A construction which denied the power of removal by the President was further maintained by arguments drawn from the danger of the abuse of the power; from the supposed tendency of an exposure of public officers to capricious removal to impair the efficiency of the civil service; from the alleged injustice and hardship of displacing incumbents dependent upon their official stations without sufficient consideration; from a supposed want of responsibility on the part of the President, and from an imagined defect of guaranties against a vicious President who might incline to abuse the power. On the other hand, an exclusive power of removal by the President was defended as a true exposition of the text of the Constitution. It was maintained that there are certain causes for which persons ought to be removed from office without being guilty of treason, bribery, or malfeasance, and that the nature of things demands that it should be so. "Suppose," it was said, "a man becomes insane by the visitation of God and is likely to ruin our affairs; are the hands of the Government to be confined from warding off the evil? Suppose a person in office not possessing the talents he was judged to have at the time of the appointment; is the error not to be corrected? Suppose he acquires vicious habits and incurable indolence or total neglect of the duties of his office, which shall work mischief to the public welfare; is there no way to arrest the threatened danger? Suppose he becomes odious and unpopular by reason of the measures he pursues—and this he may do without committing any positive offense against the law; must he preserve his office in despite of the popular will? Suppose him grasping for his own aggrandizement and the elevation of his connections by every means short of the treason defined by the Constitution, hurrying your affairs to the precipice of destruction, endangering your domestic tranquillity, plundering you of the means of defense, alienating the affections of your allies and promoting the spirit of discord; must the tardy, tedious, desultory road by way of impeachment be traveled to overtake the man who, barely confining himself within the letter of the law, is employed in drawing off the vital principle of the Government? The nature of things, the great objects of society, the express objects of the Constitution itself, require that this thing should be otherwise. To unite the Senate with the President in the exercise of the power," it was said, "would involve us in the most serious difficulty. Suppose a discovery of any of those events should take place when the Senate is not in session; how is the remedy to be applied? The evil could be avoided in no other way than by the Senate sitting always." In regard to the danger of the power being abused if exercised by one man it was said "that the danger is as great with respect to the Senate, who are assembled from various parts of the continent, with different impressions and opinions;" "that such a body is more likely to misuse the power of removal than the man whom the united voice of America calls to the Presidential chair. As the nature of government requires the power of removal," it was maintained "that it should be exercised in this way by the hand capable of exerting itself with effect; and the power must be conferred on the President by the Constitution as the executive officer of the Government."

Mr. Madison, whose adverse opinion in the Federalist had been relied upon by those who denied the exclusive power, now participated in the debate. He declared that he had reviewed his former opinions, and he summed up the whole case as follows:

The Constitution affirms that the executive power is vested in the President. Are there exceptions to this proposition? Yes; there are. The Constitution says that in appointing to office the Senate shall be associated with the President, unless in the case of inferior officers, when the law shall otherwise direct. Have we (that is, Congress) a right to extend this exception? I believe not. If the Constitution has invested all executive power in the President, I venture to assert that the Legislature has no right to diminish or modify his executive authority. The question now resolves itself into this: Is the power of displacing an executive power? I conceive that if any power whatsoever is in the Executive it is the power of appointing, overseeing, and controlling those who execute the laws. If the Constitution had not qualified the power of the President in appointing to office by associating the Senate with him in that business, would it not be clear that he would have the right by virtue of his executive power to make such appointment? Should we be authorized in defiance of that clause in the Constitution, "The executive power shall be vested in the President," to unite the Senate with the President in the appointment to office? I conceive not. If it is admitted that we should not be authorized to do this, I think it may be disputed whether we have a right to associate them in removing persons from office, the one power being as much of an executive nature as the other; and the first one is authorized by being excepted out of the general rule established by the Constitution in these words: "The executive power shall be vested in the President."

The question, thus ably and exhaustively argued, was decided by the House of Representatives, by a vote of 34 to 20, in favor of the principle that the executive power of removal is vested by the Constitution in the Executive, and in the Senate by the casting vote of the Vice-President.

The question has often been raised in subsequent times of high excitement, and the practice of the Government has, nevertheless, conformed in all cases to the decision thus early made.

The question was revived during the Administration of President Jackson, who made, as is well recollected, a very large number of removals, which were made an occasion of close and rigorous scrutiny and remonstrance. The subject was long and earnestly debated in the Senate, and the early construction of the Constitution was, nevertheless, freely accepted as binding and conclusive upon Congress.

The question came before the Supreme Court of the United States in January, 1839, ex parte Hennen. It was declared by the court on that occasion that the power of removal from office was a subject much disputed, and upon which a great diversity of opinion was entertained in the early history of the Government. This related, however, to the power of the President to remove officers appointed with the concurrence of the Senate, and the great question was whether the removal was to be by the President alone or with the concurrence of the Senate, both constituting the appointing power. No one denied the power of the President and Senate jointly to remove where the tenure of the office was not fixed by the Constitution, which was a full recognition of the principle that the power of removal was incident to the power of appointment; but it was very early adopted as a practical construction of the Constitution that this power was vested in the President alone, and such would appear to have been the legislative construction of the Constitution, for in the organization of the three great Departments of State, War, and Treasury, in the year 1789, provision was made for the appointment of a subordinate officer by the head of the Department, who should have charge of the records, books, and papers appertaining to the office when the head of the Department should be removed from office by the President of the United States. When the Navy Department was established, in the year 1798, provision was made for the charge and custody of the books, records, and documents of the Department in case of vacancy in the office of Secretary by removal or otherwise. It is not here said "by removal of the President," as is done with respect to the heads of the other Departments, yet there can be no doubt that he holds his office with the same tenure as the other Secretaries and is removable by the President. The change of phraseology arose, probably, from its having become the settled and well-understood construction of the Constitution that the power of removal was vested in the President alone in such cases, although the appointment of the officer is by the President and Senate. (13 Peters, p. 139.)

Our most distinguished and accepted commentators upon the Constitution concur in the construction thus early given by Congress, and thus sanctioned by the Supreme Court. After a full analysis of the Congressional debate to which I have referred, Mr. Justice Story comes to this conclusion:

After a most animated discussion, the vote finally taken in the House of Representatives was affirmative of the power of removal in the President, without any cooperation of the Senate, by the vote of 34 members against 20. In the Senate the clause in the bill affirming the power was carried by the casting vote of the Vice-President. That the final decision of this question so made was greatly influenced by the exalted character of the President then in office was asserted at the time and has always been believed; yet the doctrine was opposed as well as supported by the highest talents and patriotism of the country. The public have acquiesced in this decision, and it constitutes, perhaps, the most extraordinary case in the history of the Government of a power conferred by implication on the Executive by the assent of a bare majority of Congress which has not been questioned on many other occasions.

The commentator adds:

Nor is this general acquiescence and silence without a satisfactory explanation.

Chancellor Kent's remarks on the subject are as follows:

On the first organization of the Government it was made a question whether the power of removal in case of officers appointed to hold at pleasure resided nowhere but in the body which appointed, and, of course, whether the consent of the Senate was not requisite to remove. This was the construction given to the Constitution, while it was pending for ratification before the State conventions, by the author of the Federalist. But the construction which was given to the Constitution by Congress, after great consideration and discussion, was different. The words of the act [establishing the Treasury Department] are: "And whenever the same shall be removed from office by the President of the United States, or in any other case of vacancy in the office, the assistant shall act." This amounted to a legislative construction of the Constitution, and it has ever since been acquiesced in and acted upon as a decisive authority in the case. It applies equally to every other officer of the Government appointed by the President, whose term of duration is not specially declared. It is supported by the weighty reason that the subordinate officers in the executive department ought to hold at the pleasure of the head of the department, because he is invested generally with the executive authority, and the participation in that authority by the Senate was an exception to a general principle and ought to be taken strictly. The President is the great responsible officer for the faithful execution of the law, and the power of removal was incidental to that duty, and might often be requisite to fulfill it.

Thus has the important question presented by this bill been settled, in the language of the late Daniel Webster (who, while dissenting from it, admitted that it was settled), by construction, settled by precedent, settled by the practice of the Government, and settled by statute. The events of the last war furnished a practical confirmation of the wisdom of the Constitution as it has hitherto been maintained in many of its parts, including that which is now the subject of consideration. When the war broke out, rebel enemies, traitors, abettors, and sympathizers were found in every Department of the Government, as well in the civil service as in the land and naval military service. They were found in Congress and among the keepers of the Capitol; in foreign missions; in each and all the Executive Departments; in the judicial service; in the post-office, and among the agents for conducting Indian affairs. Upon probable suspicion they were promptly displaced by my predecessor, so far as they held their offices under executive authority, and their duties were confided to new and loyal successors. No complaints against that power or doubts of its wisdom were entertained in any quarter. I sincerely trust and believe that no such civil war is likely to occur again. I can not doubt, however, that in whatever form and on whatever occasion sedition can raise an effort to hinder or embarrass or defeat the legitimate action of this Government, whether by preventing the collection of revenue, or disturbing the public peace, or separating the States, or betraying the country to a foreign enemy, the power of removal from office by the Executive, as it has heretofore existed and been practiced, will be found indispensable.

Under these circumstances, as a depositary of the executive authority of the nation, I do not feel at liberty to unite with Congress in reversing it by giving my approval to the bill. At the early day when this question was settled, and, indeed, at the several periods when it has subsequently been agitated, the success of the Constitution of the United States, as a new and peculiar system of free representative government, was held doubtful in other countries, and was even a subject of patriotic apprehension among the American people themselves. A trial of nearly eighty years, through the vicissitudes of foreign conflicts and of civil war, is confidently regarded as having extinguished all such doubts and apprehensions for the future. During that eighty years the people of the United States have enjoyed a measure of security, peace, prosperity, and happiness never surpassed by any nation. It can not be doubted that the triumphant success of the Constitution is due to the wonderful wisdom with which the functions of government were distributed between the three principal departments—the legislative, the executive, and the judicial—and to the fidelity with which each has confined itself or been confined by the general voice of the nation within its peculiar and proper sphere. While a just, proper, and watchful jealousy of executive power constantly prevails, as it ought ever to prevail, yet it is equally true that an efficient Executive, capable, in the language of the oath prescribed to the President, of executing the laws and, within the sphere of executive action, of preserving, protecting, and defending the Constitution of the United States, is an indispensable security for tranquillity at home and peace, honor, and safety abroad. Governments have been erected in many countries upon our model. If one or many of them have thus far failed in fully securing to their people the benefits which we have derived from our system, it may be confidently asserted that their misfortune has resulted from their unfortunate failure to maintain the integrity of each of the three great departments while preserving harmony among them all.

Having at an early period accepted the Constitution in regard to the Executive office in the sense in which it was interpreted with the concurrence of its founders, I have found no sufficient grounds in the arguments now opposed to that construction or in any assumed necessity of the times for changing those opinions. For these reasons I return the bill to the Senate, in which House it originated, for the further consideration of Congress which the Constitution prescribes. Insomuch as the several parts of the bill which I have not considered are matters chiefly of detail and are based altogether upon the theory of the Constitution from which I am obliged to dissent, I have not thought it necessary to examine them with a view to make them an occasion of distinct and special objections.

Experience, I think, has shown that it is the easiest, as it is also the most attractive, of studies to frame constitutions for the self-government of free states and nations. But I think experience has equally shown that it is the most difficult of all political labors to preserve and maintain such free constitutions of self-government when once happily established. I know no other way in which they can be preserved and maintained except by a constant adherence to them through the various vicissitudes of national existence, with such adaptations as may become necessary, always to be effected, however, through the agencies and in the forms prescribed in the original constitutions themselves.

Whenever administration fails or seems to fail in securing any of the great ends for which republican government is established, the proper course seems to be to renew the original spirit and forms of the Constitution itself.

ANDREW JOHNSON.



WASHINGTON, March 2, 1867.

To the House of Representatives:

I have examined the bill "to provide for the more efficient government of the rebel States" with the care and anxiety which its transcendent importance is calculated to awaken. I am unable to give it my assent, for reasons so grave that I hope a statement of them may have some influence on the minds of the patriotic and enlightened men with whom the decision must ultimately rest.

The bill places all the people of the ten States therein named under the absolute domination of military rulers; and the preamble undertakes to give the reason upon which the measure is based and the ground upon which it is justified. It declares that there exists in those States no legal governments and no adequate protection for life or property, and asserts the necessity of enforcing peace and good order within their limits. Is this true as matter of fact?

It is not denied that the States in question have each of them an actual government, with all the powers—executive, judicial, and legislative—which properly belong to a free state. They are organized like the other States of the Union, and, like them, they make, administer, and execute the laws which concern their domestic affairs. An existing de facto government, exercising such functions as these, is itself the law of the state upon all matters within its jurisdiction. To pronounce the supreme law-making power of an established state illegal is to say that law itself is unlawful.

The provisions which these governments have made for the preservation of order, the suppression of crime, and the redress of private injuries are in substance and principle the same as those which prevail in the Northern States and in other civilized countries. They certainly have not succeeded in preventing the commission of all crime, nor has this been accomplished anywhere in the world. There, as well as elsewhere, offenders sometimes escape for want of vigorous prosecution, and occasionally, perhaps, by the inefficiency of courts or the prejudice of jurors. It is undoubtedly true that these evils have been much increased and aggravated, North and South, by the demoralizing influences of civil war and by the rancorous passions which the contest has engendered. But that these people are maintaining local governments for themselves which habitually defeat the object of all government and render their own lives and property insecure is in itself utterly improbable, and the averment of the bill to that effect is not supported by any evidence which has come to my knowledge. All the information I have on the subject convinces me that the masses of the Southern people and those who control their public acts, while they entertain diverse opinions on questions of Federal policy, are completely united in the effort to reorganize their society on the basis of peace and to restore their mutual prosperity as rapidly and as completely as their circumstances will permit.

The bill, however, would seem to show upon its face that the establishment of peace and good order is not its real object. The fifth section declares that the preceding sections shall cease to operate in any State where certain events shall have happened. These events are, first, the selection of delegates to a State convention by an election at which negroes shall be allowed to vote; second, the formation of a State constitution by the convention so chosen; third, the insertion into the State constitution of a provision which will secure the right of voting at all elections to negroes and to such white men as may not be disfranchised for rebellion or felony; fourth, the submission of the constitution for ratification to negroes and white men not disfranchised, and its actual ratification by their vote; fifth, the submission of the State constitution to Congress for examination and approval, and the actual approval of it by that body; sixth, the adoption of a certain amendment to the Federal Constitution by a vote of the legislature elected under the new constitution; seventh, the adoption of said amendment by a sufficient number of other States to make it a part of the Constitution of the United States. All these conditions must be fulfilled before the people of any of these States can be relieved from the bondage of military domination; but when they are fulfilled, then immediately the pains and penalties of the bill are to cease, no matter whether there be peace and order or not, and without any reference to the security of life or property. The excuse given for the bill in the preamble is admitted by the bill itself not to be real. The military rule which it establishes is plainly to be used, not for any purpose of order or for the prevention of crime, but solely as a means of coercing the people into the adoption of principles and measures to which it is known that they are opposed, and upon which they have an undeniable right to exercise their own judgment.

I submit to Congress whether this measure is not in its whole character, scope, and object without precedent and without authority, in palpable conflict with the plainest provisions of the Constitution, and utterly destructive to those great principles of liberty and humanity for which our ancestors on both sides of the Atlantic have shed so much blood and expended so much treasure.

The ten States named in the bill are divided into five districts. For each district an officer of the Army, not below the rank of a brigadier-general, is to be appointed to rule over the people; and he is to be supported with an efficient military force to enable him to perform his duties and enforce his authority. Those duties and that authority, as defined by the third section of the bill, are "to protect all persons in their rights of person and property, to suppress insurrection, disorder, and violence, and to punish or cause to be punished all disturbers of the public peace or criminals." The power thus given to the commanding officer over all the people of each district is that of an absolute monarch. His mere will is to take the place of all law. The law of the States is now the only rule applicable to the subjects placed under his control, and that is completely displaced by the clause which declares all interference of State authority to be null and void. He alone is permitted to determine what are rights of person or property, and he may protect them in such way as in his discretion may seem proper. It places at his free disposal all the lands and goods in his district, and he may distribute them without let or hindrance to whom he pleases. Being bound by no State law, and there being no other law to regulate the subject, he may make a criminal code of his own; and he can make it as bloody as any recorded in history, or he can reserve the privilege of acting upon the impulse of his private passions in each case that arises. He is bound by no rules of evidence; there is, indeed, no provision by which he is authorized or required to take any evidence at all. Everything is a crime which he chooses to call so, and all persons are condemned whom he pronounces to be guilty. He is not bound to keep any record or make any report of his proceedings. He may arrest his victims wherever he finds them, without warrant, accusation, or proof of probable cause. If he gives them a trial before he inflicts the punishment, he gives it of his grace and mercy, not because he is commanded so to do.

To a casual reader of the bill it might seem that some kind of trial was secured by it to persons accused of crime, but such is not the case. The officer "may allow local civil tribunals to try offenders," but of course this does not require that he shall do so. If any State or Federal court presumes to exercise its legal jurisdiction by the trial of a malefactor without his special permission, he can break it up and punish the judges and jurors as being themselves malefactors. He can save his friends from justice, and despoil his enemies contrary to justice.

It is also provided that "he shall have power to organize military commissions or tribunals:" but this power he is not commanded to exercise. It is merely permissive, and is to be used only "when in his judgment it may be necessary for the trial of offenders." Even if the sentence of a commission were made a prerequisite to the punishment of a party, it would be scarcely the slightest check upon the officer, who has authority to organize it as he pleases, prescribe its mode of proceeding, appoint its members from his own subordinates, and revise all its decisions. Instead of mitigating the harshness of his single rule, such a tribunal would be used much more probably to divide the responsibility of making it more cruel and unjust.

Several provisions dictated by the humanity of Congress have been inserted in the bill, apparently to restrain the power of the commanding officer; but it seems to me that they are of no avail for that purpose. The fourth section provides: First. That trials shall not be unnecessarily delayed; but I think I have shown that the power is given to punish without trial; and if so, this provision is practically inoperative. Second. Cruel or unusual punishment is not to be inflicted; but who is to decide what is cruel and what is unusual? The words have acquired a legal meaning by long use in the courts. Can it be expected that military officers will understand or follow a rule expressed in language so purely technical and not pertaining in the least degree to their profession? If not, then each officer may define cruelty according to his own temper, and if it is not usual he will make it usual. Corporal punishment, imprisonment, the gag, the ball and chain, and all the almost insupportable forms of torture invented for military punishment lie within the range of choice. Third. The sentence of a commission is not to be executed without being approved by the commander, if it affects life or liberty, and a sentence of death must be approved by the President. This applies to cases in which there has been a trial and sentence. I take it to be clear, under this bill, that the military commander may condemn to death without even the form of a trial by a military commission, so that the life of the condemned may depend upon the will of two men instead of one.

It is plain that the authority here given to the military officer amounts to absolute despotism. But to make it still more unendurable, the bill provides that it may be delegated to as many subordinates as he chooses to appoint, for it declares that he shall "punish or cause to be punished." Such a power has not been wielded by any monarch in England for more than five hundred years. In all that time no people who speak the English language have borne such servitude. It reduces the whole population of the ten States—all persons, of every color, sex, and condition, and every stranger within their limits—to the most abject and degrading slavery. No master ever had a control so absolute over the slaves as this bill gives to the military officers over both white and colored persons.

It may be answered to this that the officers of the Army are too magnanimous, just, and humane to oppress and trample upon a subjugated people. I do not doubt that army officers are as well entitled to this kind of confidence as any other class of men. But the history of the world has been written in vain if it does not teach us that unrestrained authority can never be safely trusted in human hands. It is almost sure to be more or less abused under any circumstances, and it has always resulted in gross tyranny where the rulers who exercise it are strangers to their subjects and come among them as the representatives of a distant power, and more especially when the power that sends them is unfriendly. Governments closely resembling that here proposed have been fairly tried in Hungary and Poland, and the suffering endured by those people roused the sympathies of the entire world. It was tried in Ireland, and, though tempered at first by principles of English law, it gave birth to cruelties so atrocious that they are never recounted without just indignation. The French Convention armed its deputies with this power and sent them to the southern departments of the Republic. The massacres, murders, and other atrocities which they committed show what the passions of the ablest men in the most civilized society will tempt them to do when wholly unrestrained by law.

The men of our race in every age have struggled to tie up the hands of their governments and keep them within the law, because their own experience of all mankind taught them that rulers could not be relied on to concede those lights which they were not legally bound to respect. The head of a great empire has sometimes governed it with a mild and paternal sway, but the kindness of an irresponsible deputy never yields what the law does not extort from him. Between such a master and the people subjected to his domination there can be nothing but enmity; he punishes them if they resist his authority, and if they submit to it he hates them for their servility.

I come now to a question which is, if possible, still more important. Have we the power to establish and carry into execution a measure like this? I answer, Certainly not, if we derive our authority from the Constitution and if we are bound by the limitations which it imposes.

This proposition is perfectly clear, that no branch of the Federal Government—executive, legislative, or judicial—can have any just powers except those which it derives through and exercises under the organic law of the Union. Outside of the Constitution we have no legal authority more than private citizens, and within it we have only so much as that instrument gives us. This broad principle limits all our functions and applies to all subjects. It protects not only the citizens of States which are within the Union, but it shields every human being who comes or is brought under our jurisdiction. We have no right to do in one place more than in another that which the Constitution says we shall not do at all. If, therefore, the Southern States were in truth out of the Union, we could not treat their people in a way which the fundamental law forbids.

Some persons assume that the success of our arms in crushing the opposition which was made in some of the States to the execution of the Federal laws reduced those States and all their people—the innocent as well as the guilty—to the condition of vassalage and gave us a power over them which the Constitution does not bestow or define or limit. No fallacy can be more transparent than this. Our victories subjected the insurgents to legal obedience, not to the yoke of an arbitrary despotism. When an absolute sovereign reduces his rebellious subjects, he may deal with them according to his pleasure, because he had that power before. But when a limited monarch puts down an insurrection, he must still govern according to law. If an insurrection should take place in one of our States against the authority of the State government and end in the overthrow of those who planned it, would that take away the rights of all the people of the counties where it was favored by a part or a majority of the population? Could they for such a reason be wholly outlawed and deprived of their representation in the legislature? I have always contended that the Government of the United States was sovereign within its constitutional sphere; that it executed its laws, like the States themselves, by applying its coercive power directly to individuals, and that it could put down insurrection with the same effect as a State and no other. The opposite doctrine is the worst heresy of those who advocated secession, and can not be agreed to without admitting that heresy to be right.

Invasion, insurrection, rebellion, and domestic violence were anticipated when the Government was framed, and the means of repelling and suppressing them were wisely provided for in the Constitution; but it was not thought necessary to declare that the States in which they might occur should be expelled from the Union. Rebellions, which were invariably suppressed, occurred prior to that out of which these questions grow; but the States continued to exist and the Union remained unbroken. In Massachusetts, in Pennsylvania, in Rhode Island, and in New York, at different periods in our history, violent and armed opposition to the United States was carried on; but the relations of those States with the Federal Government were not supposed to be interrupted or changed thereby after the rebellious portions of their population were defeated and put down. It is true that in these earlier cases there was no formal expression of a determination to withdraw from the Union, but it is also true that in the Southern States the ordinances of secession were treated by all the friends of the Union as mere nullities and are now acknowledged to be so by the States themselves. If we admit that they had any force or validity or that they did in fact take the States in which they were passed out of the Union, we sweep from under our feet all the grounds upon which we stand in justifying the use of Federal force to maintain the integrity of the Government.

This is a bill passed by Congress in time of peace. There is not in any one of the States brought under its operation either war or insurrection. The laws of the States and of the Federal Government are all in undisturbed and harmonious operation. The courts, State and Federal, are open and in the full exercise of their proper authority. Over every State comprised in these five military districts, life, liberty, and property are secured by State laws and Federal laws, and the National Constitution is everywhere in force and everywhere obeyed. What, then, is the ground on which this bill proceeds? The title of the bill announces that it is intended "for the more efficient government" of these ten States. It is recited by way of preamble that no legal State governments "nor adequate protection for life or property" exist in those States, and that peace and good order should be thus enforced. The first thing which arrests attention upon these recitals, which prepare the way for martial law, is this, that the only foundation upon which martial law can exist under our form of government is not stated or so much as pretended. Actual war, foreign invasion, domestic insurrection—none of these appear; and none of these, in fact, exist. It is not even recited that any sort of war or insurrection is threatened. Let us pause here to consider, upon this question of constitutional law and the power of Congress, a recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in ex parte Milligan.

I will first quote from the opinion of the majority of the court:

Martial law can not arise from a threatened invasion. The necessity must be actual and present, the invasion real, such as effectually closes the courts and deposes the civil administration.

We see that martial law comes in only when actual war closes the courts and deposes the civil authority; but this bill, in time of peace, makes martial law operate as though we were in actual war, and becomes the cause instead of the consequence of the abrogation of civil authority. One more quotation:

It follows from what has been said on this subject that there are occasions when martial law can be properly applied. If in foreign invasion or civil war the courts are actually closed, and it is impossible to administer criminal justice according to law, then, on the theater of active military operations, where war really prevails, there is a necessity to furnish a substitute for the civil authority thus overthrown, to preserve the safety of the army and society; and as no power is left but the military, it is allowed to govern by martial rule until the laws can have their free course.

I now quote from the opinion of the minority of the court, delivered by Chief Justice Chase:

We by no means assert that Congress can establish and apply the laws of war where no war has been declared or exists. Where peace exists, the laws of peace must prevail.

This is sufficiently explicit. Peace exists in all the territory to which this bill applies. It asserts a power in Congress, in time of peace, to set aside the laws of peace and to substitute the laws of war. The minority, concurring with the majority, declares that Congress does not possess that power. Again, and, if possible, more emphatically, the Chief Justice, with remarkable clearness and condensation, sums up the whole matter as follows:

There are under the Constitution three kinds of military jurisdiction—one to be exercised both in peace and war; another to be exercised in time of foreign war without the boundaries of the United States, or in time of rebellion and civil war within States or districts occupied by rebels treated as belligerents; and a third to be exercised in time of invasion or insurrection within the limits of the United States, or during rebellion within the limits of the States maintaining adhesion to the National Government, when the public danger requires its exercise. The first of these may be called jurisdiction under military law, and is found in acts of Congress prescribing rules and articles of war or otherwise providing for the government of the national forces; the second may be distinguished as military government, superseding as far as may be deemed expedient the local law, and exercised by the military commander under the direction of the President, with the express or implied sanction of Congress; while the third may be denominated martial law proper, and is called into action by Congress, or temporarily, when the action of Congress can not be invited, and in the case of justifying or excusing peril, by the President, in times of insurrection or invasion or of civil or foreign war, within districts or localities where ordinary law no longer adequately secures public safety and private rights.

It will be observed that of the three kinds of military jurisdiction which can be exercised or created under our Constitution there is but one that can prevail in time of peace, and that is the code of laws enacted by Congress for the government of the national forces. That body of military law has no application to the citizen, nor even to the citizen soldier enrolled in the militia in time of peace. But this bill is not a part of that sort of military law, for that applies only to the soldier and not to the citizen, whilst, contrariwise, the military law provided by this bill applies only to the citizen and not to the soldier.

I need not say to the representatives of the American people that their Constitution forbids the exercise of judicial power in any way but one—that is, by the ordained and established courts. It is equally well known that in all criminal cases a trial by jury is made indispensable by the express words of that instrument. I will not enlarge on the inestimable value of the right thus secured to every freeman or speak of the danger to public liberty in all parts of the country which must ensue from a denial of it anywhere or upon any pretense. A very recent decision of the Supreme Court has traced the history, vindicated the dignity, and made known the value of this great privilege so clearly that nothing more is needed. To what extent a violation of it might be excused in time of war or public danger may admit of discussion, but we are providing now for a time of profound peace, when there is not an armed soldier within our borders except those who are in the service of the Government. It is in such a condition of things that an act of Congress is proposed which, if carried out, would deny a trial by the lawful courts and juries to 9,000,000 American citizens and to their posterity for an indefinite period. It seems to be scarcely possible that anyone should seriously believe this consistent with a Constitution which declares in simple, plain, and unambiguous language that all persons shall have that right and that no person shall ever in any case be deprived of it. The Constitution also forbids the arrest of the citizen without judicial warrant, founded on probable cause. This bill authorizes an arrest without warrant, at the pleasure of a military commander. The Constitution declares that "no person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime unless on presentment by a grand jury." This bill holds every person not a soldier answerable for all crimes and all charges without any presentment. The Constitution declares that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." This bill sets aside all process of law, and makes the citizen answerable in his person and property to the will of one man, and as to his life to the will of two. Finally, the Constitution declares that "the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended unless when, in case of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it;" whereas this bill declares martial law (which of itself suspends this great writ) in time of peace, and authorizes the military to make the arrest, and gives to the prisoner only one privilege, and that is a trial "without unnecessary delay." He has no hope of release from custody, except the hope, such as it is, of release by acquittal before a military commission.

The United States are bound to guarantee to each State a republican form of government. Can it be pretended that this obligation is not palpably broken if we carry out a measure like this, which wipes away every vestige of republican government in ten States and puts the life, property, liberty, and honor of all the people in each of them under the domination of a single person clothed with unlimited authority?

The Parliament of England, exercising the omnipotent power which it claimed, was accustomed to pass bills of attainder; that is to say, it would convict men of treason and other crimes by legislative enactment. The person accused had a hearing, sometimes a patient and fair one, but generally party prejudice prevailed instead of justice. It often became necessary for Parliament to acknowledge its error and reverse its own action. The fathers of our country determined that no such thing should occur here. They withheld the power from Congress, and thus forbade its exercise by that body, and they provided in the Constitution that no State should pass any bill of attainder. It is therefore impossible for any person in this country to be constitutionally convicted or punished for any crime by a legislative proceeding of any sort. Nevertheless, here is a bill of attainder against 9,000,000 people at once. It is based upon an accusation so vague as to be scarcely intelligible and found to be true upon no credible evidence. Not one of the 9,000,000 was heard in his own defense. The representatives of the doomed parties were excluded from all participation in the trial. The conviction is to be followed by the most ignominious punishment ever inflicted on large masses of men. It disfranchises them by hundreds of thousands and degrades them all, even those who are admitted to be guiltless, from the rank of freemen to the condition of slaves.

The purpose and object of the bill—the general intent which pervades it from beginning to end—is to change the entire structure and character of the State governments and to compel them by force to the adoption of organic laws and regulations which they are unwilling to accept if left to themselves. The negroes have not asked for the privilege of voting; the vast majority of them have no idea what it means. This bill not only thrusts it into their hands, but compels them, as well as the whites, to use it in a particular way. If they do not form a constitution with prescribed articles in it and afterwards elect a legislature which will act upon certain measures in a prescribed way, neither blacks nor whites can be relieved from the slavery which the bill imposes upon them. Without pausing here to consider the policy or impolicy of Africanizing the southern part of our territory, I would simply ask the attention of Congress to that manifest, well-known, and universally acknowledged rule of constitutional law which declares that the Federal Government has no jurisdiction, authority, or power to regulate such subjects for any State. To force the right of suffrage out of the hands of the white people and into the hands of the negroes is an arbitrary violation of this principle.

This bill imposes martial law at once, and its operations will begin so soon as the general and his troops can be put in place. The dread alternative between its harsh rule and compliance with the terms of this measure is not suspended, nor are the people afforded any time for free deliberation. The bill says to them, take martial law first, then deliberate. And when they have done all that this measure requires them to do other conditions and contingencies over which they have no control yet remain to be fulfilled before they can be relieved from martial law. Another Congress must first approve the Constitution made in conformity with the will of this Congress and must declare these States entitled to representation in both Houses. The whole question thus remains open and unsettled and must again occupy the attention of Congress; and in the meantime the agitation which now prevails will continue to disturb all portions of the people.

The bill also denies the legality of the governments of ten of the States which participated in the ratification of the amendment to the Federal Constitution abolishing slavery forever within the jurisdiction of the United States and practically excludes them from the Union. If this assumption of the bill be correct, their concurrence can not be considered as having been legally given, and the important fact is made to appear that the consent of three-fourths of the States—the requisite number—has not been constitutionally obtained to the ratification of that amendment, thus leaving the question of slavery where it stood before the amendment was officially declared to have become a part of the Constitution.

That the measure proposed by this bill does violate the Constitution in the particulars mentioned and in many other ways which I forbear to enumerate is too clear to admit of the least doubt. It only remains to consider whether the injunctions of that instrument ought to be obeyed or not. I think they ought to be obeyed, for reasons which I will proceed to give as briefly as possible.

In the first place, it is the only system of free government which we can hope to have as a nation. When it ceases to be the rule of our conduct, we may perhaps take our choice between complete anarchy, a consolidated despotism, and a total dissolution of the Union; but national liberty regulated by law will have passed beyond our reach.

It is the best frame of government the world ever saw. No other is or can be so well adapted to the genius, habits, or wants of the American people. Combining the strength of a great empire with unspeakable blessings of local self-government, having a central power to defend the general interests, and recognizing the authority of the States as the guardians of industrial rights, it is "the sheet anchor of our safety abroad and our peace at home." It was ordained "to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, promote the general welfare, provide for the common defense, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and to our posterity." These great ends have been attained heretofore, and will be again by faithful obedience to it; but they are certain to be lost if we treat with disregard its sacred obligations.

It was to punish the gross crime of defying the Constitution and to vindicate its supreme authority that we carried on a bloody war of four years' duration. Shall we now acknowledge that we sacrificed a million of lives and expended billions of treasure to enforce a Constitution which is not worthy of respect and preservation?

Those who advocated the right of secession alleged in their own justification that we had no regard for law and that their rights of property, life, and liberty would not be safe under the Constitution as administered by us. If we now verify their assertion, we prove that they were in truth and in fact fighting for their liberty, and instead of branding their leaders with the dishonoring name of traitors against a righteous and legal government we elevate them in history to the rank of self-sacrificing patriots, consecrate them to the admiration of the world, and place them by the side of Washington, Hampden, and Sidney. No; let us leave them to the infamy they deserve, punish them as they should be punished, according to law, and take upon ourselves no share of the odium which they should bear alone.

It is a part of our public history which can never be forgotten that both Houses of Congress, in July, 1861, declared in the form of a solemn resolution that the war was and should be carried on for no purpose of subjugation, but solely to enforce the Constitution and laws, and that when this was yielded by the parties in rebellion the contest should cease, with the constitutional rights of the States and of individuals unimpaired. This resolution was adopted and sent forth to the world unanimously by the Senate and with only two dissenting voices in the House. It was accepted by the friends of the Union in the South as well as in the North as expressing honestly and truly the object of the war. On the faith of it many thousands of persons in both sections gave their lives and their fortunes to the cause. To repudiate it now by refusing to the States and to the individuals within them the rights which the Constitution and laws of the Union would secure to them is a breach of our plighted honor for which I can imagine no excuse and to which I cannot voluntarily become a party.

The evils which spring from the unsettled state of our Government will be acknowledged by all. Commercial intercourse is impeded, capital is in constant peril, public securities fluctuate in value, peace itself is not secure, and the sense of moral and political duty is impaired. To avert these calamities from our country it is imperatively required that we should immediately decide upon some course of administration which can be steadfastly adhered to. I am thoroughly convinced that any settlement or compromise or plan of action which is inconsistent with the principles of the Constitution will not only be unavailing, but mischievous; that it will but multiply the present evils, instead of removing them. The Constitution, in its whole integrity and vigor, throughout the length and breadth of the land, is the best of all compromises. Besides, our duty does not, in my judgment, leave us a choice between that and any other. I believe that it contains the remedy that is so much needed, and that if the coordinate branches of the Government would unite upon its provisions they would be found broad enough and strong enough to sustain in time of peace the nation which they bore safely through the ordeal of a protracted civil war. Among the most sacred guaranties of that instrument are those which declare that "each State shall have at least one Representative," and that "no State, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate." Each House is made the "judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its own members," and may, "with the concurrence of two-thirds, expel a member." Thus, as heretofore urged, "in the admission of Senators and Representatives from any and all of the States there can be no just ground of apprehension that persons who are disloyal will be clothed with the powers of legislation, for this could not happen when the Constitution and the laws are enforced by a vigilant and faithful Congress." "When a Senator or Representative presents his certificate of election, he may at once be admitted or rejected; or, should there be any question as to his eligibility, his credentials may be referred for investigation to the appropriate committee. If admitted to a seat, it must be upon evidence satisfactory to the House of which he thus becomes a member that he possesses the requisite constitutional and legal qualifications. If refused admission as a member for want of due allegiance to the Government, and returned to his constituents, they are admonished that none but persons loyal to the United States will be allowed a voice in the legislative councils of the nation, and the political power and moral influence of Congress are thus effectively exerted in the interests of loyalty to the Government and fidelity to the Union." And is it not far better that the work of restoration should be accomplished by simple compliance with the plain requirements of the Constitution than by a recourse to measures which in effect destroy the States and threaten the subversion of the General Government? All that is necessary to settle this simple but important question without further agitation or delay is a willingness on the part of all to sustain the Constitution and carry its provisions into practical operation. If to-morrow either branch of Congress would declare that upon the presentation of their credentials members constitutionally elected and loyal to the General Government would be admitted to seats in Congress, while all others would be excluded and their places remain vacant until the selection by the people of loyal and qualified persons, and if at the same time assurance were given that this policy would be continued until all the States were represented in Congress, it would send a thrill of joy throughout the entire land, as indicating the inauguration of a system which must speedily bring tranquillity to the public mind.

While we are legislating upon subjects which are of great importance to the whole people, and which must affect all parts of the country, not only during the life of the present generation, but for ages to come, we should remember that all men are entitled at least to a hearing in the councils which decide upon the destiny of themselves and their children. At present ten States are denied representation, and when the Fortieth Congress assembles on the 4th day of the present month sixteen States will be without a voice in the House of Representatives. This grave fact, with the important questions before us, should induce us to pause in a course of legislation which, looking solely to the attainment of political ends, fails to consider the rights it transgresses, the law which it violates, or the institutions which it imperils.

ANDREW JOHNSON.



PROCLAMATIONS.

ANDREW JOHNSON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

To all whom it may concern:

Whereas exequaturs were heretofore issued to the following-named persons at the dates mentioned and for the places specified, recognizing them as consular officers, respectively, of the Kingdom of Hanover, of the Electorate of Hesse, of the Duchy of Nassau, and of the city of Frankfort, and declaring them free to exercise and enjoy functions, powers, and privileges under the said exequaturs, viz:

FOR THE KINGDOM OF HANOVER.

Julius Frederich, consul at Galveston, Tex., July 28, 1848. Otto Frank, consul at San Francisco, Cal., July 9, 1850. Augustus Reichard, consul at New Orleans, La., January 22, 1853. Kauffmann H. Muller, consul at Savannah, Ga., June 28, 1854. G.C. Baurmeister, consul at Charleston, S.C., April 21, 1856. Adolph Gosling, consul-general at New York, November 7, 1859. G.W. Hennings, vice-consul at New York, July 2, 1860. George Papendiek, consul at Boston, November 3, 1863. Francis A. Hoffmann, consul at Chicago, July 26, 1864. Carl C. Schoettler, consul at Philadelphia, Pa., September 23, 1864. A. Rettberg, consul at Cleveland, Ohio, September 27, 1864. A.C. Wilmaus, consul at Milwaukee, Wis., October 7, 1864. Adolph Meier, consul at St. Louis, Mo., October 7, 1864. Theodor Schwartz, consul at Louisville, Ky., October 12, 1864. Carl F. Adae, consul at Cincinnati, Ohio, October 20, 1864. Werner Dresel, consul at Baltimore, Md., July 25, 1866.

FOR THE ELECTORATE OF HESSE.

Theodor Wagner, consul at Galveston, Tex., March 7, 1857. Clamor Friedrich Hagedorn, consul at Philadelphia, February 14, 1862. Werner Dresel, consul at Baltimore, Md., September 26, 1864. Friedrich Kuhne, consul at New York, September 30, 1864. Richard Thiele, consul at New Orleans, La., October 18, 1864. Carl Adae, consul at Cincinnati, Ohio, October 20, 1864. Robert Barth, consul at St. Louis, Mo., April 11, 1865. C.F. Mebius, consul at San Francisco, Cal., May 3, 1865.

FOR THE DUCHY OF NASSAU.

Wilhelm A. Kobbe, consul-general for the United States at New York, November 19, 1846. Friedrich Wilhelm Freudenthal, consul for Louisiana at New Orleans, January 22, 1852. Franz Moureau, consul for the western half of Texas at New Braunfels, April 6, 1857. Carl C. Finkler, consul for California at San Francisco, May 21, 1864. Ludwig von Baumbach, consul for Wisconsin, September 27, 1864. Otto Cuntz, consul for Massachusetts at Boston, October 7, 1864. Friedrich Kuhne, consul at New York, September 30, 1864. Carl F. Adae, consul for the State of Ohio, October 20, 1864. Robert Barth, consul for Missouri, April 18, 1865.

FOR THE CITY OF FRANKFORT.

John H. Harjes, consul at Philadelphia, Pa., September 27, 1864. F.A. Reuss, consul at St. Louis, Mo., September 30, 1864. A.C. Wilmanns, consul for Wisconsin at Milwaukee, October 7, 1864. Francis A. Hoffmann, consul for Chicago, Ill., October 12, 1864. Carl F. Adae, consul for Ohio and Indiana, October 20, 1864. Jacob Julius de Neufville, consul in New York, July 3, 1866.

And whereas the said countries, namely, the Kingdom of Hanover, the Electorate of Hesse, the Duchy of Nassau, and the city of Frankfort, have, in consequence of the late war between Prussia and Austria, been united to the Crown of Prussia; and

Whereas His Majesty the King of Prussia has requested of the President of the United States that the aforesaid exequaturs may, in consequence of the before-recited premises, be revoked:

Now, therefore, these presents do declare that the above-named consular officers are no longer recognized, and that the exequaturs heretofore granted to them are hereby declared to be absolutely null and void from this day forward.

In testimony whereof I have caused these letters to be made patent and the seal of the United States of America to be hereunto affixed.

[SEAL.]

Given under my hand at the city of Washington, this 19th day of December, A.D. 1866, and of the Independence of the United States of America the ninety-first.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

By the President: WILLIAM H. SEWARD, Secretary of State.



ANDREW JOHNSON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

To all whom it may concern:

An exequatur, bearing date the 22d day of March, 1866, having been issued to Gerhard Janssen, recognizing him as consul of Oldenburg for New York and declaring him free to exercise and enjoy such functions, powers, and privileges as are allowed to consuls by the law of nations or by the laws of the United States and existing treaty stipulations between the Government of Oldenburg and the United States, and the said Janssen having refused to appear in the supreme court of the State of New York to answer in a suit there pending against himself and others on the plea that he is a consular officer of Oldenburg, thus seeking to use his official position to defeat the ends of justice, it is deemed advisable that the said Gerhard Janssen should no longer be permitted to continue in the exercise of said functions, powers, and privileges.

These are therefore to declare that I no longer recognize the said Gerhard Janssen as consul of Oldenburg for New York and will not permit him to exercise or enjoy any of the functions, powers, or privileges allowed to consuls of that nation; and that I do hereby wholly revoke and annul the said exequatur heretofore given and do declare the same to be absolutely null and void from this day forward.

In testimony whereof I have caused these letters to be made patent and the seal of the United States of America to be hereunto affixed.

[SEAL.]

Given under my hand at Washington, this 26th day of December, A.D. 1866, and of the Independence of the United States of America the ninety-first.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

By the President: WILLIAM H. SEWARD, Secretary of State.



BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

A PROCLAMATION.

Whereas satisfactory evidence has been received by me from His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of France, through the Marquis de Montholon, his envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary, that vessels belonging to citizens of the United States entering any port of France or of its dependencies on or after the 1st day of January, 1867, will not be subjected to the payment of higher duties on tonnage than are levied upon vessels belonging to citizens of France entering the said ports:

Now, therefore, I, Andrew Johnson, President of the United States of America, by virtue of the authority vested in me by an act of Congress of the 7th day of January, 1824, entitled "An act concerning discriminating duties of tonnage and impost," and by an act in addition thereto of the 24th day of May, 1828, do hereby declare and proclaim that on and after the said 1st day of January, 1867, so long as vessels of the United States shall be admitted to French ports on the terms aforesaid, French vessels entering ports of the United States will be subject to no higher rates of duty on tonnage than are levied upon vessels of the United States in the ports thereof.

In testimony whereof I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

[SEAL.]

Done at the city of Washington, this 28th day of December, A.D. 1866, and of the Independence of the United States of America the ninety-first.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

By the President: WILLIAM H. SEWARD, Secretary of State.



BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

A PROCLAMATION.

Whereas, in virtue of the power conferred by the act of Congress approved June 22, 1860, sections 15 and 24 of which act were designed by proper provisions to secure the strict neutrality of citizens of the United States residing in or visiting the Empires of China and Japan, a notification was issued on the 4th of August last by the legation of the United States in Japan, through the consulates of the open ports of that Empire, requesting American shipmasters not to approach the coasts of Suwo and Nagato pending the then contemplated hostilities between the Tycoon of Japan and the Daimio of the said Provinces; and

Whereas authentic information having been received by the said legation that such hostilities had actually commenced, a regulation in furtherance of the aforesaid notification and pursuant to the act referred to was issued by the minister resident of the United States in Japan forbidding American merchant vessels from stopping or anchoring at any port or roadstead in that country except the three opened ports, viz, Kanagawa (Yokohama), Nagasaki, and Hakodate, unless in distress or forced by stress of weather, as provided by treaty, and giving notice that masters of vessels committing a breach of the regulation would thereby render themselves liable to prosecution and punishment and also to forfeiture of the protection of the United States if the visit to such nonopened port or roadstead should either involve a breach of treaty or be construed as an act in aid of insurrection or rebellion:

Now, therefore, be it known that I, Andrew Johnson, President of the United States of America, with a view to prevent acts which might injuriously affect the relations existing between the Government of the United States and that of Japan, do hereby call public attention to the aforesaid notification and regulation, which are hereby sanctioned and confirmed.

In testimony whereof I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

[SEAL.]

Done at the city of Washington, this 12th day of January, A.D. 1867, and of the Independence of the United States the ninety-first.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

By the President: WILLIAM H. SEWARD, Secretary of State.



BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

A PROCLAMATION.

Whereas by an act of the Congress of the United States of the 24th of May, 1828, entitled "An act in addition to an act entitled 'An act concerning discriminating duties of tonnage and impost' and to equalize the duties on Prussian vessels and their cargoes," it is provided that, upon satisfactory evidence being given to the President of the United States by the government of any foreign nation that no discriminating duties of tonnage or impost are imposed or levied in the ports of the said nation upon vessels wholly belonging to citizens of the United States or upon the produce, manufactures, or merchandise imported in the same from the United States or from any foreign country, the President is thereby authorized to issue his proclamation declaring that the foreign discriminating duties of tonnage and impost within the United States are and shall be suspended and discontinued so far as respects the vessels of the said foreign nation and the produce, manufactures, or merchandise imported into the United States in the same from the said foreign nation or from any other foreign country, the said suspension to take effect from the time of such notification being given to the President of the United States and to continue so long as the reciprocal exemption of vessels belonging to citizens of the United States and their cargoes, as aforesaid, shall be continued, and no longer; and

Whereas satisfactory evidence has lately been received by me from His Majesty the King of the Hawaiian Islands, through an official communication of His Majesty's minister of foreign relations under date of the 10th of December, 1866, that no other or higher duties of tonnage and impost are imposed or levied in the ports of the Hawaiian Islands upon vessels wholly belonging to citizens of the United States and upon the produce, manufactures, or merchandise imported in the same from the United States and from any foreign country whatever than are levied on Hawaiian ships and their cargoes in the same ports under like circumstances:

Now, therefore, I, Andrew Johnson, President of the United States of America, do hereby declare and proclaim that so much of the several acts imposing discriminating duties of tonnage and impost within the United States are and shall be suspended and discontinued so far as respects the vessels of the Hawaiian Islands and the produce, manufactures, and merchandise imported into the United States in the same from the dominions of the Hawaiian Islands and from any other foreign country whatever, the said suspension to take effect from the said 10th day of December and to continue thenceforward so long as the reciprocal exemption of the vessels of the United States and the produce, manufactures, and merchandise imported into the dominions of the Hawaiian Islands in the same, as aforesaid, shall be continued on the part of the Government of His Majesty the King of the Hawaiian Islands.

In testimony whereof I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

[SEAL.]

Done at the city of Washington, the 29th day of January, A.D. 1867, and of the Independence of the United States of America the ninety-first.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

By the President: WILLIAM H. SEWARD, Secretary of State.



BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

A PROCLAMATION.

Whereas the Congress of the United States did by an act approved on the 19th day of April, 1864, authorize the people of the Territory of Nebraska to form a constitution and State government and for the admission of such State into the Union on an equal footing with the original States upon certain conditions in said act specified; and

Whereas said people did adopt a constitution conforming to the provisions and conditions of said act and ask admission into the Union; and

Whereas the Congress of the United States did on the 8th and 9th days of February, 1867, in mode prescribed by the Constitution, pass a further act for the admission of the State of Nebraska into the Union, in which last-named act it was provided that it should not take effect except upon the fundamental condition that within the State of Nebraska there should be no denial of the elective franchise or of any other right to any person by reason of race or color, excepting Indians not taxed, and upon the further fundamental condition that the legislature of said State, by a solemn public act, should declare the assent of said State to the said fundamental condition and should transmit to the President of the United States an authenticated copy of said act of the legislature of said State, upon receipt whereof the President, by proclamation, should forthwith announce the fact, whereupon said fundamental condition should be held as a part of the organic law of the State, and thereupon, and without any further proceeding on the part of Congress, the admission of said State into the Union should be considered as complete; and

Whereas within the time prescribed by said act of Congress of the 8th and 9th of February, 1867, the legislature of the State of Nebraska did pass an act ratifying the said act of Congress of the 8th and 9th of February, 1867, and declaring that the aforenamed provisions of the third section of said last-named act of Congress should be a part of the organic law of the State of Nebraska; and

Whereas a duly authenticated copy of said act of the legislature of the State of Nebraska has been received by me:

Now, therefore, I, Andrew Johnson, President of the United States of America, do, in accordance with the provisions of the act of Congress last herein named, declare and proclaim the fact that the fundamental conditions imposed by Congress on the State of Nebraska to entitle that State to admission to the Union have been ratified and accepted and that the admission of the said State into the Union is now complete.

In testimony whereof I have hereto set my hand and have caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

[SEAL.]

Done at the city of Washington, this 1st day of March, A.D. 1867, and of the Independence of the United States of America the ninety-first.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

By the President: WILLIAM H. SEWARD, Secretary of State.

[Note.—The Fortieth Congress, first session, met March 4, 1867, in accordance with the act of January 22, 1867, and on March 30, in accordance with the concurrent resolution of March 29, adjourned to July 3. The Senate met in special session April 1, in conformity to the proclamation of the President of the United States of March 30, and on April 20 adjourned without day. The Fortieth Congress, first session, again met July 3, and on July 20, in accordance with the concurrent resolution of the latter date, adjourned to November 21; again met November 21, and on December 2, 1867, in accordance with the concurrent resolution of November 26, adjourned without day.]



SPECIAL MESSAGES.

MARCH 11, 1867.

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit to the Senate, in answer to their resolution of the 28th of July last, a report from the Secretary of State, with accompanying documents.[18]

ANDREW JOHNSON.

[Footnote 18: Correspondence since March 4, 1857, touching the claim to military service asserted by France and Prussia in reference to persons born in those countries, but who have since become citizens of the United States.]



WASHINGTON CITY, March 13, 1867.

To the Senate of the United States:

I herewith lay before the Senate, for its constitutional action thereon, a treaty concluded this day between the United States and the chiefs and headmen of the Kickapoo tribe of Indians.

A letter of the Secretary of the Interior and a copy of a letter of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, explanatory of said treaty, are also herewith transmitted.

ANDREW JOHNSON.



WASHINGTON CITY, D.C., March 13, 1867.

To the Senate of the United States:

I herewith lay before the Senate, for its constitutional action thereon, a treaty concluded in this city on the 15th instant [ultimo] between the United States and the Stockbridge and Munsee tribes of Indians.

A letter of the Secretary of the Interior of the 25th instant [ultimo] and a copy of a communication from the Commissioner of Indian Affairs of the 19th instant [ultimo], explanatory of the said treaty, are also herewith transmitted.

ANDREW JOHNSON.



WASHINGTON CITY, D.C., March 13, 1867.

To the Senate of the United States:

I herewith lay before the Senate, for its constitutional action thereon, a treaty concluded in this city on the 23d instant [ultimo] between the United States and the following tribes of Indians, viz: The Senecas, the confederated Senecas and Shawnees, the Quapaws, the Ottawas, the confederated Peorias, Kaskaskias, Weas and Piankeshaws, and the Miamis.

A letter of the Secretary of the Interior of the 26th instant [ultimo] and a copy of a letter of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs of the 25th instant [ultimo], explanatory of said treaty, are also herewith transmitted.

ANDREW JOHNSON.



WASHINGTON CITY, D.C., March 13, 1867.

To the Senate of the United States:

I herewith lay before the Senate, for its constitutional action thereon, a treaty concluded on the 2d March, 1866, between the United States and the Shawnee tribe of Indians of Kansas.

A letter of the Secretary of the Interior of the 6th instant and a copy of a communication from the Commissioner of Indian Affairs of the 2d instant, explanatory of the said treaty, are also herewith transmitted.

ANDREW JOHNSON.



WASHINGTON CITY, D.C., March 13, 1867.

To the Senate of the United States:

I herewith lay before the Senate, for its constitutional action thereon, a treaty concluded on the 27th instant [ultimo] between the United States and the Pottawatomie tribe of Indians.

A letter of the Secretary of the Interior of the 28th instant [ultimo] and a copy of a communication from the Commissioner of Indian Affairs of the 27th instant [ultimo], explanatory of the said treaty, are also herewith transmitted.

ANDREW JOHNSON.



WASHINGTON CITY, D.C., March 13, 1867.

To the Senate of the United States:

I herewith lay before the Senate, for its constitutional action thereon a treaty concluded in this city on the 13th instant [ultimo] between the United States and the Kansas or Kaw tribe of Indians.

A letter of the Secretary of the Interior of the 25th instant [ultimo] and a copy of a communication of the 19th instant [ultimo] from the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, explanatory of said treaty, are also herewith transmitted.

ANDREW JOHNSON.



WASHINGTON CITY, March 13, 1867.

To the Senate of the United States:

I herewith lay before the Senate, for its constitutional action thereon, a treaty this day concluded between the United States and the Cherokee Nation of Indians, providing for the sale of their lands in Kansas, known as the "Cherokee neutral lands."

A letter of the Secretary of the Interior and accompanying copy of a letter from the Commissioner of Indian Affairs of this date, in relation to the treaty, are also herewith transmitted.

ANDREW JOHNSON.



WASHINGTON, March 14, 1867.

To the House of Representatives:

I transmit herewith a report from the Secretary of State, in further answer to the resolution[19] of the House of Representatives of the 24th of January last.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

[Footnote 19: Requesting information "in relation to a removal of the Protestant Church or religious assembly meeting at the American embassy from the city of Rome by an order of that Government."]



WASHINGTON, March 15, 1867.

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit to the Senate, in further answer to their resolution of the 31st of January last, a report from the Secretary of State, with accompanying documents.[20]

ANDREW JOHNSON.

[Footnote 20: Dispatch from the United States consul at Geneva, with an inclosure, refuting charges against his moral character, etc.]



WASHINGTON, March 20, 1867.

To the House of Representatives:

I transmit to the House of Representatives, in answer to their resolution of the 18th instant, a report[21] from the Secretary of State, with its accompanying papers.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

[Footnote 21: Relating to trials in Canada of citizens of the United States for complicity in the Fenian invasion of that country.]



WASHINGTON, March 20, 1867.

To the House of Representatives:

I transmit to the House of Representatives, in answer to their resolution of the 18th instant, a report[22]from the Secretary of State, with an accompanying paper.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

[Footnote 22: Relating to the withdrawal of French troops from the Mexican Republic.]



WASHINGTON, March 20, 1867.

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit to the Senate, in answer to their resolution of the 15th instant, reports[23] from the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury, with accompanying papers.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

[Footnote 23: Relating to the fees of consular agents within the districts of salaried consuls, etc.]



WASHINGTON, March 20, 1867.

To the House of Representatives:

In answer to a resolution of the House of Representatives of the 7th instant, relative to the arrest, imprisonment, and treatment of American citizens in Great Britain or its Provinces, I transmit a report from the Secretary of State on the subject.

ANDREW JOHNSON.



WASHINGTON, D.C., March 21, 1867.

To the Senate of the United States:

I herewith lay before the Senate, for its constitutional action thereon, a treaty concluded on the 19th of March, 1867, between the United States and the Chippewa tribe of Indians of the Mississippi.

A letter of the Secretary of the Interior and a copy of a letter of Hon. Lewis V. Bogy, special commissioner, of the 20th instant, explanatory of the said treaty, are also herewith transmitted.

ANDREW JOHNSON.



WASHINGTON, D.C., March 30, 1867.

To the House of Representatives:

In giving my approval to the joint resolution providing for the expenses of carrying into full effect an act entitled "An act to provide for the more efficient government of the rebel States," I am moved to do so for the following reason: The seventh section of the act supplementary to the act for the more efficient government of the rebel States provides that the expenses incurred under or by virtue of that act shall be paid out of any moneys in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated. This provision is wholly unlimited as to the amount to be expended, whereas the resolution now before me limits the appropriation to $500,000. I consider this limitation as a very necessary check against unlimited expenditure and liabilities. Yielding to that consideration, I feel bound to approve this resolution, without modifying in any manner any objections heretofore stated against the original and supplemental acts.

ANDREW JOHNSON.



WASHINGTON, March 30, 1867.

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit to the Senate, for its consideration with a view to ratification, a treaty between the United States and His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias upon the subject of a cession of territory by the latter to the former, which treaty was this day signed in this city by the plenipotentiaries of the parties.

ANDREW JOHNSON.



PROCLAMATION.

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

A PROCLAMATION.

Whereas objects of interest to the United States require that the Senate should be convened at 12 o'clock on Monday, the 1st day of April next, to receive and act upon such communications as may be made to it on the part of the Executive.

Now, therefore, I, Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, have considered it to be my duty to issue this my proclamation, declaring that an extraordinary occasion requires the Senate of the United States to convene for the transaction of business at the Capitol, in the city of Washington, on Monday, the 1st day of April next, at 12 o'clock on that day, of which all who shall at that time be entitled to act as members of that body are hereby required to take notice.

[SEAL.]

Given under my hand and the seal of the United States, at Washington, the 30th day of March, A.D. 1867, and of the Independence of the United States of America the ninety-first.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

By the President: WILLIAM H. SEWARD, Secretary of State.



SPECIAL MESSAGES.

[The following messages were sent to the special session of the Senate.]

WASHINGTON, March 28, 1867.

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit to the Senate, in answer to their resolution of the 20th instant, a report[24] from the Secretary of State, with accompanying documents.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

[Footnote 24: Relating to the exequatur of the consul of the Grand Duchy of Oldenburg residing at New York.]



WASHINGTON, April 12, 1867.

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit to the Senate, in answer to their resolution of the 10th instant, calling for information relative to prisoners of war taken by belligerents in the Mexican Republic, a report from the Secretary of State, with accompanying papers.

ANDREW JOHNSON.



WASHINGTON, April 13, 1867.

To the Senate of the United States:

In compliance with a resolution of the Senate of the 28th of January last, requesting certain information in regard to governors, secretaries, and judges of Territories, I transmit herewith reports[25] from the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Interior, and the Attorney-General.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

[Footnote 25: Relating to the absence of Territorial officers from their posts of duty.]



WASHINGTON, April 15, 1867.

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit to the Senate, in answer to their resolution of the 13th instant, a report[26] from the Secretary of State.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

[Footnote 26: Relating to the absence of Governor Alexander Cumming from the Territory of Colorado since his appointment as governor.]



WASHINGTON, April 16, 1867.

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit herewith reports from the heads of the several Executive Departments, in answer to the resolution of the Senate of the 11th instant, requesting "copies of any official opinions which may have been given by the Attorney-General, the Solicitor of the Treasury, or by any other officer of the Government on the interpretation of the act of Congress regulating the tenure of office, and especially with regard to appointments by the President during the recess of Congress."

ANDREW JOHNSON.



[The following messages were sent to the Fortieth Congress, first session.]

WASHINGTON, July 5, 1867.

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit to the Senate, for its consideration with a view to ratification, a convention for commercial reciprocity between the United States and His Majesty the King of the Hawaiian Islands, which convention was signed by the plenipotentiaries of the parties in the city of San Francisco on the 21st day of May last.

ANDREW JOHNSON.



WASHINGTON, July 5, 1867.

To the Senate and House of Representatives:

I transmit to Congress a copy of a convention between the United States and the Republic of Venezuela for the adjustment of claims of citizens of the United States on the Government of that Republic. The ratifications of this convention were exchanged at Caracas on the 10th of April last. As its first article stipulates that the commissioners shall meet in that city within four months from that date, the expediency of passing the usual act for the purpose of carrying the convention into effect will, of course, engage the attention of Congress.

ANDREW JOHNSON.



WASHINGTON, July 6, 1867.

To the Senate and House of Representatives:

I transmit to Congress a copy of a treaty between the United States and His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, the ratifications of which were exchanged in this city on the 20th day of June last.

This instrument provides for a cession of territory to the United States in consideration of the payment of $7,200,000 in gold. The attention of Congress is invited to the subject of an appropriation for this payment, and also to that of proper legislation for the occupation and government of the territory as a part of the dominion of the United States.

ANDREW JOHNSON.



WASHINGTON, July 6, 1867.

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit to the Senate, for its consideration with a view to ratification, a convention between the United States, Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, and Japan, concluded at Yedo on the 25th of June, 1866.

ANDREW JOHNSON.



WASHINGTON, July 8, 1867.

To the House of Representatives:

I transmit herewith a report from the Attorney-General, additional to the reports submitted by him December 31, 1866, and March 2, 1867, in reply to a resolution of the House of Representatives of December 10, 1866, requesting "a list of names of all persons engaged in the late rebellion against the United States Government who have been pardoned by the President from April 15, 1865, to this date; that said list shall also state the rank of each person who has been so pardoned, if he has been engaged in the military service of the so-called Confederate government, and the position if he shall have held any civil office under said so-called Confederate government; and shall also further state whether such person has at any time prior to April 14, 1861, held any office under the United States Government, and, if so, what office, together with the reasons for granting such pardon, and also the names of the person or persons at whose solicitation such pardon was granted."

ANDREW JOHNSON.



WASHINGTON, July 9, 1867.

To the House of Representatives

In compliance with the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 5th of July, requesting the President "to inform the House what States have ratified the amendment to the Constitution of the United States proposed by concurrent resolution of the two Houses of Congress, June 16, 1866," I transmit a report from the Secretary of State.

ANDREW JOHNSON.



WASHINGTON, July 10, 1867.

To the House of Representatives:

In compliance with so much of the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 8th instant as requests information in regard to certain agreements said to have been entered into between the United States, European and West Virginia Land and Mining Company and certain reputed agents of the Republic of Mexico, I transmit a report from the Secretary of State and the papers accompanying it.

ANDREW JOHNSON.



WASHINGTON, July 11, 1867.

To the House of Representatives:

In compliance with the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 3d instant, requesting me to transmit all the official correspondence between the Department of State and the Hon. Lewis D. Campbell, late minister to Mexico, and also that with his successor, I communicate a report from the Secretary of State and the papers accompanying it.

ANDREW JOHNSON.



WASHINGTON, July 12, 1867.

To the Senate of the United States:

In compliance with the resolution of the Senate of the 8th instant, requesting me to transmit "all the official correspondence between the Department of State and the Hon. Lewis D. Campbell, late minister of the United States to the Republic of Mexico, from the time of his appointment, also the correspondence of the Department with his successor," I communicate herewith a report on the subject from the Secretary of State, from which it appears that the correspondence called for by the Senate has already been communicated to the House of Representatives.

ANDREW JOHNSON.



WASHINGTON, D.C., July 15, 1867.

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit herewith reports from the Secretary of War and the Attorney-General, containing the information called for by the resolution of the Senate of the 3d instant, requesting the President "to communicate to the Senate copies of all orders, instructions, circular letters, or letters of advice issued to the respective military officers assigned to the command of the several military districts under the act passed March 2, 1867, entitled 'An act to provide for the more efficient government of the rebel States,' and the act supplementary thereto, passed March 23, 1867; also copies of all opinions given to him by the Attorney-General of the United States touching the construction and interpretation of said acts, and of all correspondence relating to the operation, construction, or execution of said acts that may have taken place between himself and any of said commanders, or between him and the General of the Army, or between the latter and any of said commanders, touching the same subjects; also copies of all orders issued by any of said commanders in carrying out the provisions of said acts or either of them; also that he inform the Senate what progress has been made in the matter of registration under said acts, and whether the sum of money heretofore appropriated for carrying them out is probably sufficient."

In answer to that portion of the resolution which inquires whether the sum of money heretofore appropriated for carrying these acts into effect is probably sufficient, reference is made to the accompanying report of the Secretary of War. It will be seen from that report that the appropriation of $500,000 made in the act approved March 30, 1867, for the purpose of carrying into effect the "Act to provide for the more efficient government of the rebel States," passed March 2, 1867, and the act supplementary thereto, passed March 23, 1867, has already been expended by the commanders of the several military districts, and that, in addition, the sum of $1,648,277 is required for present purposes.

It is exceedingly difficult at the present time to estimate the probable expense of carrying into full effect the two acts of March last and the bill which passed the two Houses of Congress on the 13th instant. If the existing governments of ten States of the Union are to be deposed and their entire machinery is to be placed under the exclusive control and authority of the respective district commanders, all the expenditures incident to the administration of such governments must necessarily be incurred by the Federal Government. It is believed that, in addition to the $2,100,000 already expended or estimated for, the sum which would be required for this purpose would not be less than $14,000,000—the aggregate amount expended prior to the rebellion in the administration of their respective governments by the ten States embraced in the provisions of these acts. This sum would no doubt be considerably augmented if the machinery of these States is to be operated by the Federal Government, and would be largely increased if the United States, by abolishing the existing State governments, should become responsible for liabilities incurred by them before the rebellion in laudable efforts to develop their resources, and in no wise created for insurrectionary or revolutionary purposes. The debts of these States, thus legitimately incurred, when accurately ascertained will, it is believed, approximate $100,000,000; and they are held not only by our own citizens, among whom are residents of portions of the country which have ever remained loyal to the Union, but by persons who are the subjects of foreign governments. It is worthy the consideration of Congress and the country whether, if the Federal Government by its action were to assume such obligations, so large an addition to our public expenditures would not seriously impair the credit of the nation, or, on the other hand, whether the refusal of Congress to guarantee the payment of the debts of these States, after having displaced or abolished their State governments, would not be viewed as a violation of good faith and a repudiation by the national legislature of liabilities which these States had justly and legally incurred.

ANDREW JOHNSON.



WASHINGTON, July 18, 1867.

To the Senate of the United States:

In compliance with the resolution of the Senate of the 8th instant, requesting me to furnish to that body copies of any correspondence on the files of the Department of State relating to any recent events in Mexico, I communicate a report from the Secretary of State, with the papers accompanying it.

ANDREW JOHNSON.



WASHINGTON, July 18, 1867.

To the House of Representatives:

In compliance with that part of the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 8th instant which requests me to transmit to the House of Representatives any official correspondence or other information relating to the capture and execution of Maximilian and the arrest and reported execution of Santa Anna in Mexico, I inclose herewith a report from the Secretary of State, from which it appears that the correspondence called for by the House of Representatives has already been communicated to the Senate of the United States.

ANDREW JOHNSON.



WASHINGTON, July 20, 1867.

To the House of Representatives:

I have received a resolution adopted by the House of Representatives on the 8th instant, inquiring "whether the publication which appeared in the National Intelligencer and other public prints on the 21st of June last, and which contained a statement of the proceedings of the President and Cabinet in respect to an interpretation of the acts of Congress commonly known as the reconstruction acts, was made by the authority of the President or with his knowledge and consent," and "whether the full and complete record or minute of all the proceedings, conclusions, and determinations of the President and Cabinet relating to said acts of Congress and their interpretation is embraced or given in said publication," and also requesting that "a true copy of the full and complete record or minute of such proceedings, conclusions, and determinations in regard to the interpretation of said reconstruction acts" be furnished to the House.

In compliance with the request of the House of Representatives, I have to state that the publication to which the resolution refers was made by proper authority, and that it comprises the proceedings in Cabinet relating to the acts of Congress mentioned in the inquiry, upon which, after taking the opinions of the heads of the several Executive Departments of the Government, I had announced my own conclusions. Other questions arising from these acts have been under consideration, upon which, however, no final conclusion has been reached. No publication in reference to them has, therefore, been authorized by me; but should it at any time be deemed proper and advantageous to the interests of the country to make public those or any other proceedings of the Cabinet, authority for their promulgation will be given by the President.

A correct copy of the record of the proceedings, published in the National Intelligencer and other newspapers on the 21st ultimo, is herewith transmitted, together with a copy of the instructions based upon the conclusions of the President and Cabinet and sent to the commanders of the several military districts created by act of Congress of March 2, 1867.