In some cases the expenditure per gun had reached the enormous total of 300 rounds daily.

A proportion of at least 25 per cent. of high-explosive shells for 13 and 18 pdrs. was included in the demands to which I have referred above.

In a communication to the War Office on December 31st, the view was expressed that considerably more high explosive was necessary, and the following table was laid down as our minimum requirements to carry on the war with any prospect of success:—

REQUIRED OUTPUT OF AMMUNITION.

Rounds per gun a day.

13-pdr. 50 (25 H.E.) 18-pdr. 50 (25 H.E.) 4.5-in. howitzer 40 (35 H.E.) 6-in. howitzer 25 (all H.E.) 60-pdr. 25 (15 H.E.) 4.7-in. gun 25 (15 H.E.) 6-in. gun 25 (all H.E.) 9.2-in. howitzer 12 (all H.E.)

It was explained that this output was necessary for a period of active operations, and should be continued even during a lull, till a reserve of three or four times the amount laid down in war establishments had been accumulated. To this request there was no reply until January 19th. The War Office then declined to work up to more than 20 rounds a day, and refused a request for 50 per cent, of high explosives.

This amazing attitude at a most critical time compelled me to consider means by which the several members of the Government, and the public also, might be advised of this deplorable apathy which, if long continued, meant the destruction of our Army.

In this letter from the War Office, of January 19th, which I have already mentioned, an estimate was attached of the receipts which we might rely upon up to and including the month of May. This estimate was far below our requirements, whilst the actual receipts fell far short of it. The actual supply in May proved to be less than one half of the War Office estimate, which was the only one ever furnished for our guidance. Such failure made it quite impossible to make any reliable forecast of the condition of the ammunition supply at any particular date. This state of uncertainty rendered the formulation of plans for co-operating with the French most difficult, if not impossible.

During the winter of 1914-15 it was hoped to accumulate some small reserve of ammunition, but, during this period, all our efforts in this direction were of no avail, because the number of rounds per 18-pdr. gun throughout this period fell to less than five!

I had serious misgivings that the morale of the Army was becoming affected by this first long and weary winter of inactivity in the trenches, and to render the defence effective it was necessary to undertake an offensive operation.

Early in March a small reserve of ammunition had been accumulated, and the Battle of Neuve Chapelle was fought and won. Had proper steps been taken to increase the supply when my first strong appeals were sent in during September 1914, the offensive operation commenced so successfully at Neuve Chapelle might have been much further developed, and, indeed, possibly have led to great and important results. But the battle had to be broken off after three days' fighting because we were brought to a standstill through want of ammunition.

Immediately afterwards I again addressed the strongest representations I could frame to the War Office. I begged that His Majesty's Government might be informed that, if their object was to drive the enemy off French and Belgian territory during 1915, no progress towards this objective could be obtained unless and until the supply of artillery ammunition should enable the Army to engage in sustained operations. The only official reply which I received to this letter was an injunction to use the utmost economy, but a private letter, dated March 16th, was addressed by Sir James Wolfe Murray to Sir William Robertson, who was then my Chief of Staff. This letter was said to have been dictated by the Secretary of State, and its contents hinted very strongly that an impression prevailed at the War Office that we were wasting ammunition.

The operations at Neuve Chapelle used up all our available resources, and it became necessary to restore them by reverting for a time to a strictly defensive attitude.

It was, moreover, very clear that the Germans had early realised that the war was to be one calling for colossal supplies of munitions; supplies, indeed, upon such a stupendous scale as the world had never before dreamed of, and they also realised the vital necessity for heavy artillery. They began with an inferior field gun, and they never stopped to remedy this defect, but directed all their energies, from the first, to developing their heavy artillery. Whilst their total proportion of guns to bayonets was fully maintained, the proportion of field guns to bayonets was reduced, and all heavy guns enormously increased. Each month the development of heavy artillery became more accentuated until, towards the late spring of 1915, the greater number of projectiles fired by the Germans, whenever operations of any importance were taking place, were of 5.9 and upwards. This was in defence as well as in attack, and by this means the enemy endeavoured to shatter the morale of the attackers, as well as to inflict very heavy casualties.

The necessity for a great preponderance of heavy artillery was also recognised by the French long before our War Office could be persuaded to move in that direction. From early in the war they aimed at obtaining one heavy gun of 6-in. calibre and upwards for every field gun they held, without reducing the proportion to bayonets of the latter which obtains in the French Army. To meet these requirements the French were taking guns from their old warships and coast defence ships, and straining every nerve to get guns of heavy calibre into the field.

In May, 1915, the proportion of field to heavy guns above 6-in. calibre in the French Army was 2.3 to one. At this time the British Army had but 71 guns altogether above 5-in. calibre against 1,416 below it, and no adequate steps whatever had yet been taken to bring the proportion more nearly to the requirements of modern warfare. The supply of trench guns and mortars, with their ammunition, hand-grenades, and other most necessary munitions of war, was almost negligible, nor was there any active attempt to understand and grapple vitally with the new problems calling for the application of modern science to the character of warfare that had developed.

I have referred before to the disinclination of the War Office, prior to the war, to take up seriously the question of high explosives; the natural consequence was that the true nature of high-explosive shells, and the correct particulars which govern their construction, were not properly understood, as they had too little experience of them.

The deadly nature of modern rifle and machine-gun fire had brought about trench warfare, which enabled the troops opposite to one another to approach to ranges which were customary in the days of the Peninsula and Waterloo. The time-honoured grenades, which were so marked a feature in those days, were thus resuscitated.

Although the War Office received detailed reports from the Front as to the employment by the enemy of these new and unfamiliar weapons, no proper attention was ever paid to these reports. It was their duty to bring these old-time weapons up to date, and to compete with the new mechanical inventions constantly being devised by the great organisation of a thoroughly prepared enemy. But reports from the Front as to these new and unfamiliar weapons were received with a carelessness which bordered on incredulity. The critical days in the early part of November, and during the First Battle of Ypres, compelled me to devise a plan to meet the exigencies of this grave emergency. As the fighting settled into trench warfare, the inadequacy of our weapons to enable us to reply to an enemy thoroughly equipped with every contrivance for this sort of warfare became painfully apparent; while even our hand-grenades, by reason of their faulty construction, frequently did not explode. I was therefore compelled to conduct experiments in the field, and improvise new weapons as well as possible. For such work the Army had no organisation. In this I received invaluable assistance from my friend, George Moore. Mr. Moore is an American who has had wide experience of large construction developments in the United States. Although a young man, he was deeply versed in the method of scientific research as applied to mechanical invention. Add to this that he was a great personal friend of my own and passionately interested in the success of the Allies, and it will be seen how naturally I turned to him for help and advice in this terrible crisis. Under Mr. Moore's advice and direction, experiments were carried out with the maximum of speed, energy and resource, covering the field of the proper construction and use of high explosives, hand-grenades, trench mortars and bombs; and a number of factories and small plants were set up for the production, for use in the field, of properly constructed hand-grenades, bombs and trench mortars.

As a result of this work in the daily trench struggle that had then developed, we were rapidly enabled to acquire the accurate knowledge of the proper use of high explosives, and the appliances necessary to meet the enemy on his own ground under these novel conditions of warfare. Mr. Moore from time to time brought men in whom he had trust and confidence to help in the work. Among them I will only specifically refer to Colonel Lewis, an American, whose machine gun, bearing his name, proved of such enormous help in this war, and to Lieutenant Lawrence Breese. This gallant young officer of the Blues, to which magnificent regiment he belonged, did wonderful work, and conducted experiments the result of which was of the highest value; and, after several months of tireless energy, gave his life in carrying out one of these experiments. This hastily improvised organisation worked night and day in these trying times, with the results which enabled us, with success, to meet the enemy in trench warfare.

During this time I received visits at my Headquarters from prominent members of both Houses of Parliament, to whom I told, in course of conversation, the great anxiety I felt on the subject of the shortage of heavy guns and ammunition.

On March 22nd I gave an interview to the Press, which appeared generally in the English papers, from which I quote: "It is a rough war, but the problem it sets is a comparatively simple one—munitions, more munitions, always more munitions; this is the essential question, the governing condition of all progress, of every leap forward." On March 27th I gave an interview to The Times, in which I said as follows: "The protraction of the war depends entirely upon the supply of men and munitions. Should these be unsatisfactory, the war will be accordingly prolonged. I dwell emphatically on the need for munitions."

To the public men who visited me, I appealed that they should make known this grave necessity to the public in their speeches. I quote a line from a speech of the Earl of Durham, who, at my request, said: "What we want and must have is more and more munitions."

At a conference at Chantilly with Lord Kitchener, I reminded him of my constant representations on the subject of munitions, both officially and privately, and warned him that the danger would be fatal if instant action were not taken to supply our needs.

It must be remembered that all this time, when the British Forces in France were in absolute jeopardy owing to these deficiencies, trainloads of all kinds of ammunition were passing along our rear en route to Marseilles and the Dardanelles.

This was the situation when on April 22nd the Germans made their first attack with poisoned gas in the Second Battle of Ypres and, in a gigantic effort, again attempted to break through; and the defence called for the most desperate kind of fighting, only surpassed in intensity by the struggle in the First Battle of Ypres. Just about this time, the then Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith, made his famous Newcastle speech, in which he stated that the Army had all the ammunition it required. When I read this speech, after all my public and private appeals, I lost any hope that I had entertained of receiving help from the Government as then constituted. So that, on May 9th, 1915, when we commenced the Battle of Festubert, an operation undertaken to relieve the intense pressure on the troops at Ypres, my mind was filled with keen anxiety. After all our demands, less than 8 per cent. of our shells were high explosive, and we had only sufficient supply for about 40 minutes of artillery preparation for this attack. On the tower of a ruined church I spent several hours in close observation of the operations. Nothing since the Battle of the Aisne had ever impressed me so deeply with the terrible shortage of artillery and ammunition as did the events of that day. As I watched the Aubers ridge, I clearly saw the great inequality of the artillery duels, and, as attack after attack failed, I could see that the absence of sufficient artillery support was doubling and trebling our losses in men. I therefore determined on taking the most drastic measures to destroy the apathy of a Government which had brought the Empire to the brink of disaster. A friend was standing by my side on the tower, and to him I poured out my doubts and fears and announced my determination. He warned me that the politicians would never forgive the action I proposed, and that it meant my certain recall from the command in France. But my decision was made, and I immediately started for my Headquarters, fully determined on my future course of action.

If any additional proof were required of the hopelessness of any relief coming from the War Office, I found it waiting for me when I reached Headquarters that afternoon, in the shape of a telegram from the Secretary of State for War, directing that 20 per cent. of our scanty reserve supply of ammunition was to be shipped to the Dardanelles. I immediately gave instructions that evidence should be furnished to Colonel Repington, military correspondent of The Times, who happened to be then at Headquarters, that the vital need of high-explosive shells had been a fatal bar to our Army success on that day. I directed that copies of all the correspondence which had taken place between myself and the Government on the question of the supply of ammunition be made at once, and I sent my Secretary, Brinsley FitzGerald, with Captain Frederick Guest, one of my A.D.C.s, to England with instructions that these proofs should be laid before Mr. Lloyd George, who had already shown me, by his special interest in this subject, that he grasped the deadly nature of our necessities. I instructed also that they should be laid before Mr. Arthur J. Balfour and Mr. Bonar Law, whose sympathetic understanding of my difficulties, when they visited me in France, had led me to expect that they would take the action that this grave exigency demanded. Together with the correspondence, I sent the following memorandum:—

(Secret.)

INFORMATION REGARDING AMMUNITION

1. Large quantities of high-explosive shells for field guns have become essential owing to the form of warfare in which the Army is engaged. The enemy is entrenched from the sea to the Swiss frontier. There is no flank in his position that can be turned. It is necessary, therefore, for all offensive operations to start by breaking the enemy's line, which presupposes the attack of formidable field entrenchments. Shrapnel, being the man-killing projectile which is used against troops in the open, is primarily used in defence. In offensive operations it is used for searching communication trenches, preventing the enemy's reinforcements intervening in the fight, repelling counter-attacks, and, as an alternative for high-explosive shell, for cutting wire entanglements. It is, however, ineffective against the occupants of the trenches, breastworks, or buildings. It is, therefore, necessary to have high-explosive shell to destroy parapets, obstacles, buildings, and many forms of fortified localities that the enemy constructs, more particularly his machine-gun emplacements. Without an adequate supply the attack is impotent against the defenders of field fortifications, as the first step cannot be taken. Guns require 50 per cent. of high-explosive shell. Howitzers use high-explosive shell almost exclusively.

2. We have found by experience that the field guns actually engaged in offensive operations, such as Neuve Chapelle, fire about 120 rounds per gun per day.

Heavy guns and howitzers, according to their calibre, fire less in proportion. The guns of the whole Army are of course never equally heavily engaged at the same time, but the number of guns available and the amount of ammunition are the limiting factors when a plan of attack is being considered. There is, therefore, scarcely any limit to the supply of ammunition that could be usefully employed. The more ammunition, the bigger the scale on which the attack can be delivered, and the more persistently it can be pressed.

Demands must, however, be reasonable, and our position would be very greatly improved if our supply reached the figures in the attached Table "A" within three months. Up to the present it has been below these figures.

WANTED THREE MONTHS HENCE, SAY, AUGUST 1ST.

Table "A."

Guns Rounds per Gun Total Rounds Nature. now in per Day. required Daily.[3] Country. Shrapnel. H.E. Shrapnel. H.E. 18-pdr. 700 12 12 8,500 8,500 13-pdr. 125 12 12 1,500 1,500 15-pdr. BLC. 200 12 12 2,500 2,500 4.7-in. gun 80 8 8 650 650 60-pdr. 28 8 8 250 250 5-in. howitzer 50 15 750 4.5-in. howit- 130 4 16 500 2,000 zer. 6-in. howitzer 40 12 500 9.2-in. howit- 12 12 150 zer. 13,900 16,800 Grand Total 30,700 daily. Grand Total 921,000 monthly.

[Footnote 3: Round numbers are given. Expansion must be provided for at a similar rate. We need more guns and a correspondingly larger amount of ammunition.]

3. Table "B" shows the percentage of high explosive of certain natures received since application for increased quantities was made between September and December last.

PERCENTAGE OF HIGH EXPLOSIVE RECEIVED SINCE FIRST APPLICATION FOR IT IN INCREASED QUANTITIES.

Table "B."

Nature of Gun. Dec. Jan. Feb. March. April. May. Per Per Per Per Per Per Cent. Cent. Cent. Cent. Cent. Cent. 13-pdr. Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil 18-pdr. 3.8 6.8 8.3 8.2 6.1 8 4.5-in. howitzer 44.4 68.5 88 75 59 65 60-pdr. 66 60 56 53 50 7-in. howitzer 55 59 51 77 69 50

Colonel FitzGerald and Captain Guest reported that on May 12th and 14th they had carried out my instructions and laid the facts before Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Balfour and Mr. Bonar Law. On May 15th, Colonel Repington's article appeared in The Times. The world knows what then happened. The Coalition Government was formed, with Mr. Lloyd George as Minister of Munitions; and, though delays afterwards occurred, the problem was at last faced with the intelligence and energy that its gravity demanded, and I feel that for his work on munitions we owe unmeasured gratitude to Mr. Lloyd George. The successful solution of the problem came when he applied to it that matchless energy which has enabled him to come through the great ordeal as England's most valued leader in her direst hour.

For my unprecedented action I claim that no other course lay open to me. To organise the nation's industrial resources upon a stupendous scale was the only way if we were to continue with success the great struggle which lay before us, and I feel that the result achieved fully warranted the steps I took.



INDEX

ABBEVILLE, 182, 199, 205; Railway junction, 200.

Admiralty, see British Admiralty.

Aeltre, 208.

Aeroplane Squadrons, 2, 3, 4, 5; R.F.C., 25.

Aeroplanes and Aircraft, effect on warfare, 12; at Amiens, 33; potentialities realised by French, 155; menace of, to London, in event of Germans reaching Calais, 215.

Aerial Reconnaissances, 12, 43-4, 90, 121, 145, 185, 200 passim; Future of, 144.

Air Services (see also Royal Flying Corps), spirit of, 340.

Aire, 200.

Aire-Bethune line, 2nd Corps directed on, 199, 201, 202.

Aire-La Bassee Canal reached by 2nd Corps, 203.

Aisne, Battle of the, 13, 16, 142 sqq., 193 sqq.; day of opening, 146; British share in, 115, 118 sqq., 140-1; French's dispositions of, how influenced, 157; French share in, 115, 121, 123, 135, 140 sqq., 145, 146, 154, 157, 158-9, 160, 161, 164; German forces believed to be in position for, 116; German heavy artillery in, 119, 144, 212; Germany's lost opportunity in, 216; Intense artillery fire in, 144, 145-6, 149, 150, 212; Last days of (Oct. 1 sqq.), 193 sqq.; Last repulse of the enemy at, by the 1st Corps (Oct. 11), 211; Losses, 152-3, 159, 160; Operations hampered by, Lack of artillery and machine guns, 101, 347, 356; Rain, 157; Tactical aspect of, 140, 159; Value in, of British "moral," 55; Battlefield, Features of, Strategical, 148; Topographical, 143, 145, 147-8.

Aisne Canal, suggested French extension to, 186.

Aisne, Department of, 48.

Aisne-Compiegne-Soissons line, withdrawal to, 91.

Aisne Front, withdrawal from, object of, plan first conceived, 155-6, 157, 301; pourparlers on, with Joffre, 163, 164 sqq.; the Northern move begun, 193; progress of, 235-6; French views on, 305 sqq.

Aisne Heights, a reconnaissance from, 161.

Aisne River: Bridges (road) over, 147; All under artillery fire, 148; Constructed over by British Corps (Sept. 13), 150, 151; British positions on, 146-7, 158, 160, 165, 182; Steep banks of, 145; Reported German troop-transfer to, 223; Roads and railways in valley of, 147-8; Wooded country N. of, marches through, consultations on, with Joffre, 143.

Aizy, German counter-attack at, 151.

Albert, King of the Belgians, characteristics of, 344; French invited to H.Q. of, at Louvain, 42-3; sortie directed by, 143-4; and the withdrawal from Antwerp, 175; and French's scheme for Anglo-Belgian military co-operation (Dec. 28-30), 343 sqq.

Albert, French progress near, 325.

Alfrey, Lieut., killed at Moncel, 120.

Allenby, Major-General E. H. H. (now General Sir E. H. H., G.C.M.G., K.C.B.), G.O.C. 1st Cavalry Division, later G.O.C. Cavalry Corps (q.v.), 16, 24, 323; At Mons and after, Instructions to, 47; support given by, to Fergusson (Aug. 24), 65; During the Retreat from Mons, protection given by, to infantry, &c., 60, 64, 65, 71, 72, 75, 84-5, 87; view of, on Smith-Dorrien's situation on Aug. 25, 76; help given by, to 2nd Corps at Le Cateau, 78; During the Marne operations, 109; Marne bridges seized by, 133; fine leadership of, 137; During the Aisne operations, 146, 161; During the Move North and the Battle of Ypres, role assigned to, and finely carried out by, 200-1, 202 sqq., 233; the stand on the Wytschaete-Messines ridge, 204, 233, 238, 244, 246, 247, 277; consummate skill shown by, 261; later work, 278, 280; On the services of the London Scottish on Oct. 31-Nov. 1, 262-3.

Allied Commanders, views of, before the Retreat from Mons, 47, 55, 56, 57; wishes ignored in London (Oct. 4, &c), in reference to Antwerp, 180 et proevi.

Allied Forces (see also Belgian, British, and French); support of, to Belgium inadequate to prevent retreat, 46; positions of, on Aug. 29, 91; offensive planned for, for Sept. 6, 107, 109-10; and the end of the Great Retreat, 110; situation of, on Oct. 6, 181-3; object of, on Oct. 6, 182; combined eastward advance of, planned for Oct. 13, 203; condition, if the enemy had driven a wedge between, 225; position of, and enemy forces opposing, on the night of Oct. 21, 231-2; enormous enemy superiority to (Oct. 30), 240; dispositions of, at the 1st Battle of Ypres (Oct. 29 p.m.), 242; loyalty and fine feeling between, as evidenced in the 1st Battle of Ypres, 256; augmentation of, in the West, some resources of, 301-2; plans for, in the West, at close of 1st Battle of Ypres, bases of, 301; needs and alternatives, 301-2; combined attack by (Dec. 14), on the Hollebeke-Wytschaete ridge line, 322; ability of, to keep the line inviolate, proven, 345.

Allied Nations, spirit of, at close of 1914, 345.

Alost-Termonde-Lokeren line, German move on (Oct. 11), 203.

Alsace, French offensive in, 48.

Alston, General, G.O.C. Naval Detachments for Antwerp, 181.

Alternatives in Campaigns, the faculty of choice of, 217.

America, entry of, into the War, 346.

American Civil War, lesson of, as to interference by Home Government with Commanders in the Field, 111, 178.

Amiens, British concentration point, 6, 14, 32; aircraft at, 33; 6th French Army forming at, 89; German forces operating through, 105.

Ammunition (see also Artillery, Guns, High Explosive, Machine-Guns, Royal Artillery, &c.), 44; British lack of, and the consequences, French's constant representations on, before and during the war, 162-3, 241; Kitchener on, 309-10; French's reply, 313, 316; results, 332-3, 343, 347, 349, 351; the upshot of the agitation, 347 sqq.; the Memorandum to the War Cabinet, 357-60; and the results, 360; Gun-fire, 1st Battle of Ypres, restricted for lack of, 349; Output of, required for, Reserve, 349-50; Use, 349; Russian (reported) deficiency in; Joffre's information concerning (Dec. 27), 341.

Ancre River, Bulkeley Johnson killed at, 136.

Anley, Colonel F. G., O.C. (temp.) 12th Infantry Brigade, 26.

Annequin—Pont Fixe—Festubert—Chapelle—Fosse line, 2nd Corps at (Oct. 12), 210.

Ansell, Lieut.-Colonel, O.C. 5th Dragoon Guards, killed in action, 76.

Antwerp, 48, 163, 304; Belgian retirement on, 45, 46; sortie from, 143; danger to, not envisaged, 157; Belgian withdrawal from, planned, 175; relief of, French's efforts for, 176 sqq.; Kitchener's action, 177, 179, 181; French's views on (Oct. 6), 182-3; and Joffre's, 178-9; British Government's anxieties on, 191; position at, 198; fall of, 175 sqq., 192, 201; menace of, to the Channel ports, 176; and effect of, on French's plans of Sept., 164, 302; French's steps to keep in touch with events at, 184 sqq.; German advances from, 208-9.

Appomattox, Lee's surrender at, 231.

Archangel, disadvantages of, 315.

Ardennes, the, anticipations concerning, 11, 39; Rivers rising in, 51.

Argyll and Sutherland (Princess Louise's) Highlanders: 2nd Batt., 23, 61; in the Battle of Ypres, 243; 7th Batt. (T.), 296.

Armentieres, 209; 3rd Corps' fighting near, 219, 220; the town taken, 221; and shelled, 222; German forces N. of, 240; success of the 6th Division near (Oct. 28), 241.

Armentieres—La Bassee, Indian Corps' fighting between, 284.

Armies, Decision to form, communicated to Corps' Commanders, 337.

Arques, 329.

Arras, and the Sea, German strength between (Oct. 10), Foch's estimate of, 223; attack N. of, by de Maud'huy (Dec. 16-17), 324-5; weather difficulties at, 337; Joffre's plan to break through W. of, 342; French success near (Dec. 27), 345.

Arras front, the, 234.

Artillery see German, Guns, Heavy Artillery, Royal Artillery.

Artists' Rifles (28th (County of London) Batt. the London Regiment), arrival in France (Nov.), 27, 271, 295; converted into an Officers' Training Corps, 272, 295, 297.

Asia Minor, action in, French's view on, 316.

Asquith, Rt. Hon. H. H., 305, 308, 329, 331; and the Entente, 3; at the Council of War of Aug. 5, 1914, 3; French's relations with, and the ammunition shortage, 332; the Newcastle speech, 356.

Ath, route from, across Haine Valley, 49; German advance to, 57.

Attack, how best warded off, 313.

"Attaque!" General Foch's constant cry, 198, 274.

Aubers Ridge, artillery shortage at, 356.

Augustovo, German disaster at, 230.

Aulnoy, 2nd Corps at (Sept. 8), 123.

Aulnoye, Railway junction at, 52.

Austria-Hungary, War declared by, on Serbia, 2; French and British declarations of War with, 2.

Austro-German defeats, 268, 274.

Avesnes, 50, 67.

Bailleul, 227, 234, 241, 245, 258; German defeat at, 207.

Balfour, Rt. Hon. A. J., and the Munitions question, 357, 360.

Balloon observation and heavy artillery, 12.

Baltic Sea, 315.

Barrow, Lieut.-Col. G. de S., A.D.C. Chief of Staff to Allenby, 243.

Barry, Lieut.-Col. S. L., A.D.C. to French, 255.

Bassevelle, advanced troops at, 126, 127.

Battenberg, H.S.H. Prince Maurice of, death from wounds, 240.

Battles, past and present, names of, and time-limits of, 218.

Bavai, 2nd Army Corps' retreat on (Aug. 24), 63, 64; French's advanced H.Q. at, 65, 66, 68; conditions in, and around, 69-70; strategic importance of, 65.

Bayonets, demand for, by British cavalry (Sept. 21), 161.

Bazaine and Metz, warning from, 71.

Bazoches, 148.

Beale-Browne, Major, 9th Lancers, at Moncel, 119.

Beaumont, French movements near, 38-9.

Becherelle-Maison Neuve road, fighting in woods near, 128.

Bedfordshire Regiment: 1st Batt., 23; 2nd Batt., 29.

Belgian Army (see also Allied Forces); nearest French force to, 38; entrenched near Louvain, 41; retreat on Aug. 21, 45-6; later position, 48; in Antwerp, 143, 176; co-operation of anticipated, 182; position in combined advance as planned, 203; retreat of, to Bruges and the Yser, 183, 192, 201, 208, 212; fatigue of, 217, 224; stand of, on that stream, 278; German attack on, at Nieuport (Oct. 19), 227; in the Battle of Ypres, 232; active hostilities resumed by (Dec. 2), 336; French's scheme for co-operation with, by amalgamation, 343-5.

Belgian Coast-line (see also Channel Ports), Plans for regaining command of, 303; Commandant of Antwerp, French in communication with, 191; Defence of Frontier fortresses, 7, 176; Government, Message from, to French, on the retirement on Antwerp, 45-6; departure of, from Antwerp (Oct. 3), 175; Neutrality, British guarantee of, 9, 14; Pre-war attitude as to conduct in a general war, 9; Refugees near Le Cateau (Aug. 24), 68-9, 83.

Belgian Luxemburg, German forces in, 41.

Belgium, Central Plains of, 50; French cavalry operations in, 44, 67, 68; German turning movement in, 57; Industrially important districts of, 49, 50, 51; Inundation of, 242-3; Further, considered, 313.

Bellot, fighting at, 126.

Beluchi Regiment, 129th (Duke of Connaught's Own), 238.

Bercelaere, the Worcesters at (Oct. 31), 254.

Berinage coalfield, 49, 51, 53.

Berry-au-Bac, French capture of Prussian Guards at (Sept. 17), 157.

Berthelot, General, Chief of Staff to Joffre, first impressions of, 35.

Bertie, Rt. Hon. Sir Francis Leveson, G.C.B. (now Lord Bertie), British Ambassador to the French Republic, a tribute to, 33; views of, on Kitchener's functions (Sept. 2), 99; telegram to, from Grey on the Coastal advance (Dec. 9), 305 sqq.

Bethune, 209, 235; 2nd corps at, 209, 210.

Bethune—Aire line, 2nd corps approaching, 201, 202.

Bethune-Lille-Tournai road, assigned for French advance (Oct. 13), 203.

Beyers, General, a chivalrous act by, 339.

Bhopal Infantry, 9th Regiment, 238.

Bidon, General, French Territorials under, 233.

Binche, distances from, to Conde and to Le Nouvion, 48; strategic importance of, 53; occupied by enemy, 60.

Bingham, Brigadier-General Hon. C. E., G.O.C. 4th Cavalry Brigade, 24, 65, 247.

"Black Country"-like area, 2nd Corps' operations in, 209.

"Black Marias," see "Jack Johnsons".

Black Watch, The (Royal Highlanders), 1st Batt., 17, 126, 250, 328; 5th Batt. (T.), arrival of, in France, 295.

Bleu to Berthen, German positions on, 207.

Bleu to Neuve Eglise line, secured by 3rd Corps, 207.

Boers, the, chivalry shown by, in fight, 339.

Bois l'Eveque, roads and railways, traversing, 52.

Bois Grenier, capture of, by 3rd Corps (Oct. 18), 221.

Boitron, enemy fire from, 127; Church, artillery action N. of, counter-attack near, and Guards' action in woods N.W. of, 128.

Bombs, use of, 144.

Bonnet, 1st Army Corps H.Q., 65; fighting watched from, by French, 66.

Bordeaux, 305, 346.

Border Regiment, the, 2nd Batt., 28; 5th Batt. (T.), 27, 295.

Borodino, Battle of, 217.

Bouchain, Scheldt crossing at, 50.

Boulogne, 173, 176, 180, 183, 188; French's landing at, 13; German menace to, 171, 176; Napoleon's menace from, 215; a possible execution of in the present century foreseen, 155-6.

Bourg, the Aisne crossed at, by 1st Corps, 151.

Bouvignies, Scheldt crossing at, 50.

Bowes, Brigadier-General, G.O.C. 8th Infantry Brigade, 21, 322.

Bradbury, Captain, killed in action, 101.

Braine and district cleared by Allenby's cavalry, 146.

"Brand, Tom" (Viscount Hampden), O.C. Hertfordshire Territorials, powers of, with his men, 271.

Brandenburg Corps, and its commander in the Franco-German War of 1870, 285.

Bray, 60.

Braye, French extension to, suggested, 186.

Breese, Lieutenant Lawrence, of the Royal Horse Guards, scientific experiment of, on new weapons, costing his life, 355.

Breteuil, de Castelnau's H.Q. at, 199.

Bridges, Colonel Thomas, 4th Dragoon Guards, character summary of, 184-5; sent to Brussels, 185; report from, on the situation in Antwerp, 198; French's representative with H.M. the King of the Belgians, the co-operative scheme discussed with, 343-4.

Bridoux, General, Commanding French Cavalry Corps, role assigned to, 143; killed, 158.

Brigades, see Infantry Brigades.

Briggs, Brigadier-General C. J., G.O.C. 1st Cavalry Brigade, 24.

British Admiralty, views of, on the Zeebrugge schemes, 311, 320-1.

British Army, see each component part, and Names of Commanders; see also British Expeditionary Force, and Indian Corps; Disadvantages of (circa 1914), 140; One of its most sacred Traditions, 330; Possibility of Employing elsewhere than as on Jan. 9, 1915; Memorandum of War Council, 313-14; and French's reply, 315 sqq.; Secret of its fighting power, 330.

British Empire at stake in the 1st Battle of Ypres, 214-16; two fateful dates for, 237, 252, 260; saved by the Cavalry Corps, 261; jeopardised by the shortage of Munitions. French's consequent action, 347, 356, 357; practically inviolate throughout the War, 331.

British Expeditionary Force for France, command given to French, 2, 8, 17; Composition of, 4; at start and later, with names of Commanders, 16 sqq.; Combined action with the Navy considered by French and discussed with Churchill, 157, 164; further consideration of, 302 sqq.; objections of the French, 305, 307, 342, 343; the substituted plan in operation, 322 sqq.; Concentration on left flank of the French fixed, 5, 6-7, 14; and effected, 33, 35, 40; general instructions for action when completed, 42; order of the day referred to, 212; see also Move northward, below; Condition of, after Le Cateau, 89, 95, 111; Co-operation of, with the Belgians, French's scheme for, 302, 303, 343-5; Belgian promise of, 43-6; Deficiencies after Le Cateau due to Losses (q.v.) (Aug. 31), 95; Despatch of, to France; Instructions to C.-in-C. on his departure, 13-15; Feeling of, for the Prussian invaders of East Prussia, 194; French's talks with the men, 88-9, 136; German estimate of (Sept. 3), 105; the thing forgotten by them, 107; H.Q. in London; Locale and Staff, 5-6; Imperilment of, by the abandonment of the French offensive, 94; Losses (see also that head) in Officers, how made good, 272; Marching of, 94; Message to, from the King, 275; Moral of, see Spirit Animating, below; Moral sustained through the Great Retreat, 107; Motive and Task of, 14; Move of, to the N., to left flank of French forces, envisaged by French in Sept., 157, 162; the pourparlers on, 163 sqq.; Joffre's views on, 166-9, and dispositions suggested by him, 169 sqq.; urged on by French in early October, 176; further urgent representations on, to Joffre, and the replies, 185 sqq.; the march begun (Oct. 1), 193, 195 sqq.; its progress, 198 sqq.; how thwarted, 341 sqq.; combined advance east planned for (Oct. 13), 20; New base decided on, 93; Offensive action by, urged by Joffre and others (Aug. 31), and refused by French, 95; Orders of the Day issued to, by French; Sept. 8, 131-2; Special: Aug. 22, paragraph 2, quoted, 212; Oct. 16, 211-12; Oct. 23, 229; Nov. 1, 257; Nov. 3, 260-9; Nov. 3, 269-70; Position desired for, for Sept. 6, by Joffre, 107; Positions held by (see also Concentration, above), and movements of, before and during the: (a) Retreat from Mons, 47 sqq.; (b) Battle of the Marne, 117 sqq.; (c) Battle of the Aisne, 145 sqq.; (d) Movement N., after that Battle, 193 sqq.; (e) 1st Battle of Ypres, 214 sqq.; (f) Operations of Dec. 14-19, 1914, 326 sqq.; Qualities shown by all ranks in the 1st Battle of Ypres, 238, 239; Reserves and reinforcements available, 113, 228; continued lack of both, 265; War Council's view on (Jan. 7, 1915), 309; Roads and Supply Railheads allotted to, for the Battle of the Marne, 132-3; Services of, acknowledgments of, by, Joffre, 85, 98; Poincare, 198; Spirit animating, 55, 78, 88-9, 98, 110, 111, 113, 238, 239, 266, 269, 270, 271; Strain endured by, in the 1st Battle of Ypres, 237; Successive instead of united action by, envisaged by Joffre (Oct. 4), 189 sqq.; Wilson's share in preparation of, 108.

British Force for Relief of Antwerp, 177, 179, 181; what befell it, and what might have been done with it, 183; Poincare's view on, 198.

British Forces, see British Army.

British Government, see also War Cabinet; offensive action urged by, on Aug. 31, 95; objective unattainable without adequate Munitions, insistence on by French, 351 sqq., 357 sqq.; see also 347, 358 sqq.; Guarantee of Belgian neutrality, 9, 14.

British Imperial General Staff, French's resignation from, 1; and French's appointment to Command of B.E.F., 2; conferences of, with French General Staff, 5, 9.

British Losses at Le Cateau, 78-9, 83-7, 89, 153; in the Battle of the Aisne, 152-3, 159, 160; on the Marne, 137, 138; in the Battle of Ypres, 251, 279, 285-6.

British Naval co-operation arranged for, 226-7; Detachments for relief of Antwerp, and their Commander, 179, 181; difficulty of withdrawing, 201; Transport Service line, efficiency of, 40.

British Navy (see also Naval co-operation) Combined action with plans for, 157, 164 sqq., 302 sqq.; French objections to, 305, 307, 342, 343; Position of in Aug. 1914, 4; and at the close of the year, 345.

British Reservists, in Aug. 1914, 42.

British Soldiers, military characteristics of, 42; Moral superiority of, over German, value of, 55; and Officers, instinctive sympathy between, 88; Qualities of, saving the Armies from disaster, 94; Spirit of, at and before the Battle of the Marne, 113, 121; Troops, mobilisation of, 3.

Brooke, Colonel Lord, and the Warwickshire Battery of Horse Artillery (q.v.), 295.

Broome, a pause at, with Kitchener, 333.

Bruges, Belgian retreat on, covered by Rawlinson, 201; German advance on, 208; and arrival at, 219; plan for clearing, 221, 226; failure of, 235.

Brussels, Belgian evacuation of, 45-6; German cavalry advance on, 58; Colonel Bridges despatched to, 185; Railway to and from, 53; route from, across Haine valley, 49.

Brussels-Givet line, German menace to, 41.

Bucy-le-Long-Bourg line, held by British, 150, 152.

Bug, the, Russian operations near, 334.

Bulfin, Brigadier-General E. S., G.O.C. 2nd Infantry Brigade, 18, 244; given command of the 1st Division, 251-2.

Bulgaria, Joffre's hopes from, 34.

Bull Run, Battle of, 231.

Bully beef, exchange of, for loan of Guns, by Haig, 159.

"Bunching up" of infantry, 130.

Bussieres, attempt to cut off enemy retreat at, 128.

Bussieres-Boitron-Hondevilliers line, British left on, 131.

Butler, Brigadier-General R. H. K., G.O.C. 3rd Infantry Brigade, 18.

Buzancy, French's view from, of the Aisne combat, 145.

Byng, Major-General Hon. Sir Julian, G.O.C. 3rd Cavalry Division, 29; operations by, 201; during the Battle of Ypres, 227, 239, 243, 244; Appointed to command Cavalry Division for relief of Antwerp, 181.

Bzura, the, Russian retreat to, and stand on, 230.

Cabinet, The (see also War Cabinet), anxiety of (Dec. 1914), 332.

Cabinet Ministers, French's efforts to rouse to the need for more Munitions, 347.

Calais, 183; menace to, and from, of the fall of Antwerp, 176, 214-15, 304.

Calais-Dover, distance well within range of modern heavy artillery, 215.

Cambon, Paul, French Ambassador in London, 3.

Cambrai, 77; canal by, 49-50; Scheldt crossing at, 50; British troops near, 72; German reinforcements at, 182.

Cambrai to Conde and to Le Nouvion, distances, 48.

Cameron Highlanders, 1st Batt., 27; at the Petit Morin, 126; in the Battle of Ypres, 250; at Givenchy, 328.

Cameronians, The (Scottish Rifles), 5th Batt. (T.), 295.

Campaigns, alternatives offered by preliminary conditions of, 217-18; Development of, often quite unlike the preconceived plan, 217; success in, from what resulting, 217-18.

Campbell, Lieut.-Colonel D., 9th Lancers, at Moncel, 119; and wounded, 120.

Canal Du Centre, junction of, with the Conde Canal, 53.

Capper, Major-General T., G.O.C. 7th Infantry Division, 28, 227; sent to relief of Antwerp, 181; at Ghent, 201, 203; retreat thence, 208.

Carency, French line advanced at, 345.

Carvin and Lens, French Cavalry operating between, 182.

Cassel, French's interviews at, with Foch, 233, 274, 277-8; on the inundation question, 242-3.

Castelnau, General de, efforts of, to turn the German flank, 13, 145, 159, 160, 162, 197, 216, 325; Fine leading of, and the results, 158-9; Seen by French on October 8, personal losses sustained by, and pressure on troops of, 199.

Catillon, Bridge at, 51.

Cattenieres, German move on, 77.

Cavalry, see British, French, German, Cavalry.

Cavalry, British (see also Indian Cavalry, and each unit under Brigade, Corps, Division, Regiment, and Names of Commanders) of the Expeditionary Force, 4; Composition and Commanders of, 16, 17 sqq. (see also Cavalry Brigades, Corps, Divisions), Demand of, for Bayonets, 161; Guns saved by, at Le Cateau, 77; Memorandum on the Employment of, 129-30; Operations of, before, during, and after the, (a) Retreat from Mons, 44, 47 sqq.; (b) Battle of the Marne, 119 sqq.; (c) Battle of the Aisne, 146, 152, 165; (d) Move northwards, 172 sqq.; (e) 1st Battle of Ypres, 220 sqq. passim; (f) Operations of Dec. 14-19, 238; Reconnaissance work of; shared with Aircraft, 43-4; Superiority of, to that of the enemy, 94; Brigades: 1st, 24; fine work of, at Braine, 146; 2nd, 24, 65, 73; guns saved by, 77; at Moncel, 119-20; 3rd, 24, 65; at St. Quentin, 87; fighting on the Marne, 129, 132; filling gap between 3rd and 2nd Corps, 135; energy of, 137; at Chassemy, 152; 4th, 24, 25, 63; at Messines, 247, 263; 5th, 25; at Binche, 47; at Cerizy, 87; near Compiegne, 93; on the Marne, 132; following gap between 3rd and 2nd Corps, 135; in Marne Battle, 135; French's talk to, after the fight, 136; energy of, 137; at Chassemy, 152; 6th, 29; at Gheluvelt, 250; 7th (see also Kavanagh), 30; in the Battle of Ypres, 250, 251; at Messines, 246; fine work by, 256, 272; Corps (see also Allenby), formation of, 24, 200, 202; fine work by, 203, 204 sqq.; operations planned for, in the Battle of Ypres, 219; and executed by, 220, 221; victories of, 223; front held by, 225, 232; falling back on Messines, 227; hard pressed at Zonnebeke, 233; glorious stand by, and by associated troops on the Wytschaete-Messines ridge, 238, 244 sqq.; support sent to, 250; admirable aid given by, 261; repulse of the enemy by, back to the Lys, 277; Divisional, see Divisional Cavalry; Divisions: 1st, 16, 24, 61; fine reconnaissance work by, 64, 65, 72, 73, 75, 76, 84, 87, 119, 126; orders to, before the Battle of the Marne, 132; at Braine, 152; and the move N., 169, 171, 173, 188; the move begun, 193, 193, 198, 200, 202; fine work by, 204, 205; fighting on the Lys, 220; in support at Messines, 244; fierce fighting by, 245, 246, 247; withdrawal to Wulverghem, 258, 259; London Scottish joining in the trenches, 263; supporting Conneau, 264; reinforcing Haig, 280; 2nd, 25, 146; move to the N., 170-1, 172, 174, 193, 195, 200; capture by, of the Mont des Cats, 204; and of Mont Noir, 205; capture by, of Mont Kemmel, 208; at Warneton, 220; reinforcing Haig, 243; and hard pressed, 244; at Messines, 246; at Gheluvelt, 250; heavily attacked on the Wytschaete-Messines ridge, 237, 258, 259; French support of, 261; London Scottish detached to support, 263; 3rd, 16, 29, 165, 178, 188, 273; detailed for Relief of Antwerp, 180, 181, 192, 201; at Thourout, 204; fighting in Houthulst Forest, 220; near Menin, 224; increasing pressure on, 227, 233, 239; intense fighting near Hollebeke, 243, 244, 246; value of, 276; critical situation, 251; fighting at Wytschaete-Messines ridge, 260; 8th, 169.

Cavalry Commanders, French's discussions with, before Mons, 43.

Cavalry on Foot, disadvantages of, 261-2.

Cavalry spirit, advantages of, 262.

Cavan, Brigadier-General the Earl of, G.O.C. 4th (Guards Brigade), 19, 244, 271; later command of, 252, 271; fine work by, 272; marvellous influence over his men, 271.

Celles, spurs near, 150.

Cerizy, German cavalry repulse at, 87.

Cerseuil, 7th Brigade at, 195.

Chailly and Jouy-sur-Morin, 1st Corps at, 123.

Chalons, rail to, from Maubeuge, 53.

Chamigny, Marne crossed at, by part of 3rd Corps, 138.

Champagne, Plain of, 117; German forces giving way in, 142.

Changis, Marne crossings near, 124, 129; French difficulties at, 133-4.

Changis-Coulommiers line, British position on, before the Marne Battle, 115.

Channel Ports, German menace to, 341; constantly in French's mind, 11, 155-7; increased by the fall of Antwerp, 176; possibility of averting, 183; gravity of, in the 1st Battle of Ypres, 214-16, 224; the advance checked by that battle, 235-6, 277; moment of greatest danger to (Oct. 31), 252, 260; saved by the Territorials, 294; rendered grave by German hold on Belgian coast, Grey on, 306-7; French's plan for extinguishing this menace, 302 sqq.; Joffre's views and alternative plan, 307, 310-11; and memorandum on, 317-18.

Channel Tunnel, 214; views on, of French, 156.

Chantilly, meetings at, with Joffre, 336, 340; conference at, with Kitchener, the Munitions question urged at, 355-6.

Charleroi, country near, 50; German advance on, 58.

Charleroi Canal, canals connected with, 53.

Charly-sur-Marne, bridge at, seized by Allenby, 133.

Chassemy, Gough's cavalry at, 152.

Chateau-Thierry, French forces falling back on, 104; taken by the enemy, 105; French advance directed on, 115; German concentration near, 151.

Chatillon, the French G.H.Q. at, 142.

Chemin des Dames, position maintained by the French, 157; plateau S. of, 161.

Cheshire Regiment: 1st Batt., 22; 6th Batt. (T.), 296.

Chetwode, Brigadier-General Sir Philip P. W., G.O.C. 5th Cavalry Brigade, 25, 47; German cavalry repulsed by, at Cerizy, 87; 1st Corps' retirement covered by, 93; French's visit with, to the tired troops, 136.

Chichester, Brigadier-General, O.C. Territorial Training Camp, St. Omer, 294.

Chivalry in war, importance of maintaining, instances of, in the Boer War, 339.

Chivres Plateau, German artillery concentration on, 151-2.

Chivres Plateau-Missy line held by 5th Division, 152.

Chivres Spur, Aisne Valley, 147.

Christmas Day, 1900, a Boer Christmas present after, 339.

Christmas Day, 1914, how spent by French, 337; an armistice believed to have been suggested for, by the Pope, 337; German fraternisation on, 338.

Churchill, Rt. Hon. Winston, and the Entente, 3; on the situation of the British Navy on August 5, 1914, 4; attacks on, repudiated by French, and valuable help acknowledged, 164; character-summary of, 302-3; visits of, to French, and plans for naval co-operation sketched out during, 163-4; and letters after, 302 sqq.; later visit to French (Dec. 17), the difficulties of British coastal advance discussed, 305; French dislike of the plan, 305; and substitute for it, 307; on the French attitude to the Zeebrugge plan, 307; telegram from (Jan. 2), on the development of Zeebrugge as a submarine base, 308; text, 311.

Clive, Major, Grenadier Guards, liaison officer at French H.Q., news from, 72; a tribute to, 274.

Cloth Hall, and other glories at Ypres, 248.

Coast-line, menace to, see Channel ports.

Coldstream Guards, The, 1st Batt., 17, 250; at Givenchy, 328; 2nd Batt., 19, 125, 128, 244; 3rd Batt., 19, 125, 127, 128, 244.

Command of Ground, chief value of, 149.

Commander-in-Chief, demands on the brain of, 80; functions of, as exercised by Kitchener in South Africa, 333; responsibility of, for all blame always maintained by French, 329-30.

Commanders of Armies in the Field, and Interference by Home Government, see Divided Command.

Committee of Imperial Defence, 1, 8; warning to, by French, on the command of the Channel ports, 155-6, 214; suggestion to, on sectional construction of submarines made by French, 216; French a member of, 8.

Compiegne, French's G.H.Q. at, 86, 89, 90, 93; conference at, with Joffre, 92; pivot of French cavalry operations, 146.

Compiegne-Clermont line, French forces falling back to, 93.

Compiegne-La Fere line, gap in, Joffre's desire for the British to fill, and French's replies, 92, 94, 95.

Compiegne-Longueil-Pont Ste. Maxence area, 3rd Corps directed on, 187.

Conde, the Scheldt at, 48, 50; military value of, 53, 54; roads from, route of, 54; 2nd Corps' difficulties S.E. of, 65; Aisne crossing at, 150.

Conde Bridge, British cavalry (entrenched) covering, 195.

Conde-Cambrai-Le Nouvion-Binche area, Features of, Strategical, 52 sqq.; Topographical, 48 sqq.

Conde Canal line, British forces on, 47, 50; junction of, with Canal Du Centre, 53; bridges gained by German cavalry, 62.

Conde Fort, Missy, cleared of enemy, 149.

Conde-Manette line, British forces on, 60.

Conde-Mons-Erquelinnes line, British on, 59; heavy pressure on, 61.

Conde-Valenciennes-Cambrai-Le Cateau-Landrecies road, 54.

Congreve, Brigadier-General W. N., V.C., G.O.C. 18th Infantry Brigade, 28.

Connaught Rangers, 1st Batt., 19, 128, 238; 2nd Batt., 19, 160.

Conneau, General, French cavalry under, operations of, 204, 227, 235; at Messines, 264, 278; relieved, 280.

Cormicy-Rheims-Verzy line, held by 5th French Army, 146.

Corps Commander, discussions with before Mons, 43.

Coulommiers, French at, with Haig, 106; French's G.H.Q. at, 131.

Council of War of Aug. 5, 1914, Members and Military Officers present at, 3-4; topics discussed and conclusions arrived at, 4-5.

County of London (London Regiment): 9th Batt. (Queen Victoria's Rifles), 295; 12th Batt. (The Rangers), 296; 13th Batt. (Princess Louise's Kensington Batt.), 295.

Courcelles, 1st Corps H.Q., 152.

Courtacon-Esternay-La Villeneuve-les-Charleville line reached by 5th French Army, 121.

Courtacon-Esternay-Sezanne line, 5th French Army directed on, before the Marne battle, 115.

Courtrai, Rawlinson's operations towards, 201, 219; German advance to, 208; and reinforcements at, 240.

Couvrelles-Ciry-Nampteuil-sous-Muret area, British troops in, 196.

Cracow, anticipated fall of, 194; Russian tactics concerning, 230.

Craonne, French forces near, 152; loss of, 157.

Crawford, and the Light Division, 215.

Cressy, Allenby's H.Q. at, 87.

Crouy and Crouy Ridge, Allied forces at, 152.

Cuiry-Housse-Oulchy-le-Chateau area, 2nd Corps directed to assemble in, 193.

Cuisy-Iverny-Neufmontiers-Meaux, French advance by, across the Marne, 115.

Cunard, Lady, 2.

Cunliffe-Owen, Colonel, G.O.C. 2nd Infantry Brigade (temp.), 18.

Cuthbert, Brigadier-General G. J., G.O.C. 13th Infantry Brigade, 22.

Cyclist Companies attached to Divisional Cavalry and R.E., 1st, 18; 2nd, 20; 3rd, 21; 4th, 26; 5th, 23; 6th, 28; 7th, 29.

Dagny, Cavalry action near, 119.

D'Amade, General, troops under, 61; help given by, to 2nd Brigade at Le Cateau, 78, 80; attack by, on the Germans about Peronne, 87.

Dammartin, G.H.Q. moved to, 95, 100, 101, 104.

Dardanelles Expedition, repercussion of, on the W. front, 316, 318, 343, 356; the climax and its results, 357 sqq.

Davies, Brigadier-General R. H., G.O.C. 6th Infantry Brigade, 19.

Davies, Brigadier-General, G.O.C. 8th Infantry Brigade, 66.

Dawnay, Major Hugh, 2nd Life Guards, services and death in action, 84, 273-4; on the 1st Corps' doings (Oct. 24), 235.

Defence, strengthened by Modern Weapons, 12, 144.

Delays, danger of, 7.

de la Panouse, Vicomte, and British support of France, 3.

de Lisle, Brigadier-General (later, Major-General) H. de B., G.O.C. 2nd Cavalry Brigade, 24; later G.O.C. 1st Cavalry Division, 24, 65; role assigned to, 200, 202-3; and finely executed by, 204-5; at Messines, 247; high praise due to, 261; in the Battle of Ypres, 280.

Denain, Scheldt crossing at, 50.

Denmark, Neutrality of, and Vulnerability of Sea-communications, 315.

Derby, Earl of, on Kitchener's love for Broome, 333.

Devonshire Regiment, 1st Batt., 21, 22, 27, 327.

Dhuisy, British troops directed to, to ease pressure on 8th French Division, 134.

Dhuizel, 146; 1st Corps H.Q. at, 152.

Dieppe, German opportunity at, lost, 214, 215-16.

Dinant, French forces at (Aug. 18), 41.

Dinant-Trelon line, 5th French Army on, 58, 59.

Dispatches, difficulty of writing, 80.

Divided Command and Divided Counsels, evils of, 99 sqq.; 177 sqq., 222, 319; Poincare's views on, 198-9; French's efforts to minimise, 232-3; a concrete instance (Dec. 18), 325.

Divisional Cavalry: 1st Division, 18; 2nd, 20; 3rd, 21; 4th, 26; 5th, 23; 6th, 28, 203; 7th, 29.

Divisions, British (see also Cavalry Division), Commanders and Composition of, 16, 17, 19, 20, 22, 25, 27, 28; Regular Forces, 1st, 16, 17, 252; in the Retreat from Mons, 66, 106; in the Battles of the Marne, 125, 126, 129; and of the Aisne (at Vendresse), 151; in the Battle of Ypres, 223, 232; at Gheluvelt, 241-2, 250, 253-4, 265; at Messines, 260, 265; moved into reserve, 284; 2nd, 16, 19; in the Retreat from Mons, 66, 81, 106; in the Battle of the Marne, 119, 127; at the Petit Morin, 128; in the Battle of the Aisne, 151; in the Battle of Ypres, 223, 235, 251, 253-4, 265; Territorials incorporated with, 297; 3rd, 16, 20; in the Retreat from Mons, 60, 62, 71; at Solesmes, 73, 75; in the Battle of the Marne, at Nanteuil, 133, 160, 193; in the Battle of the Aisne, at Aizy, 151; and Vuilly, 152; position on Oct. 2, 195; Commander killed, 211; in the Battle of Ypres, at Messines, 247; and after, 323; 4th, 16, 25, 68, 72, 105; at Le Cateau, 77, 210; and after, 85; bridging feat, of, in the Marne Battle, 134; in the Battle of the Aisne, 145, 152, 161; moving North, 205; at Bailleul, 207; in the Battle of Ypres, Le Gheer retaken by, 233; at Messines, fine work of, 245; 5th, 16, 22; in the Retreat from Mons, 62, 71, 76; heavy pressure on, 66, 70; in the Battle of the Marne, 133, 134; in the Battle of the Aisne and after, 150-2, 195, 196; heavy fighting by, 210; in the Battle of Ypres, at La Bassee, 221; in the December operations, 323; 6th, 16, 27, 94, 150, 203; in the Marne Battle, 153, 160; in the Battle of Ypres, 205; Bailleul and Meteren taken by, 207; success of, at Armentieres, 241; constant fighting of, 275; 7th, 16, 28, 165, 167, 169, 173; not under French, 177, 178, 179; detailed for relief of Antwerp, 180-1; French's reiteration of request for, 188; placed under French's orders, 192, 208; orders to, 208; in the Battle of Ypres, 224, 239, 251, 253-4, 256, 327; defence by, of the Ypres salient, 239; at Gheluvelt, 241-2; heavily shelled, 251; heavy losses, 260, 265; 8th, 165, 167, 169, 171, 173, 201, 239; in the Battle of Ypres, 327; 12th, at the Battle of Loos, O.C. killed, 150; 27th, 239, 305; 28th, 310; Territorial: 46th (North Midland), 300; 47th (London), 300; 48th (South Midland), 300; 49th (West Riding), 300; 50th (Northumbrian), 300; 51st (Highland), 300.

Dixmude, French Naval Division at, 208; German forces between it and Nieuport, 240; taken by them, 278; and held, 283; possibility of clearing line to, 304; Belgian forces active near, 337.

Domptin, reached by 1st Army Corps, 133.

Doran, Brigadier-General B. J. C., G.O.C. 8th Infantry Brigade, 21.

Doran, Brigadier-General W. R. B., G.O.C. 17th Infantry Brigade, 28.

Dorset Regiment, 1st Batt., 23.

Douai-St. Quentin Railway, junction of, at Cambrai, 54.

Doue, H.Q. of Smith-Dorrien, 128; German evacuation of, 131.

Douglas, General Sir Charles, G.C.B., at the Council of War of Aug. 5, 1914, 3.

Doullens, H.Q. of Foch at, French's visit to and conference at, 199-200.

Douve River, 324; Valley of, German attack in, 245; and continuous activity in, later, 275.

Dover, War time aspect of, 31, 34; Straits of, and the Command of the Channel Ports, 155-7.

Dragoon Guards: 1st (King's), 29, 250; 2nd (Queen's Bays), 24, 146; 3rd, 29, 250; 4th (Royal Irish), 24, 65, 73, 184; at Messines, 245; 5th (Pss. Charlotte of Wales), 24, 76; at Messines, 245; 6th (Carabiniers), 24; at Messines, 247.

Dragoons: 1st (Royals), 29, 250; at Hollebeke, 243; 2nd (Scots Greys), 25, 47; after the crossing of the Marne, 130.

Dranoutre-Messines area, reached by 1st Cavalry Division, 205.

Drummond, Brigadier-General L. G., G.O.C. 19th Infantry Brigade, 23; at Valenciennes, placed under orders of Allenby, 61, 65.

Du Cane, Colonel (temp. Brigadier-General) J. P., C.B., Chief of Staff, 3rd Corps, 323.

Duff, Lieut.-Colonel Grant, C.B., and his men, in the Battle of the Marne, 126.

Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry, 1st Batt., 22.

Dunkirk, 169, 179, 183, 188, 228, 243; importance of and risks to, 155, 176, 214, 304.

Dunkirk-Cambrai-La Capelle-Hirson line, French Reserves on, 21, 41, 47-8, 73.

Durham, Earl of, demand by, at French's request, for more Munitions, 355.

Durham Light Infantry, 2nd Batt., 28.

Dyle, the Belgian retreat on (Aug. 18), 46.

Eastern War Front, British official fears concerning (Dec. 27), laid before Joffre, and his views on the matter, 340-1.

East Prussia, Russian operations in, 194, 229, 268.

Ecaillon stream, affluent of the Scheldt, 50.

Edward, Prince of Wales, arrival of, in France, 287.

Egerton, ——, of Egerton's Brigade, 261.

Egyptian Campaign of 1882, volunteers in, 292.

Eighteenth (British) Corps, 186.

Eleventh (British) Corps, 169.

England, Immunity of, during the War, 330-1; Invasion of, possibilities of, 155-6.

Entente Powers, British Cabinet's loyalty to, 3.

Epernay, Forest near, French attempt to turn, 143.

Epernay-Rheims, French movement towards, 143.

Ereclin, the, and other affluents of the Scheldt, 50.

Esperey, General Franchet d', see Franchet d'Esperey.

Essex Regiment, 2nd Batt., 26.

Estaires, Germans driven back near, 204; Lahore Division sent to, 234.

Estaires to Menin, cavalry reconnaissance in strength along the Lys from, directed for Oct. 15, 205.

Etreux, Munster Fusiliers cut up at, 17.

European War, French's anticipations of, 1, 2.

Falloden, Viscount Grey of, see Grey, Rt. Hon. Sir Edward.

Fanshawe, Brigadier-General, G.O.C. 6th Infantry Brigade, 19.

Faujus, Cavalry action at, 120-1.

Fere-en-Tardenois, French's H.Q. moved to, 145; visit at, from President Poincare, 198-9.

Fergusson, Major-General Sir Charles, G.O.C. 5th Division, 22; hard pressed (Aug. 24), 65; and the Aisne crossing at Missy, 149, 150.

Ferozepore Brigade, see under Indian troops.

Festubert, Battle of (1915), 344; British artillery supplies for, 356; drastic measures taken by French after, on the Munition question, 357; Indian troops engaged at, 327, 328.

Field Guns (see also Guns), actually on the Offensive, number of rounds fired per gun per day, 358.

Finance Department's opposition to provision of Munitions, 348.

Fifth Corps, part of 2nd Army under Smith-Dorrien, 337.

First Army Corps (1st B.E.F.), Commander, and composition, 16, 17-20; during the Mons Battle, and the Retreat, 60, 64, 65, 66, 93, 110; the fight at Landrecies, 74-5, 77-8; gap between and the 2nd Corps (Aug. 26), 74-5, 81; French assistance to, 81-2; the retreat resumed, 82; fatigued but ready, 100; retirement of, engagements during, 110, 116; on the Marne, 122, 125, 132, 137; at Chilly and Jouy-sur-Morin (Sept. 8), 123; roads and supply railheads for (Sept. 9), 132; crossing the Marne, 133; appearance and attitude of, 135-6; fatigue of; French's talk to, 136; positions of, before and during the Battle of the Aisne, 146; in the Battle of the Aisne, 150-1; points at which Aisne crossing was effected by (Sept. 14), 151; successful operation of, 151; positions of (Sept. 14), 152; reinforcement sent to, and plan for, 153; counter-attack repulsed with heavy losses, 153; heavy attack on, repulsed (Sept. 17), 157; reinforcements sent to (Sept. 18), 158; losses, 159; heavy fighting, 159-61; disposition of, in the move N., 171; relief of, French's efforts to effect, 185-6; relief of, Notes on, of the Allied Chiefs, 185 sqq., 191; movements ordered (Oct. 1), 193; position of (Oct. 2), 195; relief of, delay in, Joffre's assurance as to (Oct. 10), 201-2; final repulse by, of the Germans on the Aisne (Oct. 11), 211; arrival of last detachment of, at St. Omer, 211; French's intended use of, against Bruges and Roulers, 219, 226; sent N., 228; actions by and positions of, in the 1st Battle of Ypres, 232, 235, 242; defence of the Ypres salient, 239; sqq. passim; actions by, sqq.; action, 1st Defence of Ypres salient, 239; report from (Oct. 30), 243; French effective support for, promised by Foch (Oct. 31), 243; Orders to (Oct. 30), 244-5; position serious (Oct. 31), 249; the retirement, 252; the rally, 253; H.Q. guard, 248; line broken, 251; line re-established (Oct. 31), 255-6; heavily attacked (Nov. 1), 259, 260; rest essential for, 264, 265; heavily engaged (Nov. 11), the line pierced, with heavy losses and re-established, 278-9; help given by, to Vidal, 279; part played by, in the 1st Battle of Ypres, 283; parallels to, 285; losses sustained, 285-6; Reserve, Territorials in, 297; relief sent by, to the Indian Corps (Dec. 20), 328; as part of the 1st Army under Haig (Dec. 25), 337.

"First Seven Divisions, The," at the Battle of Ypres, 237-8.

FitzClarence, Brigadier-General, V.C., G.O.C. 1st Infantry Brigade, 17; the situation at Gheluvelt saved by, 254-5; killed in action, 17, 255, 280.

FitzGerald, Lieut.-Colonel Brinsley, French's Secretary, 34, 255, 357, 360.

Fitzgerald, Sir Maurice, 31.

Flag of Truce, practically unknown in the Great War, 339.

Flanking Movement, de Castelnau's efforts to effect, see Castelnau; planned by French, 13, 157 sqq. passim, 197, 235-6, 301; Foch's view on, 199; see also Aisne Front, withdrawal from.

Foch, General (now Marshal), 13, 321; Appearance, 197-8; Characteristics: Military genius, 197-8; optimism, 199, 223, 242-3, 274; spirit of, and audacious strategy of, 198, 274; Effort of, to turn the German flank, 13, 145, 199; French's friendship with, and tribute to, 197-8; relations with French, conferences, plans, &c. concerted together (in order of date), 199-200, 203, 216, 218, 220, 224, 235, 255, 260, 274; on inundation (Oct. 29), 242-3; promise of support by, 221, 226, 245, 260, 281; no reserves to spare, 265; but help given to 1st Corps, 283-4; Representing the French Army at Lord Roberts's funeral service in France, 282; On the enemy attack on his line between Ypres and the sea, support asked and given, 278; On the Operations of Dec. 16-17, 324-5; On the "Russian bluff," 337.

Fontaine Fauvel, high ground about, reached by Allenby, 133.

Fontaine-Ors road, 52.

Fontenelle, Sambre source near, 50.

Foret de Crecy, 117.

Foret de Mormal, roads and railways traversing, 52; enemy advance through, 75, 81.

Foret de Nieppe, cleared by British cavalry, 203.

Foret de St. Gobain, 143.

"Formidable," H.M.S., sunk by submarine in Channel, 311.

"Fosse Position," 10th French Corps at, 57.

Fosse-Charleroi-Thuin line, French forces on, 58.

Fourth Corps, British Army, Commander and composition of, 201; in the march north, 203; covering Belgian retreat, 208; directed eastward, danger to left of, 219, 221, 224; 220, 223, 226, 227; in the Battle of Ypres, 232, 327; temporarily broken up, 239; part of 1st Army under Haig, 337.

Fowke, Brigadier-General, O.C. Royal Engineers, 6.

France and Belgium, the line in (Oct. 14-June 15), held, thanks to the Territorials, 294; British Expeditionary Force for (q.v.), Command of, 2, 8; Victory of, share in, of the Women and Children, 36.

Franchet d'Esperey, General, G.O.C. 5th Army, vice Lanrezac superseded (Sept. 4), 107; at the Marne, 115, 123, 125.

Francis Ferdinand, Archduke, murder of, 1.

Franco-Belgian frontier, terrain near, 49.

Franco-British consultations in Aug. 1914, 6, 9; Military relations during 1914, 108, 112 passim; Understanding as to Co-operation in event of German attack on France, 5, 6, 9.

Franco-German war of 1870, fame in, of the Brandenburg Corps, 285.

Franiere, German advance near, 57.

Frederick Charles of Prussia, Prince, and the Brandenburg Corps, 285.

Frederick the Great, German military following of, 346.

French, Field Marshal Sir J. P., G.C.B., &c. (now Viscount French of Ypres), and the Great War; Commander-in-Chief of the British Expeditionary Force, Aug. 1914, 2, 3, 8, 17; the command "entirely independent," 15 (cf. 94 sqq., 177, and 329-30, see also Ammunition, Channel Ports, Move Northward, Offensive); anticipation by, of European War, 1, 8; the first idea received of the coming in 1914, 2; the violation of Belgian neutrality expected, 10-11; at the Council of War of Aug. 5, 1914, 3; views of, on landing of B.E.F., 6-7; advance studies of, on problems of a B.E.F., 8-9; all plans concentrated on a war of movement and manoeuvre, 11; at German manoeuvres of 1911, and the Kaiser's remarks on his forces, 9-10; instructions to, before leaving for France, 13-5, 94; arrival in France, official visits, 33; first meeting with Joffre and his staff, 34 sqq.; visits of, to Corps Commanders, &c., and conferences with them, 40, 43, 47, 60, 62, 130, 154, 159, 202, 209, 210, 219, 243-4, 246, 249, 255, 337 et alibi; visit of, to Lanrezac, 56; and message sent to, later, 57; interviews with Commander of French Reserve Divisions, 37; letter to Kitchener on French dispositions W. of the Meuse, request in, for Plumer to succeed Grierson, 38-40; appreciation of the situation on Aug. 18, 40-2; observations on the physique of the British troops, 42; invitation to Louvain from the King of the Belgians, 42-3; message from Belgian Government on evacuating Brussels, 45-6; no idea of retreat then entertained by, 47; visit to Lanrezac's G.H.Q., and the beginning of his retreat, 56-7; Lanrezac's request to, 58; and the reply, 59; anxiety for the Mons salient, 61; meeting with Sordet, 67-8; the temptation of Maubeuge, 70; orders issued for the retreat to continue, 71; the vital problem before, as to a stand on Aug. 25, 73; retreat decided on, 74; account of the fighting at Landrecies sent by, to Kitchener, 75; Dispatch by, on the Battle of Le Cateau, 79-80; interviews with Joffre and with Lanrezac, 81, 82-3, 85-6; Joffre's, telegram to, of appreciation of the services of the British Army, 85; possible stand on the Oise considered by, and personal reconnaissance by, of the terrain, 85; roadside talks with the British troops, 88-9; idea of, for a stand between the Marne and the Seine, 92; conference of, with Joffre, inability to make a stand insisted on, 92; and reiterated, 93; opinion of, on von Kluck's movement, 106; pressure put upon to change his plans successfully resisted, 92, 93 sqq., 111-12; independence of action, necessity for, felt and urged by, in letter to Lord Kitchener, 94; interview in Paris with Kitchener, 95 sqq.; results, 95-8; letters to, from Joffre on French's proposed disposition of forces, 96-7, 97-8; and the reply, 98; letter to, from Gallieni (Sept. 2), on co-operation of the British, in the defence of Paris, and the reply (Sept. 3), 102-4; Joffre's plans communicated to, 107; and conference with him at Melun, 110, 114 sqq.; object of, in writing this record, 111, 114 sqq.; basis of orders issued by, on the Battle of the Marne, 114, 116-17, 122-3; view of, on the enemy situation and intentions before the Battle of the Marne, 116-17; visits by, to the British Corps, 118-19, 122; problem before, on Sept. 7-8, 123-5; memorandum issued by, on lessons of the Marne Battle, 129 sqq.; the Marne crossed by, and a talk with the 5th Cavalry Brigade, 135-6; despatch of, on the Battle of the Marne, 137; estimate by, of the British contribution to the success of the Battle of the Marne, 140-1; optimism of, after the Battle of the Marne, 142 sqq.; further conferences with Joffre, 143; principle of modern warfare brought home to, 145; observations by, 145, 148, 149, 159-60, 161, 206-7, 222, 237, 243, 323 et alibi; appreciation by, of the situation on Sept. 14-15, 153; reviving hopes of enemy retreat, 153; modified on Sept. 16, 154, 155; grave anxiety beginning to possess, as to the safety of the Channel ports (q.v.), 155-7, 176; the move N. from the Aisne for their defence with naval co-operation first conceived, 157, 162, 164; letter to, from Maunoury, on his intended advance, and asking for British support, 161-2; official correspondence of, on heavy artillery (q.v.), and Munitions (q.v.) begun, 163; visit to, of Winston Churchill (Sept.), 163-4; plans for co-operation with the Navy discussed, 164; letters exchanged by, with Joffre, on the move N. of the British forces, 164 sqq.; hampered by the smallness of his army, 165; difficulties of, due to the siege and fall of Antwerp, 175 sqq.; exchange of messages on, between French and Kitchener, 179 sqq.; strongly averse to sending troops inside Antwerp, 180; steps taken by, to keep in touch with events at Antwerp, 184-5; efforts of, to expedite the British move N., urgent note from, to Joffre, and the reply, 185 sqq.; conclusions of, on the German situation on Oct. 1, hopes of, and orders issued by, 193-4; basis of, 194; visit to, from President Poincare, 198; visits by, to de Castelnau, and to Foch, plans detailed to, and concerted with the latter, 199-200; instructions given by, to Allenby, 200-1, 202, 205; and to Rawlinson, 201; plans arranged by, with Foch, 203, 216, 218, 220; and direction based thereon given to Corps Commanders, 219; these plans modified by reports and observations, 218, 220, 222, 223 sqq.; apprehension of, as to offensive advance conveyed to Foch, and his reply, 220-1; all hope of an offensive abandoned (Oct. 21), 228; reinforcements obtainable, 228; visit of, to Pulteney at Hazebrouck, the fighting witnessed there, 205-7; mistaken anticipations before the 1st Battle of Ypres, basis of, 216, 223, the one reservation, 216-17; grave decision taken by, on Oct. 19, workings of his mind, and manner in which the problem presented itself, 223 sqq.; conclusions arrived at, a balance of certain against uncertain disaster, 225; action taken on decision, 225 sqq.; instructions given by, to Haig on Oct. 19, 225-6; reserves lacking to, 225; hopes of, in Oct., 1914, 231; basis of, 229, 231 sqq.; efforts of, to minimise the evils of divided command, 232-3; estimate held by, of British operations during the second phase of the 1st Battle of Ypres, 237; anxiety of, concerning the 2nd Corps, 240, 241; apprehension of, on supply of Ammunition, 241; visit to, of Foch, promising effective support to 1st Corps, 245; blow to, of the falling back of the 1st Corps, 252-3; the dramatic climax, 253 sqq.; message sent by, to the O.C. London Scottish on their work of Oct. 31-Nov. 1, 263; their aspect on parade noted by, 264; hopes of, still constantly disappointed, 270-1; consultations of, with Foch on the need of relieving the 1st Corps, 283-4; the infection of his hopefulness, 274; news of the great enemy attack received during, 277-8; view of, on the true position for the British Army, 302, (see also 154 sqq. and Channel Ports); visit to, while on the Aisne, from Winston Churchill (then at the Admiralty), agreement with on Naval co-operation, 302-3 sqq.; letters to, from Churchill on the same subject, 303-5; replies by, to memoranda from Kitchener on the Zeebrugge scheme, 311-13; and to that of the War Council on possible different theatres of war, 315-17; visit to, from Admiral Hood (Dec. 13), on Naval co-operation in the advance from Nieuport, 321; ordered home for consultation with the Cabinet, 329; the meeting at Walmer Castle, 329; discussions with Kitchener on the situation; insistence by French on his personal responsibility for all blame, 329-30; sympathy shown to, by Asquith, 332; feelings of, for Kitchener as soldier and as politician, their differences, a last and happy memory of a former chief, 333; continued discussion with the War Cabinet, 334; its alarmist views not shared by, 336; nor by Foch, 337; decision of, to form Armies, communicated to designated Commanders, 337; the Christmas fraternisation stopped by, 338; interview of, with Joffre by desire of the War Cabinet, 335, 336, 340; on future plans, as to coastal advance, with Naval co-operation, 342; plan of, to work the N. section with the Belgian and British Armies, 343; why it failed, 343, 345; state of mind of, at close of 1914; the results of the year justifying, 345; experiments conducted by, in the field, on new weapons for trench warfare, 354-5; constant efforts of, to secure adequate supplies of Munitions of War and considered action by, of May 1915, with full knowledge of all entailed thereby, 347 sqq.; earlier urgency, when chief of I.G.S., on the Munitions question; financial opposition met by, 348; visits to, of Members of both Houses of Parliament on whom the need of Guns and Munitions was urged, 355; interviews given by, to the Press, on the question of Munitions, 355; ordered to surrender part of his Munition reserves for the Dardanelles, 357; Secretary and A.D.C. sent by, to lay proofs of the urgent need of Munitions before Lloyd George, as well as before Balfour and Bonar Law, 357; text of the Memorandum sent at the same time, 357 sqq.; the results, 360-1; unprecedented action taken by, on the Munition question (May 9, 1915), and the results, 357 sqq.; Offices held by, at various times, Chief of Imperial General Staff, 1, 2; I.G. of Forces, 8, 296; I.Y., experiences as, fully borne out in the War, 295; On his alleged call on Maunoury for assistance on Sept. 8, 135; On the effect on the campaign of the shortage of Ammunition (q.v.), 350-1; on his lack of reserves, 265; on the lesson learnt from the failure at the Lys River, 145; On his position as C.-in-C. in France, 94, 99-100, 329-30; On the possibility of "bending" but not of "breaking" the enemy's trench line, 145; Orders of the Day, issued by, see under British Expeditionary Force; Submarine construction in sections suggested by (May 1914), 214.

French, Armies or Corps, see also Allied Forces, Names of Commanders, and French Forces infra, Artillery, prevision and provision, 352-3; the 75's, 341; activity along the Ourcq (Sept.), 106; Cavalry Divisions, 182; French's request concerning, on Aug. 16, 35; dispositions of, 38 sqq.; operations of, in Belgium, 44; Staff of, characteristics of, 67; in the Marne Battle, 113 sqq., 126 sqq., 131 sqq.; Bridoux's, operations assigned to, on Sept. 10, 143; raid by, and death of commander, 157-8; Conneau's, in the Battle of Ypres, 204, 227, 231, 278; Maunoury's (1st Corps), dispositions for and during the Marne Battle, 115, 125, 146; de Mitry's, success of, on Oct. 11, 204; pushed back (Oct. 19), 227; positions and movements in the 1st Battle of Ypres, 232 sqq.; Sordet's, co-operation of (Aug. 26-7), 84; Chasseurs, 281; Infantry, 1st, at Dinant, 41; 2nd, Progress of, up to end of September, 162; and in Dec., 325; 3rd, Line of (Aug. 18-21), 41, 47; defeat and retreat of, 70; German artillery captured by, 145; 4th, Line of, on Aug. 21, 47; disposition of, on and after Aug. 30, 93, 116, 133-4; progress of, 146; 5th, Dispositions of, Aug. 16, and after, 35-7, 39; advance by, intended, 47; fighting by, 57 sqq., 60; retirement begun, 64; and continued, 68, 70, 72, 81; effect on 1st Division, 81-2; Joffre's promise as to, 86; the retreat still continued, 88; brilliant success of, at Guise, 91; gap between and the 6th Army, filled by French at Joffre's request, 92-3; but widened by the further retreat, 95; situation saved by British cavalry, 94; position of, on Sept. 2, Joffre on, 96-7; retreat continued, 104-5; fighting on the Marne, 106; dispositions of, on Sept. 4-5, 107, 109-10; its new commander, 107; Joffre's intention for it to advance, 115; fighting on the Marne, 121-3; British connection to be maintained with, 124-5; position of, Sept. 9, 131; across the Marne, 137-8; value to, of British co-operation, 141; in the Aisne Battle, 143, 146; 6th, Formation of, 86; and Commander, 89; quality of, and glory won by, in the Marne Battle, 88; enemy unaware of, 90; and consequent miscalculations, 105; objective of, on Aug. 30, 93; dispositions of, and support of, to British forces, Joffre on, 96; retreat of, on Paris, 104; Joffre's plans for, for Sept. 6, 107, 109, 114-15; in the Battle of the Marne, German forces opposing, 121, 123; French's efforts to help, 124; success of, 129, 135, 141; position assigned to (Sept. 10), 143; heavily engaged (Sept. 12) on the Aisne, 145-6, 152; attack by, on Nouvron, 154; efforts by, to turn German flank, 154, 158-9, 162; defensive line assigned to, on Sept. 18, and Army placed under de Castelnau, 158; blow struck by changing line of battle, 159; Northward operation of, 160, 162; with other forces placed under Foch, 197; 7th, 89; 8th, 116; British aid given to, 133-4; 9th, Position assigned to, before the Marne Battle, 116; 10th Corps to secure connection between, and the 5th, 143; entrenched at Ypres, 233; in the Battle of Ypres, 284; defenders of the salient, 239; at Zonnebeke, 242, 255, 260; Joffre's need of, 345; 10th, Action, losses and position of, in August, 41, 57, 58; position assigned to, on Sept. 10, 143; forming part of the "group" under Foch, 197; forced back, 202; positions of, in 1st Battle of Ypres, 241; 13th, checked at Noyon, 134; 16th, in the Battle of Ypres, 259; co-operation of, on Oct. 31-Nov. 1, 260, 261, 264; and later, 323, 324; an instance of divided command (Dec. 18), 325; 20th, 345; 21st, 128, 324; 32nd, attack by, and successes of, Klein Zillebeke-Zillebeke line, 322; 61st, at Nouvron, 154; 62nd, at Nouvron, 154; Naval, at Dixmude and Nieuport, 202, 208, 221, 232, 278; New, formed, objective of (Sept. 30), 162; Northern, d'Urbal in command of, 234; reinforced, 235; advance of, delayed by enemy machine guns, results as to the British forces engaged, 322 sqq.; Reserves, 35, 39, 44, 72, 81; 6th and 7th, 39, 47-8, 57, 81-2; Territorials for Dunkirk, asked for by Kitchener, 179-80; and sent by Joffre, 188; strength of, 181; moved to Ypres, 208; on the Yser, 221.

French Army: Actions of (1915), important but indecisive, 343; and British, in Aug. 1914, relative positions of, 35; Compared with German Army up to 1914, 140; Good British relations with, how established, 108; General order issued to, by de Maud'huy on the death of Lord Roberts, 282-3.

French Decorations sent to British Troops (Sept. 3), 99.

French Forces, see also French Armies or Corps, French Army, and French Divisions; disposition of, on Aug. 17 and after, 38-9, 41, 47-8; early successes, 55; losses, 58; in the retreat from Mons, 72, 73, 92, 93; Joffre's instructions to, 97, 98; of Sept. 10, 142-3; changes of Commanders in, and spirit animating, 113; positions in the Aisne Battle, 152; operating in the Northern area, under Foch's general control (Oct. 3), 197, 201; relief by, of 2nd Corps, 211; support by, in the N. sought by French, 221; and given, 245, 246, 250, 258-9; on the Yser, and elsewhere, 224; landing at Dunkirk, 243; at Arras, progress hampered by weather, 337; Moroccan troops in a crater-hole, 161; Zouaves, 260; Fortresses of the second class, object of, 52; General Staff, British consultations with before, and on outbreak of, war, 5, 6, 9; efforts of, to provide heavy artillery, 352; impressions of, 40; attitude of, to proposed British combined Coastal operations (Dec.), 305; plans of, for meeting a possible W. offensive by the enemy, 341; Military Mission on eve of war, consultation (Aug. 10), 6; Misgivings as to British military support, 3; Nation, attitude of, in August, 1914, 3, 33, 34; Railways, strain of, in relation to the move N. of the British Army, 104, 166, 167, 171, 172, 173, 187; Relations with Austria broken off, 2; "75" gun newest ammunition for, wonderful results with, Joffre on, 341; Supplies of Munitions for Russia, Joffre on, 341-2; Territory, German violation of, 2; Women, agricultural services of, 36.

Frezenberg-Westhoek-Klein-Zillebeke line, importance of, 251.

Fromelles, terrain near, 209.

Frost bite of the Feet, a misnomer, 288.

Galicia, Russian operations in, 194, 230, 337; influence of, on the Western Campaign, 301.

Gallieni, General, Military Governor of Paris, 33; letter from, to French, on co-operation of Allied Forces in defence of Paris, and the reply, 102-4; visit of, to Melun with Joffre's plans, 107.

Gallipoli Campaign, French's view on, 316.

Garatin, Allenby's cavalry at, 109.

Garde Dragoner (German) and the Moncel fight, 119.

Garhwal Brigade, see under Indian Corps.

Gastins, Allied advance to, 115, 119.

Gembloux, German cavalry repulsed from (Aug. 18), 41.

George V., Message from, to the British Expeditionary Force, and the reply (Nov. 9), 275; an audience with (Dec.), 336.

George, Rt. Hon. David Lloyd, a tribute to, 163; French's proofs of his dangerous lack of Ammunition laid before (May 9, 1915), 356; and the result, 360-1.

German advance, preliminary operations 2, 7; anticipations on, 11, 42; line of 43; and aims of, 44; continuance of, 46-7; the Meuse crossed, 72; further direction of, 77, 80-1; last days of, 109; Aerial observation apparently faulty at Abbeville, 200; Army, see also German Artillery, Cavalry, First Army Higher Command, Offensive, &c., Grierson's knowledge, of 37; Positions, operations, forces employed (in sequence), 40-1; crushing superiority of, at Mons, 43, 46, 57; turning movement, 57, 58, 65, 70, 73, 75, 78; investment of Paris aimed at by, 89, 90-1; troops sent to Eastern frontier (Aug.), 92; drawing on of, urged by French, 92; French plans for, 103; offensive abandoned by von Kluck, 114, 116, 121, 122; risky situation of, 115; 116; at the Battle of the Marne, 118 sqq., 131, 137; retreat of, from the Marne, summary on, 138-9; advantages held by, when defeated on the Marne, 139-40; effect on, of the sortie from Antwerp, 144; French efforts to turn right flank of, 145, 189; in the Aisne Battle, 145, 149 sqq.; ideas entertained as to movements of, 152-3, 161, 193; capture by, of Antwerp, possibilities opened up by, but missed, 176; line held by, and strength of, on Oct. 6, 182, 186; forces gathering near Lille, 198; surprised by British cavalry and 3rd Corps, 200; de Maud'huy forced back by, 202; divisions moving on Alost-Termonde-Lokeren, 203; forces opposing at Bailleul, 207; westward concentration of, from Antwerp, 208-9; detachments at Bruges and Roulers, 219; outposts of, 4th Division in touch with, 220; increasing strength, and its effects, 222, 224, 226, 227-8; forces engaged, and actual positions of, on night of Oct. 21, 231-2; later positions, 232 sqq. passim; attacks by, in massed formation, 235; losses during 1st Battle of Ypres, 232-3, 235, 241, 242, 279; continual reinforcements of, during the 1st Battle of Ypres, 238, 240, 243; onslaught of (Oct. 31-Nov. 1), glorious resistance of Allied forces, and points of major importance, 238-9, 260; at Gheluvelt, 250; enormous superiority of, in numbers and artillery (Oct. 31-Nov. 1), 260; and before, 267; failure to turn the situation to full account, 260-1; forces opposing Cavalry Corps at Messines (Oct. 31-Nov. 1), 262; pressure on W. Front increasing, 270; forces employed in the great attack on the Ypres salient (Nov. 11-12), 277, 278; reduced to War of Position on its whole W. Front, 345; Advance to the sea checked by the first phase of the 1st Battle of Ypres, 235-6; First use of poisoned gas by, 356; Morale of, effect on, of the W. fighting, 268; Results to, of successive phases of the 1st Battle of Ypres summarised, 277; Right flank of (see also Flanking Movement), efforts to turn first phase of the 1st Battle of Ypres, the conclusion of (Oct. 26), 235-6; Tied down on the W. to a line of trenches; French on, to his troops, 268; Artillery, 45, 66, 78, 101, 119, 123, 126-7, 131, 133, 145-6, 152-3, 240; Rheims Cathedral destroyed by, 159; 3rd French Army's capture of (Sept. 11), 145; Heavy, 144, 222, 240, 348; development of, 352; range of, 215; 8-in. howitzers 144, 198, 212, 348; Machine guns of, 124, 321-2, 324 passim, et alibi; Preparation of, before the war, scale of, 351, 352; Tactics, 129; Cavalry, passim, tactics of, in Belgium, 44-5; artillery and jaeger battalions with, 42, 124, 126, 207; operations of, and repulses, &c., 83-4, 198, 204, 230; French's knowledge of, utilised on the Marne, 9, 10, 123-4; Defiance of chivalry in war, 338; Designs at Landrecies and at Le Cateau, 76, 78; Difficulties in September, 105-6; Emperor, see William II; First Army of the Meuse, operations of, 46 sqq.; offensive abandoned by, 114, 115, 116, 121, 122; Troops composing, at the Battle of the Marne, 118 sqq.; Higher Command (Great General Staff), plans of, changes in, errors made by, 91, 104-6, 107, 176, 345-6; Instructions on treatment of Indian prisoners, 196; Invasion, possibilities of, 215; rumour on, 329; Line in Flanders, possibility of breaking through, French on (Jan. 1917) essentials to, 316; Points at which a break-through was planned by Joffre (Dec. 27), this idea the basis of the general strategic idea for 1915, 342; its results, 342-3; Mobilisation proceedings, 2, 7; Naval flag driven from the sea (Dec. 1914), 345; Northern flanks, efforts to turn, 145, 155, 158-9, 182, 198, 198, 214 sqq.; Offensive on W. Front, French anticipations of (Jan. 19, 1915), as affecting the Zeebrugge scheme, 317-18; Home anxieties over (Dec. 17), 329 sqq.; French's view on, 336; Proclamation of "Kriegsgefahrszustand," 2; Strategic scheme for invasion of France crushed at the Battle of the Marne, 138-9; Submarine Base, developing at Zeebrugge, 308, 311; Campaign, how it might have been frustrated, 304, 308, 311, 312; Tactics, flanking and outflanking manoeuvres, 154; Violation of, Belgian neutrality, 45, 46, 47; Franco-British prevision on, 9, 10-11; French territory, 2; War menace, 1, 2, 5, 9, 10-11.

Germany, Declarations of War by, 2, 3; and previous preparations, 2, 140; Paris railways to, route of, 53; The decisive spot in the war in French's view (Jan. 1915), 316.

Gheluvelt, fighting at, for Ypres salient, 241-2, 245, 258; the 1st Division broken at, 251, 252; position retrieved by counterattack, 253; fresh German menace to, 260.

Ghent, Belgian Army to withdraw to (Oct. 3), 175; French troops holding, and British sent to, 201, 203; retirement from, 208; operations designed in regard to, 220-1, 226; failure of, 233.

Ghistelle-Roulers line, German advance to, 209.

Gibbon, Co.-Sergt.-Major, 5th (Northumberland) Fusiliers, gallant piece of work by (Nov. 15), 284.

Givenchy, lost and retaken, 327.

Givenchy-Festubert front restored, 328.

Givenchy-les-La Bassee line, French attack on, 325.

Givenchy-les-La Bassee-Quinque Rue line, German attack on, 327.

Givenchy-N.W. of Aubers line advance to, of 2nd Corps, 220.

Givenchy-Pont du Hem line, reached by 2nd Corps, 219.

Givenchy-Richebourg line, German occupation of, 328.

Givet-Dinant-Namur-Brussels line, French troops west of, details of, 38-9.

Givet-Mezieres, French reserves between, 39.

Givet-Philippeville-Maubeuge line, 5th French Army falling back on, 64-5, 72.

Givry, 1st Army Corps' move up towards, 64.

Gleichen, Brigadier-General Count (now Lord) A. E. W., K.C.V.O., G.O.C. 15th Infantry Brigade, 28.

Gloucestershire Regiment, 1st Batt., 18, 328.

Gordon, Brigadier-General F., G.O.C. 19th Infantry Brigade, 23.

Gordon Highlanders, The, 1st Batt., 21, 66; in action, 322; 2nd Batt., 28; 6th Batt. (Banff and Donside, T.), 296.

Gough, Brigadier-General Hubert de la Poer, G.O.C. 3rd Cavalry Brigade, 24; later Major-General, G.O.C. 2nd Cavalry Division, 25, 251; operations of, in the retreat from Mons, 65, 87; in the Marne fighting, 129, 132, 137; in the Aisne fighting, 152, 158; and the 2nd Cavalry Division, route for, on move N. 172, 188; the situation explained to, 195; role assigned to, 200; Mont des Cats taken by, 204; skilful leadership of, at Mont Noir, 205; at Hollebeke, 244; on his position at Wytschaete, 246; disposition made by, 247; high praise due to, 261.

Gough, John, Chief of Staff to Haig, 249, 265.

Grand Morin River, German forces near, 116, 118; the fight to force, 119, 122; successful, 123, 124.

Grant, Captain Colquhoun, a modern parallel to, 326.

Great Britain (see also England), War declared by, 2, 3; mobilisation of forces, 3; support by, of France, doubts felt on, 3.

Grenadier Guards, The, 1st Batt., 28; 2nd Batt., 19, 244; in the forcing of the Petit Morin, 125, 127.

Grenfell, Capt. Francis, and the 9th Lancers, guns saved by, 77.

Grey, Rt. Hon. Sir Edward (Viscount Grey of Falloden), 99; and the Entente, 3; telegram from, to Sir Francis Bertie, on the Coastal advance scheme, 305 sqq.

Grierson, Lieut.-General Sir James M., K.C.B., at the Council of War, Aug. 5, 1914, 3, 7; appointed G.O.C. 2nd Army Corps, B.E.F., and sudden death of, 16, 20, 37, 39, 62; character sketch of, 37; successor appointed, 38, 61-2.

Groote Vierstraat, H.Q. 1st Cavalry Division, 246.

Grosetti, General, G.O.C. French 16th Corps, 324.

Guest, Captain the Hon. Frederick, D.S.O., A.D.C. to French, 357, 360.

Guise, German defeat at, 91.

Guise-La Fere line held by 5th French army after Aug. 29, 91.

Guns, and Machine Guns, see also Heavy Artillery, Losses of, at Le Cateau, 78-9, 87, 153; Shortage of, 321; one cause of, 101; the view of the War Council on, 309-10; controverted by French, 316; results, 322, 332-3.

Haddon, Sir Charles, Master-General of Ordnance, visit from; need for Heavy Artillery urged on by French, 62-3.

Haig, Lieut.-General (now Field-Marshal) Sir Douglas, K.C.B., G.O.C. First Army Corps, B.E.F., 16, 17, 248, 260; at the Council of War of Aug. 5, 1914, 3; views of, on landing of B.E.F., 6; positions occupied by, on and after Aug. 21, 47; in the Retreat from Mons, 75, 82, 85; German pressure on, 104, 109; operations of, at the Battle of the Marne, 118, 119, 122; the forcing of the passage of the Petit Morin, 125-6; military qualities of, 159, 279, 280; instructions to, on Oct. 19, 225-6; conferences with, at Ypres, 233; at Hooge, 239, 247, 249; share of in the 1st Battle of Ypres, 242, 243, 244, 260 sqq.; the driving back of his 1st Division, 251, 252; the line re-established, 255-6; messages from (Nov. 2), on rest for the tired troops, 265; the situation on Nov. 11-12, saved by, in the first place, 280; in reserve, 283, 284; Commanding in the Festubert area, 328; First Army formed and placed under, 337.

Hainault, Province of, 48; Mons, the capital of, 53.

Haine River, course, valley, affluents, and passage across, 48-9, 50.

Haking, Brigadier-General R., C.B., G.O.C. 5th Infantry Brigade, 19.

Haldane, Brigadier-General J. A. L., G.O.C. 10th Infantry Brigade, 26; later as Major-General, G.O.C. 3rd Division, 20, 26, 323.

Haldane, Rt. Hon. Viscount, and the Entente, 3; and War possibilities (in 1908), 8; and the O.T.C., 272; and the creation of the Territorial Forces, 291-2, 296; Divisional Organisation devised and carried through by; strong opposition; complete justification by success in active warfare, 298-300; "Reward" got by; nature of, 299.

Ham, 158.

Hamilton, Major-General Hubert I. W., C.V.O., G.O.C. 3rd Division, killed in action, 20; a tribute to, 211.

Hamilton, General Sir Ian, G.C.B., D.S.O., 39.

Hamley, Sir Edward, cited on, Bazaine's clinging to Metz, 71; Napoleon I's miscalculations in 1806, and on the importance of initial right direction given to movements, 217-18.

Hampshire Regiment, 1st Batt., 26, 134, 327.

Hand Grenades, revived use of, 144, 353, 354.

Hankey, Major, 2nd Batt. Worcester Regt., on FitzClarence and the retaking of Gheluvelt, 255.

Harmignies, R.H.A. reserves at, 47.

Hastiere, captured by the Germans, 65.

Havre, 171, 173, 188; British communications with, menaced, 74, 93.

Hazebrouck, British troops at and near, 179, 190, 203, 205, 210, 228; German cavalry reported in, 198; conference at, with Corps Commanders: directions given to them, 219.

Head-Quarters Staff, embarkation of, 7, 13.

Heavy Artillery, present mode of employing, 12; British lack of, 352-3; supply urgently pressed by French, 162-3; arrival of, 287; French prevision on, and provision of, 352-3; long ranges at which effective, 215.

Helpe, Majeure and Mineure, affluents of the Sambre, 51.

Henderson, Brigadier-General Sir David, C.B., G.O.C. 1st Division, 17; later, G.O.C. Royal Flying Corps, 25, 33, 61, 185.

Hertfordshire Regiment (T.), 1st Batt., 19, 280, 296; 2nd Batt., 271; in 1st Battle of Ypres, 280, 297.

Hesdin, H.Q. 2nd Corps, visits at, to Smith-Dorrien, 202.

Hickie, Brigadier-General, G.O.C. 13th Infantry Brigade, 22.

High Explosive Shells demanded by French, 349-50; table of required output, 349; nature not properly understood, 353; Memorandum on the necessity for, 358-60.

H.E., uses of, 358; table of percentages received, Dec. 1914-May 1915, 360.

Highland Light Infantry, 128, 252; 2nd Batt., 160; 9th (Glasgow Highlanders) Batt. (T.), 19, 295, 297.

Highlanders, 42; (The Black Watch), in the Battle of the Marne, 126.

Hill 63, Artillery position on, 245, 259.

Hindenburg, Generalfeldmarshal von, in the Eastern campaign, 230.

Hirson, French reserves near, 39.

Hirson-Mezieres, railway, 53.

Holland, neutrality of, and vulnerability of sea-communications, 315.

Hollebeke and its chateau, fighting at, 243, 244, 246, 322; William II's intention to go to (Nov. 1), 257; the dent near between the Allied Forces, anxiety caused by, 276, 280.

Hollebeke-Wytschaete ridge line, combined attack on, 322.

Home Defence, Churchill on, 4; Kitchener on, 309.

Hon, 2nd Corps H.Q. established at, 66.

Hondevilliers, advance on, 126-7.

Honourable Artillery Company (T.), 27, 271, 295; attached to the Indian Corps; splendid appearance of, and fine war record built up by, 297.