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ANDREW JOHNSON.
IN CABINET, June 18, 1867.
Present: The President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, the Postmaster-General, the Attorney-General, the Acting Secretary of the Interior.
The President announced that he had under consideration the two opinions from the Attorney-General as to the legal questions arising upon the acts of Congress commonly known as the reconstruction acts, and that in view of the great magnitude of the subject and of the various interests involved he deemed it proper to have it considered fully in the Cabinet and to avail himself of all the light which could be afforded by the opinions and advice of the members of the Cabinet, to enable him to see that these laws be faithfully executed and to decide what orders and instructions are necessary and expedient to be given to the military commanders.
The President said further that the branch of the subject that seemed to him first in order for consideration was as to the instructions to be sent to the military commanders for their guidance and for the guidance of persons offering for registration. The instructions proposed by the Attorney-General, as set forth in the summary contained in his last opinion, will therefore be now considered.
The summary was then read at length.
The reading of the summary having been concluded, each section was then considered, discussed, and voted upon as follows:
1. The oath prescribed in the supplemental act defines all the qualifications required, and every person who can take that oath is entitled to have his name entered upon the list of voters.
All vote "aye" except the Secretary of War, who votes "nay."
2. The board of registration have no authority to administer any other oath to the person applying for registration than this prescribed oath, nor to administer any oath to any other person touching the qualifications of the applicant or the falsity of the oath so taken by him.
No provision is made for challenging the qualifications of the applicant or entering upon any trial or investigation of his qualifications, either by witnesses or any other form of proof.
All vote "aye" except the Secretary of War, who votes "nay."
3. As to citizenship and residence:
The applicant for registration must be a citizen of the State and of the United States, and must be a resident of a county or parish included in the election district. He may be registered if he has been such citizen for a period less than twelve months at the time he applies for registration, but he can not vote at any election unless his citizenship has then extended to the full term of one year. As to such a person, the exact length of his citizenship should be noted opposite his name on the list, so that it may appear on the day of election, upon reference to the list, whether the full term has then been accomplished.
Concurred in unanimously.
4. An unnaturalized person can not take this oath, but an alien who has been naturalized can take it, and no other proof of naturalization can be required from him.
All vote "aye" except the Secretary of War, who votes "nay."
5. No one who is not 21 years of age at the time of registration can take the oath, for he must swear that he has then attained that age.
Concurred in unanimously.
6. No one who has been disfranchised for participation in any rebellion against the United States or for felony committed against the laws of any State or of the United States can take this oath.
The actual participation in a rebellion or the actual commission of a felony does not amount to disfranchisement. The sort of disfranchisement here meant is that which is declared by law passed by competent authority, or which has been fixed upon the criminal by the sentence of the court which tried him for the crime.
No law of the United States has declared the penalty of disfranchisement for participation in rebellion alone; nor is it known that any such law exists in either of these ten States, except, perhaps, Virginia, as to which State special instructions will be given.
All vote "aye" except the Secretary of War, who dissents as to the second and third paragraphs.
7. As to disfranchisement arising from having held office followed by participation in rebellion:
This is the most important part of the oath, and requires strict attention to arrive at its meaning. The applicant must swear or affirm as follows:
"That I have never been a member of any State legislature, nor held any executive or judicial office in any State, and afterwards engaged in an insurrection or rebellion against the United States or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof; that I have never taken an oath as a member of Congress of the United States, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, and afterwards engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the United States or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof."
Two elements must concur in order to disqualify a person under these clauses: First, the office and official oath to support the Constitution of the United States; second, engaging afterwards in rebellion. Both must exist to work disqualification, and must happen in the order of time mentioned.
A person who has held an office and taken the oath to support the Federal Constitution and has not afterwards engaged in rebellion is not disqualified. So, too, a person who has engaged in rebellion, but has not theretofore held an office and taken that oath, is not disqualified.
All vote "aye" except the Secretary of War, who votes "nay."
8. Officers of the United States:
As to these the language is without limitation. The person who has at any time prior to the rebellion held any office, civil or military, under the United States, and has taken an official oath to support the Constitution of the United States, is subject to disqualification.
Concurred in unanimously.
9. Militia officers of any State prior to the rebellion are not subject to disqualification.
All vote "aye" except the Secretary of War, who votes "nay."
10. Municipal officers—that is to say, officers of incorporated cities, towns, and villages, such as mayors, aldermen, town council, police, and other city or town officers—are not subject to disqualification.
Concurred in unanimously.
11. Persons who have prior to the rebellion been members of the Congress of the United States or members of a State legislature are subject to disqualification, but those who have been members of conventions framing or amending the constitution of a State prior to the rebellion are not subject to disqualification.
Concurred in unanimously.
12. All the executive or judicial officers of any State who took an oath to support the Constitution of the United States are subject to disqualification, including county officers. They are subject to disqualification if they were required to take as a part of their official oath the oath to support the Constitution of the United States.
Concurred in unanimously.
13. Persons who exercised mere employments under State authority are not disqualified; such as commissioners to lay out roads, commissioners of public works, visitors of State institutions, directors of State institutions, examiners of banks, notaries public, commissioners to take acknowledgments of deeds.
Concurred in unanimously; but the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary of War express the opinion that lawyers are such officers as are disqualified if they participated in the rebellion. Two things must exist as to any person to disqualify him from voting: First, the office held prior to the rebellion, and, afterwards, participation in the rebellion.
14. An act to fix upon a person the offense of engaging in rebellion under this law must be an overt and voluntary act, done with the intent of aiding or furthering the common unlawful purpose. A person forced into the rebel service by conscription or under a paramount authority which he could not safely disobey, and who would not have entered such service if left to the free exercise of his own will, can not be held to be disqualified from voting.
All vote "aye" except the Secretary of War, who votes "nay" as the proposition is stated.
15. Mere acts of charity, where the intent is to relieve the wants of the object of such charity, and not done in aid of the cause in which he may have been engaged, do not disqualify; but organized contributions of food and clothing for the general relief of persons engaged in the rebellion, and not of a merely sanitary character, but contributed to enable them to perform their unlawful object, maybe classed with acts which do disqualify. Forced contributions to the rebel cause in the form of taxes or military assessments, which a person was compelled to pay or contribute, do not disqualify; but voluntary contributions to the rebel cause, even such indirect contributions as arise from the voluntary loan of money to the rebel authorities or purchase of bonds or securities created to afford the means of carrying on the rebellion, will work disqualification.
Concurred in unanimously.
16. All those who in legislative or other official capacity were engaged in the furtherance of the common unlawful purpose, where the duties of the office necessarily had relation to the support of the rebellion, such as members of the rebel conventions, congresses, and legislatures, diplomatic agents of the rebel Confederacy, and other officials whose offices were created for the purpose of more effectually carrying on hostilities or whose duties appertained to the support of the rebel cause, must be held to be disqualified; but officers who during the rebellion discharged official duties not incident to war, but only such duties as belong even to a state of peace and were necessary to the preservation of order and the administration of law, are not to be considered as thereby engaging in rebellion or as disqualified. Disloyal sentiments, opinions, or sympathies would not disqualify, but where a person has by speech or writing incited others to engage in rebellion he must come under the disqualification.
All vote "aye" except the Secretary of War, who dissents to the second paragraph, with the exception of the words "where a person has by speech or by writing incited others to engage in rebellion he must come under the disqualification."
17. The duties of the board appointed to superintend the elections.
This board, having the custody of the list of registered voters in the district for which it is constituted, must see that the name of the person offering to vote is found upon the registration list, and if such proves to be the fact it is the duty of the board to receive his vote if then qualified by residence. They can not receive the vote of any person whose name is not upon the list, though he may be ready to take the registration oath, and although he may satisfy them that he was unable to have his name registered at the proper time, in consequence of absence, sickness, or other cause.
The board can not enter into any inquiry as to the qualifications of any person whose name is not on the registration list, or as to the qualifications of any person whose name is on that list..
Concurred in unanimously.
18. The mode of voting is provided in the act to be by ballot. The board will keep a record and poll book of the election, showing the votes, list of voters, and the persons elected by a plurality of the votes cast at the election, and make returns of these to the commanding general of the district.
Concurred in unanimously.
19. The board appointed for registration and for superintending the elections must take the oath prescribed by the act of Congress approved July 2, 1862, entitled "An act to prescribe an oath of office."
Concurred in unanimously.
IN CABINET, June 20, 1867.
Present: The same Cabinet officers as on the 18th, except the Acting Secretary of the Interior.
The President announced to the Cabinet that after full deliberation he concurred with the majority upon the sections of the summary upon which the Secretary of War expressed his dissent, and that he concurred with the Cabinet upon those sections approved by unanimous vote; that as it appeared the military commanders entertained doubts upon the points covered by the summary, and as their action hitherto had not been uniform, he deemed it proper, without further delay, to communicate in a general order[27] to the respective commanders the points set forth in the summary.
[Footnote 27: See Executive order of June 20, 1867, pp. 552-556.]
VETO MESSAGES.
WASHINGTON, March 23, 1867.
To the House of Representatives:
I have considered the bill entitled "An act supplementary to an act entitled 'An act to provide for the more efficient government of the rebel States,' passed March 2, 1867, and to facilitate restoration," and now return it to the House of Representatives with my objections.
This bill provides for elections in the ten States brought under the operation of the original act to which it is supplementary. Its details are principally directed to the elections for the formation of the State constitutions, but by the sixth section of the bill "all elections" in these States occurring while the original act remains in force are brought within its purview. Referring to these details, it will be found that, first of all, there is to be a registration of the voters. No one whose name has not been admitted on the list is to be allowed to vote at any of these elections. To ascertain who is entitled to registration, reference is made necessary, by the express language of the supplement, to the original act and to the pending bill. The fifth section of the original act provides, as to voters, that they shall be "male citizens of the State, 21 years old and upward, of whatever race, color, or previous condition, who have been residents of said State for one year." This is the general qualification, followed, however, by many exceptions. No one can be registered, according to the original act, "who may be disfranchised for participation in the rebellion"—a provision which left undetermined the question as to what amounted to disfranchisement, and whether without a judicial sentence the act itself produced that effect. This supplemental bill superadds an oath, to be taken by every person before his name can be admitted upon the registration, that he has "not been disfranchised for participation in any rebellion or civil war against the United States." It thus imposes upon every person the necessity and responsibility of deciding for himself, under the peril of punishment by a military commission if he makes a mistake, what works disfranchisement by participation in rebellion and what amounts to such participation. Almost every man—the negro as well as the white—above 21 years of age who was resident in these ten States during the rebellion, voluntarily or involuntarily, at some time and in some way did participate in resistance to the lawful authority of the General Government. The question with the citizen to whom this oath is to be proposed must be a fearful one, for while the bill does not declare that perjury may be assigned for such false swearing nor fix any penalty for the offense, we must not forget that martial law prevails; that every person is answerable to a military commission, without previous presentment by a grand jury, for any charge that may be made against him, and that the supreme authority of the military commander determines the question as to what is an offense and what is to be the measure of punishment.
The fourth section of the bill provides "that the commanding general of each district shall appoint as many boards of registration as may be necessary, consisting of three loyal officers or persons." The only qualification stated for these officers is that they must be "loyal." They may be persons in the military service or civilians, residents of the State or strangers. Yet these persons are to exercise most important duties and are vested with unlimited discretion. They are to decide what names shall be placed upon the register and from their decision there is to be no appeal. They are to superintend the elections and to decide all questions which may arise. They are to have the custody of the ballots and to make return of the persons elected. Whatever frauds or errors they may commit must pass without redress. All that is left for the commanding general is to receive the returns of the elections, open the same, and ascertain who are chosen "according to the returns of the officers who conducted said elections." By such means and with this sort of agency are the conventions of delegates to be constituted.
As the delegates are to speak for the people, common justice would seem to require that they should have authority from the people themselves. No convention so constituted will in any sense represent the wishes of the inhabitants of these States, for under the all-embracing exceptions of these laws, by a construction which the uncertainty of the clause as to disfranchisement leaves open to the board of officers, the great body of the people may be excluded from the polls and from all opportunity of expressing their own wishes or voting for delegates who will faithfully reflect their sentiments.
I do not deem it necessary further to investigate the details of this bill. No consideration could induce me to give my approval to such an election law for any purpose, and especially for the great purpose of framing the constitution of a State. If ever the American citizen should be left to the free exercise of his own judgment it is when he is engaged in the work of forming the fundamental law under which he is to live. That work is his work, and it can not properly be taken out of his hands. All this legislation proceeds upon the contrary assumption that the people of each of these States shall have no constitution except such as may be arbitrarily dictated by Congress and formed under the restraint of military rule. A plain statement of facts makes this evident.
In all these States there are existing constitutions, framed in the accustomed way by the people. Congress, however, declares that these constitutions are not "loyal and republican," and requires the people to form them anew. What, then, in the opinion of Congress, is necessary to make the constitution of a State "loyal and republican"? The original act answers the question: It is universal negro suffrage—a question which the Federal Constitution leaves exclusively to the States themselves. All this legislative machinery of martial law, military coercion, and political disfranchisement is avowedly for that purpose and none other. The existing constitutions of the ten States conform to the acknowledged standards of loyalty and republicanism. Indeed, if there are degrees in republican forms of government, their constitutions are more republican now than when these States, four of which were members of the original thirteen, first became members of the Union.
Congress does not now demand that a single provision of their constitutions be changed except such as confine suffrage to the white population. It is apparent, therefore, that these provisions do not conform to the standard of republicanism which Congress seeks to establish. That there may be no mistake, it is only necessary that reference should be made to the original act, which declares "such constitution shall provide that the elective franchise shall be enjoyed by all such persons as have the qualifications herein stated for electors of delegates." What class of persons is here meant clearly appears in the same section; that is to say, "the male citizens of said State 21 years old and upward, of whatever race, color, or previous condition, who have been resident in said State for one year previous to the day of such election."
Without these provisions no constitution which can be framed in any one of the ten States will be of any avail with Congress. This, then, is the test of what the constitution of a State of this Union must contain to make it republican. Measured by such a standard, how few of the States now composing the Union have republican constitutions! If in the exercise of the constitutional guaranty that Congress shall secure to every State a republican form of government universal suffrage for blacks as well as whites is a sine qua non, the work of reconstruction may as well begin in Ohio as in Virginia, in Pennsylvania as in North Carolina.
When I contemplate the millions of our fellow-citizens of the South with no alternative left but to impose upon themselves this fearful and untried experiment of complete negro enfranchisement—and white disfranchisement, it may be, almost as complete—or submit indefinitely to the rigor of martial law, without a single attribute of freemen, deprived of all the sacred guaranties of our Federal Constitution, and threatened with even worse wrongs, if any worse are possible, it seems to me their condition is the most deplorable to which any people can be reduced. It is true that they have been engaged in rebellion and that their object being a separation of the States and a dissolution of the Union there was an obligation resting upon every loyal citizen to treat them as enemies and to wage war against their cause.
Inflexibly opposed to any movement imperiling the integrity of the Government, I did not hesitate to urge the adoption of all measures necessary for the suppression of the insurrection. After a long and terrible struggle the efforts of the Government were triumphantly successful, and the people of the South, submitting to the stern arbitrament, yielded forever the issues of the contest. Hostilities terminated soon after it became my duty to assume the responsibilities of the chief executive officer of the Republic, and I at once endeavored to repress and control the passions which our civil strife had engendered, and, no longer regarding these erring millions as enemies, again acknowledged them as our friends and our countrymen. The war had accomplished its objects. The nation was saved and that seminal principle of mischief which from the birth of the Government had gradually but inevitably brought on the rebellion was totally eradicated. Then, it seemed to me, was the auspicious time to commence the work of reconciliation; then, when these people sought once more our friendship and protection, I considered it our duty generously to meet them in the spirit of charity and forgiveness and to conquer them even more effectually by the magnanimity of the nation than by the force of its arms. I yet believe that if the policy of reconciliation then inaugurated, and which contemplated an early restoration of these people to all their political rights, had received the support of Congress, every one of these ten States and all their people would at this moment be fast anchored in the Union and the great work which gave the war all its sanction and made it just and holy would have been accomplished. Then over all the vast and fruitful regions of the South peace and its blessings would have prevailed, while now millions are deprived of rights guaranteed by the Constitution to every citizen and after nearly two years of legislation find themselves placed under an absolute military despotism. "A military republic, a government founded on mock elections and supported only by the sword," was nearly a quarter of a century since pronounced by Daniel Webster, when speaking of the South American States, as "a movement, indeed, but a retrograde and disastrous movement, from the regular and old-fashioned monarchical systems;" and he added:
If men would enjoy the blessings of republican government, they must govern themselves by reason, by mutual counsel and consultation, by a sense and feeling of general interest, and by the acquiescence of the minority in the will of the majority, properly expressed; and, above all, the military must be kept, according to the language of our bill of rights, in strict subordination to the civil authority. Wherever this lesson is not both learned and practiced there can be no political freedom. Absurd, preposterous is it, a scoff and a satire on free forms of constitutional liberty, for frames of government to be prescribed by military leaders and the right of suffrage to be exercised at the point of the sword.
I confidently believe that a time will come when these States will again occupy their true positions in the Union. The barriers which now seem so obstinate must yield to the force of an enlightened and just public opinion, and sooner or later unconstitutional and oppressive legislation will be effaced from our statute books. When this shall have been consummated, I pray God that the errors of the past may be forgotten and that once more we shall be a happy, united, and prosperous people, and that at last, after the bitter and eventful experience through which the nation has passed, we shall all come to know that our only safety is in the preservation of our Federal Constitution and in according to every American citizen and to every State the rights which that Constitution secures.
ANDREW JOHNSON.
WASHINGTON, D.C., April 10, 1867.[28]
The first session of the Fortieth Congress adjourned on the 30th day of March, 1867. This bill,[29] which was passed during that session, was not presented for my approval by the Hon. Edmund G. Ross, of the Senate of the United States, and a member of the Committee on Enrolled Bills, until Monday, the 1st day of April, 1867, two days after the adjournment. It is not believed that the approval of any bill after the adjournment of Congress, whether presented before or after such adjournment, is authorized by the Constitution of the United States, that instrument expressly declaring that no bill shall become a law the return of which may have been prevented by the adjournment of Congress. To concede that under the Constitution the President, after the adjournment of Congress, may, without limitation in respect to time, exercise the power of approval, and thus determine at his discretion whether or not bills shall become laws, might subject the executive and legislative departments of the Government to influences most pernicious to correct legislation and sound public morals, and—with a single exception, occurring during the prevalence of civil war—would be contrary to the established practice of the Government from its inauguration to the present time. This bill will therefore be filed in the office of the Secretary of State without my approval.
ANDREW JOHNSON.
[Footnote 28: Pocket veto. Was never sent to Congress, but was deposited in the Department of State.]
[Footnote 29: Joint resolution placing certain troops of Missouri on an equal footing with others as to bounties.]
WASHINGTON, D.C., July 19, 1867.
To the House of Representatives of the United States:
I return herewith the bill entitled "An act supplementary to an act entitled 'An act to provide for the more efficient government of the rebel States,' passed on the 2d day of March, 1867, and the act supplementary thereto, passed, on the 23d day of March, 1867," and will state as briefly as possible some of the reasons which prevent me from giving it my approval.
This is one of a series of measures passed by Congress during the last four months on the subject of reconstruction. The message returning the act of the 2d of March last states at length my objections to the passage of that measure. They apply equally well to the bill now before me, and I am content merely to refer to them and to reiterate my conviction that they are sound and unanswerable.
There are some points peculiar to this bill, which I will proceed at once to consider.
The first section purports to declare "the true intent and meaning," in some particulars, of the two prior acts upon this subject.
It is declared that the intent of those acts was, first, that the existing governments in the ten "rebel States" "were not legal State governments," and, second, "that thereafter said governments, if continued, were to be continued subject in all respects to the military commanders of the respective districts and to the paramount authority of Congress."
Congress may by a declaratory act fix upon a prior act a construction altogether at variance with its apparent meaning, and from the time, at least, when such a construction is fixed the original act will be construed to mean exactly what it is stated to mean by the declaratory statute. There will be, then, from the time this bill may become a law no doubt, no question, as to the relation in which the "existing governments" in those States, called in the original act "the provisional governments," stand toward the military authority. As those relations stood before the declaratory act, these "governments," it is true, were made subject to absolute military authority in many important respects, but not in all, the language of the act being "subject to the military authority of the United States, as hereinafter prescribed." By the sixth section of the original act these governments were made "in all respects subject to the paramount authority of the United States."
Now by this declaratory act it appears that Congress did not by the original act intend to limit the military authority to any particulars or subjects therein "prescribed," but meant to make it universal. Thus over all of these ten States this military government is now declared to have unlimited authority. It is no longer confined to the preservation of the public peace, the administration of criminal law, the registration of voters, and the superintendence of elections, but "in all respects" is asserted to be paramount to the existing civil governments.
It is impossible to conceive any state of society more intolerable than this; and yet it is to this condition that 12,000,000 American citizens are reduced by the Congress of the United States. Over every foot of the immense territory occupied by these American citizens the Constitution of the United States is theoretically in full operation. It binds all the people there and should protect them; yet they are denied every one of its sacred guaranties.
Of what avail will it be to any one of these Southern people when seized by a file of soldiers to ask for the cause of arrest or for the production of the warrant? Of what avail to ask for the privilege of bail when in military custody, which knows no such thing as bail? Of what avail to demand a trial by jury, process for witnesses, a copy of the indictment, the privilege of counselor that greater privilege, the writ of habeas corpus?
The veto of the original bill of the 2d of March was based on two distinct grounds—the interference of Congress in matters strictly appertaining to the reserved powers of the States and the establishment of military tribunals for the trial of citizens in time of peace. The impartial reader of that message will understand that all that it contains with respect to military despotism and martial law has reference especially to the fearful power conferred on the district commanders to displace the criminal courts and assume jurisdiction to try and to punish by military boards; that, potentially, the suspension of the habeas corpus was martial law and military despotism. The act now before me not only declares that the intent was to confer such military authority, but also to confer unlimited military authority over all the other courts of the State and over all the officers of the State—legislative, executive, and judicial. Not content with the general grant of power, Congress, in the second section of this bill, specifically gives to each military commander the power "to suspend or remove from office, or from the performance of official duties and the exercise of official powers, any officer or person holding or exercising, or professing to hold or exercise, any civil or military office or duty in such district under any power, election, appointment, or authority derived from, or granted by, or claimed under any so-called State, or the government thereof, or any municipal or other division thereof."
A power that hitherto all the departments of the Federal Government, acting in concert or separately, have not dared to exercise is here attempted to be conferred on a subordinate military officer. To him, as a military officer of the Federal Government, is given the power, supported by "a sufficient military force," to remove every civil officer of the State. What next? The district commander, who has thus displaced the civil officer, is authorized to fill the vacancy by the detail of an officer or soldier of the Army, or by the appointment of "some other person."
This military appointee, whether an officer, a soldier, or "some other person," is to perform "the duties of such officer or person so suspended or removed." In other words, an officer or soldier of the Army is thus transformed into a civil officer. He may be made a governor, a legislator, or a judge. However unfit he may deem himself for such civil duties, he must obey the order. The officer of the Army must, if "detailed," go upon the supreme bench of the State with the same prompt obedience as if he were detailed to go upon a court-martial. The soldier, if detailed to act as a justice of the peace, must obey as quickly as if he were detailed for picket duty.
What is the character of such a military civil officer? This bill declares that he shall perform the duties of the civil office to which he is detailed. It is clear, however, that he does not lose his position in the military service. He is still an officer or soldier of the Army; he is still subject to the rules and regulations which govern it, and must yield due deference, respect, and obedience toward his superiors.
The clear intent of this section is that the officer or soldier detailed to fill a civil office must execute its duties according to the laws of the State. If he is appointed a governor of a State, he is to execute the duties as provided by the laws of that State, and for the time being his military character is to be suspended in his new civil capacity. If he is appointed a State treasurer, he must at once assume the custody and disbursement of the funds of the State, and must perform those duties precisely according to the laws of the State, for he is intrusted with no other official duty or other official power. Holding the office of treasurer and intrusted with funds, it happens that he is required by the State laws to enter into bond with security and to take an oath of office; yet from the beginning of the bill to the end there is no provision for any bond or oath of office, or for any single qualification required under the State law, such as residence, citizenship, or anything else. The only oath is that provided for in the ninth section, by the terms of which everyone detailed or appointed to any civil office in the State is required "to take and to subscribe the oath of office prescribed by law for officers of the United States." Thus an officer of the Army of the United States detailed to fill a civil office in one of these States gives no official bond and takes no official oath for the performance of his new duties, but as a civil officer of the State only takes the same oath which he had already taken as a military officer of the United States. He is, at last, a military officer performing civil duties, and the authority under which he acts is Federal authority only; and the inevitable result is that the Federal Government, by the agency of its own sworn officers, in effect assumes the civil government of the State.
A singular contradiction is apparent here. Congress declares these local State governments to be illegal governments, and then provides that these illegal governments shall be carried on by Federal officers, who are to perform the very duties imposed on its own officers by this illegal State authority. It certainly would be a novel spectacle if Congress should attempt to carry on a legal State government by the agency of its own officers. It is yet more strange that Congress attempts to sustain and carry on an illegal State government by the same Federal agency.
In this connection I must call attention to the tenth and eleventh sections of the bill, which provide that none of the officers or appointees of these military commanders "shall be bound in his action by any opinion of any civil officer of the United States," and that all the provisions of the act "shall be construed liberally, to the end that all the intents thereof may be fully and perfectly carried out."
It seems Congress supposed that this bill might require construction, and they fix, therefore, the rule to be applied. But where is the construction to come from? Certainly no one can be more in want of instruction than a soldier or an officer of the Army detailed for a civil service, perhaps the most important in a State, with the duties of which he is altogether unfamiliar. This bill says he shall not be bound in his action by the opinion of any civil officer of the United States. The duties of the office are altogether civil, but when he asks for an opinion he can only ask the opinion of another military officer, who, perhaps, understands as little of his duties as he does himself; and as to his "action," he is answerable to the military authority, and to the military authority alone. Strictly, no opinion of any civil officer other than a judge has a binding force.
But these military appointees would not be bound even by a judicial opinion. They might very well say, even when their action is in conflict with the Supreme Court of the United States, "That court is composed of civil officers of the United States, and we are not bound to conform our action to any opinion of any such authority."
This bill and the acts to which it is supplementary are all founded upon the assumption that these ten communities are not States and that their existing governments are not legal. Throughout the legislation upon this subject they are called "rebel States," and in this particular bill they are denominated "so-called States," and the vice of illegality is declared to pervade all of them. The obligations of consistency bind a legislative body as well as the individuals who compose it. It is now too late to say that these ten political communities are not States of this Union. Declarations to the contrary made in these three acts are contradicted again and again by repeated acts of legislation enacted by Congress from the year 1861 to the year 1867.
During that period, while these States were in actual rebellion, and after that rebellion was brought to a close, they have been again and again recognized as States of the Union. Representation has been apportioned to them as States. They have been divided into judicial districts for the holding of district and circuit courts of the United States, as States of the Union only can be districted. The last act on this subject was passed July 23, 1866, by which every one of these ten States was arranged into districts and circuits.
They have been called upon by Congress to act through their legislatures upon at least two amendments to the Constitution of the United States. As States they have ratified one amendment, which required the vote of twenty-seven States of the thirty-six then composing the Union. When the requisite twenty-seven votes were given in favor of that amendment—seven of which votes were given by seven of these ten States—it was proclaimed to be a part of the Constitution of the United States, and slavery was declared no longer to exist within the United States or any place subject to their jurisdiction. If these seven States were not legal States of the Union, it follows as an inevitable consequence that in some of the States slavery yet exists. It does not exist in these seven States, for they have abolished it also in their State constitutions; but Kentucky not having done so, it would still remain in that State. But, in truth, if this assumption that these States have no legal State governments be true, then the abolition of slavery by these illegal governments binds no one, for Congress now denies to these States the power to abolish slavery by denying to them the power to elect a legal State legislature, or to frame a constitution for any purpose, even for such a purpose as the abolition of slavery.
As to the other constitutional amendment, having reference to suffrage, it happens that these States have not accepted it. The consequence is that it has never been proclaimed or understood, even by Congress, to be a part of the Constitution of the United States. The Senate of the United States has repeatedly given its sanction to the appointment of judges, district attorneys, and marshals for every one of these States; yet, if they are not legal States, not one of these judges is authorized to hold a court. So, too, both Houses of Congress have passed appropriation bills to pay all these judges, attorneys, and officers of the United States for exercising their functions in these States. Again, in the machinery of the internal-revenue laws all these States are districted, not as "Territories," but as "States."
So much for continuous legislative recognition. The instances cited, however, fall far short of all that might be enumerated. Executive recognition, as is well known, has been frequent and unwavering. The same maybe said as to judicial recognition through the Supreme Court of the United States. That august tribunal, from first to last, in the administration of its duties in banc and upon the circuit, has never failed to recognize these ten communities as legal States of the Union. The cases depending in that court upon appeal and writ of error from these States when the rebellion began have not been dismissed upon any idea of the cessation of jurisdiction. They were carefully continued from term to term until the rebellion was entirely subdued and peace reestablished, and then they were called for argument and consideration as if no insurrection had intervened. New cases, occurring since the rebellion, have come from these States before that court by writ of error and appeal, and even by original suit, where only "a State" can bring such a suit. These cases are entertained by that tribunal in the exercise of its acknowledged jurisdiction, which could not attach to them if they had come from any political body other than a State of the Union. Finally, in the allotment of their circuits made by the judges at the December term, 1865, every one of these States is put on the same footing of legality with all the other States of the Union. Virginia and North Carolina, being a part of the fourth circuit, are allotted to the Chief Justice. South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and Florida constitute the fifth circuit, and are allotted to the late Mr. Justice Wayne. Louisiana, Arkansas, and Texas are allotted to the sixth judicial circuit, as to which there is a vacancy on the bench.
The Chief Justice, in the exercise of his circuit duties, has recently held a circuit court in the State of North Carolina. If North Carolina is not a State of this Union, the Chief Justice had no authority to hold a court there, and every order, judgment, and decree rendered by him in that court were coram non judice and void.
Another ground on which these reconstruction acts are attempted to be sustained is this: That these ten States are conquered territory; that the constitutional relation in which they stood as States toward the Federal Government prior to the rebellion has given place to a new relation; that their territory is a conquered country and their citizens a conquered people, and that in this new relation Congress can govern them by military power.
A title by conquest stands on clear ground; it is a new title acquired by war; it applies only to territory; for goods or movable things regularly captured in war are called "booty," or, if taken by individual soldiers, "plunder."
There is not a foot of the land in any one of these ten States which the United States holds by conquest, save only such land as did not belong to either of these States or to any individual owner. I mean such lands as did belong to the pretended government called the Confederate States. These lands we may claim to hold by conquest. As to all other land or territory, whether belonging to the States or to individuals, the Federal Government has now no more title or right to it than it had before the rebellion. Our own forts, arsenals, navy-yards, custom-houses, and other Federal property situate in those States we now hold, not by the title of conquest, but by our old title, acquired by purchase or condemnation for public use, with compensation to former owners. We have not conquered these places, but have simply "repossessed" them.
If we require more sites for forts, custom-houses, or other public use, we must acquire the title to them by purchase or appropriation in the regular mode. At this moment the United States, in the acquisition of sites for national cemeteries in these States, acquires title in the same way. The Federal courts sit in court-houses owned or leased by the United States, not in the court-houses of the States. The United States pays each of these States for the use of its jails. Finally, the United States levies its direct taxes and its internal revenue upon the property in these States, including the productions of the lands within their territorial limits, not by way of levy and contribution in the character of a conqueror, but in the regular way of taxation, under the same laws which apply to all the other States of the Union.
From first to last, during the rebellion and since, the title of each of these States to the lands and public buildings owned by them has never been disturbed, and not a foot of it has ever been acquired by the United States, even under a title by confiscation, and not a foot of it has ever been taxed under Federal law.
In conclusion I must respectfully ask the attention of Congress to the consideration of one more question arising under this bill. It vests in the military commander, subject only to the approval of the General of the Army of the United States, an unlimited power to remove from office any civil or military officer in each of these ten States, and the further power, subject to the same approval, to detail or appoint any military officer or soldier of the United States to perform the duties of the officer so removed, and to fill all vacancies occurring in those States by death, resignation, or otherwise.
The military appointee thus required to perform the duties of a civil office according to the laws of the State, and, as such, required to take an oath, is for the time being a civil officer. What is his character? Is he a civil officer of the State or a civil officer of the United States? If he is a civil officer of the State, where is the Federal power under our Constitution which authorizes his appointment by any Federal officer? If, however, he is to be considered a civil officer of the United States, as his appointment and oath would seem to indicate, where is the authority for his appointment vested by the Constitution? The power of appointment of all officers of the United States, civil or military, where not provided for in the Constitution, is vested in the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, with this exception, that Congress "may by law vest the appointment of such inferior officers as they think proper in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of Departments." But this bill, if these are to be considered inferior officers within the meaning of the Constitution, does not provide for their appointment by the President alone, or by the courts of law, or by the heads of Departments, but vests the appointment in one subordinate executive officer, subject to the approval of another subordinate executive officer. So that, if we put this question and fix the character of this military appointee either way, this provision of the bill is equally opposed to the Constitution.
Take the case of a soldier or officer appointed to perform the office of judge in one of these States, and, as such, to administer the proper laws of the State. Where is the authority to be found in the Constitution for vesting in a military or an executive officer strict judicial functions to be exercised under State law? It has been again and again decided by the Supreme Court of the United States that acts of Congress which have attempted to vest executive powers in the judicial courts or judges of the United States are not warranted by the Constitution. If Congress can not clothe a judge with merely executive duties, how can they clothe an officer or soldier of the Army with judicial duties over citizens of the United States who are not in the military or naval service? So, too, it has been repeatedly decided that Congress can not require a State officer, executive or judicial, to perform any duty enjoined upon him by a law of the United States. How, then, can Congress confer power upon an executive officer of the United States to perform such duties in a State? If Congress could not vest in a judge of one of these States any judicial authority under the United States by direct enactment, how can it accomplish the same thing indirectly, by removing the State judge and putting an officer of the United States in his place?
To me these considerations are conclusive of the unconstitutionality of this part of the bill now before me, and I earnestly commend their consideration to the deliberate judgment of Congress.
Within a period less than a year the legislation of Congress has attempted to strip the executive department of the Government of some of its essential powers. The Constitution and the oath provided in it devolve upon the President the power and duty to see that the laws are faithfully executed. The Constitution, in order to carry out this power, gives him the choice of the agents, and makes them subject to his control and supervision. But in the execution of these laws the constitutional obligation upon the President remains, but the power to exercise that constitutional duty is effectually taken away. The military commander is as to the power of appointment made to take the place of the President, and the General of the Army the place of the Senate; and any attempt on the part of the President to assert his own constitutional power may, under pretense of law, be met by official insubordination. It is to be feared that these military officers, looking to the authority given by these laws rather than to the letter of the Constitution, will recognize no authority but the commander of the district and the General of the Army.
If there were no other objection than this to this proposed legislation, it would be sufficient. Whilst I hold the chief executive authority of the United States, whilst the obligation rests upon me to see that all the laws are faithfully executed, I can never willingly surrender that trust or the powers given for its execution. I can never give my assent to be made responsible for the faithful execution of laws, and at the same time surrender that trust and the powers which accompany it to any other executive officer, high or low, or to any number of executive officers. If this executive trust, vested by the Constitution in the President, is to be taken from him and vested in a subordinate officer, the responsibility will be with Congress in clothing the subordinate with unconstitutional power and with the officer who assumes its exercise.
This interference with the constitutional authority of the executive department is an evil that will inevitably sap the foundations of our federal system; but it is not the worst evil of this legislation. It is a great public wrong to take from the President powers conferred on him alone by the Constitution, but the wrong is more flagrant and more dangerous when the powers so taken from the President are conferred upon subordinate executive officers, and especially upon military officers. Over nearly one-third of the States of the Union military power, regulated by no fixed law, rules supreme. Each one of the five district commanders, though not chosen by the people or responsible to them, exercises at this hour more executive power, military and civil, than the people have ever been willing to confer upon the head of the executive department, though chosen by and responsible to themselves. The remedy must come from the people themselves. They know what it is and how it is to be applied. At the present time they can not, according to the forms of the Constitution, repeal these laws; they can not remove or control this military despotism. The remedy is, nevertheless, in their hands; it is to be found in the ballot, and is a sure one if not controlled by fraud, overawed by arbitrary power, or, from apathy on their part, too long delayed. With abiding confidence in their patriotism, wisdom, and integrity, I am still hopeful of the future, and that in the end the rod of despotism will be broken, the armed heel of power lifted from the necks of the people, and the principles of a violated Constitution preserved.
ANDREW JOHNSON.
WASHINGTON, D.C., July 19, 1867.
To the House of Representatives:
For reasons heretofore stated in my several veto messages to Congress upon the subject of reconstruction, I return without my approval the "Joint resolution to carry into effect the several acts providing for the more efficient government of the rebel States," and appropriating for that purpose the sum of $1,000,000.
ANDREW JOHNSON.
PROCLAMATIONS.
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.
A PROCLAMATION.
Whereas by the Constitution of the United States the executive power is vested in a President of the United States of America, who is bound by solemn oath faithfully to execute the office of President and to the best of his ability to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States, and is by the same instrument made Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States and is required to take care that the laws be faithfully executed; and
Whereas by the same Constitution it is provided that the said Constitution and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof shall be the supreme law of the land, and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby; and
Whereas in and by the same Constitution the judicial power of the United States is vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as Congress may from time to time ordain and establish, and the aforesaid judicial power is declared to extend to all cases in law and equity arising under the Constitution, the laws of the United States, and the treaties which shall be made under their authority; and
Whereas all officers, civil and military, are bound by oath that they will support and defend the Constitution against all enemies, foreign and domestic, and will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; and
Whereas all officers of the Army and Navy of the United States, in accepting their commissions under the laws of Congress and the Rules and Articles of War, incur an obligation to observe, obey, and follow such directions as they shall from time to time receive from the President or the General or other superior officers set over them according to the rules and discipline of war; and
Whereas it is provided by law that whenever, by reason of unlawful obstructions, combinations, or assemblages of persons or rebellion against the authority of the Government of the United States, it shall become impracticable, in the judgment of the President of the United States, to enforce by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings the laws of the United States within any State or Territory, the Executive in that case is authorized and required to secure their faithful execution by the employment of the land and naval forces; and
Whereas impediments and obstructions, serious in their character, have recently been interposed in the States of North Carolina and South Carolina, hindering and preventing for a time a proper enforcement there of the laws of the United States and of the judgments and decrees of a lawful court thereof, in disregard of the command of the President of the United States; and
Whereas reasonable and well-founded apprehensions exist that such ill-advised and unlawful proceedings may be again attempted there or elsewhere:
Now, therefore, I, Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, do hereby warn all persons against obstructing or hindering in any manner whatsoever the faithful execution of the Constitution and the laws; and I do solemnly enjoin and command all officers of the Government, civil and military, to render due submission and obedience to said laws and to the judgments and decrees of the courts of the United States, and to give all the aid in their power necessary to the prompt enforcement and execution of such laws, decrees, judgments, and processes.
And I do hereby enjoin upon the officers of the Army and Navy to assist and sustain the courts and other civil authorities of the United States in a faithful administration of the laws thereof and in the judgments, decrees, mandates, and processes of the courts of the United States; and I call upon all good and well-disposed citizens of the United States to remember that upon the said Constitution and laws, and upon the judgments, decrees, and processes of the courts made in accordance with the same, depend the protection of the lives, liberty, property, and happiness of the people. And I exhort them everywhere to testify their devotion to their country, their pride in its prosperity and greatness, and their determination to uphold its free institutions by a hearty cooperation in the efforts of the Government to sustain the authority of the law, to maintain the supremacy of the Federal Constitution, and to preserve unimpaired the integrity of the National Union.
In testimony whereof I have caused the seal of the United States to be affixed to these presents and sign the same with my hand.
[SEAL.]
Done at the city of Washington, the 3d day of September, in the year 1867.
ANDREW JOHNSON.
By the President: WILLIAM H. SEWARD, Secretary of State.
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
A PROCLAMATION.
Whereas in the month of July, A.D. 1861, the two Houses of Congress, with extraordinary unanimity, solemnly declared that the war then existing was not waged on the part of the Government in any spirit of oppression nor for any purpose of conquest or subjugation, nor purpose of overthrowing or interfering with the rights or established institutions of the States, but to defend and maintain the supremacy of the Constitution and to preserve the Union, with all the dignity, equality, and rights of the several States unimpaired, and that as soon as these objects should be accomplished the war ought to cease; and
Whereas the President of the United States, on the 8th day of December, A.D. 1863, and on the 26th day of March, A.D. 1864, did, with the objects of suppressing the then existing rebellion, of inducing all persons to return to their loyalty, and of restoring the authority of the United States, issue proclamations offering amnesty and pardon to all persons who had, directly or indirectly, participated in the then existing rebellion, except as in those proclamations was specified and reserved; and
Whereas the President of the United States did on the 29th day of May, A.D. 1865, issue a further proclamation, with the same objects before mentioned, and to the end that the authority of the Government of the United States might be restored and that peace, order, and freedom might be established, and the President did by the said last-mentioned proclamation proclaim and declare that he thereby granted to all persons who had, directly or indirectly, participated in the then existing rebellion, except as therein excepted, amnesty and pardon, with restoration of all rights of property, except as to slaves, and except in certain cases where legal proceedings had been instituted, but upon condition that such persons should take and subscribe an oath therein prescribed, which oath should be registered for permanent preservation; and
Whereas in and by the said last-mentioned proclamation of the 29th day of May, A.D. 1865, fourteen extensive classes of persons therein specially described were altogether excepted and excluded from the benefits thereof; and
Whereas the President of the United States did, on the 2d day of April, A.D. 1866, issue a proclamation declaring that the insurrection was at an end and was thenceforth to be so regarded; and
Whereas there now exists no organized armed resistance of misguided citizens or others to the authority of the United States in the States of Georgia, South Carolina, Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, Alabama, Louisiana, Arkansas, Mississippi, Florida, and Texas, and the laws can be sustained and enforced therein by the proper civil authority, State or Federal, and the people of said States are well and loyally disposed, and have conformed, or, if permitted to do so, will conform in their legislation to the condition of affairs growing out of the amendment to the Constitution of the United States prohibiting slavery within the limits and jurisdiction of the United States; and
Whereas there no longer exists any reasonable ground to apprehend within the States which were involved in the late rebellion any renewal thereof or any unlawful resistance by the people of said States to the Constitution and laws of the United States; and
Whereas large standing armies, military occupation, martial law, military tribunals, and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the right of trial by jury are in time of peace dangerous to public liberty, incompatible with the individual rights of the citizen, contrary to the genius and spirit of our free institutions, and exhaustive of the national resources, and ought not, therefore, to be sanctioned or allowed except in cases of actual necessity for repelling invasion or suppressing insurrection or rebellion; and
Whereas a retaliatory or vindictive policy, attended by unnecessary disqualifications, pains, penalties, confiscations, and disfranchisements, now, as always, could only tend to hinder reconciliation among the people and national restoration, while it must seriously embarrass, obstruct, and repress popular energies and national industry and enterprise; and
Whereas for these reasons it is now deemed essential to the public welfare and to the more perfect restoration of constitutional law and order that the said last-mentioned proclamation so as aforesaid issued on the 29th day of May, A.D. 1865, should be modified, and that the full and beneficent pardon conceded thereby should be opened and further extended to a large number of the persons who by its aforesaid exceptions have been hitherto excluded from Executive clemency:
Now, therefore, be it known that I, Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, do hereby proclaim and declare that the full pardon described in the said proclamation of the 29th day of May, A.D. 1865, shall henceforth be opened and extended to all persons who, directly or indirectly, participated in the late rebellion, with the restoration of all privileges, immunities, and rights of property, except as to property with regard to slaves, and except in cases of legal proceedings under the laws of the United States; but upon this condition, nevertheless, that every such person who shall seek to avail himself of this proclamation shall take and subscribe the following oath and shall cause the same to be registered for permanent preservation in the same manner and with the same effect as with the oath prescribed in the said proclamation of the 29th day of May, 1865, namely:
I, —— ——, do solemnly swear (or affirm), in presence of Almighty God, that I will henceforth faithfully support, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States and the Union of the States thereunder, and that I will in like manner abide by and faithfully support all laws and proclamations which have been made during the late rebellion with reference to the emancipation of slaves. So help me God.
The following persons, and no others, are excluded from the benefits of this proclamation and of the said proclamation of the 29th day of May, 1865, namely:
First. The chief or pretended chief executive officers, including the President, the Vice-President, and all heads of departments of the pretended Confederate or rebel government, and all who were agents thereof in foreign states and countries, and all who held or pretended to hold in the service of the said pretended Confederate government a military rank or title above the grade of brigadier-general or naval rank or title above that of captain, and all who were or pretended to be governors of States while maintaining, aiding, abetting, or submitting to and acquiescing in the rebellion.
Second. All persons who in any way treated otherwise than as lawful prisoners of war persons who in any capacity were employed or engaged in the military or naval service of the United States.
Third. All persons who at the time they may seek to obtain the benefits of this proclamation are actually in civil, military, or naval confinement or custody, or legally held to bail, either before or after conviction, and all persons who were engaged, directly or indirectly, in the assassination of the late President of the United States or in any plot or conspiracy in any manner therewith connected.
In testimony whereof I have signed these presents with my hand and have caused the seal of the United States to be hereunto affixed.
[SEAL.]
Done at the city of Washington, the 7th day of September, A.D. 1867, and of the Independence of the United States of America the ninety-second.
ANDREW JOHNSON.
By the President: WILLIAM H. SEWARD, Secretary of State.
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
A PROCLAMATION.
Whereas it has been ascertained that in the nineteenth paragraph of the proclamation of the President of the United States of the 20th of August, 1866, declaring the insurrection at an end which had theretofore existed in the State of Texas, the previous proclamation of the 13th of June, 1865, instead of that of the 2d day of April, 1866, was referred to:
Now, therefore, be it known that I, Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, do hereby declare and proclaim that the said words "13th of June, 1865," are to be regarded as erroneous in the paragraph adverted to, and that the words "2d day of April, 1866," are to be considered as substituted therefor.
In testimony whereof I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.
[SEAL.]
Done at the city of Washington, this 7th day of October, A.D. 1867, and of the Independence of the United States of America the ninety-second.
ANDREW JOHNSON.
By the President: WILLIAM H. SEWARD, Secretary of State.
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
A PROCLAMATION.
In conformity with a recent custom that may now be regarded as established on national consent and approval, I, Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, do hereby recommend to my fellow-citizens that Thursday, the 28th day of November next, be set apart and observed throughout the Republic as a day of national thanksgiving and praise to the Almighty Ruler of Nations, with whom are dominion and fear, who maketh peace in His high places.
Resting and refraining from secular labors on that day, let us reverently and devoutly give thanks to our Heavenly Father for the mercies and blessings with which He has crowned the now closing year. Especially let us remember that He has covered our land through all its extent with greatly needed and very abundant harvests; that He has caused industry to prosper, not only in our fields, but also in our workshops, in our mines, and in our forests. He has permitted us to multiply ships upon our lakes and rivers and upon the high seas, and at the same time to extend our iron roads so far into the secluded places of the continent as to guarantee speedy overland intercourse between the two oceans. He has inclined our hearts to turn away from domestic contentions and commotions consequent upon a distracting and desolating civil war, and to walk more and more in the ancient ways of loyalty, conciliation, and brotherly love. He has blessed the peaceful efforts with which we have established new and important commercial treaties with foreign nations, while we have at the same time strengthened our national defenses and greatly enlarged our national borders.
While thus rendering the unanimous and heartfelt tribute of national praise and thanksgiving which is so justly due to Almighty God, let us not fail to implore Him that the same divine protection and care which we have hitherto so undeservedly and yet so constantly enjoyed may be continued to our country and our people throughout all their generations forever.
In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.
[SEAL.]
Done at the city of Washington, this 26th day of October, A.D. 1867, and of the Independence of the United States the ninety-second.
ANDREW JOHNSON.
By the President: WILLIAM H. SEWARD, Secretary of State.
EXECUTIVE ORDERS.
GENERAL ORDERS, No. 10.
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE, Washington, March 11, 1867.
* * * * *
II. In pursuance of the act of Congress entitled "An act to provide for the more efficient government of the rebel States," the President directs the following assignments to be made:
First District, State of Virginia, to be commanded by Brevet Major-General J.M. Schofield. Headquarters, Richmond, Va.
Second District, consisting of North Carolina and South Carolina, to be commanded by Major-General D.E. Sickles. Headquarters, Columbia, S.C.
Third District, consisting of the States of Georgia, Florida, and Alabama, to be commanded by Major-General G.H. Thomas. Headquarters, Montgomery, Ala.
Fourth District, consisting of the States of Mississippi and Arkansas, to be commanded by Brevet Major-General E.O.C. Ord. Headquarters, Vicksburg, Miss.
Fifth District, consisting of the States of Louisiana and Texas, to be commanded by Major-General P.H. Sheridan. Headquarters, New Orleans, La.
The powers of departmental commanders are hereby delegated to the above-named district commanders.
By command of General Grant:
E.D. TOWNSEND,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
GENERAL ORDERS, No. 18.
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE, Washington, March 15, 1867.
The President directs that the following change be made, at the request of Major-General Thomas, in the assignment announced in General Orders, No. 10, of March 11, 1867, of commanders of districts, under the act of Congress entitled "An act to provide for the more efficient government of the rebel States," and of the Department of the Cumberland, created in General Orders, No. 14, of March 12, 1867:
Brevet Major-General John Pope to command the Third District, consisting of the States of Georgia, Florida, and Alabama; and Major-General George H. Thomas to command the Department of the Cumberland
By command of General Grant:
E.D. TOWNSEND,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
WAR DEPARTMENT, ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE, Washington, June 20, 1867.
Whereas several commanders of military districts created by the acts of Congress known as the reconstruction acts have expressed doubts as to the proper construction thereof and in respect to some of their powers and duties under said acts, and have applied to the Executive for information in relation thereto; and
Whereas the said acts of Congress have been referred to the Attorney-General for his opinion thereon, and the said acts and the opinion of the Attorney-General have been fully and carefully considered by the President in conference with the heads of the respective Departments:
The President accepts the following as a practical interpretation of the aforesaid acts of Congress on the points therein presented, and directs the same to be transmitted to the respective military commanders for their information, in order that there may be uniformity in the execution of said acts:
1. The oath prescribed in the supplemental act defines all the qualifications required, and every person who can take that oath is entitled to have his name entered upon the list of voters.
2. The board of registration have no authority to administer any other oath to the person applying for registration than this prescribed oath, nor to administer an oath to any other person touching the qualifications of the applicant or the falsity of the oath so taken by him. The act, to guard against falsity in the oath, provides that if false the person taking it shall be tried and punished for perjury.
No provision is made for challenging the qualifications of the applicant or entering upon any trial or investigation of his qualifications, either by witnesses or any other form of proof.
3. As to citizenship and residence:
The applicant for registration must be a citizen of the State and of the United States, and must be a resident of a county or parish included in the election district. He may be registered if he has been such citizen for a period less than twelve months at the time he applies for registration, but he can not vote at any election unless his citizenship has then extended to the full term of one year. As to such a person, the exact length of his citizenship should be noted opposite his name on the list, so that it may appear on the day of election, upon reference to the list, whether the full term has then been accomplished.
4. An unnaturalized person can not take this oath, but an alien who has been naturalized can take it, and no other proof of naturalization can be required from him.
5. No one who is not 21 years of age at the time of registration can take the oath, for he must swear that he has then attained that age.
6. No one who has been disfranchised for participation in any rebellion against the United States or for felony committed against the laws of any State or of the United States can take this oath.
The actual participation in a rebellion or the actual commission of a felony does not amount to disfranchisement. The sort of disfranchisement here meant is that which is declared by law passed by competent authority, or which has been fixed upon the criminal by the sentence of the court which tried him for the crime.
No law of the United States has declared the penalty of disfranchisement for participation in rebellion alone; nor is it known that any such law exists in either of these ten States, except, perhaps, Virginia, as to which State special instructions will be given.
7. As to disfranchisement arising from having held office followed by participation in rebellion:
This is the most important part of the oath, and requires strict attention to arrive at its meaning. The applicant must swear or affirm as follows:
That I have never been a member of any State legislature, nor held any executive or judicial office in any State, and afterwards engaged in an insurrection or rebellion against the United States or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof; that I have never taken an oath as a member of Congress of the United States, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, and afterwards engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the United States or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof.
Two elements must concur in order to disqualify a person under these clauses: First, the office and official oath to support the Constitution of the United States; second, engaging afterwards in rebellion. Both must exist to work disqualification, and must happen in the order of time mentioned.
A person who has held an office and taken the oath to support the Federal Constitution and has not afterwards engaged in rebellion is not disqualified. So, too, a person who has engaged in rebellion, but has not theretofore held an office and taken that oath, is not disqualified.
8. Officers of the United States:
As to these the language is without limitation. The person who has at any time prior to the rebellion held an office, civil or military, under the United States, and has taken an official oath to support the Constitution of the United States, is subject to disqualification.
9. Militia officers of any State prior to the rebellion are not subject to disqualification.
10. Municipal officers—that is to say, officers of incorporated cities, towns, and villages, such as mayors, aldermen, town council, police, and other city or town officers—are not subject to disqualification.
11. Persons who have prior to the rebellion been members of the Congress of the United States or members of a State legislature are subject to disqualification, but those who have been members of conventions framing or amending the Constitution of a State prior to the rebellion are not subject to disqualification.
12. All the executive or judicial officers of any State who took an oath to support the Constitution of the United States are subject to disqualification, including county officers. They are subject to disqualification if they were required to take as a part of their official oath the oath to support the Constitution of the United States.
13. Persons who exercised mere employment under State authority are not disqualified; such as commissioners to lay out roads, commissioners of public works, visitors of State institutions, directors of State institutions, examiners of banks, notaries public, and commissioners to take acknowledgments of deeds.
ENGAGING IN REBELLION.
Having specified what offices held by anyone prior to the rebellion come within the meaning of the law, it is necessary next to set forth what subsequent conduct fixes upon such person the offense of engaging in rebellion. Two things must exist as to any person to disqualify him from voting: First, the office held prior to the rebellion, and, afterwards, participation in the rebellion.
14. An act to fix upon a person the offense of engaging in the rebellion under this law must be an overt and voluntary act, done with the intent of aiding or furthering the common unlawful purpose. A person forced into the rebel service by conscription or under a paramount authority which he could not safely disobey, and who would not have entered such service if left to the free exercise of his own will, can not be held to be disqualified from voting.
15. Mere acts of charity, where the intent is to relieve the wants of the object of such charity, and not done in aid of the cause in which he may have been engaged, do not disqualify; but organized contributions of food and clothing for the general relief of persons engaged in the rebellion, and not of a merely sanitary character, but contributed to enable them to perform their unlawful object, may be classed with acts which do disqualify.
Forced contributions to the rebel cause in the form of taxes or military assessments, which a person was compelled to pay or contribute, do not disqualify; but voluntary contributions to the rebel cause, even such indirect contributions as arise from the voluntary loan of money to rebel authorities or purchase of bonds or securities created to afford the means of carrying on the rebellion, will work disqualification.
16. All those who in legislative or other official capacity were engaged in the furtherance of the common unlawful purpose, where the duties of the office necessarily had relation to the support of the rebellion, such as members of the rebel conventions, congresses, and legislatures, diplomatic agents of the rebel Confederacy, and other officials whose offices were created for the purpose of more effectually carrying on hostilities or whose duties appertained to the support of the rebel cause, must be held to be disqualified.
But officers who during the rebellion discharged official duties not incident to war, but only such duties as belong even to a state of peace and were necessary to the preservation of order and the administration of law, are not to be considered as thereby engaging in rebellion or as disqualified. Disloyal sentiments, opinions, or sympathies would not disqualify, but where a person has by speech or by writing incited others to engage in rebellion he must come under the disqualification.
17. The duties of the board appointed to superintend the elections:
This board, having the custody of the list of registered voters in the district for which it is constituted, must see that the name of the person offering to vote is found upon the registration list, and if such proves to be the fact it is the duty of the board to receive his vote if then qualified by residence. They can not receive the vote of any person whose name is not upon the list, though he may be ready to take the registration oath, and although he may satisfy them that he was unable to have his name registered at the proper time, in consequence of absence, sickness, or other cause.
The board can not enter into any inquiry as to the qualifications of any person whose name is not on the registration list, or as to the qualifications of any person whose name is on the list.
18. The mode of voting is provided in the act to be by ballot. The board will keep a record and poll book of the election, showing the votes, list of voters, and the persons elected by a plurality of the votes cast at the election, and make returns of these to the commanding general of the district.
19. The board appointed for registration and for superintending the elections must take the oath prescribed by the act of Congress approved July 2, 1862, entitled "An act to prescribe an oath of office."
By order of the President:
E.D. TOWNSEND,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
EXECUTIVE MANSION,
Washington, August 12, 1867,
Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.
SIR: By virtue of the power and authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and laws of the United States, you are hereby suspended from office as Secretary of War, and will cease to exercise any and all functions pertaining to the same.
You will at once transfer to General Ulysses S. Grant, who has this day been authorized and empowered to act as Secretary of War ad interim, all records, books, and other property now in your custody and charge.
ANDREW JOHNSON.
EXECUTIVE MANSION,
Washington, D.C., August 12, 1867.
General ULYSSES S. GRANT,
Washington, D.C.
SIR: The Hon. Edwin M. Stanton having been this day suspended as Secretary of War, you are hereby authorized and empowered to act as Secretary of War ad interim, and will at once enter upon the discharge of the duties of the office.
The Secretary of War has been instructed to transfer to you all the records, books, papers, and other public property now in his custody and charge.
ANDREW JOHNSON.
EXECUTIVE MANSION,
Washington, D.C., August 17, 1867.
Major-General George H. Thomas is hereby assigned to the command of the Fifth Military District, created by the act of Congress passed on the 2d day of March, 1867.
Major-General P.H. Sheridan is hereby assigned to the command of the Department of the Missouri.
Major-General Winfield S. Hancock is hereby assigned to the command of the Department of the Cumberland.
The Secretary of War ad interim will give the necessary instructions to carry this order into effect.
ANDREW JOHNSON.
EXECUTIVE MANSION,
Washington, D.C., August 26, 1867.
General U.S. GRANT,
Secretary of War ad interim.
SIR: In consequence of the unfavorable condition of the health of Major-General George H. Thomas, as reported to you in Surgeon Hasson's dispatch of the 21st instant, my order dated August 17, 1867, is hereby modified so as to assign Major-General Winfield S. Hancock to the command of the Fifth Military District, created by the act of Congress passed March 2, 1867, and of the military department comprising the States of Louisiana and Texas. On being relieved from the command of the Department of the Missouri by Major-General P. H. Sheridan, Major-General Hancock will proceed directly to New Orleans, La., and, assuming the command to which he is hereby assigned, will, when necessary to a faithful execution of the laws, exercise any and all powers conferred by acts of Congress upon district commanders and any and all authority pertaining to officers in command of military departments.
Major-General P.H. Sheridan will at once turn over his present command to the officer next in rank to himself, and, proceeding without delay to Fort Leavenworth, Kans., will relieve Major-General Hancock of the command of the Department of the Missouri.
Major-General George H. Thomas will until further orders remain in command of the Department of the Cumberland.
Very respectfully, yours,
ANDREW JOHNSON.
EXECUTIVE MANSION,
Washington, D.C., August 26, 1867.
Brevet Major-General Edward R.S. Canby is hereby assigned to the command of the Second Military District, created by the act of Congress of March 2, 1867, and of the Military Department of the South, embracing the States of North Carolina and South Carolina. He will, as soon as practicable, relieve Major-General Daniel E. Sickles, and, on assuming the command to which he is hereby assigned, will, when necessary to a faithful execution of the laws, exercise any and all powers conferred by acts of Congress upon district commanders and any and all authority pertaining to officers in command of military departments.
Major-General Daniel E. Sickles is hereby relieved from the command of the Second Military District.
The Secretary of War ad interim will give the necessary instructions to carry this order into effect.
ANDREW JOHNSON.
EXECUTIVE MANSION,
Washington, D.C., September 4, 1867.
The heads of the several Executive Departments of the Government are instructed to furnish each person holding an appointment in their respective Departments with an official copy of the proclamation of the President bearing date the 3d instant, with directions strictly to observe its requirements for an earnest support of the Constitution of the United States and a faithful execution of the laws which have been made in pursuance thereof.
ANDREW JOHNSON.
[Note.—The Fortieth Congress, second session, met December 2, 1867, in conformity to the Constitution of the United States, and on July 27, 1868, in accordance with the concurrent resolution of July 24, adjourned to September 21; again met September 21, and adjourned to October 16; again met October 16, and adjourned to November 10; again met November 10 and adjourned to December 7, 1868; the latter meetings and adjournments being in accordance with the concurrent resolution of September 21.]
THIRD ANNUAL MESSAGE.
WASHINGTON, December 3, 1867.
Fellow-Citizens of the Senate and House of Representatives:
The continued disorganization of the Union, to which the President has so often called the attention of Congress, is yet a subject of profound and patriotic concern. We may, however, find some relief from that anxiety in the reflection that the painful political situation, although before untried by ourselves, is not new in the experience of nations. Political science, perhaps as highly perfected in our own time and country as in any other, has not yet disclosed any means by which civil wars can be absolutely prevented. An enlightened nation, however, with a wise and beneficent constitution of free government, may diminish their frequency and mitigate their severity by directing all its proceedings in accordance with its fundamental law.
When a civil war has been brought to a close, it is manifestly the first interest and duty of the state to repair the injuries which the war has inflicted, and to secure the benefit of the lessons it teaches as fully and as speedily as possible. This duty was, upon the termination of the rebellion, promptly accepted, not only by the executive department, but by the insurrectionary States themselves, and restoration in the first moment of peace was believed to be as easy and certain as it was indispensable. The expectations, however, then so reasonably and confidently entertained were disappointed by legislation from which I felt constrained by my obligations to the Constitution to withhold my assent.
It is therefore a source of profound regret that in complying with the obligation imposed upon the President by the Constitution to give to Congress from time to time information of the state of the Union I am unable to communicate any definitive adjustment, satisfactory to the American people, of the questions which since the close of the rebellion have agitated the public mind. On the contrary, candor compels me to declare that at this time there is no Union as our fathers understood the term, and as they meant it to be understood by us. The Union which they established can exist only where all the States are represented in both Houses of Congress; where one State is as free as another to regulate its internal concerns according to its own will, and where the laws of the central Government, strictly confined to matters of national jurisdiction, apply with equal force to all the people of every section. That such is not the present "state of the Union" is a melancholy fact, and we must all acknowledge that the restoration of the States to their proper legal relations with the Federal Government and with one another, according to the terms of the original compact, would be the greatest temporal blessing which God, in His kindest providence, could bestow upon this nation. It becomes our imperative duty to consider whether or not it is impossible to effect this most desirable consummation.
The Union and the Constitution are inseparable. As long as one is obeyed by all parties, the other will be preserved; and if one is destroyed, both must perish together. The destruction of the Constitution will be followed by other and still greater calamities. It was ordained not only to form a more perfect union between the States, but to "establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity." Nothing but implicit obedience to its requirements in all parts of the country will accomplish these great ends. Without that obedience we can look forward only to continual outrages upon individual rights, incessant breaches of the public peace, national weakness, financial dishonor, the total loss of our prosperity, the general corruption of morals, and the final extinction of popular freedom. To save our country from evils so appalling as these, we should renew our efforts again and again.
To me the process of restoration seems perfectly plain and simple. It consists merely in a faithful application of the Constitution and laws. The execution of the laws is not now obstructed or opposed by physical force. There is no military or other necessity, real or pretended, which can prevent obedience to the Constitution, either North or South. All the rights and all the obligations of States and individuals can be protected and enforced by means perfectly consistent with the fundamental law. The courts may be everywhere open, and if open their process would be unimpeded. Crimes against the United States can be prevented or punished by the proper judicial authorities in a manner entirely practicable and legal. There is therefore no reason why the Constitution should not be obeyed, unless those who exercise its powers have determined that it shall be disregarded and violated. The mere naked will of this Government, or of some one or more of its branches, is the only obstacle that can exist to a perfect union of all the States.
On this momentous question and some of the measures growing out of it I have had the misfortune to differ from Congress, and have expressed my convictions without reserve, though with becoming deference to the opinion of the legislative department. Those convictions are not only unchanged, but strengthened by subsequent events and further reflection. The transcendent importance of the subject will be a sufficient excuse for calling your attention to some of the reasons which have so strongly influenced my own judgment. The hope that we may all finally concur in a mode of settlement consistent at once with our true interests and with our sworn duties to the Constitution is too natural and too just to be easily relinquished.
It is clear to my apprehension that the States lately in rebellion are still members of the National Union. When did they cease to be so? The "ordinances of secession" adopted by a portion (in most of them a very small portion) of their citizens were mere nullities. If we admit now that they were valid and effectual for the purpose intended by their authors, we sweep from under our feet the whole ground upon which we justified the war. Were those States afterwards expelled from the Union by the war? The direct contrary was averred by this Government to be its purpose, and was so understood by all those who gave their blood and treasure to aid in its prosecution. It can not be that a successful war, waged for the preservation of the Union, had the legal effect of dissolving it. The victory of the nation's arms was not the disgrace of her policy; the defeat of secession on the battlefield was not the triumph of its lawless principle. Nor could Congress, with or without the consent of the Executive, do anything which would have the effect, directly or indirectly, of separating the States from each other. To dissolve the Union is to repeal the Constitution which holds it together, and that is a power which does not belong to any department of this Government, or to all of them united. |
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