In submitting this request (with which I complied on the 29th instant[51]) you take occasion to allude to recent publications in reference to the circumstances connected with the vacation by yourself of the office of Secretary of War ad interim, and with the view of correcting statements which you term "gross misrepresentations" give at length your own recollection of the facts under which, without the sanction of the President, from whom you had received and accepted the appointment, you yielded the Department of War to the present incumbent.

As stated in your communication, some time after you had assumed the duties of Secretary of War ad interim we interchanged views respecting the course that should be pursued in the event of nonconcurrence by the Senate in the suspension from office of Mr. Stanton. I sought that interview, calling myself at the War Department. My sole object in then bringing the subject to your attention was to ascertain definitely what would be your own action should such an attempt be made for his restoration to the War Department. That object was accomplished, for the interview terminated with the distinct understanding that if upon reflection you should prefer not to become a party to the controversy or should conclude that it would be your duty to surrender the Department to Mr. Stanton upon action in his favor by the Senate you were to return the office to me prior to a decision by the Senate, in order that if I desired to do so I might designate someone to succeed you. It must have been apparent to you that had not this understanding been reached it was my purpose to relieve you from the further discharge of the duties of Secretary of War ad interim and to appoint some other person in that capacity.

Other conversations upon this subject ensued, all of them having on my part the same object and leading to the same conclusion as the first. It is not necessary, however, to refer to any of them excepting that of Saturday, the 11th instant, mentioned in your communication. As it was then known that the Senate had proceeded to consider the case of Mr. Stanton, I was anxious to learn your determination. After a protracted interview, during which the provisions of the tenure-of-office bill were freely discussed, you said that, as had been agreed upon in our first conference, you would either return the office to my possession in time to enable me to appoint a successor before final action by the Senate upon Mr. Stanton's suspension, or would remain as its head, awaiting a decision of the question by judicial proceedings. It was then understood that there would be a further conference on Monday, by which time I supposed you would be prepared to inform me of your final decision. You failed, however, to fulfill the engagement, and on Tuesday notified me in writing of the receipt by you of official notification of the action of the Senate in the case of Mr. Stanton, and at the same time informed me that according to the act regulating the tenure of certain civil offices your functions as Secretary of War ad interim ceased from the moment of the receipt of the notice. You thus, in disregard of the understanding between us, vacated the office without having given me notice of your intention to do so. It is but just, however, to say that in your communication you claim that you did inform me of your purpose, and thus "fulfilled the promise made in our last preceding conversation on this subject." The fact that such a promise existed is evidence of an arrangement of the kind I have mentioned. You had found in our first conference "that the President was desirous of keeping Mr. Stanton out of office whether sustained in the suspension or not." You knew what reasons had induced the President to ask from you a promise; you also knew that in case your views of duty did not accord with his own convictions it was his purpose to fill your place by another appointment. Even ignoring the existence of a positive understanding between us, these conclusions were plainly deducible from our various conversations. It is certain, however, that even under these circumstances you did not offer to return the place to my possession, but, according to your own statement, placed yourself in a position where, could I have anticipated your action, I would have been compelled to ask of you, as I was compelled to ask of your predecessor in the War Department, a letter of resignation, or else to resort to the more disagreeable expedient of suspending you by a successor.

As stated in your letter, the nomination of Governor Cox, of Ohio, for the office of Secretary of War was suggested to me. His appointment as Mr. Stanton's successor was urged in your name, and it was said that his selection would save further embarrassment. I did not think that in the selection of a Cabinet officer I should be trammeled by such considerations. I was prepared to take the responsibility of deciding the question in accordance with my ideas of constitutional duty, and, having determined upon a course which I deemed right and proper, was anxious to learn the steps you would take should the possession of the War Department be demanded by Mr. Stanton. Had your action been in conformity to the understanding between us, I do not believe that the embarrassment would have attained its present proportions or that the probability of its repetition would have been so great.

I know that, with a view to an early termination of a state of affairs so detrimental to the public interests, you voluntarily offered, both on Wednesday, the 15th instant, and on the succeeding Sunday, to call upon Mr. Stanton and urge upon him that the good of the service required his resignation. I confess that I considered your proposal as a sort of reparation for the failure on your part to act in accordance with an understanding more than once repeated, which I thought had received your full assent, and under which you could have returned to me the office which I had conferred upon you, thus saving yourself from embarrassment and leaving the responsibility where it properly belonged—with the President, who is accountable for the faithful execution of the laws.

I have not yet been informed by you whether, as twice proposed by yourself, you have called upon Mr. Stanton and made an effort to induce him voluntarily to retire from the War Department.

You conclude your communication with a reference to our conversation at the meeting of the Cabinet held on Tuesday, the 14th instant. In your account of what then occurred you say that after the President had given his version of our previous conversations you stated them substantially as given in your letter; that you in no wise admitted the correctness of his statement of them, "though, to soften the evident contradiction my statement gave, I said (alluding to our first conversation on the subject) the President might have understood me the way he said, namely, that I had promised to resign if I did not resist the reinstatement. I made no such promise."

My recollection of what then transpired is diametrically the reverse of your narration. In the presence of the Cabinet I asked you—

First. If, in a conversation which took place shortly after your appointment as Secretary of War ad interim, you did not agree either to remain at the head of the War Department and abide any judicial proceedings that might follow nonconcurrence by the Senate in Mr. Stanton's suspension, or, should you wish not to become involved in such a controversy, to put me in the same position with respect to the office as I occupied previous to your appointment, by returning it to me in time to anticipate such action by the Senate. This you admitted.

Second. I then asked you if, at our conference on the preceding Saturday, I had not, to avoid misunderstanding, requested you to state what you intended to do, and, further, if in reply to that inquiry you had not referred to our former conversations, saying that from them I understood your position, and that your action would be consistent with the understanding which had been reached. To these questions you also replied in the affirmative.

Third. I next asked if at the conclusion of our interview on Saturday it was not understood that we were to have another conference on Monday before final action by the Senate in the case of Mr. Stanton. You replied that such was the understanding, but that you did not suppose the Senate would act so soon; that on Monday you had been engaged in a conference with General Sherman and were occupied with "many little matters," and asked if General Sherman had not called on that day. What relevancy General Sherman's visit to me on Monday had with the purpose for which you were then to have called I am at a loss to perceive, as he certainly did not inform me whether you had determined to retain possession of the office or to afford me an opportunity to appoint a successor in advance of any attempted reinstatement of Mr. Stanton.

This account of what passed between us at the Cabinet meeting on the 14th instant widely differs from that contained in your communication, for it shows that instead of having "stated our conversations as given in the letter" which has made this reply necessary you admitted that my recital of them was entirely accurate. Sincerely anxious, however, to be correct in my statements, I have to-day read this narration of what occurred on the 14th instant to the members of the Cabinet who were then present. They, without exception, agree in its accuracy.

It is only necessary to add that on Wednesday morning, the 15th instant, you called on me, in company with Lieutenant-General Sherman. After some preliminary conversation, you remarked that an article in the National Intelligencer of that date did you much injustice. I replied that I had not read the Intelligencer of that morning. You then first told me that it was your intention to urge Mr. Stanton to resign his office.

After you had withdrawn I carefully read the article of which you had spoken, and found that its statements of the understanding between us were substantially correct. On the 17th I caused it to be read to four of the five members of the Cabinet who were present at our conference on the 14th, and they concurred in the general accuracy of its statements respecting our conversation upon that occasion.

In reply to your communication, I have deemed it proper, in order to prevent further misunderstanding, to make this simple recital of facts.

Very respectfully, yours,

ANDREW JOHNSON.

[Footnote 49: See p. 613.]

[Footnote 50: See pp. 613-615.]

[Footnote 51: See p. 615.]



General Grant to the President.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES,

Washington, D.C., February 3, 1868.

His Excellency A. JOHNSON,

President of the United States.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 31st ultimo,[52] in answer to mine of the 28th ultimo[53]. After a careful reading and comparison of it with the article in the National Intelligencer of the 15th ultimo and the article over the initials J.B.S. in the New York World of the 27th ultimo, purporting to be based upon your statement and that of the members of your Cabinet therein named, I find it to be but a reiteration, only somewhat more in detail, of the "many and gross misrepresentations" contained in these articles, and which my statement of the facts set forth in my letter of the 28th ultimo[53] was intended to correct; and I here reassert the correctness of my statements in that letter, anything in yours in reply to it to the contrary notwithstanding.

I confess my surprise that the Cabinet officers referred to should so greatly misapprehend the facts in the matter of admissions alleged to have been made by me at the Cabinet meeting of the 14th ultimo as to suffer their names to be made the basis of the charges in the newspaper article referred to, or agree in the accuracy, as you affirm they do, of your account of what occurred at that meeting.

You know that we parted on Saturday, the 11th ultimo, without any promise on my part, either express or implied, to the effect that I would hold on to the office of Secretary of War ad interim against the action of the Senate, or, declining to do so myself, would surrender it to you before such action was had, or that I would see you again at any fixed time on the subject.

The performance of the promises alleged by you to have been made by me would have involved a resistance to law and an inconsistency with the whole history of my connection with the suspension of Mr. Stanton.

From our conversations and my written protest of August 1, 1867, against the removal of Mr. Stanton, you must have known that my greatest objection to his removal or suspension was the fear that someone would be appointed in his stead who would, by opposition to the laws relating to the restoration of the Southern States to their proper relations to the Government, embarrass the Army in the performance of duties especially imposed upon it by these laws; and it was to prevent such an appointment that I accepted the office of Secretary of War ad interim, and not for the purpose of enabling you to get rid of Mr. Stanton by my withholding it from him in opposition to law, or, not doing so myself, surrendering it to one who would, as the statement and assumptions in your communication plainly indicate was sought. And it was to avoid this same danger, as well as to relieve you from the personal embarrassment in which Mr. Stanton's reinstatement would place you, that I urged the appointment of Governor Cox, believing that it would be agreeable to you and also to Mr. Stanton, satisfied as I was that it was the good of the country, and not the office, the latter desired.

On the 15th ultimo, in presence of General Sherman, I stated to you that I thought Mr. Stanton would resign, but did not say that I would advise him to do so. On the 18th I did agree with General Sherman to go and advise him to that course, and on the 19th I had an interview alone with Mr. Stanton, which led me to the conclusion that any advice to him of the kind would be useless, and I so informed General Sherman.

Before I consented to advise Mr. Stanton to resign, I understood from him, in a conversation on the subject immediately after his reinstatement, that it was his opinion that the act of Congress entitled "An act temporarily to supply vacancies in the Executive Departments in certain cases," approved February 20, 1863, was repealed by subsequent legislation, which materially influenced my action. Previous to this time I had had no doubt that the law of 1863 was still in force, and, notwithstanding my action, a fuller examination of the law leaves a question in my mind whether it is or is not repealed. This being the case, I could not now advise his resignation, lest the same danger I apprehended on his first removal might follow.

The course you would have it understood I agreed to pursue was in violation of law and without orders from you, while the course I did pursue, and which I never doubted you fully understood, was in accordance with law and not in disobedience of any orders of my superior.

And now, Mr. President, when my honor as a soldier and integrity as a man have been so violently assailed, pardon me for saying that I can but regard this whole matter, from the beginning to the end, as an attempt to involve me in the resistance of law, for which you hesitated to assume the responsibility in orders, and thus to destroy my character before the country. I am in a measure confirmed in this conclusion by your recent orders directing me to disobey orders from the Secretary of War, my superior and your subordinate, without having countermanded his authority to issue the orders I am to disobey.

With the assurance, Mr. President, that nothing less than a vindication of my personal honor and character could have induced this correspondence on my part,

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

U.S. GRANT, General.

Respectfully forwarded to the Secretary of War for his information, and to be made a part of correspondence previously furnished on same subject.

U.S. GRANT, General.

[Footnote 52: See pp. 615-618.]

[Footnote 53: See pp. 613-615.]



WASHINGTON, February 17, 1868.

To the House of Representatives of the United States:

In reply to the resolution adopted by the House of Representatives on the 19th of December last, calling for correspondence and information in relation to Russian America, I transmit reports and accompanying documents from the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury, respectively.

ANDREW JOHNSON.



WASHINGTON, February 18, 1868.

To the House of Representatives of the United States:

In answer to a resolution of the House of Representatives of the 17th of January last, calling for information in regard to the execution of the treaty of 1858 with China, for the settlement of claims, I transmit a report of the Secretary of State and the papers which accompany it.

ANDREW JOHNSON.



WASHINGTON, D.C., February 19, 1868.

To the House of Representatives:

I transmit herewith a report from the Attorney-General, prepared in compliance with the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 26th November, 1867, requesting a list of all pardons "granted since the 14th day of April, 1865, to any person or persons charged with or convicted of making or passing counterfeit money, or having counterfeit money or tools or instruments for making the same in his or their possession, or charged with or convicted of the crime of forgery or criminal alteration of papers, accounts, or other documents, or of the crime of perjury, and that such list be accompanied by a particular statement in each case of the reasons or grounds of the pardon, with a disclosure of the names of persons, if any, who recommended or advised the same."

ANDREW JOHNSON.



WASHINGTON, D.C., February 19, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit herewith a report from the Attorney-General, prepared in compliance with a resolution adopted by the Senate on the 2d day of December last, requesting "a full list of the names of all persons pardoned by the President since May 1, 1865, who have been convicted of counterfeiting United States bonds, greenbacks, national-bank currency, fractional currency, or the coin of the United States, with the date of issuing each pardon, reasons for issuing it, and by whom recommended."

ANDREW JOHNSON.



WASHINGTON, February 20, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

In answer to a resolution of the Senate of the 18th of December last, requesting information in regard to the island of San Juan, on Puget Sound, I transmit a report from the Secretary of State and the papers which accompanied it.

ANDREW JOHNSON.



WASHINGTON, February 20, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

With reference to the convention between Denmark and the United States concluded on the 24th of October last, I transmit to the Senate a copy in translation of a note of the 19th instant addressed to the Secretary of State by His Danish Majesty's charge d'affaires, announcing the ratification of the convention by the Government of Denmark and stating his readiness to proceed with the customary exchange of ratifications.

ANDREW JOHNSON.



WASHINGTON, February 21, 1868.

To the House of Representatives of the United States:

I transmit herewith a communication from the Chief of the Engineer Corps of the Army, accompanied by a report, in reference to ship canals around the Falls of the Ohio River, called for by the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 18th instant.

ANDREW JOHNSON.



WASHINGTON, D.C., February 21, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

On the 12th day of August, 1867, by virtue of the power and authority vested in the President by the Constitution and laws of the United States, I suspended Edwin M. Stanton from the office of Secretary of War.

In further exercise of the power and authority so vested in the President, I have this day removed Mr. Stanton from office and designated the Adjutant-General of the Army to act as Secretary of War ad interim.

Copies of the communications upon this subject addressed to Mr. Stanton and the Adjutant-General are herewith transmitted for the information of the Senate.

ANDREW JOHNSON.



WASHINGTON, D.C., February 22, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

I have received a copy of the resolution adopted by the Senate on the 21st instant, as follows:

Whereas the Senate have received and considered the communication of the President stating that he had removed Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War, and had designated the Adjutant-General of the Army to act as Secretary of War ad interim: Therefore,

Resolved by the Senate of the United States, That under the Constitution and laws of the United States the President has no power to remove the Secretary of War and designate any other officer to perform the duties of that office ad interim.

This resolution is confined to the power of the President to remove the Secretary of War and to designate another officer to perform the duties of the office ad interim, and by its preamble is made expressly applicable to the removal of Mr. Stanton and the designation to act ad interim of the Adjutant-General of the Army. Without, therefore, attempting to discuss the general power of removal as to all officers, upon which subject no expression of opinion is contained in the resolution, I shall confine myself to the question as thus limited—the power to remove the Secretary of War.

It is declared in the resolution—

That under the Constitution and laws of the United States the President has no power to remove the Secretary of War and designate any other officer to perform the duties of that office ad interim.

As to the question of power under the Constitution, I do not propose at present to enter upon its discussion.

The uniform practice from the beginning of the Government, as established by every President who has exercised the office, and the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States have settled the question in favor of the power of the President to remove all officers excepting a class holding appointments of a judicial character. No practice nor any decision has ever excepted a Secretary of War from this general power of the President to make removals from office.

It is only necessary, then, that I should refer to the power of the Executive, under the laws of the United States, to remove from office a Secretary of War. The resolution denies that under these laws this power has any existence. In other words, it affirms that no such authority is recognized or given by the statutes of the country.

What, then, are the laws of the United States which deny the President the power to remove that officer? I know but two laws which bear upon this question. The first in order of time is the act of August 7, 1789, creating the Department of War, which, after providing for a Secretary as its principal officer, proceeds as follows:

SEC. 2. And be it further enacted, That there shall be in the said Department an inferior officer, to be appointed by the said principal officer, to be employed therein as he shall deem proper, and to be called the chief clerk in the Department of War, and who, whenever the said principal officer shall be removed from office by the President of the United States, or in any other case of vacancy, shall during such vacancy have the charge and custody of all records, books, and papers appertaining to the said Department.

It is clear that this act, passed by a Congress many of whose members participated in the formation of the Constitution, so far from denying the power of the President to remove the Secretary of War, recognizes it as existing in the Executive alone, without the concurrence of the Senate or of any other department of the Government. Furthermore, this act does not purport to confer the power by legislative authority, nor in fact was there any other existing legislation through which it was bestowed upon the Executive. The recognition of the power by this act is therefore complete as a recognition under the Constitution itself, for there was no other source or authority from which it could be derived.

The other act which refers to this question is that regulating the tenure of certain civil offices, passed by Congress on the 2d day of March, 1867. The first section of that act is in the following words:

That every person holding any civil office to which he has been appointed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and every person who shall hereafter be appointed to any such office, and shall become duly qualified to act therein, is and shall be entitled to hold such office until a successor shall have been in like manner appointed and duly qualified, except as herein otherwise provided: Provided, That the Secretaries of State, of the Treasury, of War, of the Navy, and of the Interior, the Postmaster-General, and the Attorney-General shall hold their offices, respectively, for and during the term of the President by whom they may have been appointed and for one month thereafter, subject to removal by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

The fourth section of the same act restricts the term of offices to the limit prescribed by the law creating them.

That part of the first section which precedes the proviso declares that every person holding a civil office to which he has been or may be appointed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate shall hold such office until a successor shall have been in like manner appointed. It purports to take from the Executive, during the fixed time established for the tenure of the office, the independent power of removal, and to require for such removal the concurrent action of the President and the Senate.

The proviso that follows proceeds to fix the term of office of the seven heads of Departments, whose tenure never had been defined before, by prescribing that they "shall hold their offices, respectively, for and during the term of the President by whom they may have been appointed and for one month thereafter, subject to removal by and with the advice and consent of the Senate."

Thus, as to these enumerated officers, the proviso takes from the President the power of removal except with the advice and consent of the Senate. By its terms, however, before he can be deprived of the power to displace them it must appear that he himself has appointed them. It is only in that case that they have any tenure of office or any independent right to hold during the term of the President and for one month after the cessation of his official functions. The proviso, therefore, gives no tenure of office to any one of these officers who has been appointed by a former President beyond one month after the accession of his successor.

In the case of Mr. Stanton, the only appointment under which he held the office of Secretary of War was that conferred upon him by my immediate predecessor, with the advice and consent of the Senate. He has never held from me any appointment as the head of the War Department. Whatever right he had to hold the office was derived from that original appointment and my own sufferance. The law was not intended to protect such an incumbent of the War Department by taking from the President the power to remove him. This, in my judgment, is perfectly clear, and the law itself admits of no other just construction. We find in all that portion of the first section which precedes the proviso that as to civil officers generally the President is deprived of the power of removal, and it is plain that if there had been no proviso that power would just as clearly have been taken from him so far as it applies to the seven heads of Departments. But for reasons which were no doubt satisfactory to Congress these principal officers were specially provided for, and as to them the express and only requirement is that the President who has appointed them shall not without the advice and consent of the Senate remove them from office. The consequence is that as to my Cabinet, embracing the seven officers designated in the first section, the act takes from me the power, without the concurrence of the Senate, to remove any one of them that I have appointed, but it does not protect such of them as I did not appoint, nor give to them any tenure of office beyond my pleasure.

An examination of this act, then, shows that while in one part of the section provision is made for officers generally, in another clause there is a class of officers, designated by their official titles, who are excepted from the general terms of the law, and in reference to whom a clear distinction is made as to the general power of removal limited in the first clause of the section.

This distinction is that as to such of these enumerated officers as hold under the appointment of the President the power of removal can only be exercised by him with the consent of the Senate, while as to those who have not been appointed by him there is no like denial of his power to displace them. It would be a violation of the plain meaning of this enactment to place Mr. Stanton upon the same footing as those heads of Departments who have been appointed by myself. As to him, this law gives him no tenure of office. The members of my Cabinet who have been appointed by me are by this act entitled to hold for one month after the term of my office shall cease; but Mr. Stanton could not, against the wishes of my successor, hold a moment thereafter. If he were permitted by that successor to hold for the first two weeks, would that successor have no power to remove him? But the power of my successor over him could be no greater than my own. If my successor would have the power to remove Mr. Stanton after permitting him to remain a period of two weeks, because he was not appointed by him, but by his predecessor, I, who have tolerated Mr. Stanton for more than two years, certainly have the same right to remove him, and upon the same ground, namely, that he was not appointed by me, but by my predecessor.

Under this construction of the tenure-of-office act, I have never doubted my power to remove Mr. Stanton.

Whether the act were constitutional or not, it was always my opinion that it did not secure him from removal. I was, however, aware that there were doubts as to the construction of the law, and from the first I deemed it desirable that at the earliest possible moment those doubts should be settled and the true construction of the act fixed by decision of the Supreme Court of the United States. My order of suspension in August last was intended to place the case in such a position as would make a resort to a judicial decision both necessary and proper. My understanding and wishes, however, under that order of suspension were frustrated, and the late order for Mr. Stanton's removal was a further step toward the accomplishment of that purpose.

I repeat that my own convictions as to the true construction of the law and as to its constitutionality were well settled and were sustained by every member of my Cabinet, including Mr. Stanton himself. Upon the question of constitutionality, each one in turn deliberately advised me that the tenure-of-office act was unconstitutional. Upon the question whether, as to those members who were appointed by my predecessor, that act took from me the power to remove them, one of those members emphatically stated in the presence of the others sitting in Cabinet that they did not come within the provisions of the act, and it was no protection to them. No one dissented from this construction, and I understood them all to acquiesce in its correctness. In a matter of such grave consequence I was not disposed to rest upon my own opinions, though fortified by my constitutional advisers. I have therefore sought to bring the question at as early a day as possible before the Supreme Court of the United States for final and authoritative decision.

In respect to so much of the resolution as relates to the designation of an officer to act as Secretary of War ad interim, I have only to say that I have exercised this power under the provisions of the first section of the act of February 13, 1795, which, so far as they are applicable to vacancies caused by removals, I understand to be still in force.

The legislation upon the subject of ad interim appointments in the Executive Departments stands, as to the War Office, as follows:

The second section of the act of the 7th of August, 1789, makes provision for a vacancy in the very case of a removal of the head of the War Department, and upon such a vacancy gives the charge and custody of the records, books, and papers to the chief clerk. Next, by the act of the 8th of May, 1792, section 8, it is provided that in case of a vacancy occasioned by death, absence from the seat of Government, or sickness of the head of the War Department the President may authorize a person to perform the duties of the office until a successor is appointed or the disability removed. The act, it will be observed, does not provide for the case of a vacancy caused by removal. Then, by the first section of the act of February 13, 1795, it is provided that in case of any vacancy the President may appoint a person to perform the duties while the vacancy exists.

These acts are followed by that of the 20th of February, 1863, by the first section of which provision is again made for a vacancy caused by death, resignation, absence from the seat of Government, or sickness of the head of any Executive Department of the Government, and upon the occurrence of such a vacancy power is given to the President—

to authorize the head of any other Executive Department, or other officer in either of said Departments whose appointment is vested in the President, at his discretion, to perform the duties of the said respective offices until a successor be appointed or until such absence or inability by sickness shall cease: Provided, That no one vacancy shall be supplied in manner aforesaid for a longer term than six months.

This law, with some modifications, reenacts the act of 1792, and provides, as did that act, for the sort of vacancies so to be filled; but, like the act of 1792, it makes no provision for a vacancy occasioned by removal. It has reference altogether to vacancies arising from other causes.

According to my construction of the act of 1863, while it impliedly repeals the act of 1792 regulating the vacancies therein described, it has no bearing whatever upon so much of the act of 1795 as applies to a vacancy caused by removal. The act of 1795 therefore furnishes the rule for a vacancy occasioned by removal—one of the vacancies expressly referred to in the act of the 7th of August, 1789, creating the Department of War. Certainly there is no express repeal by the act of 1863 of the act of 1795. The repeal, if there is any, is by implication, and can only be admitted so far as there is a clear inconsistency between the two acts. The act of 1795 is inconsistent with that of 1863 as to a vacancy occasioned by death, resignation, absence, or sickness, but not at all inconsistent as to a vacancy caused by removal.

It is assuredly proper that the President should have the same power to fill temporarily a vacancy occasioned by removal as he has to supply a place made vacant by death or the expiration of a term. If, for instance, the incumbent of an office should be found to be wholly unfit to exercise its functions, and the public service should require his immediate expulsion, a remedy should exist and be at once applied, and time be allowed the President to select and appoint a successor, as is permitted him in case of a vacancy caused by death or the termination of an official term.

The necessity, therefore, for an ad interim appointment is just as great, and, indeed, may be greater in cases of removal than in any others. Before it be held, therefore, that the power given by the act of 1795 in cases of removal is abrogated by succeeding legislation an express repeal ought to appear. So wholesome a power should certainly not be taken away by loose implication.

It may be, however, that in this, as in other cases of implied repeal, doubts may arise. It is confessedly one of the most subtle and debatable questions which arise in the construction of statutes. If upon such a question I have fallen into an erroneous construction, I submit whether it should be characterized as a violation of official duty and of law.

I have deemed it proper, in vindication of the course which I have considered it my duty to take, to place before the Senate the reasons upon which I have based my action. Although I have been advised by every member of my Cabinet that the entire tenure-of-office act is unconstitutional, and therefore void, and although I have expressly concurred in that opinion in the veto message which I had the honor to submit to Congress when I returned the bill for reconsideration, I have refrained from making a removal of any officer contrary to the provisions of the law, and have only exercised that power in the case of Mr. Stanton, which, in my judgment, did not come within its provisions. I have endeavored to proceed with the greatest circumspection, and have acted only in an extreme and exceptional case, carefully following the course which I have marked out for myself as a general rule, faithfully to execute all laws, though passed over my objections on the score of constitutionality. In the present instance I have appealed, or sought to appeal, to that final arbiter fixed by the Constitution for the determination of all such questions. To this course I have been impelled by the solemn obligations which rest upon me to sustain inviolate the powers of the high office committed to my hands.

Whatever may be the consequences merely personal to myself, I could not allow them to prevail against a public duty so clear to my own mind, and so imperative. If what was possible had been certain, if I had been fully advised when I removed Mr. Stanton that in thus defending the trust committed to my hands my own removal was sure to follow, I could not have hesitated. Actuated by public considerations of the highest character, I earnestly protest against the resolution of the Senate which charges me in what I have done with a violation of the Constitution and laws of the United States.

ANDREW JOHNSON.



WASHINGTON, February 25, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

In further answer of the resolution of the Senate of the 13th of January last, relative to the appointment of the Hon. Anson Burlingame to a diplomatic or other mission by the Emperor of China, I transmit a report from the Secretary of State and the communication which accompanied it.

ANDREW JOHNSON.



WASHINGTON, D.C., February 26, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit herewith a report from the General Commanding the Army of the United States, prepared in compliance with the resolution of the Senate of the 4th instant, requesting copies of all instructions relating to the Third Military District issued to General Pope and General Meade.

ANDREW JOHNSON.



WASHINGTON, March 4, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

In answer to the resolution of the Senate of the 17th February ultimo, concerning the alleged interference of the United States consul at Rome in the late difficulty in Italy, I transmit a report from the Secretary of State, containing the information called for by the resolution.

ANDREW JOHNSON.



WASHINGTON, March 5, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit a report of this date from the Secretary of State, and the accompanying papers, in regard to the revolution in the Dominican Republic.

ANDREW JOHNSON.



WASHINGTON, March 5, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

In answer to the resolution of the Senate of the 21st of February last, in relation to the abduction of one Allan Macdonald from Canada, I transmit a communication from the Secretary of State, accompanied by the papers relating to that subject.

ANDREW JOHNSON.



WASHINGTON, March 5, 1868.

To the House of Representatives of the United States:

In answer to the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 7th of January last, in relation to the claim of the late Benjamin W. Perkins against the Russian Government, I transmit a communication from the Secretary of State, which is accompanied by the papers called for by the resolution.

ANDREW JOHNSON.



WASHINGTON, March 6, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit to the Senate the accompanying report[54] of the Secretary of State, in answer to their resolution of the 13th January,

ANDREW JOHNSON.

[Footnote 54: Relating to a claim, under the act of Congress of August 18, 1856, of citizens of the United States to guano on Alta Vela, an island in the vicinity of Santo Domingo.]



WASHINGTON, March 10, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit, for the consideration of the Senate with a view to ratification, a treaty between the United States and His Majesty the King of Prussia, in the name of the North German Confederation, for the purpose of regulating the citizenship of those persons who emigrate from the Confederation to this country and from the United States to the North German Confederation.

ANDREW JOHNSON.



WASHINGTON, March 11, 1868.

To the House of Representatives:

In further answer to the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 25th of November, 1867, calling for information in relation to the trial and conviction of American citizens in Great Britain and Ireland for the last two years, I transmit a continuation of the report from the Secretary of State upon the subject.

ANDREW JOHNSON.



WASHINGTON, March 14, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

In answer to the resolution of the Senate of the 27th of January last, in relation to the arrest and trial of the Rev. John McMahon, Robert B. Lynch, and John Warren by the Government of Great Britain, and requesting to be informed what action has been taken by this Government in maintaining the rights of American citizens abroad, I transmit a report of the Secretary of State, which is accompanied by a copy of the papers called for by that resolution.

ANDREW JOHNSON.



WASHINGTON, D.C., March 18, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

I herewith lay before the Senate, for its constitutional action thereon, a treaty made on the 2d day of March, 1868, by and between Nathaniel G. Taylor, Commissioner of Indian Affairs; Alexander C. Hunt, governor and ex officio superintendent of Indian affairs of Colorado Territory, and Kit Carson, on the part of the United States, and the representatives of the Tabeguache, Muache, Capote, Weeminuche, Yampa, Grand River, and Uintah bands of Ute Indians.

A letter of the Secretary of the Interior of the 17th instant and the papers therein referred to are also herewith transmitted.

ANDREW JOHNSON.



WASHINGTON, March 24, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit to the Senate, for its consideration with a view to ratification, a convention, signed on the 23d instant, for the surrender of criminals, between the United States and the Government of Italy.

ANDREW JOHNSON.



WASHINGTON, March 24, 1868.

To the House of Representatives:

I transmit herewith a report[55] and accompanying documents, in answer to a resolution of the House of Representatives of the 18th ultimo.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

[Footnote 55: Relating to unexpended appropriations for contingent expenses of foreign intercourse; amount remaining on deposit with Baring Brothers & Co. September 30, 1867, etc.]



WASHINGTON, March 25, 1868.

To the House of Representatives:

I transmit to the House of Representatives, in answer to a resolution of the 9th instant, the accompanying report[56] from the Secretary of State.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

[Footnote 56: Declining to transmit copies of correspondence, negotiations, and treaties with German States since January 1, 1868, relative to the rights of naturalized citizens.]



WASHINGTON, March 25, 1868.

To the House of Representatives:

I transmit herewith a report and accompanying document,[57] in answer to a resolution of the House of Representatives of the 18th ultimo.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

[Footnote 57: Statement of amounts paid for legal services by the Department of State during each year since 1860, with names of persons to whom paid.]



WASHINGTON, March 25, 1868.

To the House of Representatives of the United States:

In answer to a resolution of the House of Representatives of the 18th ultimo, relating to the report of Mr. Cowdin, I transmit a report of the Secretary of State and the document[58] to which it refers.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

[Footnote 58: Report of Elliot C. Cowdin, United States commissioner to the Paris Exposition of 1867, on silk and silk manufactures.]



WASHINGTON, April 2, 1868.

To the House of Representatives:

I transmit to the House of Representatives, in further answer to their resolution of the 9th ultimo, the accompanying report[59] from the Secretary of State.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

[Footnote 59: Transmitting correspondence pertaining to the convention of February 22, 1868, with the North German Confederation, relative to naturalization.]



WASHINGTON, April 2, 1868.

To the House of Representatives:

In further reply to the resolution adopted by the House of Representatives on the 19th of December, 1867, calling for correspondence and information in relation to Russian America, I transmit a report from the Secretary of State and the papers which accompanied it.

ANDREW JOHNSON.



WASHINGTON, April 3, 1868.

To the House of Representatives:

I transmit a report from the Secretary of State and the papers accompanying it, in answer to a resolution of the House of Representatives of the 10th of February last, requesting information relative to the imprisonment and destruction of the property of Antonio Pelletier by the people and authorities of Hayti.

ANDREW JOHNSON.



WASHINGTON, April 13, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

In answer to the resolution of the Senate of the 5th of February last, calling for the correspondence upon the subject of the murder by the inhabitants of the island of Formosa of the ship's company of the American bark Rover, I transmit a report from the Secretary of State and a report from the Secretary of the Navy, with accompanying papers.

ANDREW JOHNSON.



WASHINGTON, April 18, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

In answer to the resolution of the Senate of the 14th of April instant, calling for information relative to any application by any party for exclusive privileges in connection with hunting, trading, and the fisheries in Alaska, I transmit herewith the report of the Secretary of State on the subject, with its accompanying papers.

ANDREW JOHNSON.



WASHINGTON, D.C., April 22, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

In compliance with the resolution of the Senate of the 28th ultimo, requesting information as to the number and designations of military departments formed since the 1st day of August, 1867, and as to the statute or other authority under which they have been established, I transmit a report from the Adjutant-General's Office showing the organization since that date of the Department of Alaska and the Military Division of the Atlantic.

The orders issued by me upon this subject are in accordance with long-established usage and hitherto unquestioned authority. This will be readily seen from the accompanying report, which shows that, employing the authority vested by the Constitution in the President as Commander in Chief of the Army, it has been customary for my predecessors to create such military divisions and departments as from time to time they deemed advisable.

ANDREW JOHNSON.



WASHINGTON, April 27, 1868.

To the Senate and House of Representatives:

I submit a report of the Secretary of State, concerning the naturalization treaty recently negotiated between the United States and North Germany.

ANDREW JOHNSON.



WASHINGTON, D.C., May 5, 1868.

To the Senate and House of Representatives:

I transmit to Congress the accompanying documents, which I deem it proper to state are all the papers[60] that have been submitted to the President relating to the proceedings to which they refer in the States of South Carolina and Arkansas.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

[Footnote 60: Constitutions of South Carolina and Arkansas.]



WASHINGTON, May 6, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit to the Senate, in further answer to their resolution of the 14th of April last, the accompanying report[61] from the Secretary of State.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

[Footnote 61: Relating to application for exclusive privileges in connection with hunting, trading, and the fisheries in Alaska.]



WASHINGTON, D.C., May 8, 1868.

To the House of Representatives:

I transmit herewith reports from the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of the Navy, prepared in compliance with a resolution of the House of Representatives of the 12th of December last, requesting information respecting the sale of public vessels since the close of the rebellion. No report upon the subject has yet been received from the Department of War.

ANDREW JOHNSON.



WASHINGTON, May 9, 1868.

To the House of Representatives:

I transmit to the House of Representatives, in answer to their resolution of the 14th ultimo, a report from the Secretary of State, with accompanying papers.[62]

ANDREW JOHNSON.

[Footnote 62: Report of Freeman H. Morse, United States consul at Condon, on "The Foreign Maritime Commerce of the United States: Its Past, Present, and Future," etc.]



WASHINGTON, May 9, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit herewith reports from the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney-General, prepared in compliance with the resolution of the Senate of the 17th December last, requesting information in reference to the seizure and confiscation of property. No report upon this subject has yet been received by me from the War Department.

ANDREW JOHNSON.



WASHINGTON, D.C., May 11, 1868.

To the Senate and House of Representatives:

I transmit to Congress the accompanying documents,[63] which embrace all the papers that have been submitted to me relating to the proceedings to which they refer in the States of North Carolina and Louisiana.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

[Footnote 63: Constitutions of North Carolina and Louisiana.]



WASHINGTON, May 15, 1868.

To the House of Representatives:

I transmit to the House of Representatives, in answer to their resolution of the 8th instant, a report[64] from the Secretary of State, with accompanying papers.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

[Footnote 64: Relating to the detention, at the request of the House of Representatives, of the ironclad monitors Oneoto and Catawba, purchased from the United States by Swift & Co., and supposed to be intended for the Government of Peru, then at war with a power friendly to the United States.]



WASHINGTON, D.C., May 18, 1868.

To the Senate and House of Representatives:

I transmit to Congress the accompanying document,[65] which is the only paper which has been submitted to me relating to the proceedings to which it refers in the State of Georgia.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

[Footnote 65: Constitution of Georgia.]



WASHINGTON, May 23, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit to the Senate a report from the Secretary of State, with accompaniments, in relation to recent events in the Empire of Japan.

ANDREW JOHNSON.



WASHINGTON, D.C., May 27, 1868.

To the Senate and House of Representatives:

I transmit to Congress the accompanying documents,[66] which are the only papers which have been submitted to me relating to the proceedings to which they refer in the State of Florida.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

[Footnote 66: Letter from the president of the constitutional convention of Florida, transmitting a copy of the constitution of that State.]



WASHINGTON, May 29, 1868.

To the House of Representatives:

I transmit herewith a letter from the Secretary of the Navy, in reply to the resolution of the House of Representatives adopted on the 26th instant, making inquiries relative to a naval force at Hayti.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, June 2, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

I communicate, for the information of the Senate, in confidence, a report of the Secretary of State, accompanied by a copy of a dispatch recently received from the acting consul of the United States at San Jose, Costa Rica.

ANDREW JOHNSON.



WASHINGTON, June 2, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

I communicate, for the consideration of the Senate, a report from the Secretary of State, accompanied by a copy of a dispatch recently received from the acting United States consul in charge of the legation at San Jose, Costa Rica.

ANDREW JOHNSON.



WASHINGTON, June 5, 1868.

To the House of Representatives:

In further answer to the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 25th of November, 1867, calling for information in relation to the trial and conviction of American citizens in Great Britain and Ireland for the last two years, I transmit the accompanying report from the Secretary of State upon the subject.

ANDREW JOHNSON.



WASHINGTON, June 8, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

In compliance with the resolution of the Senate of the 28th ultimo, I transmit herewith a communication from the Postmaster-General, with a copy of the correspondence recently had with the authorities of Great Britain in relation to a new postal treaty.

ANDREW JOHNSON.



WASHINGTON, D.C. June 10, 1868.

To the House of Representatives:

In reply to the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 1st instant, I transmit herewith a report from the Secretary of the Interior, in reference to a treaty now being negotiated between the Great and Little Osage Indians and the special Indian commissioners acting on the part of the United States.

ANDREW JOHNSON.



WASHINGTON, D.C. June 13, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

I herewith submit to the Senate, for its constitutional action thereon, a treaty concluded on the 27th ultimo between commissioners on the part of the United States and the Great and Little Osage tribe of Indians of Kansas, together with a communication from the Secretary of the Interior suggesting an amendment to the fourteenth article, and a copy of the report of the commissioners.

ANDREW JOHNSON.



WASHINGTON, D.C., June 15, 1868.

To the House of Representatives:

I transmit herewith a report from the Secretary of the Interior, made in reply to the resolution adopted by the House of Representatives on the 13th instant.

The treaty recently concluded with the Great and Little Osage Indians, to which the accompanying report refers, was submitted to the Senate prior to the receipt of the resolution of the House upon the subject.

ANDREW JOHNSON.



WASHINGTON, June, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit to the Senate, for its consideration with a view to its ratification, a treaty between the United States and His Majesty the King of Bavaria, signed at Munich on the 26th ultimo, concerning the citizenship of persons emigrating from Bavaria to the United States and from the United States to the Kingdom of Bavaria. I transmit also a copy of the letter of the United States minister communicating the treaty, of the protocol which accompanied it, and a translation of the Bavarian military law referred to in the latter paper.

ANDREW JOHNSON.



WASHINGTON, D.C., June 20, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

I herewith transmit to the Senate, for its constitutional action thereon, a treaty concluded at Fort Sumner, N. Mex., on the 1st instant, between Lieutenant-General W. T. Sherman and Colonel Samuel F. Tappan, on the part of the United States, and the chiefs and headmen of the Navajo Indians, on the part of the latter. I also transmit a communication upon the subject from the Secretary of the Interior, with the accompanying papers.

ANDREW JOHNSON.



WASHINGTON, June 22, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit to the Senate, in answer to their resolution of the 28th ultimo, a report from the Secretary of State, with accompanying papers.[67]

ANDREW JOHNSON.

[Footnote 67: Correspondence relative to the act of Congress of March 27, 1867, prohibiting persons in the diplomatic service of the United States from wearing any uniform or official costume not previously authorized by Congress.]



WASHINGTON, June 23, 1868.

To the House of Representatives:

I transmit a report from the Secretary of State, in answer to a resolution of the House of Representatives of the 15th instant, upon the subject of Messrs. Warren and Costello, who have been convicted and sentenced to penal imprisonment in Great Britain.

ANDREW JOHNSON.



WASHINGTON, June 23, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit to the Senate a copy of a dispatch addressed to the Department of State by the consul of the United States at Bangkok, Siam, dated December 31, 1867, with a view to its consideration and the ratification thereof, of the modification proposed by the royal counselors of the Kingdom of Siam in Article I of the general regulations which form a part of the treaty between the United States and that Kingdom concluded May 29, 1856, of which a printed copy is also herewith transmitted.

ANDREW JOHNSON.



WASHINGTON, June 29, 1868.

To the Senate and House of Representatives:

I transmit to Congress a copy of a dispatch from the United States consul at Elsinore, and of an instruction from the Secretary of State to the United States minister at Copenhagen, relative to an alleged practice of the Danish authorities to banish convicts to this country. The expediency of making it a penal offense to bring such persons to the United States is submitted to your consideration.

ANDREW JOHNSON.



WASHINGTON, July 2, 1868.

To the House of Representatives:

I transmit herewith a report from the Secretary of State of the 2d instant, together with accompanying papers.[68]

ANDREW JOHNSON.

[Footnote 68: Petitions of merchants and shipowners of New York and Boston relative to the detention, at the request of the House of Representatives, of the ironclad monitors Oneoto and Calawba, purchased from the United States by Swift & Co., and supposed to be intended for the Government of Peru, then at war with a power friendly to the United States.]



WASHINGTON, D.C., July 7, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

I herewith lay before the Senate, for its constitutional action thereon, a treaty concluded at Fort Laramie, Dakota Territory, on the 7th of May, 1868, between the United States and the chiefs and headmen of the Crow Indians of Montana, and a treaty concluded at Fort Lyaramie, Dakota Territory, on the 10th of May, 1868, between the United States and the chiefs and headmen of the Northern Cheyenne and Northern Arapahoe tribes of Indians.

A letter from the Secretary of the Interior suggesting amendments to said treaties, and the papers to which he refers in his communication, are also herewith transmitted.

ANDREW JOHNSON.



WASHINGTON, D.C., July 7, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

I herewith lay before the Senate, for its constitutional action thereon, a treaty made and concluded at Ottawa, Kans., on the 1st day of June, 1868, between the United States and the Swan Creek and Black River Chippewas and the Munsee or Christian Indians of the State of Kansas.

Accompanying the treaty is a letter from the Secretary of the Interior, dated the 30th ultimo, together with the papers therein designated.

ANDREW JOHNSON.



WASHINGTON, July 9, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit to the Senate, for consideration with a view to ratification, additional articles to the treaty between the United States and His Majesty the Emperor of China of the 18th June, 1858, signed in this city on the 4th instant by the plenipotentiaries of the parties.

ANDREW JOHNSON.



WASHINGTON, July 10, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit to the Senate, for consideration with a view to ratification, a convention between the United States and the Mexican Republic, signed in this city by the plenipotentiaries of the parties on the 4th instant, providing for an adjustment of claims of citizens of the United States on the Mexican Government and of Mexican citizens on the Government of the United States.

ANDREW JOHNSON.



WASHINGTON, July 10, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

Referring to my message to the Senate of the 23d of May last, I herewith transmit a further report from the Secretary of State, with an accompanying document, relative to late occurrences in Japan.

ANDREW JOHNSON.



WASHINGTON, July 14, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit to the Senate a report from the Secretary of State, inclosing a list of the States of the Union whose legislatures have ratified the proposed fourteenth article of amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and also a copy of the resolutions of ratification, as called for in the Senate's resolution of the 9th instant, together with a copy of the respective resolutions of the legislatures of Ohio and New Jersey purporting to rescind the resolutions of ratification of said amendment which had previously been adopted by the legislatures of these two States, respectively, or to withdraw their consent to the same.

ANDREW JOHNSON.



WASHINGTON, July 15, 1868.

To the Senate and House of Representatives:

I hereby transmit to Congress a report, with the accompanying papers, received from the Secretary of State, in compliance with the requirements of the eighteenth section of the act entitled "An act to regulate the diplomatic and consular systems of the United States," approved August 18, 1856.

ANDREW JOHNSON.



WASHINGTON, July 15, 1868.

To the Congress of the United States:

I submit herewith a correspondence between the Secretary of State and Mr. Robert B. Van Valkenburgh, minister resident of the United States in Japan. It seems to show the importance of an amendment of the law of the United States prohibiting the cooly trade.

ANDREW JOHNSON.



WASHINGTON, July 17, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit to the Senate, in compliance with its resolution of the 9th instant, a report from the Secretary of State, communicating a copy of a paper received by him to-day, purporting to be a resolution ratifying on the part of the State of Louisiana the proposed amendment to the Constitution of the United States known as Article XIV.

ANDREW JOHNSON.



WASHINGTON, July 18, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit to the Senate, in compliance with its resolution of the 9th instant, a report from the Secretary of State, communicating a copy of a paper received by me on the 18th instant, purporting to be a resolution of the senate and house of representatives of the State of South Carolina, ratifying the proposed amendment to the Constitution of the United States known as Article XIV.

ANDREW JOHNSON.



WASHINGTON, D.C., July 18, 1868.

To the Senate and House of Representatives:

Experience has fully demonstrated the wisdom of the framers of the Federal Constitution. Under all circumstances the result of their labors was as near an approximation to perfection as was compatible with the fallibility of man. Such being the estimation in which the Constitution is and has ever been held by our countrymen, it is not surprising that any proposition for its alteration or amendment should be received with reluctance and distrust. While this sentiment deserves commendation and encouragement as a useful preventive of unnecessary attempt to change its provisions, it must be conceded that time has developed imperfections and omissions in the Constitution, the reformation of which has been demanded by the best interests of the country. Some of these have been remedied in the manner provided in the Constitution itself. There are others which, although heretofore brought to the attention of the people, have never been so presented as to enable the popular judgment to determine whether they should be corrected by means of additional amendments. My object in this communication is to suggest certain defects in the Constitution which seem to me to require correction, and to recommend that the judgment of the people be taken on the amendments proposed.

The first of the defects to which I desire to direct attention is in that clause of the Constitution which provides for the election of President and Vice-President through the intervention of electors, and not by an immediate vote of the people. The importance of so amending this clause as to secure to the people the election of President and Vice-President by their direct votes was urged with great earnestness and ability by President Jackson in his first annual message, and the recommendation was repeated in five of his subsequent communications to Congress, extending through the eight years of his Administration. In his message of 1829 he said:

To the people belongs the right of electing their Chief Magistrate; it was never designed that their choice should in any case be defeated, either by the intervention of electoral colleges or by the agency confided, under certain contingencies, to the House of Representatives.

He then proceeded to state the objections to an election of President by the House of Representatives, the most important of which was that the choice of a clear majority of the people might be easily defeated. He then closed the argument with the following communication:

I would therefore recommend such an amendment of the Constitution as may remove all intermediate agency in the election of the President and Vice-President. The mode may be so regulated as to preserve to each State its present relative weight in the election, and a failure in the first attempt may be provided for by confining the second to a choice between the two highest candidates. In connection with such an amendment it would seem advisable to limit the service of the Chief Magistrate to a single term of either four or six years. If, however, it should not be adopted, it is worthy of consideration whether a provision disqualifying for office the Representatives in Congress on whom such an election may have devolved would not be proper.

Although this recommendation was repeated with undiminished earnestness in several of his succeeding messages, yet the proposed amendment was never adopted and submitted to the people by Congress. The danger of a defeat of the people's choice in an election by the House of Representatives remains unprovided for in the Constitution, and would be greatly increased if the House of Representatives should assume the power arbitrarily to reject the votes of a State which might not be cast in conformity with the wishes of the majority in that body.

But if President Jackson failed to secure the amendment to the Constitution which he urged so persistently, his arguments contributed largely to the formation of party organizations, which have effectually avoided the contingency of an election by the House of Representatives. These organizations, first by a resort to the caucus system of nominating candidates, and afterwards to State and national conventions, have been successful in so limiting the number of candidates as to escape the danger of an election by the House of Representatives.

It is clear, however, that in thus limiting the number of candidates the true object and spirit of the Constitution have been evaded and defeated. It is an essential feature in our republican system of government that every citizen possessing the constitutional qualifications has a right to become a candidate for the office of President and Vice-President, and that every qualified elector has a right to cast his vote for any citizen whom he may regard as worthy of these offices. But under the party organizations which have prevailed for years these asserted rights of the people have been as effectually cut off and destroyed as if the Constitution itself had inhibited their exercise.

The danger of a defeat of the popular choice in an election by the House of Representatives is no greater than in an election made nominally by the people themselves, when by the laws of party organizations and by the constitutional provisions requiring the people to vote for electors instead of for the President or Vice-President it is made impracticable for any citizen to be a candidate except through the process of a party nomination, and for any voter to cast his suffrage for any other person than one thus brought forward through the manipulations of a nominating convention. It is thus apparent that by means of party organizations that provision of the Constitution which requires the election of President and Vice-President to be made through the electoral colleges has been made instrumental and potential in defeating the great object of conferring the choice of these officers upon the people. It may be conceded that party organizations are inseparable from republican government, and that when formed and managed in subordination to the Constitution they may be valuable safeguards of popular liberty; but when they are perverted to purposes of bad ambition they are liable to become the dangerous instruments of overthrowing the Constitution itself. Strongly impressed with the truth of these views, I feel called upon by an imperative sense of duty to revive substantially the recommendation so often and so earnestly made by President Jackson, and to urge that the amendment to the Constitution herewith presented, or some similar proposition, may be submitted to the people for their ratification or rejection.

Recent events have shown the necessity of an amendment to the Constitution distinctly defining the persons who shall discharge the duties of President of the United States in the event of a vacancy in that office by the death, resignation, or removal of both the President and Vice-President. It is clear that this should be fixed by the Constitution, and not be left to repealable enactments of doubtful constitutionality. It occurs to me that in the event of a vacancy in the office of President by the death, resignation, disability, or removal of both the President and Vice-President the duties of the office should devolve upon an officer of the executive department of the Government, rather than one connected with the legislative or judicial departments. The objections to designating either the President pro tempore of the Senate or the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, especially in the event of a vacancy produced by removal, are so obvious and so unanswerable that they need not be stated in detail. It is enough to state that they are both interested in producing a vacancy, and, according to the provisions of the Constitution, are members of the tribunal by whose decree a vacancy may be produced.

Under such circumstances the impropriety of designating either of these officers to succeed the President so removed is palpable. The framers of the Constitution, when they referred to Congress the settlement of the succession to the office of President in the event of a vacancy in the offices of both President and Vice-President, did not, in my opinion, contemplate the designation of any other than an officer of the executive department, on whom, in such a contingency, the powers and duties of the President should devolve. Until recently the contingency has been remote, and serious attention has not been called to the manifest incongruity between the provisions of the Constitution on this subject and the act of Congress of 1792. Having, however, been brought almost face to face with this important question, it seems an eminently proper time for us to make the legislation conform to the language, intent, and theory of the Constitution, and thus place the executive department beyond the reach of usurpation, and remove from the legislative and judicial departments every temptation to combine for the absorption of all the powers of government.

It has occurred to me that in the event of such a vacancy the duties of President would devolve most appropriately upon some one of the heads of the several Executive Departments, and under this conviction I present for your consideration an amendment to the Constitution on this subject, with the recommendation that it be submitted to the people for their action.

Experience seems to have established the necessity of an amendment of that clause of the Constitution which provides for the election of Senators to Congress by the legislatures of the several States. It would be more consistent with the genius of our form of government if the Senators were chosen directly by the people of the several States. The objections to the election of Senators by the legislatures are so palpable that I deem it unnecessary to do more than submit the proposition for such an amendment, with the recommendation that it be opened to the people for their judgment.

It is strongly impressed on my mind that the tenure of office by the judiciary of the United States during good behavior for life is incompatible with the spirit of republican government, and in this opinion I am fully sustained by the evidence of popular judgment upon this subject in the different States of the Union.

I therefore deem it my duty to recommend an amendment to the Constitution by which the terms of the judicial officers would be limited to a period of years, and I herewith present it in the hope that Congress will submit it to the people for their decision.

The foregoing views have long been entertained by me. In 1845, in the House of Representatives, and afterwards, in 1860, in the Senate of the United States, I submitted substantially the same propositions as those to which the attention of Congress is herein invited. Time, observation, and experience have confirmed these convictions; and, as a matter of public duty and a deep sense of my constitutional obligation "to recommend to the consideration of Congress such measures as I deem necessary and expedient," I submit the accompanying propositions, and urge their adoption and submission to the judgment of the people.

ANDREW JOHNSON.



JOINT RESOLUTION proposing amendments to the Constitution of the United States.

Whereas the fifth article of the Constitution of the United States provides for amendments thereto in the manner following, viz:

"The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose amendments to this Constitution, or, on the application of the legislatures of two-thirds of the several States, shall call a convention for proposing amendments, which in either case shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part of this Constitution when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States or by conventions in three-fourths thereof, as the one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by the Congress: Provided, That no amendment which may be made prior to the year 1808 shall in any manner affect the first and fourth clauses in the ninth section of the first article, and that no State, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate:"

Therefore,

Be it resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled (two-thirds of both Houses concurring), That the following amendments to the Constitution of the United States be proposed to the legislatures of the several States, which, when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the States, shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part of the Constitution:

"That hereafter the President and Vice-President of the United States shall be chosen for the term of six years, by the people of the respective States, in the manner following: Each State shall be divided by the legislature thereof in districts, equal in number to the whole number of Senators and Representatives to which such State may be entitled in the Congress of the United States; the said districts to be composed of contiguous territory, and to contain, as nearly as may be, an equal number of persons entitled to be represented under the Constitution, and to be laid off for the first time immediately after the ratification of this amendment; that on the first Thursday in August in the year 18—, and on the same day every sixth year thereafter, the citizens of each State who possess the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures shall meet within their respective districts and vote for a President and Vice-President of the United States; and the person receiving the greatest number of votes for President and the one receiving the greatest number of votes for Vice-President in each district shall be holden to have received one vote, which fact shall be immediately certified by the governor of the State to each of the Senators in Congress from such State and to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. The Congress of the United States shall be in session on the second Monday in October in the year 18—, and on the same day in every sixth year thereafter; and the President of the Senate, in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, shall open all the certificates, and the votes shall then be counted. The person having the greatest number of votes for President shall be President, if such number be equal to a majority of the whole number of votes given; but if no person have such majority, then a second election shall be held on the first Thursday in the month of December then next ensuing between the persons having the two highest numbers for the office of President, which second election shall be conducted, the result certified, and the votes counted in the same manner as in the first, and the person having the greatest number of votes for President shall be President. But if two or more persons shall have received the greatest and an equal number of votes at the second election, then the person who shall have received the greatest number of votes in the greatest number of States shall be President. The person having the greatest number of votes for Vice-President at the first election shall be Vice-President, if such number be equal to a majority of the whole number of votes given; and if no person have such majority, then a second election shall take place between the persons having the two highest numbers on the same day that the second election is held for President, and the person having the highest number of the votes for Vice-President shall be Vice-President. But if there should happen to be an equality of votes between the persons so voted for at the second election, then the person having the greatest number of votes in the greatest number of States shall be Vice-President. But when a second election shall be necessary in the case of Vice-President and not necessary in the case of President, then the Senate shall choose a Vice-President from the persons having the two highest numbers in the first election, as now prescribed in the Constitution: Provided, That after the ratification of this amendment to the Constitution the President and Vice-President shall hold their offices, respectively, for the term of six years, and that no President or Vice-President shall be eligible for reelection to a second term."

Sec. 2. And be it further resolved, That Article II, section I, paragraph 6, of the Constitution of the United States shall be amended so as to read as follows:

"In case of the removal of the President from office, or of his death, resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and duties of said office, the same shall devolve on the Vice-President; and in the case of the removal, death, resignation, or inability both of the President and Vice-President, the powers and duties of said office shall devolve on the Secretary of State for the time being, and after this officer, in case of vacancy in that or other Department, and in the order in which they are named, on the Secretary of the Treasury, on the Secretary of War, on the Secretary of the Navy, on the Secretary of the Interior, on the Postmaster-General, and on the Attorney-General; and such officer, on whom the powers and duties of President shall devolve in accordance with the foregoing provisions, shall then act as President until the disability shall be removed or a President shall be elected, as is or may be provided for by law."

Sec. 3. And be it further resolved, That Article I, section 3, be amended by striking out the word "legislature," and inserting in lieu thereof the following words, viz: "Persons qualified to vote for members of the most numerous branch of the legislature," so as to make the third section of said article, when ratified by three-fourths of the States, read as follows, to wit:

"The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen by the persons qualified to vote for the members of the most numerous branch of the legislature thereof, for six years, and each Senator shall have one vote."

Sec. 4. And be it further resolved, That Article III, section I, be amended by striking out the words "good behavior," and inserting the following words, viz: "the term of twelve years." And further, that said article and section be amended by adding the following thereto, viz: "And it shall be the duty of the President of the United States, within twelve months after the ratification of this amendment by three-fourths of all the States, as provided by the Constitution of the United States, to divide the whole number of judges, as near as may be practicable, into three classes. The seats of the judges of the first class shall be vacated at the expiration of the fourth year from such classification, of the second class at the expiration of the eighth year, and of the third class at the expiration of the twelfth year, so that one-third may be chosen every fourth year thereafter."

The article as amended will read as follows:

Article III.

Sec. I. The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court and such inferior courts as the Congress from time to time may ordain and establish. The judges, both of the Supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during the term of twelve years, and shall at stated times receive for their services a compensation which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office; and it shall be the duty of the President of the United States, within twelve months after the ratification of this amendment by three-fourths of all the States, as provided by the Constitution of the United States, to divide the whole number of judges, as near as may be practicable, into three classes. The seats of the judges of the first class shall be vacated at the expiration of the fourth year from such classification; of the second class, at the expiration of the eighth year; and of the third class, at the expiration of the twelfth year, so that one-third may be chosen every fourth year thereafter.



WASHINGTON, D.C., July 18, 1868.

To the House of Representatives:

In compliance with the resolution adopted by the House of Representatives on the 13th instant, requesting "copies of all instructions, records, and correspondence connected with the commission authorized to negotiate the late treaty with the Great and Little Osage Indians, and copies of all propositions made to said commission from railroad corporations or by individuals," I transmit the accompanying communications from the Secretary of the Interior, together with the papers to which they have reference.

ANDREW JOHNSON.



WASHINGTON, July 20, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit to the Senate, in compliance with its resolution of the 9th instant, a report from the Secretary of State, communicating a copy of a paper received by me this day, purporting to be a resolution of the senate and house of representatives of the State of Alabama ratifying the proposed amendment to the Constitution of the United States known as Article XIV.

ANDREW JOHNSON.



WASHINGTON, July 24, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit herewith a letter from the Secretary of the Navy, inclosing a report of a board of naval officers appointed in pursuance of an act of Congress approved May 19, 1868, to select suitable locations for powder magazines.

ANDREW JOHNSON.



WASHINGTON, July 27, 1868.

To the House of Representatives:

I transmit to the House of Representatives, in answer to their resolution of the 24th instant, the accompanying report[69] from the Secretary of State.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

[Footnote 69: Relating to absence from his post of the consul at Panama.]



VETO MESSAGES.

WASHINGTON, D.C., March 25, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

I have considered, with such care as the pressure of other duties has permitted, a bill entitled "An act to amend an act entitled 'An act to amend the judiciary act, passed the 24th of September, 1789.'" Not being able to approve all of its provisions, I herewith return it to the Senate, in which House it originated, with a brief statement of my objections.

The first section of the bill meets my approbation, as, for the purpose of protecting the rights of property from the erroneous decision of inferior judicial tribunals, it provides means for obtaining uniformity, by appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, in cases which have now become very numerous and of much public interest, and in which such remedy is not now allowed. The second section, however, takes away the right of appeal to that court in cases which involve the life and liberty of the citizen, and leaves them exposed to the judgment of numerous inferior tribunals. It is apparent that the two sections were conceived in a very different spirit, and I regret that my objections to one impose upon me the necessity of withholding my sanction from the other.

I can not give my assent to a measure which proposes to deprive any person "restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the Constitution or of any treaty or law of the United States" from the right of appeal to the highest judicial authority known to our Government. To "secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity" is one of the declared objects of the Federal Constitution. To assure these, guaranties are provided in the same instrument, as well against "unreasonable searches and seizures" as against the suspensions of "the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, * * * unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it." It was doubtless to afford the people the means of protecting and enforcing these inestimable privileges that the jurisdiction which this bill proposes to take away was conferred upon the Supreme Court of the nation. The act conferring that jurisdiction was approved on the 5th day of February, 1867, with a full knowledge of the motives that prompted its passage, and because it was believed to be necessary and right. Nothing has since occurred to disprove the wisdom and justness of the measures, and to modify it as now proposed would be to lessen the protection of the citizen from the exercise of arbitrary power and to weaken the safeguards of life and liberty, which can never be made too secure against illegal encroachments.

The bill not only prohibits the adjudication by the Supreme Court of cases in which appeals may hereafter be taken, but interdicts its jurisdiction on appeals which have already been made to that high judicial body. If, therefore, it should become a law, it will by its retroactive operation wrest from the citizen a remedy which he enjoyed at the time of his appeal. It will thus operate most harshly upon those who believe that justice has been denied them in the inferior courts.

The legislation proposed in the second section, it seems to me, is not in harmony with the spirit and intention of the Constitution. It can not fail to affect most injuriously the just equipoise of our system of Government, for it establishes a precedent which, if followed, may eventually sweep away every check on arbitrary and unconstitutional legislation. Thus far during the existence of the Government the Supreme Court of the United States has been viewed by the people as the true expounder of their Constitution, and in the most violent party conflicts its judgments and decrees have always been sought and deferred to with confidence and respect. In public estimation it combines judicial wisdom and impartiality in a greater degree than any other authority known to the Constitution, and any act which may be construed into or mistaken for an attempt to prevent or evade its decision on a question which affects the liberty of the citizens and agitates the country can not fail to be attended with unpropitious consequences. It will be justly held by a large portion of the people as an admission of the unconstitutionally of the act on which its judgment may be forbidden or forestalled, and may interfere with that willing acquiescence in its provisions which is necessary for the harmonious and efficient execution of any law.

For these reasons, thus briefly and imperfectly stated, and for others, of which want of time forbids the enumeration, I deem it my duty to withhold my assent from this bill, and to return it for the reconsideration of Congress.

ANDREW JOHNSON.



WASHINGTON, D.C., June 20, 1868.

To the House of Representatives:

I return without my signature a bill entitled "An act to admit the State of Arkansas to representation in Congress."

The approval of this bill would be an admission on the part of the Executive that the "Act for the more efficient government of the rebel States," passed March 2, 1867, and the acts supplementary thereto were proper and constitutional. My opinion, however, in reference to those measures has undergone no change, but, on the contrary, has been strengthened by the results which have attended their execution. Even were this not the case, I could not consent to a bill which is based upon the assumption either that by an act of rebellion of a portion of its people the State of Arkansas seceded from the Union, or that Congress may at its pleasure expel or exclude a State from the Union, or interrupt its relations with the Government by arbitrarily depriving it of representation in the Senate and House of Representatives. If Arkansas is a State not in the Union, this bill does not admit it as a State into the Union. If, on the other hand, Arkansas is a State in the Union, no legislation is necessary to declare it entitled "to representation in Congress as one of the States of the Union." The Constitution already declares that "each State shall have at least one Representative;" that the Senate "shall be composed of two Senators from each State," and "that no State, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate."

That instrument also makes each House "the judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its own members," and therefore all that is now necessary to restore Arkansas in all its constitutional relations to the Government is a decision by each House upon the eligibility of those who, presenting their credentials, claim seats in the respective Houses of Congress. This is the plain and simple plan of the Constitution; and believing that had it been pursued when Congress assembled in the month of December, 1865, the restoration of the States would long since have been completed, I once again earnestly recommend that it be adopted by each House in preference to legislation, which I respectfully submit is not only of at least doubtful constitutionality, and therefore unwise and dangerous as a precedent, but is unnecessary, not so effective in its operation as the mode prescribed by the Constitution, involves additional delay, and from its terms may be taken rather as applicable to a Territory about to be admitted as one of the United States than to a State which has occupied a place in the Union for upward of a quarter of a century.

The bill declares the State of Arkansas entitled and admitted to representation in Congress as one of the States of the Union upon the following fundamental condition:

That the constitution of Arkansas shall never be so amended or changed as to deprive any citizen or class of citizens of the United States of the right to vote who are entitled to vote by the constitution herein recognized, except as a punishment for such crimes as are now felonies at common law, whereof they shall have been duly convicted under laws equally applicable to all the inhabitants of said State: Provided, That any alteration of said constitution, prospective in its effect, may be made in regard to the time and place of residence of voters.

I have been unable to find in the Constitution of the United States any warrant for the exercise of the authority thus claimed by Congress. In assuming the power to impose a "fundamental condition" upon a State which has been duly "admitted into the Union upon an equal footing with the original States in all respects whatever," Congress asserts a right to enter a State as it may a Territory, and to regulate the highest prerogative of a free people—the elective franchise. This question is reserved by the Constitution to the States themselves, and to concede to Congress the power to regulate the subject would be to reverse the fundamental principle of the Republic and to place in the hands of the Federal Government, which is the creature of the States, the sovereignty which justly belongs to the States or the people—the true source of all political power, by whom our Federal system was created and to whose will it is subordinate.