viceroy Blasco Nunnez Vela and the judges of the royal audience. We are convinced that these troubles have been produced by endeavouring to establish and enforce, in their utmost rigour, the new laws and regulations which we had judged proper for the government of that country, and for insuring good treatment to the native inhabitants. We are satisfied that you, and those who have acted along with you during these troubles, have not been actuated by any disinclination to your obedience and loyalty towards us, but merely in opposition to the extreme rigour and inexorable obstinacy of the viceroy, who refused to listen to the supplications and remonstrances which were made to him on the new regulations."

"Being well informed in regard to all these affairs, and having heard every thing that Francisco Maldonado had in charge to say on the subject from you and the inhabitants of these provinces, we have thought proper to send over as our president the licentiate De la Gasca, a member of our council of the holy inquisition, to whom we have given full power and authority to do every thing that he may deem proper and necessary for restoring tranquillity and good order in the country, to replace its affairs on a proper footing, and to introduce such regulations as may tend to the good of our service and the glory of God, and the advantage of the country and its inhabitants, both such as are our natural subjects and the original inhabitants. For this reason we will and command, and expressly desire, that you may be punctually obedient to every thing which the said Gasca shall order you in our name, in the same manner as if his commands were from ourselves; and that you give him every assistance in your power in every thing which he may require, and which may be necessary for executing the orders which we have given him, according as he may inform you, or shall require in our name, conform to the confidence we repose in your fidelity. On our part, we assure you that we entertain a just estimation of the services which you and your brother the marquis have done, and that we shall reward the same in time and place convenient to his children and brothers by effective marks of our good will. Given at Venlo, this sixteenth of February in the year of grace one thousand five hundred and forty-six."

I THE KING. By order of his Majesty, FRANCISCO DE ERASO.

Along with this letter from the emperor, the president wrote to Gonzalo Pizarro, dated on the 26th of September 1546 from Panama, and addressed to the illustrious senior Gonzalo Pizarro, in the city of Lima, of which the following is the substance.

"I have delayed sending the letter of his imperial majesty, which accompanies this present communication, till now, in the hope of being able to set out for Peru immediately after my arrival in this country, and because it appeared more conformable to the respect and obedience which I owe to his majesty to have delivered his royal letter in person than to allow it to be preceded by any writing from myself. Finding, however, that my voyage is necessarily delayed, and being informed that you have called a meeting of the colonists at Lima to consult upon the past transactions, and on what may be proper in the present situation of affairs, I have thought it improper any longer to delay sending his majestys letter, together with this from myself which I transmit by Pedro Hernandez Paniagua, a person of honour and merit, who professes to be your friend and servant."

"After the most mature and careful deliberations respecting all that has occurred in Peru, since the arrival of the late viceroy in that country, his majesty is satisfied that the commotions have not been excited by a spirit of rebellion and disobedience in the Spanish inhabitants, but through the inflexible rigour with which the viceroy endeavoured to enforce the regulations, in spite of the supplications of the colonists and their appeal to his majesty, by which they were justified in defending themselves against so great severity, at least until they should learn the royal will on the subject in answer to their remonstrances. All this appears from the letter which you addressed to his majesty, in which you declared that the principal reason which had induced you to accept the situation of governor of Peru, was that it had been given to you by the royal audience, in the name and under the seal of his majesty; by the acceptance of which employment you were enabled to do good service to the royal interests, which might otherwise have suffered much prejudice; and as you have declared these to be your motives for assuming the government, until his majesty might think proper to issue his commands, which you were ready to obey like a good and loyal subject."

"Therefore, his majesty, having seen and duly considered all these things, and heard the opinions of his councillors thereupon, has sent me for the express purpose of restoring peace, tranquillity, and good order to the country, by the revocation of the obnoxious regulations, with full power to extend his royal pardon for all that has already occurred, and to take the opinion and advice of the colonists upon those measures that may be most proper and advantageous for the royal service, the glory of God, the good of the country, and the benefit of its inhabitants. In respect to such Spaniards as cannot be provided in the country with repartitions of lands and Indians, I have orders to employ them in new discoveries, where they may acquire honour and riches, as has already been done by so many other persons. I earnestly entreat you therefore, as a Christian, and a wise and prudent gentleman of honour, to reflect seriously on all these things. As you have hitherto always evinced much affection and attachment to the welfare of the country and its inhabitants, you certainly have great reason of thankfulness to the Almighty, that in so important and delicate an affair, neither his majesty nor his councillors have been disposed to consider your past conduct in the light of revolt and rebellion against the legitimate authority of the sovereign, but have rather been pleased to view it in the light of a just and necessary defence of your own rights, and those of the Spanish inhabitants of Peru, until the decision of his majesty upon your supplications and remonstrances might be made manifest. Therefore, since his majesty has been graciously pleased to grant to you and the other colonists all that you required by your supplications, by abrogating the obnoxious regulations, it is incumbent upon you, as an obedient and loyal subject, to evince a respectful and prompt obedience to the royal orders[30]."

[Footnote 30: In translating this letter the substance has been materially compressed; omitting much loose and declamatory argumentation, with several instances of the irresistible power of the emperor, to convince Pizarro of the absolute necessity of submission. Among other arguments, Gasca quotes with approbation an instance of a Spaniard who had assassinated his brother in the midst of the German Lutherans for deserting the religion of his country; and threatens him with the vengeance of his brother Ferdinand if he should persist in rebellion against his sovereign.—E.]

"I have represented all these things to you, that you may not flatter yourself by a false confidence of being able to resist the power of his majesty, who is able if it should so please him to employ irresistible force in repressing the commotions and disorders of Peru, instead of those measures of clemency, which it has pleased God that he should now resort to; and that if reduced to the necessity of using force, it will be necessary for his majesty to take care not to ruin the country by sending too great a number of troops, instead of being under any difficulty as to sending a sufficient power to overcome all possibility of resistance. You ought likewise to reflect that matters will necessarily take a quite different turn than they have hitherto done. Hitherto your followers have been influenced by their own self-interest, not only considering the late viceroy as your enemy and your cause as good, but all of them looked upon him as their personal enemy, who wished to deprive them of their properties, and to put to death every one who opposed his designs. Under these circumstances your followers were necessarily impelled to adhere to your party in the defence of their own lives and properties. But as both are now secured, by the revocation of the obnoxious regulations, and the amnesty granted by his majesty, the Spanish inhabitants of Peru have now their legitimate sovereign as their friend and protector, to whom we all owe the most entire loyalty and obedience. I entreat you to reflect seriously on these things, and to consider that, in the present situation of affairs, and the turn which they must assuredly take in the sequel, you cannot count upon the adherence of any one, if you unfortunately choose to follow wrong measures. By contributing your assistance to put an end to the commotions which have distracted the kingdom of Peru, the whole inhabitants of that country will remain indebted to your exertions for the maintenance of their rights and privileges, in having opposed the execution of the obnoxious regulations, and having procured a favourable attention to their supplications and remonstrances; insomuch that his majesty has been pleased to send me with an express commission to listen to and redress all grievances. Should you unfortunately resolve upon refusing submission to the royal authority, you will obliterate all the merit you derive from your past conduct; as by endeavouring to continue the troubles and commotions, you will shew yourself actuated by motives of personal interest and ambition, instead of any regard for the good of the public. Instead of serving the interests of the Spanish inhabitants of Peru, you will become the cause of infinite injury to all, and will be considered as the enemy of the kingdom, by perpetuating the troubles, and occasioning the destruction of the lives and fortunes of your friends and adherents. You ought likewise to consider that, by continuing the war, you will render it necessary to bring over a numerous army into Peru, so that you will become accountable to God and man for all the miseries and disorders which may follow, and for the entire ruin of the country and its inhabitants, by which you will incur the hatred of all the principal colonists, merchants, and other rich persons."

"To conclude, I pray God to take you and all your followers under his most holy protection, and that he may inspire you with proper sentiments on this occasion, for the good service of his majesty, the eternal welfare of your souls, and the preservation of your lives, honours, and estates; and I remain; illustrious Sir, yours, &c.

PEDRO DE LA GASCA."

Gonzalo had only been a few days in Lima on his return from Quito, when he received letters from Hinojosa informing him of the arrival of the president. He was much disturbed by this intelligence, which he immediately communicated to the captains and other principal persons of his party, and with whom he consulted upon the steps necessary to be taken in this conjuncture of affairs. Some were of opinion that it was necessary to get rid of the president, either openly or by secret assassination; while others recommended that he should be invited into Peru, where it would be easy to oblige him to agree to all their demands; or where at least they could draw their negociations with him to a great length, by insisting on convening an assembly of deputies and procurators from all the cities of the kingdom at Lima, to deliberate on the subject of his reception, and to determine whether he should be received or not; and, as Peru was of vast extent, it would be easy to put off the meeting of that assembly for two years, during which period the president might be kept in the isle of Puna under a confidential guard, by which he might be prevented from writing to Spain that the country was in rebellion; more especially as they could keep him in continual suspense, by representing that the general assembly could not meet sooner on account of the vast distance of some of the cities. Even the most moderate were for obliging the president to return into Spain.