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So much for the New Orleans riot. And there was the cause and the origin of the blood that was shed; and every drop of blood that was shed is upon their skirts, and they are responsible for it. I could test this thing a little closer, but will not do it here to-night. But when you talk about the causes and consequences that resulted from proceedings of that kind, perhaps, as I have been introduced here, and you have provoked questions of this kind—though it does not provoke me—I will tell you a few wholesome things that have been done by this Radical Congress in connection with New Orleans and the extension of the elective franchise.
I know that I have been traduced and abused. I know it has come in advance of me, here as elsewhere, that I have attempted to exercise an arbitrary power in resisting laws that were intended to be forced upon the Government; that I had exercised that power; that I had abandoned the party that elected me, and that I was a traitor, because I exercised the veto power in attempting and did arrest for a time a bill that was called a "Freedmen's Bureau" bill; yes, that I was a traitor. And I have been traduced, I have been slandered, I have been maligned, I have been called Judas Iscariot and all that. Now, my countrymen, here to-night, it is very easy to indulge in epithets; it is easy to call a man a Judas and cry out "traitor;" but when he is called upon to give arguments and facts he is very often found wanting. Judas Iscariot—Judas. There was a Judas, and he was one of the twelve apostles. Oh, yes; the twelve apostles had a Christ. The twelve apostles had a Christ, and he never could have had a Judas unless he had had twelve apostles. If I have played the Judas, who has been my Christ that I have played the Judas with? Was it Thad. Stevens? Was it Wendell Phillips? Was it Charles Sumner? These are the men that stop and compare themselves with the Savior, and everybody that differs with them in opinion, and to try to stay and arrest their diabolical and nefarious policy, is to be denounced as a Judas.
* * * * *
Well, let me say to you, if you will stand by me in this action, if you will stand by me in trying to give the people a fair chance—soldiers and citizens—to participate in these offices, God being willing I will kick them out. I will kick them out just as fast as I can.
Let me say to you in concluding that what I have said I intended to say. I was not provoked into this, and I care not for their menaces, the taunts and the jeers. I care not for threats. I do not intend to be bullied by my enemies nor overawed by my friends. But, God willing, with your help I will veto their measures whenever any of them come to me.
which said utterances, declarations, threats, and harangues, highly censurable in any, are peculiarly indecent and unbecoming in the Chief Magistrate of the United States, by means whereof said Andrew Johnson has brought the high office of the President of the United States into contempt, ridicule, and disgrace, to the great scandal of all good citizens; whereby said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, did commit and was then and there guilty of a high misdemeanor in office.
ART. XI. That said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, unmindful of the high duties of his office and of his oath of office, and in disregard of the Constitution and laws of the United States, did heretofore, to wit, on the 18th day of August, A.D. 1866, at the city of Washington, in the District of Columbia, by public speech, declare and affirm in substance that the Thirty-ninth Congress of the United States was not a Congress of the United States authorized by the Constitution to exercise legislative power under the same, but, on the contrary, was a Congress of only part of the States; thereby denying and intending to deny that the legislation of said Congress was valid or obligatory upon him, the said Andrew Johnson, except in so far as he saw fit to approve the same, and also thereby denying and intending to deny the power of the said Thirty-ninth Congress to propose amendments to the Constitution of the United States; and in pursuance of said declaration the said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, afterwards, to wit, on the 21st day of February, A.D. 1868, at the city of Washington, in the District of Columbia, did unlawfully, and in disregard of the requirement of the Constitution that he should take care that the laws be faithfully executed, attempt to prevent the execution of an act entitled "An act regulating the tenure of certain civil offices," passed March 2, 1867, by unlawfully devising and contriving, and attempting to devise and contrive, means by which he should prevent Edwin M. Stanton from forthwith resuming the functions of the office of Secretary for the Department of War, notwithstanding the refusal of the Senate to concur in the suspension theretofore made by said Andrew Johnson of said Edwin M. Stanton from said office of Secretary for the Department of War, and also by further unlawfully devising and contriving, and attempting to devise and contrive, means then and there to prevent the execution of an act entitled "An act making appropriations for the support of the Army for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1868 and for other purposes," approved March 2, 1867, and also to prevent the execution of an act entitled "An act to provide for the more efficient government of the rebel States," passed March 2, 1867, whereby the said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, did then, to wit, on the 21st day of February, A.D. 1868, at the city of Washington, commit and was guilty of a high misdemeanor in office.
SCHUYLER COLFAX,
Speaker of the House of Representatives.
Attest:
EDWARD McPHERSON,
Clerk of the House of Representatives.
IN THE SENATE, March 4, 1868.
The President pro tempore laid before the Senate the following letter from the Hon. Salmon P. Chase, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States:
WASHINGTON, March 4, 1868.
To the Senate of the United States:
Inasmuch as the sole power to try impeachments is vested by the Constitution in the Senate, and it is made the duty of the Chief Justice to preside when the President is on trial, I take the liberty of submitting, very respectfully, some observations in respect to the proper mode of proceeding upon the impeachment which has been preferred by the House of Representatives against the President now in office.
That when the Senate sits for the trial of an impeachment it sits as a court seems unquestionable.
That for the trial of an impeachment of the President this court must be constituted of the members of the Senate, with the Chief Justice presiding, seems equally unquestionable.
The Federalist is regarded as the highest contemporary authority on the construction of the Constitution, and in the sixty-fourth number the functions of the Senate "sitting in their judicial capacity as a court for the trial of impeachments" are examined.
In a paragraph explaining the reasons for not uniting "the Supreme Court with the Senate in the formation of the court of impeachments" it is observed that—
To a certain extent the benefits of that union will be obtained from making the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court the president of the court of impeachments, as is proposed by the plan of the Convention, while the inconveniences of an entire incorporation of the former into the latter will be substantially avoided. This was, perhaps, the prudent mean.
This authority seems to leave no doubt upon either of the propositions just stated; and the statement of them will serve to introduce the question upon which I think it my duty to state the result of my reflections to the Senate, namely, At what period, in the case of an impeachment of the President, should the court of impeachment be organized under oath, as directed by the Constitution?
It will readily suggest itself to anyone who reflects upon the abilities and the learning in the law which distinguish so many Senators that besides the reason assigned in the Federalist there must have been still another for the provision requiring the Chief Justice to preside in the court of impeachment. Under the Constitution, in case of a vacancy in the office of President, the Vice-President succeeds, and it was doubtless thought prudent and befitting that the next in succession should not preside in a proceeding through which a vacancy might be created.
It is not doubted that the Senate, while sitting in its ordinary capacity, must necessarily receive from the House of Representatives some notice of its intention to impeach the President at its bar, but it does not seem to me an unwarranted opinion, in view of this constitutional provision, that the organization of the Senate as a court of impeachment, under the Constitution, should precede the actual announcement of the impeachment on the part of the House.
And it may perhaps be thought a still less unwarranted opinion that articles of impeachment should only be presented to a court of impeachment; that no summons or other process should issue except from the organized court, and that rules for the government of the proceedings of such a court should be framed only by the court itself.
I have found myself unable to come to any other conclusions than these. I can assign no reason for requiring the Senate to organize as a court under any other than its ordinary presiding officer for the latter proceedings upon an impeachment of the President which does not seem to me to apply equally to the earlier.
I am informed that the Senate has proceeded upon other views, and it is not my purpose to contest what its superior wisdom may have directed.
All good citizens will fervently pray that no occasion may ever arise when the grave proceedings now in progress will be cited as a precedent; but it is not impossible that such an occasion may come.
Inasmuch, therefore, as the Constitution has charged the Chief Justice with an important function in the trial of an impeachment of the President, it has seemed to me fitting and obligatory, where he is unable to concur in the views of the Senate concerning matters essential to the trial, that his respectful dissent should appear.
S.P. CHASE,
Chief Justice of the United States.
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE SITTING FOR THE TRIAL OF THE IMPEACHMENT OF ANDREW JOHNSON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.
THURSDAY, MARCH 5, 1868.
THE UNITED STATES vs. ANDREW JOHNSON, PRESIDENT.
The Chief Justice of the United States entered the Senate Chamber and was conducted to the chair by the committee appointed by the Senate for that purpose.
The following oath was administered to the Chief Justice by Associate Justice Nelson, and by the Chief Justice to the members of the Senate:
I do solemnly swear that in all things appertaining to the trial of the impeachment of Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, now pending, I will do impartial justice according to the Constitution and laws. So help me God.
FRIDAY, MARCH 6, 1868.
THE UNITED STATES vs. ANDREW JOHNSON, PRESIDENT.
To accord with the conviction of the Chief Justice[76] that the court should adopt its own rules, those adopted on March 2 by the Senate sitting in its legislative capacity were readopted by the Senate sitting as a court of impeachment. The rules are as follows:
[Footnote 76: See letter from the Chief Justice, pp. 718-720.]
RULES OF PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE IN THE SENATE WHEN SITTING ON THE TRIAL OF IMPEACHMENTS.
I. Whensoever the Senate shall receive notice from the House of Representatives that managers are appointed on their part to conduct an impeachment against any person, and are directed to carry articles of impeachment to the Senate, the Secretary of the Senate shall immediately inform the House of Representatives that the Senate is ready to receive the managers for the purpose of exhibiting such articles of impeachment agreeably to said notice.
II. When the managers of an impeachment shall be introduced at the bar of the Senate and shall signify that they are ready to exhibit articles of impeachment against any person, the Presiding Officer of the Senate shall direct the Sergeant-at-Arms to make proclamation, who shall, after making proclamation, repeat the following words, viz:
All persons are commanded to keep silence, on pain of imprisonment, while the House of Representatives is exhibiting to the Senate of the United States articles of impeachment against ———— ————.
after which the articles shall be exhibited; and then the Presiding Officer of the Senate shall inform the managers that the Senate will take proper order on the subject of the impeachment, of which due notice shall be given to the House of Representatives.
III. Upon such articles being presented to the Senate, the Senate shall, at 1 o'clock afternoon of the day (Sunday excepted) following such presentation, or sooner if so ordered by the Senate, proceed to the consideration of such articles, and shall continue in session from day to day (Sundays excepted) after the trial shall commence (unless otherwise ordered by the Senate) until final judgment shall be rendered, and so much longer as may in its judgment be needful. Before proceeding to the consideration of the articles of impeachment the Presiding Officer shall administer the oath hereinafter provided to the members of the Senate then present, and to the other members of the Senate as they shall appear, whose duty it shall be to take the same.
IV. When the President of the United States, or the Vice-President of the United States upon whom the powers and duties of the office of President shall have devolved, shall be impeached, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States shall preside; and in a case requiring the said Chief Justice to preside notice shall be given to him by the Presiding Officer of the Senate of the time and place fixed for the consideration of the articles of impeachment as aforesaid, with a request to attend; and the said Chief Justice shall preside over the Senate during the consideration of said articles and upon the trial of the person impeached therein.
V. The Presiding Officer shall have power to make and issue, by himself or by the Secretary of the Senate, all orders, mandates, writs, and precepts authorized by these rules or by the Senate, and to make and enforce such other regulations and orders in the premises as the Senate may authorize or provide.
VI. The Senate shall have power to compel the attendance of witnesses, to enforce obedience to its orders, mandates, writs, precepts, and judgments, to preserve order, and to punish in a summary way contempts of and disobedience to its authority, orders, mandates, writs, precepts, or judgments, and to make all lawful orders, rules, and regulations which it may deem essential or conducive to the ends of justice; and the Sergeant-at-Arms, under the direction of the Senate, may employ such aid and assistance as may be necessary to enforce, execute, and carry into effect the lawful orders, mandates, writs, and precepts of the Senate.
VII. The Presiding Officer of the Senate shall direct all necessary preparations in the Senate Chamber, and the presiding officer upon the trial shall direct all the forms of proceeding while the Senate are sitting for the purpose of trying an impeachment and all forms during the trial not otherwise specially provided for. The presiding officer may, in the first instance, submit to the Senate, without a division, all questions of evidence and incidental questions; but the same shall, on the demand of one-fifth of the members present, be decided by yeas and nays.
VIII. Upon the presentation of articles of impeachment and the organization of the Senate as hereinbefore provided, a writ of summons shall issue to the accused, reciting said articles and notifying him to appear before the Senate upon a day and at a place to be fixed by the Senate, and named in such writ, and file his answer to said articles of impeachment, and to stand to and abide the orders and judgments of the Senate thereon, which writ shall be served by such officer or person as shall be named in the precept thereof such number of days prior to the day fixed for such appearance as shall be named in such precept, either by the delivery of an attested copy thereof to the person accused or, if that can not conveniently be done, by leaving such copy at the last known place of abode of such person or at his usual place of business, in some conspicuous place therein; or, if such service shall be, in the judgment of the Senate, impracticable, notice to the accused to appear shall be given in such other manner, by publication or otherwise, as shall be deemed just; and if the writ aforesaid shall fail of service in the manner aforesaid, the proceedings shall not thereby abate, but further service may be made in such manner as the Senate shall direct. If the accused, after service, shall fail to appear, either in person or by attorney, on the day so fixed therefor as aforesaid, or, appearing, shall fail to file his answer to such articles of impeachment, the trial shall proceed, nevertheless, as upon a plea of not guilty. If a plea of guilty shall be entered, judgment may be entered thereon without further proceedings.
IX. At 12 o'clock and 30 minutes afternoon of the day appointed for the return of the summons against the person impeached the legislative and executive business of the Senate shall be suspended and the Secretary of the Senate shall administer an oath to the returning officer in the form following, viz:
I, ———— ————, do solemnly swear that the return made by me upon the process issued on the —— day of —— by the Senate of the United States against ———— ———— is truly made, and that I have performed such service as herein described.
So help me God.
which oath shall be entered at large on the records.
X. The person impeached shall then be called to appear and answer the articles of impeachment against him. If he appear, or any person for him, the appearance shall be recorded, stating particularly if by himself or by agent or attorney, naming the person appearing and the capacity in which he appears, If he do not appear, either personally or by agent or attorney, the same shall be recorded.
XI. At 12 o'clock and 30 minutes afternoon of the day appointed for the trial of an impeachment the legislative and executive business of the Senate shall be suspended and the Secretary shall give notice to the House of Representatives that the Senate is ready to proceed upon the impeachment of ———— ————, in the Senate Chamber, which chamber is prepared with accommodations for the reception of the House of Representatives.
XII. The hour of the day at which the Senate shall sit upon the trial of an impeachment shall be (unless otherwise ordered) 12 o'clock m., and when the hour for such sitting shall arrive the Presiding Officer of the Senate shall so announce; and thereupon the presiding officer upon such trial shall cause proclamation to be made, and the business of the trial shall proceed. The adjournment of the Senate sitting in said trial shall not operate as an adjournment of the Senate, but on such adjournment the Senate shall resume the consideration of its legislative and executive business.
XIII. The Secretary of the Senate shall record the proceedings in cases of impeachment as in the case of legislative proceedings, and the same shall be reported in the same manner as the legislative proceedings of the Senate.
XIV. Counsel for the parties shall be admitted to appear and be heard upon an impeachment.
XV. All motions made by the parties or their counsel shall be addressed to the presiding officer, and if he or any Senator shall require it they shall be committed to writing and read at the Secretary's table.
XVI. Witnesses shall be examined by one person on behalf of the party producing them and then cross-examined by one person on the other side.
XVII. If a Senator is called as a witness, he shall be sworn and give his testimony standing in his place.
XVIII. If a Senator wishes a question to be put to a witness, or to offer a motion or order (except a motion to adjourn), it shall be reduced to writing and put by the presiding officer.
XIX. At all times while the Senate is sitting upon the trial of an impeachment the doors of the Senate shall be kept open, unless the Senate shall direct the doors to be closed while deliberating upon its decisions.
XX. All preliminary or interlocutory questions and all motions shall be argued for not exceeding one hour on each side, unless the Senate shall by order extend the time.
XXI. The case on each side shall be opened by one person. The final argument on the merits may be made by two persons on each side (unless otherwise ordered by the Senate, upon application for that purpose), and the argument shall be opened and closed on the part of the House of Representatives.
XXII. On the final question whether the impeachment is sustained the yeas and nays shall be taken on each article of impeachment separately, and if the impeachment shall not, upon any of the articles presented, be sustained by the votes of two-thirds of the members present a judgment of acquittal shall be entered; but if the person accused in such articles of impeachment shall be convicted upon any of said articles by the votes of two-thirds of the members present the Senate shall proceed to pronounce judgment, and a certified copy of such judgment shall be deposited in the office of the Secretary of State.
XXIII. All the orders and decisions shall be made and had by yeas and nays, which shall be entered on the record, and without debate, except when the doors shall be closed for deliberation, and in that case no member shall speak more than once on one question, and for not more than ten minutes on an interlocutory question, and for not more than fifteen minutes on the final question, unless by consent of the Senate, to be had without debate; but a motion to adjourn may be decided without the yeas and nays, unless they be demanded by one-fifth of the members present.
XXIV. Witnesses shall be sworn in the following form, viz:
You, ———— ————, do swear (or affirm, as the case maybe) that the evidence you shall give in the case now depending between the United States and ———— ———— shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. So help you God.
which oath shall be administered by the Secretary or any other duly authorized person.
Form of subpoena to be issued on the application of the managers of the impeachment, or of the party impeached, or of his counsel:
To ———— ————; greeting:
You and each of you are hereby commanded to appear before the Senate of the United States on the —— day of ——, at the Senate Chamber, in the city of Washington, then and there to testify your knowledge in the cause which is before the Senate in which the House of Representatives have impeached ———— ————.
Fail not.
Witness ———— ————, and Presiding Officer of the Senate, at the city of Washington, this —— day of ——, A.D. ——, and of the Independence of the United States the ———.
Form of direction for the service of said subpoena:
The Senate of the United States to ———— ————, greeting:
You are hereby commanded to serve and return the within subpoena according to law.
Dated at Washington, this —— day of ——, A.D. ——, and of the Independence of the United States the ———.
Secretary of the Senate.
Form of oath to be administered to the members of the Senate sitting in the trial of impeachments:
I solemnly swear (or affirm, as the case may be) that in all things appertaining to the trial of the impeachment of ———— ————, now pending, I will do impartial justice according to the Constitution and laws. So help me God.
Form of summons to be issued and served upon the person impeached.
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ss:
The Senate of the United States to ———— ————, greeting:
Whereas the House of Representatives of the United States of America did on the —— day of —— exhibit to the Senate articles of impeachment against you, the said ———— ————, in the words following:
[Here insert the articles.]
And demand that you, the said ———— ————, should be put to answer the accusations as set forth in said articles, and that such proceedings, examinations, trials, and judgments might be thereupon had as are agreeable to law and justice:
You, the said ———— ————, are therefore hereby summoned to be and appear before the Senate of the United States of America, at their chamber, in the city of Washington, on the —— day of ——, at 12 o'clock and 30 minutes afternoon, then and there to answer to the said articles of impeachment, and then and there to abide by, obey, and perform such orders, directions, and judgments as the Senate of the United States shall make in the premises, according to the Constitution and laws of the United States.
Hereof you are not to fail.
Witness ———— ————, and Presiding Officer of the said Senate, at the city of Washington, this —— day of ——, A.D. ——, and of the Independence of the United States the ———.
Form of precept to be indorsed on said writ of summons:
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ss:
The Senate of the United States to ———— ————, greeting:
You are hereby commanded to deliver to and leave with ———— ————, if conveniently to be found, or, if not, to leave at his usual place of abode or at his usual place of business, in some conspicuous place, a true and attested copy of the within writ of summons, together with a like copy of this precept; and in whichsoever way you perform the service, let it be done at least —— days before the appearance day mentioned in said writ of summons.
Fail not, and make return of this writ of summons and precept, with your proceedings thereon indorsed, on or before the appearance day mentioned in the said writ of summons.
Witness ———— ————, and Presiding Officer of the Senate, at the city of Washington, this —— day of ——, A.D. ——, and of the Independence of the United States the ———.
All process shall be served by the Sergeant-at-Arms of the Senate unless otherwise ordered by the court.
XXV. If the Senate shall at any time fail to sit for the consideration of articles of impeachment on the day or hour fixed therefor, the Senate may by an order, to be adopted without debate, fix a day and hour for resuming such consideration.
On March 31 Rule VII was amended to read as follows:
VII. The Presiding Officer of the Senate shall direct all necessary preparations in the Senate Chamber, and the presiding officer on the trial shall direct all the forms of proceeding while the Senate are sitting for the purpose of trying an impeachment, and all forms during the trial not otherwise specially provided for, and the presiding officer on the trial may rule all questions of evidence and incidental questions, which ruling shall stand as the judgment of the Senate, unless some member of the Senate shall ask that a formal vote be taken thereon, in which case it shall be submitted to the Senate for decision; or he may, at his option, in the first instance submit any such question to a vote of the members of the Senate.
On April 3 Rule VII was further amended by inserting at the end thereof the following:
Upon all such questions the vote shall be without a division, unless the yeas and nays be demanded by one-fifth of the members present, when the same shall be taken.
On March 13 Rule XXIII was amended to read as follows:
XXIII. All the orders and decisions shall be made and had by yeas and nays, which shall be entered on the record, and without debate, subject, however, to the operation of Rule VII, except when the doors shall be closed for deliberation, and in that case no member shall speak more than once on one question, and for not more than ten minutes on an interlocutory question, and for not more than fifteen minutes on the final question, unless by consent of the Senate, to be had without debate; but a motion to adjourn may be decided without the yeas and nays, unless they be demanded by one-fifth of the members present.
On May 7 Rule XXIII was further amended by adding thereto the following:
The fifteen minutes herein allowed shall be for the whole deliberation on the final question, and not to the final question on each article of impeachment.
FRIDAY, MARCH 13, 1868.
THE UNITED STATES vs. ANDREW JOHNSON, PRESIDENT.
Mr. Henry Stanbery, in behalf of Andrew Johnson, the respondent, read the following paper:
In the matter of the impeachment of Andrew Johnson, President of the United States.
Mr. CHIEF JUSTICE: I, Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, having been served with a summons to appear before this honorable court, sitting as a court of impeachment, to answer certain articles of impeachment found and presented against me by the honorable the House of Representatives of the United States, do hereby enter my appearance by my counsel, Henry Stanbery, Benjamin R. Curtis, Jeremiah S. Black, William M. Evarts, and Thomas A.R. Nelson, who have my warrant and authority therefor, and who are instructed by me to ask of this honorable court a reasonable time for the preparation of my answer to said articles. After a careful examination of the articles of impeachment and consultation with my counsel, I am satisfied that at least forty days will be necessary for the preparation of my answer, and I respectfully ask that it be allowed.
ANDREW JOHNSON.
Mr. Stanbery then submitted the following motion:
In the matter of the impeachment of Andrew Johnson, President of the United States.
Henry Stanbery, Benjamin R. Curtis, Jeremiah S. Black, William M. Evarts, and Thomas A.R. Nelson, of counsel for the respondent, move the court for the allowance of forty days for the preparation of the answer to the articles of impeachment, and in support of the motion make the following professional statement:
The articles are eleven in number, involving many questions of law and fact. We have during the limited time and opportunity afforded us considered as far as possible the field of investigation which must be explored in the preparation of the answer, and the conclusion at which we have arrived is that with the utmost diligence the time we have asked is reasonable and necessary.
The precedents as to time for answer upon impeachments before the Senate to which we have had opportunity to refer are those of Judge Chase and Judge Peck.
In the case of Judge Chase time was allowed from the 3d of January until the 4th of February next succeeding to put in his answer—a period of thirty-two days; but in this case there were only eight articles, and Judge Chase had been for a year cognizant of most of the articles, and had been himself engaged in preparing to meet them.
In the case of Judge Peck there was but a single article. Judge Peck asked for time from the 10th to the 25th of May to put in his answer, and it was granted. It appears that Judge Peck had been long cognizant of the ground laid for his impeachment, and had been present before the committee of the House upon the examination of the witnesses, and had been permitted by the House of Representatives to present to that body an elaborate answer to the charges.
It is apparent that the President is fairly entitled to more time than was allowed in either of the foregoing cases. It is proper to add that the respondents in these cases were lawyers, fully capable of preparing their own answers, and that no pressing official duties interfered with their attention to that business; whereas the President, not being a lawyer, must rely on his counsel. The charges involve his acts, declarations, and intentions, as to all which his counsel must be fully advised upon consultation with him, step by step, in the preparation of his defense. It is seldom that a case requires such constant communication between client and counsel as this, and yet such communication can only be had at such intervals as are allowed to the President from the usual hours that must be devoted to his high official duties.
We further beg leave to suggest for the consideration of this honorable court that, as counsel careful as well of their own reputation as of the interests of their client in a case of such magnitude as this, so out of the ordinary range of professional experience, where so much responsibility is felt, they submit to the candid consideration of the court that they have a right to ask for themselves such opportunity to discharge their duty as seems to them to be absolutely necessary.
HENRY STANBERY, B.R. CURTIS, JEREMIAH S. BLACK, \_ Per H.S. WILLIAM M. EVARTS, / THOMAS A.R. NELSON,
Of Counsel for the Respondent.
The above motion was denied, and the Senate adopted the following orders:
Ordered, That the respondent file answer to the articles of impeachment on or before Monday, the 23d day of March instant.
Ordered, That unless otherwise ordered by the Senate, for cause shown, the trial of the pending impeachment shall proceed immediately after replication shall be filed.
MONDAY, MARCH 23, 1868.
THE UNITED STATES vs. ANDREW JOHNSON, PRESIDENT.
The answer of the respondent to the articles of impeachment was submitted by his counsel, as follows:
Senate of the United States, sitting as a court of impeachment for the trial of Andrew Johnson, President of the United States.
THE ANSWER OF THE SAID ANDREW JOHNSON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, TO THE ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT EXHIBITED AGAINST HIM BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES.
Answer to Article I.—For answer to the first article he says that Edwin M. Stanton was appointed Secretary for the Department of War on the 15th day of January, A.D. 1862, by Abraham Lincoln, then President of the United States, during the first term of his Presidency, and was commissioned, according to the Constitution and laws of the United States, to hold the said office during the pleasure of the President; that the office of Secretary for the Department of War was created by an act of the First Congress in its first session, passed on the 7th day of August, A.D. 1789, and in and by that act it was provided and enacted that the said Secretary for the Department of War shall perform and execute such duties as shall from time to time be enjoined on and intrusted to him by the President of the United States, agreeably to the Constitution, relative to the subjects within the scope of the said Department; and, furthermore, that the said Secretary shall conduct the business of the said Department in such a manner as the President of the United States shall from time to time order and instruct.
And this respondent, further answering, says that by force of the act aforesaid and by reason of his appointment aforesaid the said Stanton became the principal officer in one of the Executive Departments of the Government within the true intent and meaning of the second section of the second article of the Constitution of the United States and according to the true intent and meaning of that provision of the Constitution of the United States; and, in accordance with the settled and uniform practice of each and every President of the United States, the said Stanton then became, and so long as he should continue to hold the said office of Secretary for the Department of War must continue to be, one of the advisers of the President of the United States, as well as the person intrusted to act for and represent the President in matters enjoined upon him or intrusted to him by the President touching the Department aforesaid, and for whose conduct in such capacity, subordinate to the President, the President is by the Constitution and laws of the United States made responsible.
And this respondent, further answering, says he succeeded to the office of President of the United States upon and by reason of the death of Abraham Lincoln, then President of the United States, on the 15th day of April, 1865, and the said Stanton was then holding the said office of Secretary for the Department of War under and by reason of the appointment and commission aforesaid; and not having been removed from the said office by this respondent, the said Stanton continued to hold the same under the appointment and commission aforesaid, at the pleasure of the President, until the time hereinafter particularly mentioned, and at no time received any appointment or commission save as above detailed.
And this respondent, further answering, says that on and prior to the 5th day of August, A.D. 1867, this respondent, the President of the United States, responsible for the conduct of the Secretary for the Department of War, and having the constitutional right to resort to and rely upon the person holding that office for advice concerning the great and difficult public duties enjoined on the President by the Constitution and laws of the United States, became satisfied that he could not allow the said Stanton to continue to hold the office of Secretary for the Department of War without hazard of the public interest; that the relations between the said Stanton and the President no longer permitted the President to resort to him for advice or to be, in the judgment of the President, safely responsible for his conduct of the affairs of the Department of War, as by law required, in accordance with the orders and instructions of the President; and thereupon, by force of the Constitution and laws of the United States, which devolve on the President the power and the duty to control the conduct of the business of that Executive Department of the Government, and by reason of the constitutional duty of the President to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, this respondent did necessarily consider and did determine that the said Stanton ought no longer to hold the said office of Secretary for the Department of War. And this respondent, by virtue of the power and authority vested in him as President of the United States by the Constitution and laws of the United States, to give effect to such his decision and determination, did, on the 5th day of August, A.D. 1867, address to the said Stanton a note of which the following is a true copy:
SIR: Public considerations of a high character constrain me to say that your resignation as Secretary of War will be accepted.
To which note the said Stanton made the following reply:
WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, August 5, 1867.
SIR: Your note of this day has been received, stating that "public considerations of a high character constrain" you "to say that" my "resignation as Secretary of War will be accepted."
In reply I have the honor to say that public considerations of a high character, which alone have induced me to continue at the head of this Department, constrain me not to resign the office of Secretary of War before the next meeting of Congress.
Very respectfully, yours,
EDWIN M. STANTON.
This respondent, as President of the United States, was thereon of opinion that, having regard to the necessary official relations and duties of the Secretary for the Department of War to the President of the United States, according to the Constitution and laws of the United States, and having regard to the responsibility of the President for the conduct of the said Secretary, and having regard to the permanent executive authority of the office which the respondent holds under the Constitution and laws of the United States, it was impossible, consistently with the public interests, to allow the said Stanton to continue to hold the said office of Secretary for the Department of War; and it then became the official duty of the respondent, as President of the United States, to consider and decide what act or acts should and might lawfully be done by him, as President of the United States, to cause the said Stanton to surrender the said office.
This respondent was informed and verily believed that it was practically settled by the First Congress of the United States, and had been so considered and uniformly and in great numbers of instances acted on by each Congress and President of the United States, in succession, from President Washington to and including President Lincoln, and from the First Congress to the Thirty-ninth Congress, that the Constitution of the United States conferred on the President, as part of the executive power and as one of the necessary means and instruments of performing the executive duty expressly imposed on him by the Constitution of taking care that the laws be faithfully executed, the power at any and all times of removing from office all executive officers for cause to be judged of by the President alone. This respondent had, in pursuance of the Constitution, required the opinion of each principal officer of the Executive Departments upon this question of constitutional executive power and duty, and had been advised by each of them, including the said Stanton, Secretary for the Department of War, that under the Constitution of the United States this power was lodged by the Constitution in the President of the United States, and that, consequently, it could be lawfully exercised by him, and the Congress could not deprive him thereof; and this respondent, in his capacity of President of the United States, and because in that capacity he was both enabled and bound to use his best judgment upon this question, did, in good faith and with an earnest desire to arrive at the truth, come to the conclusion and opinion, and did make the same known to the honorable the Senate of the United States by a message dated on the 2d day of March, 1867 (a true copy whereof is hereunto annexed and marked A), that the power last mentioned was conferred and the duty of exercising it in fit cases was imposed on the President by the Constitution of the United States, and that the President could not be deprived of this power or relieved of this duty, nor could the same be vested by law in the President and the Senate jointly, either in part or whole; and this has ever since remained and was the opinion of this respondent at the time when he was forced as aforesaid to consider and decide what act or acts should and might lawfully be done by this respondent, as President of the United States, to cause the said Stanton to surrender the said office.
This respondent was also then aware that by the first section of "An act regulating the tenure of certain civil offices," passed March 2, 1867, by a constitutional majority of both Houses of Congress, it was enacted as follows:
That every person holding any civil office to which he has been appointed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and every person who shall hereafter be appointed to any such office and shall become duly qualified to act therein, is and shall be entitled to hold such office until a successor shall have been in like manner appointed and duly qualified, except as herein otherwise provided: Provided, That the Secretaries of State, of the Treasury, of War, of the Navy, and of the Interior, the Postmaster-General, and the Attorney-General shall hold their offices, respectively, for and during the term of the President by whom they may have been appointed and one month thereafter, subject to removal by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
This respondent was also aware that this act was understood and intended to be an expression of the opinion of the Congress by which that act was passed that the power to remove executive officers for cause might by law be taken from the President and vested in him and the Senate jointly; and although this respondent had arrived at and still retained the opinion above expressed, and verily believed, as he still believes, that the said first section of the last-mentioned act was and is wholly inoperative and void by reason of its conflict with the Constitution of the United States, yet, inasmuch as the same had been enacted by the constitutional majority in each of the two Houses of that Congress, this respondent considered it to be proper to examine and decide whether the particular case of the said Stanton, on which it was this respondent's duty to act, was within or without the terms of that first section of the act, or, if within it, whether the President had not the power, according to the terms of the act, to remove the said Stanton from the office of Secretary for the Department of War; and having, in his capacity of President of the United States, so examined and considered, did form the opinion that the case of the said Stanton and his tenure of office were not affected by the first section of the last-named act.
And this respondent, further answering, says that although a case thus existed which, in his judgment, as President of the United States, called for the exercise of the executive power to remove the said Stanton from the office of Secretary for the Department of War; and although this respondent was of opinion, as is above shown, that under the Constitution of the United States the power to remove the said Stanton from the said office was vested in the President of the United States; and although this respondent was also of the opinion, as is above shown, that the case of the said Stanton was not affected by the first section of the last-named act; and although each of the said opinions had been formed by this respondent upon an actual case, requiring him, in his capacity of President of the United States, to come to some judgment and determination thereon, yet this respondent, as President of the United States, desired and determined to avoid, if possible, any question of the construction and effect of the said first section of the last-named act, and also the broader question of the executive power conferred upon the President of the United States by the Constitution of the United States to remove one of the principal officers of one of the Executive Departments for cause seeming to him sufficient; and this respondent also desired and determined that if, from causes over which he could exert no control, it should become absolutely necessary to raise and have in some way determined either or both of the said last-named questions, it was in accordance with the Constitution of the United States, and was required of the President thereby, that questions of so much gravity and importance, upon which the legislative and executive departments of the Government had disagreed, which involved powers considered by all branches of the Government, during its entire history down to the year 1867, to have been confided by the Constitution of the United States to the President, and to be necessary for the complete and proper execution of his constitutional duties, should be in some proper way submitted to that judicial department of the Government intrusted by the Constitution with the power, and subjected by it to the duty, not only of determining finally the construction and effect of all acts of Congress, but of comparing them with the Constitution of the United States and pronouncing them inoperative when found in conflict with that fundamental law which the people have enacted for the government of all their servants. And to these ends, first, that through the action of the Senate of the United States the absolute duty of the President to substitute some fit person in place of Mr. Stanton as one of his advisers, and as a principal subordinate officer whose official conduct he was responsible for and had lawful right to control, might, if possible, be accomplished without the necessity of raising any one of the questions aforesaid; and, second, if this duty could not be so performed, then that these questions, or such of them as might necessarily arise, should be judicially determined in manner aforesaid, and for no other end or purpose, this respondent, as President of the United States, on the 12th day of August, 1867, seven days after the reception of the letter of the said Stanton of the 5th of August, hereinbefore stated, did issue to the said Stanton the order following, namely:
EXECUTIVE MANSION,
Washington, August 12, 1867.
Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.
SIR: By virtue of the power and authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and laws of the United States, you are hereby suspended from office as Secretary of War, and will cease to exercise any and all functions pertaining to the same.
You will at once transfer to General Ulysses S. Grant, who has this day been authorized and empowered to act as Secretary of War ad interim, all records, books, papers, and other public property now in your custody and charge.
To which said order the said Stanton made the following reply:
WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington City, August 12, 1867.
The PRESIDENT.
SIR: Your note of this date has been received, informing me that by virtue of the powers vested in you as President by the Constitution and laws of the United States I am suspended from office as Secretary of War, and will cease to exercise any and all functions pertaining to the same; and also directing me at once to transfer to General Ulysses S. Grant, who has this day been authorized and empowered to act as Secretary of War ad interim, all records, books, papers, and other public property now in my custody and charge.
Under a sense of public duty, I am compelled to deny your right under the Constitution and laws of the United States, without the advice and consent of the Senate and without legal cause, to suspend me from office as Secretary of War, or the exercise of any or all functions pertaining to the same, or without such advice and consent to compel me to transfer to any person the records, books, papers, and public property in my custody as Secretary.
But inasmuch as the General Commanding the armies of the United States has been appointed ad interim, and has notified me that he has accepted the appointment, I have no alternative but to submit, under protest, to superior force.
And this respondent, further answering, says that it is provided in and by the second section of "An act regulating the tenure of certain civil offices" that the President may suspend an officer from the performance of the duties of the office held by him, for certain causes therein designated, until the next meeting of the Senate and until the case shall be acted on by the Senate; that this respondent, as President of the United States, was advised, and he verily believed, and still believes, that the executive power of removal from office confided to him by the Constitution as aforesaid includes the power of suspension from office at the pleasure of the President; and this respondent, by the order aforesaid, did suspend the said Stanton from office, not until the next meeting of the Senate or until the Senate should have acted upon the case, but, by force of the power and authority vested in him by the Constitution and laws of the United States, indefinitely and at the pleasure of the President; and the order, in form aforesaid, was made known to the Senate of the United States on the 12th day of December, A.D. 1867, as will be more fully hereinafter stated.
And this respondent, further answering, says that in and by the act of February 13, 1795, it was, among other things, provided and enacted that in case of vacancy in the office of Secretary for the Department of War it shall be lawful for the President, in case he shall think it necessary, to authorize any person to perform the duties of that office until a successor be appointed or such vacancy filled, but not exceeding the term of six months; and this respondent, being advised and believing that such law was in full force and not repealed, by an order dated August 12, 1867, did authorize and empower Ulysses S. Grant, General of the armies of the United States, to act as Secretary for the Department of War ad interim, in the form in which similar authority had theretofore been given, not until the next meeting of the Senate and until the Senate should act on the case, but at the pleasure of the President, subject only to the limitation of six months in the said last-mentioned act contained; and a copy of the last-named order was made known to the Senate of the United States on the 12th day of December, A.D. 1867, as will be hereinafter more fully stated; and in pursuance of the design and intention aforesaid, if it should become necessary, to submit the said questions to a judicial determination, this respondent, at or near the date of the last-mentioned order, did make known such his purpose to obtain a judicial decision of the said questions, or such of them as might be necessary.
And this respondent, further answering, says that in further pursuance of his intention and design, if possible, to perform what he judged to be his imperative duty, to prevent the said Stanton from longer holding the office of Secretary for the Department of War, and at the same time avoiding, if possible, any question respecting the extent of the power of removal from executive office confided to the President by the Constitution of the United States, and any question respecting the construction and effect of the first section of the said "Act regulating the tenure of certain civil offices," while he should not by any act of his abandon and relinquish either a power which he believed the Constitution had conferred on the President of the United States to enable him to perform the duties of his office or a power designedly left to him by the first section of the act of Congress last aforesaid, this respondent did, on the 12th day of December, 1867, transmit to the Senate of the United States a message, a copy whereof is hereunto annexed and marked B, wherein he made known the orders aforesaid and the reasons which had induced the same, so far as this respondent then considered it material and necessary that the same should be set forth, and reiterated his views concerning the constitutional power of removal vested in the President, and also expressed his views concerning the construction of the said first section of the last-mentioned act, as respected the power of the President to remove the said Stanton from the said office of Secretary for the Department of War, well hoping that this respondent could thus perform what he then believed, and still believes, to be his imperative duty in reference to the said Stanton without derogating from the powers which this respondent believed were confided to the President by the Constitution and laws, and without the necessity of raising judicially any questions respecting the same.
And this respondent, further answering, says that this hope not having been realized, the President was compelled either to allow the said Stanton to resume the said office and remain therein contrary to the settled convictions of the President, formed as aforesaid, respecting the powers confided to him and the duties required of him by the Constitution of the United States, and contrary to the opinion formed as aforesaid that the first section of the last-mentioned act did not affect the case of the said Stanton, and contrary to the fixed belief of the President that he could no longer advise with or trust or be responsible for the said Stanton in the said office of Secretary for the Department of War, or else he was compelled to take such steps as might in the judgment of the President be lawful and necessary to raise for a judicial decision the questions affecting the lawful right of the said Stanton to resume the said office or the power of the said Stanton to persist in refusing to quit the said office if he should persist in actually refusing to quit the same; and to this end, and to this end only, this respondent did, on the 21st day of February, 1868, issue the order for the removal of the said Stanton, in the said first article mentioned and set forth, and the order authorizing the said Lorenzo Thomas to act as Secretary of War ad interim, in the said second article set forth.
And this respondent, proceeding to answer specifically each substantial allegation in the said first article, says: He denies that the said Stanton, on the 21st day of February, 1868, was lawfully in possession of the said office of Secretary for the Department of War. He denies that the said Stanton, on the day last mentioned, was lawfully entitled to hold the said office against the will of the President of the United States. He denies that the said order for the removal of the said Stanton was unlawfully issued. He denies that the said order was issued with intent to violate the act entitled "An act regulating the tenure of certain civil offices." He denies that the said order was a violation of the last-mentioned act. He denies that the said order was a violation of the Constitution of the United States, or of any law thereof, or of his oath of office. He denies that the said order was issued with an intent to violate the Constitution of the United States, or any law thereof, or this respondent's oath of office; and he respectfully but earnestly insists that not only was it issued by him in the performance of what he believed to be an imperative official duty, but in the performance of what this honorable court will consider was, in point of fact, an imperative official duty. And he denies that any and all substantive matters in the said first article contained, in manner and form as the same are therein stated and set forth, do by law constitute a high misdemeanor in office within the true intent and meaning of the Constitution of the United States.
Answer to Article II.—And for answer to the second article this respondent says that he admits he did issue and deliver to said Lorenzo Thomas the said writing set forth in said second article, bearing date at Washington, D.C., February 21, 1868, addressed to Brevet Major-General Lorenzo Thomas, Adjutant-General United States Army, Washington, D.C., and he further admits that the same was so issued without the advice and consent of the Senate of the United States, then in session; but he denies that he thereby violated the Constitution of the United States or any law thereof, or that he did thereby intend to violate the Constitution of the United States or the provisions of any act of Congress; and this respondent refers to his answer to said first article for a full statement of the purposes and intentions with which said order was issued, and adopts the same as part of his answer to this article; and he further denies that there was then and there no vacancy in the said office of Secretary for the Department of War, or that he did then and there commit or was guilty of a high misdemeanor in office; and this respondent maintains and will insist—
1. That at the date and delivery of said writing there was a vacancy existing in the office of Secretary for the Department of War.
2. That notwithstanding the Senate of the United States was then in session, it was lawful and according to long and well-established usage to empower and authorize the said Thomas to act as Secretary of War ad interim.
3. That if the said act regulating the tenure of civil offices be held to be a valid law, no provision of the same was violated by the issuing of said order or by the designation of said Thomas to act as Secretary of War ad interim.
Answer to Article III.—And for answer to said third article this respondent says that he abides by his answer to said first and second articles in so far as the same are responsive to the allegations contained in the said third article, and, without here again repeating the same answer, prays the same be taken as an answer to this third article as fully as if here again set out at length; and as to the new allegation contained in said third article, that this respondent did appoint the said Thomas to be Secretary for the Department of War ad interim, this respondent denies that he gave any other authority to said Thomas than such as appears in said written authority, set out in said article, by which he authorized and empowered said Thomas to act as Secretary for the Department of War ad interim; and he denies that the same amounts to an appointment, and insists that it is only a designation of an officer of that Department to act temporarily as Secretary for the Department of War ad interim—until an appointment should be made. But whether the said written authority amounts to an appointment or to a temporary authority or designation, this respondent denies that in any sense he did thereby intend to violate the Constitution of the United States, or that he thereby intended to give the said order the character or effect of an appointment in the constitutional or legal sense of that term. He further denies that there was no vacancy in said office of Secretary for the Department of War existing at the date of said written authority.
Answer to Article IV.—And for answer to said fourth article this respondent denies that on the said 21st day of February, 1868, at Washington aforesaid, or at any other time or place, he did unlawfully conspire with the said Lorenzo Thomas, or with the said Thomas and any other person or persons, with intent, by intimidations and threats, unlawfully to hinder and prevent the said Stanton from holding said office of Secretary for the Department of War, in violation of the Constitution of the United States or of the provisions of the said act of Congress in said article mentioned, or that he did then and there commit or was guilty of a high crime in office. On the contrary thereof, protesting that the said Stanton was not then and there lawfully the Secretary for the Department of War, this respondent states that his sole purpose in authorizing the said Thomas to act as Secretary for the Department of War ad interim was, as is fully stated in his answer to the said first article, to bring the question of the right of the said Stanton to hold said office, notwithstanding his said suspension, and notwithstanding the said order of removal, and notwithstanding the said authority of the said Thomas to act as Secretary of War ad interim, to the test of a final decision by the Supreme Court of the United States in the earliest practicable mode by which the question could be brought before that tribunal.
This respondent did not conspire or agree with the said Thomas, or any other person or persons, to use intimidation or threats to hinder or prevent the said Stanton from holding the said office of Secretary for the Department of War, nor did this respondent at any time command or advise the said Thomas, or any other person or persons, to resort to or use either threats or intimidation for that purpose. The only means in the contemplation or purpose of respondent to be used are set forth fully in the said orders of February 21, the first addressed to Mr. Stanton and the second to the said Thomas. By the first order the respondent notified Mr. Stanton that he was removed from the said office and that his functions as Secretary for the Department of War were to terminate upon the receipt of that order; and he also thereby notified the said Stanton that the said Thomas had been authorized to act as Secretary for the Department of War ad interim, and ordered the said Stanton to transfer to him all the records, books, papers, and other public property in his custody and charge; and by the second order this respondent notified the said Thomas of the removal from office of the said Stanton, and authorized him to act as Secretary for the Department of War ad interim, and directed him to immediately enter upon the discharge of the duties pertaining to that office and to receive the transfer of all the records, books, papers, and other public property from Mr. Stanton then in his custody and charge.
Respondent gave no instructions to the said Thomas to use intimidation or threats to enforce obedience to these orders. He gave him no authority to call in the aid of the military or any other force to enable him to obtain possession of the office or of the books, papers, records, or property thereof. The only agency resorted to, or intended to be resorted to, was by means of the said Executive orders requiring obedience. But the Secretary for the Department of War refused to obey these orders, and still holds undisturbed possession and custody of that Department and of the records, books, papers, and other public property therein. Respondent further states that in execution of the orders so by this respondent given to the said Thomas he, the said Thomas, proceeded in a peaceful manner to demand of the said Stanton a surrender to him of the public property in the said Department, and to vacate the possession of the same, and to allow him, the said Thomas, peaceably to exercise the duties devolved upon him by authority of the President. That, as this respondent has been informed and believes, the said Stanton peremptorily refused obedience to the orders so issued. Upon such refusal no force or threat of force was used by the said Thomas, by authority of the President or otherwise, to enforce obedience, either then or at any subsequent time.
This respondent doth here except to the sufficiency of the allegations contained in said fourth article, and states for ground of exception that it is not stated that there was any agreement between this respondent and the said Thomas, or any other person or persons, to use intimidation and threats, nor is there any allegation as to the nature of said intimidation and threats, or that there was any agreement to carry them into execution, or that any step was taken or agreed to be taken to carry them into execution; and that the allegation in said article that the intent of said conspiracy was to use intimidation and threats is wholly insufficient, inasmuch as it is not alleged that the said intent formed the basis or became part of any agreement between the said alleged conspirators; and, furthermore, that there is no allegation of any conspiracy or agreement to use intimidation or threats.
Answer to Article V.—And for answer to the said fifth article this respondent denies that on the said 21st day of February, 1868, or at any other time or times in the same year before the said 2d day of March, 1868, or at any prior or subsequent time, at Washington aforesaid, or at any other place, this respondent did unlawfully conspire with the said Thomas, or with any other person or persons, to prevent or hinder the execution of the said act entitled "An act regulating the tenure of certain civil offices," or that, in pursuance of said alleged conspiracy, he did unlawfully attempt to prevent the said Edwin M. Stanton from holding the said office of Secretary for the Department of War, or that he did thereby commit, or that he was thereby guilty of, a high misdemeanor in office. Respondent, protesting that said Stanton was not then and there Secretary for the Department of War, begs leave to refer to his answer given to the fourth article and to his answer to the first article as to his intent and purpose in issuing the orders for the removal of Mr. Stanton and the authority given to the said Thomas, and prays equal benefit therefrom as if the same were here again repeated and fully set forth.
And this respondent excepts to the sufficiency of the said fifth article, and states his ground for such exception that it is not alleged by what means or by what agreement the said alleged conspiracy was formed or agreed to be carried out, or in what way the same was attempted to be carried out, or what were the acts done in pursuance thereof.
Answer to Article VI.—And for answer to the said sixth article this respondent denies that on the said 21st day of February, 1868, at Washington aforesaid, or at any other time or place, he did unlawfully conspire with the said Thomas by force to seize, take, or possess the property of the United States in the Department of War, contrary to the provisions of the said acts referred to in the said article, or either of them, or with intent to violate either of them. Respondent, protesting that said Stanton was not then and there Secretary for the Department of War, not only denies the said conspiracy as charged, but also denies any unlawful intent in reference to the custody and charge of the property of the United States in the said Department of War, and again refers to his former answers for a full statement of his intent and purpose in the premises.
Answer to Article VII.—And for answer to the said seventh article respondent denies that on the said 21st day of February, 1868, at Washington aforesaid, or at any other time and place, he did unlawfully conspire with the said Thomas with intent unlawfully to seize, take, or possess the property of the United States in the Department of War, with intent to violate or disregard the said act in the said seventh article referred to, or that he did then and there commit a high misdemeanor in office. Respondent, protesting that the said Stanton was not then and there Secretary for the Department of War, again refers to his former answers, in so far as they are applicable, to show the intent with which he proceeded in the premises, and prays equal benefit therefrom as if the same were here again fully repeated. Respondent further takes exception to the sufficiency of the allegations of this article as to the conspiracy alleged upon the same grounds as stated in the exception set forth in his answer to said article fourth.
Answer to Article VIII.—And for answer to the said eighth article this respondent denies that, on the 21st day of February, 1868, at Washington aforesaid, or at any other time and place, he did issue and deliver to the said Thomas the said letter of authority set forth in the said eighth article with the intent unlawfully to control the disbursements of the money appropriated for the military service and for the Department of War. This respondent, protesting that there was a vacancy in the office of Secretary of War, admits that he did issue the said letter of authority, and he denies that the same was with any unlawful intent whatever, either to violate the Constitution of the United States or any act of Congress. On the contrary, this respondent again affirms that his sole intent was to vindicate his authority as President of the United States, and by peaceful means to bring the question of the right of the said Stanton to continue to hold the said office of Secretary of War to a final decision before the Supreme Court of the United States, as has been hereinbefore set forth; and he prays the same benefit from his answer in the premises as if the same were here again repeated at length.
Answer to Article IX.—And for answer to the said ninth article the respondent states that on the said 22d day of February, 1868, the following note was addressed to the said Emory by the private secretary of the respondent:
EXECUTIVE MANSION,
WASHINGTON, D.C.,
February 22, 1868.
GENERAL: The President directs me to say that he will be pleased to have you call upon him as early as practicable.
Respectfully and truly yours,
WILLIAM G. MOORE,
United States Army.
General Emory called at the Executive Mansion according to this request. The object of respondent was to be advised by General Emory, as commander of the Department of Washington, what changes had been made in the military affairs of the department. Respondent had been informed that various changes had been made which in no wise had been brought to his notice or reported to him from the Department of War or from any other quarter, and desired to ascertain the facts. After the said Emory had explained in detail the changes which had taken place, said Emory called the attention of respondent to a general order which he referred to, and which this respondent then sent for, when it was produced. It is as follows:
GENERAL ORDERS, No, 17.
WAR DEPARTMENT,
ADJUTANT-GENERALS OFFICE,
Washington, March 14, 1867.
The following acts of Congress are published for the information and government of all concerned:
* * * * * * *
"II.—PUBLIC—No. 85.
"An act making appropriations for the support of the Army for the year ending June 30, 1868, and for other purposes.
* * * * * * *
"SEC. 2. And be it further enacted, That the headquarters of the General of the Army of the United States shall be at the city of Washington, and all orders and instructions relating to military operations issued by the President or Secretary of War shall be issued through the General of the Army, and in case of his inability through the next in rank. The General of the Army shall not be removed, suspended, or relieved from command, or assigned to duty elsewhere than at said headquarters, except at his own request, without the previous approval of the Senate; and any orders or instructions relating to military operations issued contrary to the requirements of this section shall be null and void; and any officer who shall issue orders or instructions contrary to the provisions of this section shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor in office; and any officer of the Army who shall transmit, convey, or obey any orders or instructions so issued contrary to the provisions of this section, knowing that such orders were so issued, shall be liable to imprisonment for not less than two nor more than twenty years upon conviction thereof in any court of competent jurisdiction.
* * * * * * *
"Approved, March 2, 1867."
* * * * * * *
By order of the Secretary of War:
E.D. TOWNSEND,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
Official:
———— ————,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
General Emory not only called the attention of respondent to this order, but to the fact that it was in conformity with a section contained in an appropriation act passed by Congress. Respondent, after reading the order, observed:
This is not in accordance with the Constitution of the United States, which makes me Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, or of the language of the commission which you hold.
General Emory then stated that this order had met the respondent's approval. Respondent then said in reply, in substance:
Am I to understand that the President of the United States can not give an order but through the General in Chief, or General Grant?
General Emory again reiterated the statement that it had met respondent's approval, and that it was the opinion of some of the leading lawyers of the country that this order was constitutional. With some further conversation, respondent then inquired the names of the lawyers who had given the opinion, and he mentioned the names of two. Respondent then said that the object of the law was very evident, referring to the clause in the appropriation act upon which the order purported to be based. This, according to respondent's recollection, was the substance of the conversation had with General Emory.
Respondent denies that any allegations in the said article of any instructions or declarations given to the said Emory then or at any other time contrary to or in addition to what is hereinbefore set forth are true. Respondent denies that in said conversation with said Emory he had any other intent than to express the opinion then given to the said Emory, nor did he then or at any time request or order the said Emory to disobey any law or any order issued in conformity with any law, or intend to offer any inducement to the said Emory to violate any law. What this respondent then said to General Emory was simply the expression of an opinion which he then fully believed to be sound, and which he yet believes to be so, and that is that by the express provisions of the Constitution this respondent, as President, is made the Commander in Chief of the armies of the United States, and as such he is to be respected, and that his orders, whether issued through the War Department, or through the General in Chief, or by any other channel of communication, are entitled to respect and obedience, and that such constitutional power can not be taken from him by virtue of any act of Congress. Respondent doth therefore deny that by the expression of such opinion he did commit or was guilty of a high misdemeanor in office; and the respondent doth further say that the said Article IX lays no foundation whatever for the conclusion stated in the said article, that the respondent, by reason of the allegations therein contained, was guilty of a high misdemeanor in office.
In reference to the statement made by General Emory that this respondent had approved of said act of Congress containing the section referred to, the respondent admits that his formal approval was given to said act, but accompanied the same by the following message, addressed and sent with the act to the House of Representatives, in which House the said act originated, and from which it came to respondent:
WASHINGTON, D.C., March 2, 1867.
To the House of Representatives:
The act entitled "An act making appropriations for the support of the Army for the year ending June 30, 1868, and for other purposes," contains provisions to which I must call attention. These provisions are contained in the second section, which in certain cases virtually deprives the President of his constitutional functions as Commander in Chief of the Army, and in the sixth section, which denies to ten States of the Union their constitutional right to protect themselves in any emergency by means of their own militia. These provisions are out of place in an appropriation act, but I am compelled to defeat these necessary appropriations if I withhold my signature from the act. Pressed by these considerations, I feel constrained to return the bill with my signature, but to accompany it with my earnest protest against the sections which I have indicated.
Respondent, therefore, did no more than to express to said Emory the same opinion which he had so expressed to the House of Representatives.
Answer to Article X.—And in answer to the tenth article and specifications thereof the respondent says that on the 14th and 15th days of August, in the year 1866, a political convention of delegates from all or most of the States and Territories of the Union was held in the city of Philadelphia, under the name and style of the National Union Convention, for the purpose of maintaining and advancing certain political views and opinions before the people of the United States, and for their support and adoption in the exercise of the constitutional suffrage in the elections of Representatives and Delegates in Congress which were soon to occur in many of the States and Territories of the Union; which said convention, in the course of its proceedings, and in furtherance of the objects of the same, adopted a "Declaration of principles" and "An address to the people of the United States," and appointed a committee of two of its members from each State and of one from each Territory and one from the District of Columbia to wait upon the President of the United States and present to him a copy of the proceedings of the convention; that on the 18th day of said month of August this committee waited upon the President of the United States at the Executive Mansion, and was received by him in one of the rooms thereof, and by their chairman, Hon. Reverdy Johnson, then and now a Senator of the United States, acting and speaking in their behalf, presented a copy of the proceedings of the convention and addressed the President of the United States in a speech of which a copy (according to a published report of the same, and, as the respondent believes, substantially a correct report) is hereto annexed as a part of this answer, and marked Exhibit C.
That thereupon, and in reply to the address of said committee by their chairman, this respondent addressed the said committee so waiting upon him in one of the rooms of the Executive Mansion; and this respondent believes that this his address to said committee is the occasion referred to in the first specification of the tenth article; but this respondent does not admit that the passages therein set forth, as if extracts from a speech or address of this respondent upon said occasion, correctly or justly present his speech or address upon said occasion, but, on the contrary, this respondent demands and insists that if this honorable court shall deem the said article and the said first specification thereof to contain allegation of matter cognizable by this honorable court as a high misdemeanor in office within the intent and meaning of the Constitution of the United States, and shall receive or allow proof in support of the same, that proof shall be required to be made of the actual speech and address of this respondent on said occasion, which this respondent denies that said article and specification contain or correctly or justly represent.
And this respondent, further answering the tenth article and the specifications thereof, says that at Cleveland, in the State of Ohio, and on the 3d day of September, in the year 1866, he was attended by a large assemblage of his fellow-citizens, and in deference and obedience to their call and demand he addressed them upon matters of public and political consideration; and this respondent believes that said occasion and address are referred to in the second specification of the tenth article; but this respondent does not admit that the passages therein set forth, as if extracts from a speech of this respondent on said occasion, correctly or justly present his speech or address upon said occasion, but, on the contrary, this respondent demands and insists that if this honorable court shall deem the said article and the said second specification thereof to contain allegation of matter cognizable by this honorable court as a high misdemeanor in office within the intent and meaning of the Constitution of the United States, and shall receive or allow proof in support of the same, that proof shall be required to be made of the actual speech and address of this respondent on said occasion, which this respondent denies that said article and specification contain or correctly or justly represent.
And this respondent, further answering the tenth article and the specifications thereof, says that at St. Louis, in the State of Missouri, and on the 8th day of September, in the year 1866, he was attended by a numerous assemblage of his fellow-citizens, and in deference and obedience to their call and demand he addressed them upon matters of public and political consideration; and this respondent believes that said occasion and address are referred to in the third specification of the tenth article; but this respondent does not admit that the passages therein set forth, as if extracts from a speech of this respondent on said occasion, correctly or justly present his speech or address upon said occasion, but, on the contrary, this respondent demands and insists that if this honorable court shall deem the said article and the said third specification thereof to contain allegation of matter cognizable by this honorable court as a high misdemeanor in office within the intent and meaning of the Constitution of the United States, and shall receive or allow proof in support of the same, that proof shall be required to be made of the actual speech and address of this respondent on said occasion, which this respondent denies that the said article and specification contain or correctly or justly represent. |
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