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That the reduction of the Army and the arrangement of the officers from the old to the new establishment and the appointments referred to were in every instance strictly conformable to law will, I think, be apparent. To the arrangement generally no objection has been heard; it has been made, however, to the appointments to the original vacancies, and particularly to those of Colonel Towson and Colonel Gadsden. To those appointments, therefore, further attention is due. If they were improper it must be either that they were illegal or that the officers did not merit the offices conferred on them. The acknowledged merit of the officers and the peculiar fitness for the offices to which they were respectively appointed must preclude all objection on that head. Having already suggested my impression that in filling offices newly created, to which on no principle whatever anyone could have a claim of right, Congress could not under the Constitution restrain the free selection of the President from the whole body of his fellow-citizens, I shall only further remark that if that impression is well founded all objection to these appointments must cease. If the law imposed such restraint, it would in that case be void. But, according to my judgment, the law imposed none. An objection to the legality of those appointments must be founded either on the principle that those officers were not comprised within the corps then in the service of the United States—that is, did not belong to the peace establishment—or that the power granted by the word "arrange" imposed on the President the necessity of placing in these new offices persons of the same grade only from the old. It is believed that neither objection is well founded. Colonel Towson belonged to one of the corps then in the service of the United States, or, in other words, of the military peace establishment. By the act of 1815-16 the Pay Department, of which the Paymaster General was the chief, was made one of the branches of the staff, and he and all those under him were subjected to the Rules and Articles of War. The appointment, therefore, of him, and especially to a new office, was strictly conformable to law.
The only difference between the fifth section of the act of 1815 for reducing the Army and the twelfth section of the act of 1821 for still further reducing it, by which the power to carry those laws into effect was granted to the President in each instance, consists in this, that by the former he was to cause the arrangement to be made of the officers, noncommissioned officers, musicians, and privates of the several corps of troops then in the service of the United States, whereas in the latter the term troops was omitted. It can not be doubted that that omission had an object, and that it was thereby intended to guard against misconstruction in so very material and important a circumstance by authorizing the application of the act unequivocally to every corps of the staff as well as of the line. With that word a much wider range was given to the act of 1815 on the reduction which then took place than under the last act. The omission of it from the last act, together with all the sanctions which were given by Congress to the construction of the law in the reduction made under the former, could not fail to dispel all doubt as to the extent of the power granted by the last law and of the principles which ought to guide, and on which it was thereby made the duty of the President to execute it. With respect to the other objection—that is, that officers of the same grade only ought to have been transferred to these new offices—it is equally unfounded. It is admitted that officers may be taken from the old corps and reduced and arranged in the new in inferior grades, as was done under the former reduction. This admission puts an end to the objection in this case; for if an officer may be reduced and arranged from one corps to another by an entire change of grade, requiring a new commission and a new nomination to the Senate, I see no reason why an officer may not be advanced in like manner. In both instances the grade in the old corps is alike disregarded. The transfer from it to the new turns on the merit of the party, and it is believed that the claim in this instance is felt by all with peculiar sensibility. The claim of Colonel Towson is the stronger because the arrangement of him to the office to which he is now nominated is not to one from which any officer has been removed, and to which any other officer may in any view of the case be supposed to have had a claim. As Colonel Gadsden held the office of Inspector-General, and as such was acknowledged by all to belong to the staff of the Army, it is not perceived on what ground his appointment can be objected to.
If such a construction is to be given to the act of 1821 as to confine the transfer of officers from the old to the new establishment to the corps of troops—that is, to the line of the Army—the whole staff of the Army in every branch would not only be excluded from any appointment in the new establishment, but altogether disbanded from the service. It would follow also that all the offices of the staff under the new arrangement must be filled by officers belonging to the new establishment after its organization and their arrangement in it. Other consequences not less serious would follow. If the right of the President to fill these original vacancies by the selection of officers from any branch of the whole military establishment was denied, he would be compelled to place in them officers of the same grade whose corps had been reduced, and they with them. The effect, therefore, of the law as to those appointments would be to legislate into office men who had been already legislated out of office, taking from the President all agency in their appointment. Such a construction would not only be subversive of the obvious principles of the Constitution, but utterly inconsistent with the spirit of the law itself, since it would provide offices for a particular grade, and fix every member of that grade in those offices, at a time when every other grade was reduced, and among them generals and other officers of the highest merit. It would also defeat every object of selection, since colonels of infantry would be placed at the head of regiments of artillery, a service in which they might have had no experience, and for which they might in consequence be unqualified.
Having omitted in the message to Congress at the commencement of the session to state the principles on which this law had been executed, and having imperfectly explained them in the message to the Senate of the 17th of January last, I deem it particularly incumbent on me, as well from a motive of respect to the Senate as to place my conduct in the duty imposed on me by that act in a clear point of view, to make this communication at this time. The examples under the law of 1815, whereby officers were reduced and arranged from the old corps to the new in inferior grades, fully justify all that has been done under the law of 1821. If the power to arrange under the former law authorized the removal of one officer from a particular station and the location of another in it, reducing the latter from a higher to an inferior grade, with the advice and consent of the Senate, it surely justifies under the latter law the arrangement of these officers, with a like sanction, to offices of new creation, from which no one had been removed and to which no one had a just claim. It is on the authority of these examples, supported by the construction which I gave to the law, that I have acted in the discharge of this high trust. I am aware that many officers of great merit, having the strongest claims on their country, have been reduced and others dismissed, but under the law that result was inevitable. It is believed that none have been retained who had not, likewise, the strongest claims to the appointments which have been conferred on them. To discriminate between men of acknowledged merit, especially in a way to affect so sensibly and materially their feelings and interests, for many of whom I have personal consideration and regard, has been a most painful duty; yet I am conscious that I have discharged it with the utmost impartiality. Had I opened the door to change in any case, even where error might have been committed, against whom could I afterwards have closed it, and into what consequences might not such a proceeding have led? The same remarks are applicable to the subject in its relation to the Senate, to whose calm and enlightened judgment, with these explanations, I again submit the nominations which have been rejected.
JAMES MONROE.
APRIL 15, 1822.
To the Senate of the United States:
In compliance with the resolution of the Senate of the 12th instant, requesting the President of the United States "to cause to be laid before the Senate the original proceedings of the board of general officers charged with the reduction of the Army under the act of the 2d of March, 1821, together with all communications to and from said board on the subject of reducing the Army, including the case submitted to the Attorney-General, and his opinion thereon," I now transmit a report from the Secretary of War, furnishing the information requested.
JAMES MONROE.
WASHINGTON, April 15, 1822.
To the Senate of the United States:
In compliance with a resolution of the Senate requesting the President of the United States to lay before that House any report or information which may be in his possession as to the most eligible situation on the Western waters for the erection of a national arsenal, I herewith transmit a report from the Secretary of War, containing all the information on that subject in the possession of the Executive.
JAMES MONROE.
WASHINGTON, April 15, 1822.
To the House of Representatives of the United States:
In compliance with a resolution of the House of Representatives of the 16th of February last, requesting the President of the United States "to communicate to that House whether any foreign government has made any claim to any part of the territory of the United States upon the coast of the Pacific Ocean north of the forty-second degree of latitude, and to what extent; whether any regulations have been made by foreign powers affecting the trade on that coast, and how it affects the interest of this Republic, and whether any communications have been made to this Government by foreign powers touching the contemplated occupation of Columbia River," I now transmit a report from the Secretary of State, containing the information embraced by that resolution.
JAMES MONROE.
WASHINGTON, April 18, 1822.
To the House of Representatives:
I communicate to the House of Representatives copies of sundry papers having relation to the transactions in East and West Florida, which have been received at the Department of State since my message to the two Houses of Congress of the 28th of January last, together with copies of two letters from the Secretary of State upon the same subject.
JAMES MONROE.
[The same message was sent to the Senate.]
WASHINGTON, April 23, 1822.
To the House of Representatives:
In compliance with a resolution of the House of Representatives of the 29th January last, requesting the President of the United States to cause to be communicated to that House certain information relative to the claim made by Jonathan Carver to certain lands within the United States near the Falls of St. Anthony. I now transmit a report of the Secretary of the Treasury, which, with the accompanying documents, contains all the information on this subject in the possession of the Executive.
JAMES MONROE.
WASHINGTON, April 26, 1822.
To the Senate of the United States:
I transmit to the Senate, agreeably to their resolution of yesterday, a report from the Secretary of State, with copies of the papers requested by that resolution, in relation to the recognition of the South American Provinces.
JAMES MONROE.
WASHINGTON, April 29, 1822.
To the House of Representatives:
I transmit to the House of Representatives a report from the Secretary of State, in pursuance of their resolution of the 20th instant,[A] "requesting to be furnished with a copy of the judicial proceedings in the United States court for the district of Louisiana in the case of the French slave ship La Pensee."
JAMES MONROE.
[Footnote: A: An error; so in the original message. The date of the resolution is the 18th of April.]
WASHINGTON, April 30, 1822.
To the Senate of the United States:
In compliance with a resolution of the Senate, requesting the President of the United States to cause to be laid before the Senate certain information respecting the practical operation of the system of subsisting the Army under the provisions of the act passed the 14th of April, 1818, etc., I herewith transmit a report from the Secretary of War, furnishing the information required.
JAMES MONROE.
WASHINGTON, May 1, 1822.
To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States:
In the message to both Houses of Congress at the commencement of their present session it was mentioned that the Government of Norway had issued an ordinance for admitting the vessels of the United States and their cargoes into the ports of that Kingdom upon the payment of no other or higher duties than are paid by Norwegian vessels, of whatever articles the said cargoes may consist and from whatever ports the vessels laden with them may come.
In communicating this ordinance to the Government of the United States that of Norway has requested the benefit of a similar and reciprocal provision for the vessels of Norway and their cargoes which may enter the ports of the United States.
This provision being within the competency only of the legislative authority of Congress, I communicate to them herewith copies of the communications received from the Norwegian Government in relation to the subject, and recommend the same to their consideration.
JAMES MONROE.
WASHINGTON, May 1, 1822.
To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States:
I transmit herewith to Congress copies of letters received at the Department of State from the minister of Great Britain on the subject of the duties discriminating between imported rolled and hammered iron. I recommend them particularly to the consideration of Congress, believing that although there may be ground for controversy with regard to the application of the engagements of the treaty to the case, yet a liberal construction of those engagements would be compatible at once with a conciliatory and a judicious policy.
JAMES MONROE.
WASHINGTON, May 4, 1822.
To the House of Representatives of the United States:
In compliance with a resolution of the House of Representatives of the 19th of April, requesting the President "to cause to be communicated to the House, if not injurious to the public interest, any letter which may have been received from Jonathan Russell, one of the ministers who concluded the treaty of Ghent, in conformity with the indications contained in his letter of the 25th of December, 1814," I have to state that having referred the resolution to the Secretary of State, and it appearing, by a report from him, that no such document had been deposited among the archives of the Department, I examined and found among my private papers a letter of that description marked "private" by himself. I transmit a copy of the report of the Secretary of State, by which it appears that Mr. Russell, on being apprised that the document referred to by the resolution had not been deposited in the Department of State, delivered there "a paper purporting to be the duplicate of a letter written by him from Paris on the 11th of February, 1815, to the then Secretary of State, to be communicated to the House as the letter called for by the resolution."
On the perusal of the document called for I find that it communicates a difference of opinion between Mr. Russell and a majority of his colleagues in certain transactions which occurred in the negotiations at Ghent, touching interests which have been since satisfactorily adjusted by treaty between the United States and Great Britain. The view which Mr. Russell presents of his own conduct and that of his colleagues in those transactions will, it is presumed, call from the two surviving members of that mission who differed from him a reply containing their view of those transactions and of the conduct of the parties in them, and who, should his letter be communicated to the House of Representatives, will also claim that their reply should be communicated in like manner by the Executive—a claim which, on the principle of equal justice, could not be resisted. The Secretary of State, one of the ministers referred to, has already expressed a desire that Mr. Russell's letter should be communicated, and that I would transmit at the same time a communication from him respecting it.
On full consideration of the subject I have thought it would be improper for the Executive to communicate the letter called for unless the House, on a knowledge of these circumstances, should desire it, in which case the document called for shall be communicated, accompanied by a report from the Secretary of State, as above suggested. I have directed a copy to be delivered to Mr. Russell, to be disposed of as he may think proper, and have caused the original to be deposited in the Department of State, with instruction to deliver a copy to any person who may be interested.
JAMES MONROE.
WASHINGTON, May 6, 1822.
To the Senate and House of Representatives:
I transmit to Congress translations of two letters from Don Joaquin d'Anduaga to the Secretary of State, which have been received at the Department of State since my last message communicating copies of big correspondence with this Government.
JAMES MONROE.
Don Joaquin de Anduaga to the Secretary of State.
[Translation.]
PHILADELPHIA, April 24, 1822.
SIR: As soon as the news was received in Madrid of the recent occurrences in New Spain after the arrival at Vera Cruz of the Captain-General and supreme political chief appointed for those Provinces, Don Juan O. Donoju, and some papers were seen relative to those same transactions, it was feared that for forming the treaty concluded in Cordova on the 24th of August last between the said General and the traitor, Colonel Dr. Augustine Iturbide, it had been falsely supposed that the former had power from His Catholic Majesty for that act, and in a little time the correctness of those suspicions was found, as, among other things, the said O. Donoju, when on the 26th of the same August he sent this treaty to the governor of Vera Cruz, notifying him of its prompt and punctual observance, he told him that at his sailing from the Peninsula preparation for the independence of Mexico was already thought of, and that its bases were approved of by the Government and by a commission of the Cortes. His Majesty, on sight of this and of the fatal impression which so great an imposture had produced in some ultramarine Provinces, and what must without difficulty be the consequence among the rest, thought proper to order that, by means of a circular to all the chiefs and corporations beyond seas, this atrocious falsehood should be disbelieved; and now he has deigned to command me to make it known to the Government of the United States that it is false as far as General O. Donoju published beyond his instructions, by pointing out to it that he never could have been furnished with other instructions than those conformable to constitutional principles.
In compliance with this order of His Majesty, I can do no less than observe to you, sir, how unfounded one of the reasons is in your note of the 6th instant for the recognition by this Government of those of the insurgent Provinces of Spanish-America—that it was founded on the treaty made by O. Donoju with Iturbide—since not having had that power nor instruction to conclude it it is clearly null and of no value.
I repeat to you, sir, the sentiments of my distinguished consideration, and pray God that you live many years.
JOAQUIN DE ANDUAGA.
Don Joaquin de Anduaga to the Secretary of State.
[Translation.]
PHILADELPHIA, April 26, 1822.
JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, Secretary of State.
SIR: I have received your note of the 15th instant, in which you are pleased to communicate to me the reasons which induce the President not only to refuse to His Catholic Majesty the satisfaction which he demanded in his royal name for the insults offered by General Jackson to the Spanish commissaries and officers, but to approve fully of the said chief's conduct.
Before answering the contents of the said note I thought it my duty to request instructions from my Government, and therefore without delay I have laid it before them. Until they arrive, therefore, I have confined myself to two observations:
First. If in my note of the 18th of November last I said that as General Jackson had not specified the actions which had induced him to declare the Spanish officers expelled from the Floridas criminal, nor given proof of them, I thought myself authorized to declare the accusation false, I did not this through inadvertency, but upon the evident principle that every person accused has a right to declare an accusation destitute of proof false, and, much more, an accusation not pretended to be proved. This assertion of mine does not presume that I am not persuaded of the merit of the said General and of the claim which he has upon the gratitude of his country; but although it is believed the duty of his country to eulogize and reward his eminent services, yet it will be lawful for the representative of a power outraged by him to complain of his conduct. I can not persuade myself that to aggravate my said expression you could have thought that I had been wanting in due respect, it not being possible for that opinion to have entered your mind, when by his orders Mr. Forsyth had sent to the Spanish minister on the 1st of September last a note, in which, complaining of the Captain-General of the island of Cuba, he accuses him of dishonorable pecuniary motives in not having delivered the archives, without giving any proof of so injurious an assertion; and I must remark that the rank of General Mabry in Spain is at least as elevated as that of General Jackson in the United States, and that the services performed by him to his country have rendered him as worthy as he of its consideration and respect.
Second. Although you are pleased to tell me that part of the papers taken from Colonel Coppinger are ready to be delivered, which the American commissioners, after having examined them, have adjudged to be returned to Spain, I do not think myself authorized to admit their return in this manner, but in the mode which I demanded in my note of the 22d of November last.
As I have seen by the public papers that the President has communicated to Congress the note which you were pleased to address to me, dated the 15th instant, and that it has been ordered to be printed, I take the liberty of requesting that you will have the goodness to use your influence that this my answer may be treated in the same manner, that Congress and the public may be informed that if I have not answered the first part of it as respects the general business, it is only to wait for the instructions of my Government, but that I have answered what was personal.
I renew to you, sir, the sentiments of my distinguished consideration.
JOAQUIN DE ANDUAGA.
WASHINGTON, May 6, 1822.
To the Senate of the United States:
In compliance with a resolution of the Senate of the 26th of April, requesting the President of the United States "to communicate to the Senate the report of the Attorney-General relative to any persons (citizens of the United States) who have been charged with or suspected of introducing any slaves into the United States contrary to existing laws," I transmit herewith two reports from the Attorney-General.
JAMES MONROE.
WASHINGTON, May 7, 1822.
To the Senate of the United States:
In compliance with the resolution of the Senate of the 25th of April, requesting certain information concerning lead mines on lands of the United States, I herewith transmit a report from the Secretary of War.
JAMES MONROE.
WASHINGTON, May 7, 1822.
To the House of Representatives:
In compliance with the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 23d of April, requesting the President of the United States to cause to be communicated to that House certain information respecting the lead mines of the State of Missouri, I herewith transmit a report of the Secretary of War.
JAMES MONROE.
WASHINGTON, May 7, 1822.
To the House of Representatives:
In compliance with the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 7th of May, requesting the President to communicate to that House a letter of Jonathan Russell, esq., referred to in his message of the 4th instant, together with such communications as he may have received relative thereto from any of the other ministers of the United States who negotiated the treaty of Ghent, I herewith transmit a report from the Secretary of State, with the documents called for by that resolution.
JAMES MONROE.
VETO MESSAGE.
WASHINGTON, May 4, 1822.
To the House of Representatives:
Having duly considered the bill entitled "An act for the preservation and repair of the Cumberland road," it is with deep regret, approving as I do the policy, that I am compelled to object to its passage and to return the bill to the House of Representatives, in which it originated, under a conviction that Congress do not possess the power under the Constitution to pass such a law.
A power to establish turnpikes with gates and tolls, and to enforce the collection of tolls by penalties, implies a power to adopt and execute a complete system of internal improvement. A right to impose duties to be paid by all persons passing a certain road, and on horses and carriages, as is done by this bill, involves the right to take the land from the proprietor on a valuation and to pass laws for the protection of the road from injuries, and if it exist as to one road it exists as to any other, and to as many roads as Congress may think proper to establish. A right to legislate for one of these purposes is a right to legislate for the others. It is a complete right of jurisdiction and sovereignty for all the purposes of internal improvement, and not merely the right of applying money under the power vested in Congress to make appropriations, under which power, with the consent of the States through which this road passes, the work was originally commenced, and has been so far executed. I am of opinion that Congress do not possess this power; that the States individually can not grant it, for although they may assent to the appropriation of money within their limits for such purposes, they can grant no power of jurisdiction or sovereignty by special compacts with the United States. This power can be granted only by an amendment to the Constitution and in the mode prescribed by it.
If the power exist, it must be either because it has been specifically granted to the United States or that it is incidental to some power which has been specifically granted. If we examine the specific grants of power we do not find it among them, nor is it incidental to any power which has been specifically granted.
It has never been contended that the power was specifically granted. It is claimed only as being incidental to some one or more of the powers which are specifically granted. The following are the powers from which it is said to be derived:
First, from the right to establish post-offices and post-roads; second, from the right to declare war; third, to regulate commerce; fourth, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare; fifth, from the power to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution all the powers vested by the Constitution in the Government of the United States or in any department or officer thereof; sixth and lastly, from the power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory and other property of the United States.
According to my judgment it can not be derived from either of those powers, nor from all of them united, and in consequence it does not exist.
Having stated my objections to the bill, I should now cheerfully communicate at large the reasons on which they are founded if I had time to reduce them to such form as to include them in this paper. The advanced stage of the session renders that impossible. Having at the commencement of my service in this high trust considered it a duty to express the opinion that the United States do not possess the power in question, and to suggest for the consideration of Congress the propriety of recommending to the States an amendment to the Constitution to vest the power in the United States, my attention has been often drawn to the subject since, in consequence whereof I have occasionally committed my sentiments to paper respecting it. The form which this exposition has assumed is not such as I should have given it had it been intended for Congress, nor is it concluded. Nevertheless, as it contains my views on this subject, being one which I deem of very high importance, and which in many of its bearings has now become peculiarly urgent, I will communicate it to Congress, if in my power, in the course of the day, or certainly on Monday next.
JAMES MONROE.
WASHINGTON, May 4, 1822.
To the House of Representatives:
I transmit the paper alluded to in the message of this day, on the subject of internal improvements.
JAMES MONROE.
VIEWS OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE SUBJECT OF INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS.
It may be presumed that the proposition relating to internal improvements by roads and canals, which has been several times before Congress, will be taken into consideration again either for the purpose of recommending to the States the adoption of an amendment to the Constitution to vest the necessary power in the General Government or to carry the system into effect on the principle that the power has already been granted. It seems to be the prevailing opinion that great advantage would be derived from the exercise of such a power by Congress. Respecting the right there is much diversity of sentiment. It is of the highest importance that this question should be settled. If the right exist, it ought forthwith to be exercised. If it does not exist, surely those who are friends to the power ought to unite in recommending an amendment to the Constitution to obtain it. I propose to examine this question.
The inquiry confined to its proper objects and within the most limited scale is extensive. Our Government is unlike other governments both in its origin and form. In analyzing it the differences in certain respects between it and those of other nations, ancient and modern, necessarily come into view. I propose to notice these differences so far as they are connected with the object of inquiry, and the consequences likely to result from them, varying in equal degree from those which have attended other governments. The digression, if it may be so called, will in every instance be short and the transition to the main object immediate and direct.
To do justice to the subject it will be necessary to mount to the source of power in these States and to pursue this power in its gradations and distribution among the several departments in which it is now vested. The great division is between the State governments and the General Government. If there was a perfect accord in every instance as to the precise extent of the powers granted to the General Government, we should then know with equal certainty what were the powers which remained to the State governments, since it would follow that those which were not granted to the one would remain to the other. But it is on this point, and particularly respecting the construction of these powers and their incidents, that a difference of opinion exists, and hence it is necessary to trace distinctly the origin of each government, the purposes intended by it, and the means adopted to accomplish them. By having the interior of both governments fully before us we shall have all the means which can be afforded to enable us to form a correct opinion of the endowments of each.
Before the Revolution the present States, then colonies, were separate communities, unconnected with each other except in their common relation to the Crown. Their governments were instituted by grants from the Crown, which operated, according to the conditions of each grant, in the nature of a compact between the settlers in each colony and the Crown. All power not retained in the Crown was vested exclusively in the colonies, each having a government consisting of an executive, a judiciary, and a legislative assembly, one branch of which was in every instance elected by the people. No office was hereditary, nor did any title under the Crown give rank or office in any of the colonies. In resisting the encroachments of the parent country and abrogating the power of the Crown the authority which had been held by it vested exclusively in the people of the colonies, By them was a Congress appointed, composed of delegates from each colony, who managed the war, declared independence, treated with foreign powers, and acted in all things according to the sense of their constituents. The Declaration of Independence confirmed in form what had before existed in substance. It announced to the world new States, possessing and exercising complete sovereignty, which they were resolved to maintain. They were soon after recognized by France and other powers, and finally by Great Britain herself in 1783.
Soon after the power of the Crown was annulled the people of each colony established a constitution or frame of government for themselves, in which these separate branches—legislative, executive, and judiciary—were instituted, each independent of the others. To these branches, each having its appropriate portion, the whole power of the people not delegated to Congress was communicated, to be exercised for their advantage on the representative principle by persons of their appointment, or otherwise deriving their authority immediately from them, and holding their offices for stated terms. All the powers necessary for useful purposes held by any of the strongest governments of the Old World not vested in Congress were imparted to these State governments without other checks than such as are necessary to prevent abuse, in the form of fundamental declarations or bills of right. The great difference between our governments and those of the Old World consists in this, that the former, being representative, the persons who exercise their powers do it not for themselves or in their own right, but for the people, and therefore while they are in the highest degree efficient they can never become oppressive. It is this transfer of the power of the people to representative and responsible bodies in every branch which constitutes the great improvement in the science of government and forms the boast of our system. It combines all the advantages of every known government without any of their disadvantages. It retains the sovereignty in the people, while it avoids the tumult and disorder incident to the exercise of that power by the people themselves. It possesses all the energy and efficiency of the most despotic governments, while it avoids all the oppressions and abuses inseparable from those governments.
In every stage of the conflict from its commencement until March, 1781, the powers of Congress were undefined, but of vast extent. The assemblies or conventions of the several colonies being formed by representatives from every county in each colony and the Congress by delegates from each colonial assembly, the powers of the latter for general purposes resembled those of the former for local. They rested on the same basis, the people, and were complete for all the purposes contemplated. Never was a movement so spontaneous, so patriotic, so efficient. The nation exerted its whole faculties in support of its rights, and of its independence after the contest took that direction, and it succeeded. It was, however, foreseen at a very early stage that although the patriotism of the country might be relied on in the struggle for its independence, a well-digested compact would be necessary to preserve it after obtained. A plan of confederation was in consequence proposed and taken into consideration by Congress even at the moment when the other great act which severed them from Great Britain and declared their independence was proclaimed to the world. This compact was ratified on the 21st March, 1781, by the last State, and thereupon carried into immediate effect.
The following powers were vested in the United States by the Articles of Confederation. As this, the first bond of union, was in operation nearly eight years, during which time a practical construction was given to many of its powers, all of which were adopted in the Constitution with important additions, it is thought that a correct view of those powers and of the manner in which they are executed may shed light on the subject under consideration. It may fairly be presumed that where certain powers were transferred from one instrument to the other and in the same terms, or terms descriptive only of the same powers, that it was intended that they should be construed in the same sense in the latter that they were in the former.
Article I declares that the style of the Confederacy shall be "The United States of America."
Article II. Each State retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power and right which is not expressly delegated to the United States.
Article III. The States severally enter into a firm league of friendship with each other for their common defense, the security of their liberties, and their mutual and general welfare, binding themselves to assist each other against all force offered to or attacks made upon them on account of religion, sovereignty, trade, etc.
Article IV. The free inhabitants of each State, paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several States, etc. Fugitives from justice into any of the States shall be delivered up on the demand of the executive of the State from which they fled. Full faith and credit shall be given in each State to the records and acts of every other State.
Article V. Delegates shall be annually appointed by the legislature of each State to meet in Congress on the first Monday in November, with a power to recall, etc. No State shall appoint less than two nor more than seven, nor shall any delegate hold his office for more than three in six years. Each State shall maintain its own delegates. Each State shall have one vote. Freedom of speech shall not be impeached, and the members shall be protected from arrests, except for treason, etc.
Article VI. No State shall send or receive an embassy or enter into a treaty with a foreign power. Nor shall any person holding any office of profit or trust under the United States or any State accept any present, emolument, office, or title from a foreign power. Nor shall the United States or any State grant any title of nobility. No two States shall enter into any treaty without the consent of Congress. No State shall lay any imposts or duties which may interfere with any treaties entered into by the United States. No State shall engage in war unless it be invaded or menaced with invasion by some Indian tribe, nor grant letters of marque or reprisal unless it be against pirates, nor keep up vessels of war nor any body of troops in time of peace without the consent of Congress; but every State shall keep up a well regulated militia, etc.
Article VII. When land forces are raised by any State for the common defense, all officers of and under the rank of colonel shall be appointed by the legislature of each State.
Article VIII. All charges of war and all other expenses which shall be incurred for the common defense or general welfare shall be defrayed out of a common treasury, which shall be supplied by the several States in proportion to the value of all the land in each State granted to individuals. The taxes for paying each proportion shall be levied by the several States.
Article IX. Congress shall have the sole and exclusive right and power of determining on peace and war, except in the cases mentioned in the sixth article; of sending and receiving ambassadors; entering into alliances, except, etc.; of establishing rules for deciding what captures on land and water shall be legal; of granting letters of marque and reprisal in time of peace; appointing courts for the trial of piracies and felonies on the high seas; for deciding controversies between the States and between individuals claiming lands under two or more States whose jurisdiction has been adjusted; of regulating the alloy and value of coin struck by their authority and of foreign coin; fixing the standard of weights and measures; regulating the trade with the Indians; establishing and regulating post offices from one State to another and throughout all the States, and exacting such postage as may be requisite to defray the expenses of the office; of appointing all officers of the land forces except the regimental; appointing all the officers of the naval forces; to ascertain the necessary sums of money to be raised for the service of the United States and appropriate the same; to borrow money and emit bills of credit; to build and equip a Navy; to agree on the number of land forces and to make requisitions on each State for its quota; that the assent of nine States shall be requisite to these great acts.
Article X regulates the powers of the committee of the States to sit in the recess of Congress.
Article XI provides for the admission of Canada into the Confederation.
Article XII pledges the faith of the United States for the payment of all bills of credit issued and money borrowed on their account.
Article XIII. Every State shall abide by the determination of the United States on all questions submitted to them by the Confederation, the Articles of the Confederation to be perpetual and not to be altered without the consent of every State.
This bond of union was soon found to be utterly incompetent to the purposes intended by it. It was defective in its powers; it was defective also in the means of executing the powers actually granted by it. Being a league of sovereign and independent States, its acts, like those of all other leagues, required the interposition of the States composing it to give them effect within their respective jurisdictions. The acts of Congress without the aid of State laws to enforce them were altogether nugatory. The refusal or omission of one State to pass such laws was urged as a reason to justify like conduct in others, and thus the Government was soon at a stand.
The experience of a few years demonstrated that the Confederation could not be relied on for the security of the blessings which had been derived from the Revolution. The interests of the nation required a more efficient Government, which the good sense and virtue of the people provided by the adoption of the present Constitution.
The Constitution of the United States was formed by a convention of delegates from the several States, who met in Philadelphia, duly authorized for the purpose, and it was ratified by a convention in each State which was especially called to consider and decide on the same. In this progress the State governments were never suspended in their functions. On the contrary, they took the lead in it. Conscious of their incompetency to secure to the Union the blessings of the Revolution, they promoted the diminution of their own powers and the enlargement of those of the General Government in the way in which they might be most adequate and efficient. It is believed that no other example can be found of a Government exerting its influence to lessen its own powers, of a policy so enlightened, of a patriotism so pure and disinterested. The credit, however, is more especially due to the people of each State, in obedience to whose will and under whose control the State governments acted.
The Constitution of the United States, being ratified by the people of the several States, became of necessity to the extent of its powers the paramount authority of the Union. On sound principles it can be viewed in no other light. The people, the highest authority known to our system, from whom all our institutions spring and on whom they depend, formed it. Had the people of the several States thought proper to incorporate themselves into one community, under one government, they might have done it. They had the power, and there was nothing then nor is there anything now, should they be so disposed, to prevent it. They wisely stopped, however, at a certain point, extending the incorporation to that point, making the National Government thus far a consolidated Government, and preserving the State governments without that limit perfectly sovereign and independent of the National Government. Had the people of the several States incorporated themselves into one community, they must have remained such, their Constitution becoming then, like the constitution of the several States, incapable of change until altered by the will of the majority. In the institution of a State government by the citizens of a State a compact is formed to which all and every citizen are equal parties. They are also the sole parties and may amend it at pleasure. In the institution of the Government of the United States by the citizens of every State a compact was formed between the whole American people which has the same force and partakes of all the qualities to the extent of its powers as a compact between the citizens of a State in the formation of their own constitution. It can not be altered except by those who formed it or in the mode prescribed by the parties to the compact itself.
This Constitution was adopted for the purpose of remedying all defects of the Confederation, and in this it has succeeded beyond any calculation that could have been formed of any human institution. By binding the States together the Constitution performs the great office of the Confederation; but it is in that sense only that it has any of the properties of that compact, and in that it is more effectual to the purpose, as it holds them together by a much stronger bond; and in all other respects in which the Confederation failed the Constitution has been blessed with complete success. The Confederation was a compact between separate and independent States, the execution of whose articles in the powers which operated internally depended on the State governments. But the great office of the Constitution, by incorporating the people of the several States to the extent of its powers into one community and enabling it to act directly on the people, was to annul the powers of the State governments to that extent, except in cases where they were concurrent, and to preclude their agency in giving effect to those of the General Government. The Government of the United States relies on its own means for the execution of its powers, as the State governments do for the execution of theirs, both governments having a common origin or sovereign, the people—the State governments the people of each State, the National Government the people of every State—and being amenable to the power which created it. It is by executing its functions as a Government thus originating and thus acting that the Constitution of the United States holds the States together and performs the office of a league. It is owing to the nature of its powers and the high source from whence they are derived—the people—that it performs that office better than the Confederation or any league which ever existed, being a compact which the State governments did not form, to which they are not parties, and which executes its own powers independently of them.
There were two separate and independent governments established over our Union, one for local purposes over each State by the people of the State, the other for national purposes over all the States by the people of the United States. The whole power of the people, on the representative principle, is divided between them. The State governments are independent of each other, and to the extent of their powers are complete sovereignties. The National Government begins where the State governments terminate, except in some instances where there is a concurrent jurisdiction between them. This Government is also, according to the extent of its powers, a complete sovereignty. I speak here, as repeatedly mentioned before, altogether of representative sovereignties, for the real sovereignty is in the people alone.
The history of the world affords no such example of two separate and independent governments established over the same people, nor can it exist except in governments founded on the sovereignty of the people. In monarchies and other governments not representative there can be no such division of power. The government is inherent in the possessor; it is his, and can not be taken from him without a revolution. In such governments alliances and leagues alone are practicable. But with us individuals count for nothing in the offices which they hold; that is, they have no right to them. They hold them as representatives, by appointment from the people, in whom the sovereignty is exclusively vested. It is impossible to speak too highly of this system taken in its twofold character and in all its great principles of two governments, completely distinct from and independent of each other, each constitutional, founded by and acting directly on the people, each competent to all its purposes, administering all the blessings for which it was instituted, without even the most remote danger of exercising any of its powers in a way to oppress the people. A system capable of expansion over a vast territory not only without weakening either government, but enjoying the peculiar advantage of adding thereby new strength and vigor to the faculties of both; possessing also this additional advantage, that while the several States enjoy all the rights reserved to them of separate and independent governments, and each is secured by the nature of the Federal Government, which acts directly on the people, against the failure of the others to bear their equal share of the public burdens, and thereby enjoys in a more perfect degree all the advantages of a league, it holds them together by a bond altogether different and much stronger than the late Confederation or any league that was ever known before—a bond beyond their control, and which can not even be amended except in the mode prescribed by it. So great an effort in favor of human happiness was never made before; but it became those who made it. Established in the new hemisphere, descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same language, having the same religion and universal toleration, born equal and educated in the same principles of free government, made independent by a common struggle and menaced by the same dangers, ties existed between them which never applied before to separate communities. They had every motive to bind them together which could operate on the interests and affections of a generous, enlightened, and virtuous people, and it affords inexpressible consolation to find that these motives had their merited influence.
In thus tracing our institutions to their origin and pursuing them in their progress and modifications down to the adoption of this Constitution two important facts have been disclosed, on which it may not be improper in this stage to make a few observations. The first is that in wresting the power, or what is called the sovereignty, from the Crown it passed directly to the people. The second, that it passed directly to the people of each colony and not to the people of all the colonies in the aggregate; to thirteen distinct communities and not to one. To these two facts, each contributing its equal proportion, I am inclined to think that we are in an eminent degree indebted for the success of our Revolution. By passing to the people it vested in a community every individual of which had equal rights and a common interest. There was no family dethroned among us, no banished pretender in a foreign country looking back to his connections and adherents here in the hope of a recall; no order of nobility whose hereditary rights in the Government had been violated; no hierarchy which had been degraded and oppressed. There was but one order, that of the people, by whom everything was gained by the change. I mention it also as a circumstance of peculiar felicity that the great body of the people had been born and educated under these equal and original institutions. Their habits, their principles, and their prejudices were therefore all on the side of the Revolution and of free republican government.
Had distinct orders existed, our fortune might and probably would have been different. It would scarcely have been possible to have united so completely the whole force of the country against a common enemy. A contest would probably have arisen in the outset between the orders for the control. Had the aristocracy prevailed, the people would have been heartless. Had the people prevailed, the nobility would probably have left the country, or, remaining behind, internal divisions would have taken place in every State and a civil war broken out more destructive even than the foreign, which might have defeated the whole movement. Ancient and modern history is replete with examples proceeding from conflicts between distinct orders, of revolutions attempted which proved abortive, of republics which have terminated in despotism. It is owing to the simplicity of the elements of which our system is composed that the attraction of all the parts has been to a common center, that every change has tended to cement the union, and, in short, that we have been blessed with such glorious and happy success.
And that the power wrested from the British Crown passed to the people of each colony the whole history of our political movement from the emigration of our ancestors to the present day clearly demonstrates. What produced the Revolution? The violation of our rights. What rights? Our chartered rights. To whom were the charters granted, to the people of each colony or to the people of all the colonies as a single community? We know that no such community as the aggregate existed, and of course that no such rights could be violated. It may be added that the nature of the powers which were given to the delegates by each colony and the manner in which they were executed show that the sovereignty was in the people of each and not in the aggregate. They respectively presented credentials such as are usual between ministers of separate powers, which were examined and approved before they entered on the discharge of the important duties committed to them. They voted also by colonies and not individually, all the members from one colony being entitled to one vote only. This fact alone, the first of our political association and at the period of our greatest peril, fixes beyond all controversy the source from whence the power which has directed and secured success to all our measures has proceeded.
Had the sovereignty passed to the aggregate, consequences might have ensued, admitting the success of our Revolution, which might even yet seriously affect our system. By passing to the people of each colony the opposition to Great Britain, the prosecution of the war, the Declaration of Independence, the adoption of the Confederation and of this Constitution are all imputable to them. Had it passed to the aggregate, every measure would be traced to that source; even the State governments might be said to have emanated from it, and amendments of their constitutions on that principle be proposed by the same authority. In short it is not easy to perceive all the consequences into which such a doctrine might lead. It is obvious that the people in mass would have had much less agency in all the great measures of the Revolution and in those which followed than they actually had, and proportionably less credit for their patriotism and services than they are now entitled to and enjoy. By passing to the people of each colony the whole body in each were kept in constant and active deliberation on subjects of the highest national importance and in the supervision of the conduct of all the public servants in the discharge of their respective duties. Thus the most effectual guards were provided against abuses and dangers of every kind which human ingenuity could devise, and the whole people rendered more competent to the self-government which by an heroic exertion they had acquired.
I will now proceed to examine the powers of the General Government, which, like the governments of the several States, is divided into three branches—a legislative, executive, and judiciary—each having its appropriate share. Of these the legislative, from the nature of its powers, all laws proceeding from it, and the manner of its appointment, its members being elected immediately by the people, is by far the most important. The whole system of the National Government may be said to rest essentially on the powers granted to this branch. They mark the limit within which, with few exceptions, all the branches must move in the discharge of their respective functions. It will be proper, therefore, to take a full and correct view of the powers granted to it.
By the eighth section of the first article of the Constitution it is declared that Congress shall have power—
First. To lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts, and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States;
Second. To borrow money;
Third. To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes;
Fourth. To establish an uniform rule of naturalization and uniform laws respecting bankruptcies;
Fifth. To coin money, regulate the value thereof and of foreign coin, and fix the standard of weights and measures;
Sixth. To provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the United States;
Seventh. To establish post offices and post-roads;
Eighth. To promote the progress of science and useful arts by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries;
Ninth. To constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court, to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the laws of nations;
Tenth. To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water;
Eleventh. To raise and support armies;
Twelfth. To provide and maintain a navy;
Thirteenth. To make rules for the government of the land and naval forces;
Fourteenth. To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions;
Fifteenth. To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be in the service of the United States, reserving to the States the appointment of the officers and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress;
Sixteenth. To exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatever over such district (not exceeding 10 miles square) as may, by the cession of particular States and the acceptance of by Congress, become the seat of Government of the United States; and to exercise like authority over all places purchased, by the consent of the legislature of the State in which the same may be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings;
Seventeenth. And to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States or in any department or officer thereof.
To the other branches of the Government the powers properly belonging to each are granted. The President, in whom the executive power is vested, is made commander in chief of the Army and Navy, and militia when called into the service of the United States. He is authorized, with the advice and consent of the Senate, two-thirds of the members present concurring, to form treaties, to nominate and, with the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law. He has power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States, except in cases of impeachment. It is made his duty to give to Congress from time to time information of the state of the Union, to recommend to their consideration such measures as he may judge necessary and expedient, to convene both Houses on extraordinary occasions, to receive ambassadors, and to take care that the laws be faithfully executed.
The judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as Congress may establish; and it is made to extend to all cases in law and equity arising under the Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made under their authority. Cases affecting ambassadors and other public characters, cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, causes in which the United States are a party, between two or more States, between citizens of different States, between citizens of the same State claiming grants of land under different States, between a State or the citizens thereof and foreign States, are specially assigned to these tribunals.
Other powers have been granted in other parts of the Constitution which, although they relate to specific objects, unconnected with the ordinary administration, yet, as they form important features in the Government and may shed useful light on the construction which ought to be given to the powers above enumerated, it is proper to bring into view.
By Article I, section 9, clause 1, it is provided that the migration or importation of such persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit shall not be prohibited by Congress prior to the year 1808, but a tax or duty may be imposed on such importation not exceeding $10 for each person.
By Article III, section 3, clause 1, new States may be admitted by Congress into the Union, but that no new State shall be formed within the jurisdiction of another State, nor any State be formed by the junction of two or more States or parts of States without the consent of the legislature of the States concerned as well as of the United States. And by the next clause of the same article and section power is vested in Congress to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United. States, with a proviso that nothing in the Constitution shall be so construed as to prejudice any claims of the United States or of any particular State.
By Article IV, section 4, the United States guarantee to every State a republican form of government and engage to protect each of them against invasion; and on application of the legislature, or of the executive when the legislature can not be convened, against domestic violence.
Of the other parts of the Constitution relating to power, some form restraints on the exercise of the powers granted to Congress and others on the exercise of the powers remaining to the States. The object in both instances is to draw more completely the line between the two governments and also to prevent abuses by either. Other parts operate like conventional stipulations between the States, abolishing between them all distinctions applicable to foreign powers and securing to the inhabitants of each State all the rights and immunities of citizens in the several States.
By the fifth article it is provided that Congress, whenever two-thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose amendments, or, on the application of the legislatures of two-thirds of the several States, shall call a convention for proposing amendments, which in either case shall be valid as a part of the Constitution when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States, or by conventions in three-fourths thereof, as the one or the other mode may be proposed by Congress: Provided, That no State, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal vote in the Senate, and that no amendment which may be made prior to the year 1808 shall affect the first and fourth clauses in the ninth section of the first article.
By the second section of the sixth article it is declared that the Constitution, and laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land, and that the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding. This right in the National Government to execute its powers was indispensable to its existence. If the State governments had not been restrained from encroaching on the powers vested in the National Government, the Constitution, like the Confederation, would soon have been set at naught; and it was not within the limit of the human mind to devise any plan for the accomplishment of the object other than by making a national constitution which should be to the extent of its powers the supreme law of the land. This right in the National Government would have existed under the Constitution to the full extent provided for by this declaration had it not been made. To prevent the possibility of a doubt, however, on so important a subject it was proper to make the declaration.
Having presented above a full view of all the powers granted to the United States, it will be proper to look to those remaining to the States. It is by fixing the great powers which are admitted to belong to each government that we may hope to come to a right conclusion respecting those in controversy between them. In regard to the National Government, this task was easy because its powers were to be found in specific grants in the Constitution; but it is more difficult to give a detail of the powers of the State governments, as their constitutions, containing all powers granted by the people not specifically taken from them by grants to the United States, can not well be enumerated. Fortunately, a precise detail of all the powers remaining to the State governments is not necessary in the present instance. A knowledge of their great powers only will answer every purpose contemplated, and respecting these there can be no diversity in opinion. They are sufficiently recognized and established by the Constitution of the United States itself. In designating the important powers of the State governments it is proper to observe, first, that the territory contemplated by the Constitution belongs to each State in its separate character and not to the United States in their aggregate character. Bach State holds territory according to its original charter, except in cases where cessions have been made to the United States by individual States. The United States had none when the Constitution was adopted which had not been thus ceded to them and which they held on the conditions on which such cession had been made. Within the individual States it is believed that they held not a single acre; but if they did it was as citizens held it, merely as private property. The territory acquired by cession lying without the individual States rests on a different principle, and is provided for by a separate and distinct part of the Constitution. It is the territory within the individual States to which the Constitution in its great principles applies, and it applies to such territory as the territory of a State and not as that of the United States. The next circumstance to be attended to is that the people composing this Union are the people of the several States, and not of the United States in the full sense of a consolidated government. The militia are the militia of the several States; lands are held under the laws of the States; descents, contracts, and all the concerns of private property, the administration of justice, and the whole criminal code, except in the cases of breaches of the laws of the United States made under and in conformity with the powers vested in Congress and of the laws of nations, are regulated by State laws. This enumeration shows the great extent of the powers of the State governments. The territory and the people form the basis on which all governments are founded. The militia constitutes their effective force. The regulation and protection of property and of personal liberty are also among the highest attributes of sovereignty. This, without other evidence, is sufficient to show that the great office of the Constitution of the United States is to unite the States together under a Government endowed with powers adequate to the purposes of its institution, relating, directly or indirectly, to foreign concerns, to the discharge of which a National Government thus formed alone could be competent.
This view of the exclusive jurisdiction of the several States over the territory within their respective limits, except in cases otherwise specially provided for, is supported by the obvious intent of the several powers granted to Congress, to which a more particular attention is now due. Of these the right to declare war is perhaps the most important, as well by the consequences attending war as by the other powers granted in aid of it. The right to lay taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, though necessary for the support of the civil government, is equally necessary to sustain the charges of war; the right to raise and support armies and a navy and to call forth and govern the militia when in the service of the United States are altogether of the latter kind. They are granted in aid of the power to make war and intended to give effect to it. These several powers are of great force and extent, and operate more directly within the limits and upon the resources of the States than any of the other powers. But still they are means only for given ends. War is declared and must be maintained, an army and a navy must be raised, fortifications must be erected for the common defense, debts must be paid, For these purposes duties, imposts, and excises are levied, taxes are laid, the lands, merchandise, and other property of the citizens are liable for them; if the money is not paid, seizures are made and the lands are sold. The transaction is terminated; the lands pass into other hands, who hold them, as the former proprietors did, under the laws of the individual States. They were means only to certain ends; the United States have nothing further to do with them. The same view is applicable to the power of the General Government over persons. The militia is called into the service of the United States; the service is performed; the corps returns to the State to which it belongs; it is the militia of such State, and not of the United States. Soldiers are required for the Army, who may be obtained by voluntary enlistment or by some other process founded in the principles of equality. In either case the citizen after the tour of duty is performed is restored to his former station in society, with his equal share in the common sovereignty of the nation. In all these cases, which are the strongest which can be given, we see that the right of the General Government is nothing more than what it is called in the Constitution, a power to perform certain acts, and that the subject on which it operates is a means only to that end; that it was both before and after that act under the protection and subject to the laws of the individual State within which it was.
To the other powers of the General Government the same remarks are applicable and with greater force. The right to regulate commerce with foreign powers was necessary as well to enable Congress to lay and collect duties and imposts as to support the rights of the nation in the intercourse with foreign powers. It is executed at the ports of the several States and operates almost altogether externally. The right to borrow and coin money and to fix its value and that of foreign coin are important to the establishment of a National Government, and particularly necessary in support of the right to declare war, as, indeed, may be considered the right to punish piracy and felonies on the high seas and offenses against the laws of nations. The right to establish an uniform rule of naturalization and uniform laws respecting bankruptcies seems to be essentially connected with the right to regulate commerce. The first branch of it relates to foreigners entering the country; the second to merchants who have failed. The right to promote the progress of useful arts and sciences may be executed without touching any of the individual States. It is accomplished by granting patents to inventors and preserving models, which may be done exclusively within the Federal district. The right to constitute courts inferior to the Supreme Court was a necessary consequence of the judiciary existing as a separate branch of the General Government. Without such inferior court in every State it would be difficult and might even be impossible to carry into effect the laws of the General Government. The right to establish post-offices and post-roads is essentially of the same character. For political, commercial, and social purposes it was important that it should be vested in the General Government. As a mere matter of regulation, and nothing more, I presume, was intended by it, it is a power easily executed and involving little authority within the States individually. The right to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever over the Federal district and over forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings with the consent of the State within which the same may be is a power of a peculiar character, and is sufficient in itself to confirm what has been said of all the other powers of the General Government. Of this particular grant further notice will hereafter be taken.
I shall conclude my remarks on this part of the subject by observing that the view which has been presented of the powers and character of the two Governments is supported by the marked difference which is observable in the manner of their endowment. The State governments are divided into three branches—a legislative, executive, and judiciary—and the appropriate duties of each assigned to it without any limitation of power except such as is-necessary to guard against abuse, in the form of bills of right. But in instituting the National Government an entirely different principle was adopted and pursued. The Government itself is organized, like the State governments, into three branches, but its powers are enumerated and defined in the most precise form. The subject has already been too fully explained to require illustration by a general view of the whole Constitution, every part of which affords proof of what is here advanced. It will be sufficient to advert to the eighth section of the first article, being that more particularly which defines the powers and fixes the character of the Government of the United States. By this section it is declared that Congress shall have power, first, to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, etc.
Having shown the origin of the State governments and their endowments when first formed; having also shown the origin of the National Government and the powers vested in it, and having shown, lastly, the powers which are admitted to have remained to the State governments after those which were taken from them by the National Government, I will now proceed to examine whether the power to adopt and execute a system of internal improvement by roads and canals has been vested in the United States.
Before we can determine whether this power has been granted to the General Government it will be necessary to ascertain distinctly the nature and extent of the power requisite to make such improvements. When that is done we shall be able to decide whether such power is vested in the National Government.
If the power existed it would, it is presumed, be executed by a board of skillful engineers, on a view of the whole Union, on a plan which would secure complete effect to all the great purposes of our Constitution. It is not my intention, however, to take up the subject here on this scale. I shall state a case for the purpose of illustration only. Let it be supposed that Congress intended to run a road from the city of Washington to Baltimore and to connect the Chesapeake Bay with the Delaware and the Delaware with the Raritan by a canal, what must be done to carry the project into effect? I make here no question of the existing power. I speak only of the power necessary for the purpose. Commissioners would be appointed to trace a route in the most direct line, paying due regard to heights, water courses, and other obstacles, and to acquire the right to the ground over which the road and canal would pass, with sufficient breadth for each. This must be done by voluntary grants, or by purchases from individuals, or, in case they would not sell or should ask an exorbitant price, by condemning the property and fixing its value by a jury of the vicinage. The next object to be attended to after the road and canal are laid out and made is to keep them in repair. We know that there are people in every community capable of committing voluntary injuries, of pulling down walls that are made to sustain the road, of breaking the bridges over water courses, and breaking the road itself. Some living near it might be disappointed that it did not pass through their lands and commit these acts of violence and waste from revenge or in the hope of giving it that direction, though for a short time. Injuries of this kind have been committed and are still complained of on the road from Cumberland to the Ohio. To accomplish this object Congress should have a right to pass laws to punish offenders wherever they may be found. Jurisdiction over the road would not be sufficient, though it were exclusive. It would seldom happen that the parties would be detected in the act. They would generally commit it in the night and fly far off before the sun appeared. The power to punish these culprits must therefore reach them wherever they go. They must also be amenable to competent tribunals, Federal or State. The power must likewise extend to another object not less essential or important than those already mentioned. Experience has shown that the establishment of turnpikes, with gates and tolls and persons to collect the tolls, is the best expedient that can be adopted to defray the expense of these improvements and the repairs which they necessarily require. Congress must therefore have power to make such an establishment and to support it by such regulations, with fines and penalties in the case of injuries, as may be competent to the purpose. The right must extend to all those objects, or it will be utterly incompetent. It is possessed and exercised by the States individually, and it must be possessed by the United States or the pretension must be abandoned.
Let it be further supposed that Congress, believing that they do possess the power, have passed an act for those purposes, under which commissioners have been appointed, who have begun the work. They are met at the first farm on which they enter by the owner, who forbids them to trespass on his land. They offer to buy it at a fair price or at twice or thrice its value. He persists in his refusal. Can they, on the principle recognized and acted on by all the State governments that in cases of this kind the obstinacy and perverseness of an individual must yield to the public welfare, summon a jury of upright and discreet men to condemn the land, value it, and compel the owner to receive the amount and to deliver it up to them? I believe that very few would concur in the opinion that such a power exists.
The next object is to preserve these improvements from injury. The locks of the canal are broken, the walls which sustained the road are pulled down, the bridges are broken, the road itself is plowed up, toll is refused to be paid, the gates of the canal or turnpike are forced. The offenders are pursued, caught, and brought to trial. Can they be punished? The question of right must be decided on principle. The culprits will avail themselves of every barrier that may serve to screen them from punishment. They will plead that the law under which they stand arraigned is unconstitutional, and that question must be decided by the court, whether Federal or State, on a fair investigation of the powers vested in the General Government by the Constitution. If the judges find that these powers have not been granted to Congress, the prisoners must be acquitted, and by their acquittal all claim to the right to establish such a system is at an end.
I have supposed an opposition to be made to the right in Congress by the owner of the land and other individuals charged with breaches of laws made to protect the works from injury, because it is the mildest form in which it can present itself. It is not, however, the only one. A State, also, may contest the right, and then the controversy assumes another character. Government might contend against government, for to a certain extent both the Governments are sovereign and independent of each other, and in that form it is possible, though not probable, that opposition might be made. To each limitations are prescribed, and should a contest rise between them respecting their rights and the people sustain it with anything like an equal division of numbers the worst consequences might ensue. |
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